Schemes and Personnel

[Whiskeyjack]

SBNation's Ian Boyd just published a great article on the key differences between "spread" and "pro-style" offenses:

The major decision facing a modern basketball offense is whether they are going to be a traditional, double-post offense with bangers at the center and power forward positions, or whether they are going to be a four-out team with a stretch forward.

The latter style has come to be more and more common as teams have found that handling modern strong-side zone defenses in basketball is most easily done through spacing. Put multiple players on the floor who can threaten an opponent from the perimeter and you can run high screens and get athletes moving at the basket or tossing the ball out to shooters.

Some say that these teams will inevitably go down when they play a traditional two-post team. For instance, the Memphis Grizzlies will undoubtedly look to exhaust stretch forwards asked to guard either ZBo or Gasol over the course of a seven-game series by pounding the rock into the post and killing their legs. It's hard to stretch a team and shoot threes if you are bruised and exhausted.

The really fortunate teams have the players to do both, such as the OKC Thunder who can slide Kevin Durant back and forth between small forward and power forward to create match-up advantages against a given foe. This is quite rare for a team to have enough big man talent to be proficient in either style but there's no doubt it's effective. The Spurs try to do both, playing the versatile Kawhi Leonard, traditional banger Tiago Splitter, or versatile Boris Diaw at the four depending on match-up.

College offenses face similar philosophic and personnel decisions when choosing their identities.

Pro-style and spread formations in college football

In college football the debate between pro-style and spread offenses often boils down primarily to the size and skillsets of the players used in the H and Y positions on the field.

For instance, a modern formation many would regard as being pro-style:

When there is a tight end player at the Y spot who's 6'2" 240 or bigger and either another similarly sized player at the H or else a fullback (generally sub 6'2" and 220 or bigger) then you are looking at what many will call a pro-style offense.

Of course, if it looks like this:

It may very well be described as a "spread" offense even though all you've done is move the quarterback and running back a few paces while leaving everyone else in the same place. The major reason a team with bigger personnel at the H and Y positions would put a QB in the shotgun like this is to run option plays such as "zone read."

Then there's the pure spread offense, which generally replaces those bigger bodies at the H and Y positions with receivers that may range from 5'6" to 6'4" but generally weigh less than 230 pounds and specialize at either route running or catching short passes and running in open space.

Teams will use smaller players here to execute the passing game with better receivers, get small and fast players in space, and to get the "spread out" effect on the defense that creates room to run the ball.

As many teams have learned over the years, and Oregon and Ohio State have demonstrated in their hunt for the national title, it can be easier to just space out defenders rather than trying to knock them all out of the way.

Interestingly, if a team does something like this they may not necessarily be considered a spread team but can preserve their "pro-style" street cred while running spread concepts:

Florida State commonly uses formations such as this that will feature a tight end at the H spot who can both block and run routes, but then a 3rd receiver at the Y position and a QB aligned under center. They'll also run more classical pro-style formations like the first one drawn shown but they are generally keen on getting as many receivers out into passing patterns as possible for QBs like Jameis Winston.

Then there are several spread teams, like West Virginia, that make heavy use of formations such as this one:

You can call this a "Spread-I Formation" and the H position is generally occupied by a player who most closely fits the profile of a fullback, although he might be a taller player who also serves as a TE. At any rate, for this formation's best concepts to work the player needs to be a great blocker and needn't be a good receiver.

That means that the Spread-I shown above can be more of a smashmouth, run-centric approach than a "pro-style" formation like the one above that Florida State often uses. While the 'Noles are getting four good receivers out into patterns quickly (and often the RB as well), West Virginia in the Spread-I only have three receivers that can easily get out into a pattern.

Nevertheless, the Spread-I gets the "spread" moniker while the more pass-friendly eleven personnel set (three WRs, one TE) from Florida State is labeled as pro-style.

Then there's this: very few teams exclusively play just receivers or just tight ends and fullbacks at H and Y. Many teams even strive to be "multiple," meaning that they can put bigger bodies on the field and hammer you from under center or spread receivers around the field and sling it around from the shotgun.

This isn't generally that hard either, structurally, as spread teams and pro-style teams are often using the exact same passing concepts just with different players and a few different routes.

A concept like "snag" is common both from a spread team:

As well as a pro-style team:

So what's the difference?

You can boil down the reason behind why teams are labelled as spread or pro-style teams not in how they use their H and Y positions, which is arguably most important, but whether they are in the shotgun or not.

If a team is under center even a modest amount of time, someone is going to call them a "pro-style" attack, even if they are a four-receiver run and shoot team. If a team runs option-plays from the shotgun on a regular basis, even if they are frequently doing so with tight ends and fullbacks on the field, they are going to be frequently labelled as a shotgun spread.

In general, any team that uses the option is not going to be counted as a pro-style team, even those the pros have started to incorporate some modern option looks.

In reality, a better metric is how often they flex out the H and Y positions in order to "spread" out the defense by alignment and use spacing to attack opponents. Teams that play larger bodies packed in tight aren't looking to use pre-snap spacing to attack their opponents but rather brute force and leverage at the line of scrimmage in combination with post-snap vertical stress.

Of course, the spread-I does both.

Pace is also confused with "spread" as spread teams are better known for using up tempo tactics while pro-style teams are only now catching on to the advantages.

Considering that many pro teams use both or either approach, in the future it might be best to retire the phrase "pro-style" in favor of something that more accurately describes offenses that go under center with big bodies at H and Y.

What's better?

Since both have track records of success with league and national titles to their credit, this really just depends on the kinds of players a program can reasonably expect to find and develop. The reason that the spread has really taken hold at smaller schools is that it's easier to find smaller athletes who can do damage at space than bigger bodies who can physically dominate opponents in the trenches.

Similarly, much of the hesitation from bigger schools about going spread is in the fact that if you can physically dominate your opponent, why would you choose any other path? There's simply no answer for a team that can knock you down and in an inherently violent game this approach makes a great deal of sense.

If a team isn't depending on using the QB in the running game there's often enough flexibility in some systems to recruit the best players available and then either emphasize spread or packed-in formations based on which style best suits the players on campus.

In that event, a team has to be sure to have some big bodies to help the running game though or else they risk losing their balance. It's not hard to find bruisers who can serve primarily to create angles in the running game but if a team recruits only receiving talent at the H and Y positions, be they tight ends or slot receivers, they may still struggle to run the ball.

Another reason teams may choose one or the other would be whether they are playing in warm weather or cold weather environments. What's the last thing a defensive player wants to do in the heat? Chase fast people around. What's the last thing he wants to do in the cold? Endure repeated collisions with big people.

Why not both?

Lots of coaches will say "we want to be multiple" and "either spread and throw or run depending on situation" with loaded rosters of versatile talent. In reality, this is much easier said than done.

If you look at the approach of teams that use the tight end position heavily, you'll see that they recruit real numbers at that position to ensure they have the needed talent. Similarly, spread passing teams snatch up as many receivers as they can to ensure they have the difference makers they need for their system to work.

So is it possible to truly be multiple enough to switch back and forth between using two difference-making big bodies at tight end OR two electric slot receivers? Generally the answer is no, 2014 Alabama notwithstanding.

However, there are ways in which teams can be multiple and effective using lots of different formations. The first way is simply to find players that can do both. Iowa State's EJ Bibbs lined up at H-back, tight end, slot receiver, and even as an outside receiver.

It takes a smart and versatile player to do all that but if a team can find tight ends who both block and run routes well there's no reason they couldn't also move all over the field. When the New England Patriots had Aaron Hernandez and Rob Gronkowski they were able to bring a wide variety of formations and tactics, either using their size to bulldoze opposing defenses or their route running to spread them and tear them apart.

No one could match up.

Of course, in lieu of finding such tremendous talent, there are some other options.

The Spread-I excels at mixing smashmouth and spread tactics by relying on the positional types in each system that are easiest to find, namely the effective slot receiver or the quality fullback, rather than finding the rare talents like the dual-threat tight end.

Another solution would be Boise State's "total roster" approach. The Broncos will recruit bigger bodies in order to play some pro-style schemes that pay special attention to creating leverage in the running game by moving big bodies around and playing games with the defensive front.

They'll also bring aboard speedsters and anyone who could conceivably threaten a defense with the ball in their hands and mix in four-WR spread plays with quick reads and triggers from the QB or just pull track star receivers around on sweeps to attack the perimeter. They create play packages that utilize the abilities of every player on the roster, however limited that player might be.

It's essentially the opposite tactic of finding a Gronkowksi and a Hernandez, instead embracing limited players who can thrive in limited roles and then designing endless packages to allow them to shine in those roles. This is a challenging way to build a multiple offense but it seems to at least work in Idaho.

No doubt pro-style vs spread arguments will continue in the future, especially with two "spread" teams competing for the national title after pro-style teams locked down the rings for several years in a row.

But keep two important notes in mind, first that systems like the spread-I are blurring the distinctions between the two offenses. Second, where you can really determine a team's identity is how they are attacking the field at the H and Y positions. Physicality? Finesse? Or both?

This stuff is like catnip for me.

I never realized how advantageous our particular recruiting strengths (TE and OL) could be. If Kelly committed to a "power" spread, our multiplicity would be extremely difficult to defend.

 

[Rocket89]

+1

 

[Fitzy20]

I have this debate with a friend of mine all the time, I'm a fan of the spread but in pistol rather than shotgun, and he's a fan of the pro. I like to see the similar patterns from both offenses but the spread will always be my favorite mainly because its what I ran in high school. But I do see the positives in the pro formation mainly in the running schemes.

 

[Whiskeyjack]

Changed to title to broaden the thread's scope, since I need a place to dump my nerdy football articles.

Grantland's Chris Brown just published an article titled "Ducking the Bucks: Inside the Evolution (and Oreganification) of Urban Meyer's Ohio State Offense":

Despite being known for the innovative spread offenses his Utah and Florida teams had fielded, Urban Meyer had few obvious offensive coordinator candidates in mind when he took over as Ohio State’s head football coach following the 2011 season. Dan Mullen and Steve Addazio, Meyer’s former UF coordinators, had already become head coaches, and Meyer faced another complicating factor: Though he remained committed to his vision of a power-based spread offense, he also wanted his system to evolve with the times, and he knew he needed a coordinator who could help him achieve that balance.

At Florida, Meyer’s offense revolved almost entirely around the quarterback. From 2007 through 2009, Tim Tebow led the SEC in pass efficiency while also leading the Gators in rushing yards, and the lasting image of those UF offenses is of Tebow plunging into the line on power runs. That approach worked with a 6-foot-3, 235-pound rhinoceros at quarterback, but with Tebow off to the NFL in 2010, Florida’s offense began to fall apart, and the Gators limped to an 8-5 finish. Meyer stepped away from the game in 2011 to spend more time with family, and during that time he was able to study many of the sport’s most innovative coaches and schemes. When Meyer rejoined the coaching ranks and started searching for a coordinator who could mesh the newest trends with what Meyer had done before, he asked around for suggestions, and several of his closest friends in the business suggested the same name: Iowa State offensive coordinator Tom Herman.

“It started with [then Oregon head coach] Chip Kelly, and then some other very close friends who said, ‘Look at this guy,'” Meyer told assembled media before Ohio State’s Sugar Bowl matchup with Alabama. Though many fans and media considered the hire a head-scratcher — “Got the question, ‘Who is Tom Herman? You’re bringing Iowa State’s offense to Ohio State?'” Meyer said — time has proven Meyer right: Ohio State finished in the top 10 in total offense and top five in scoring offense in 2013 and ’14, and the Buckeyes are poised to face Oregon in Monday’s national championship game thanks largely to the offense’s 537-yard, 42-point performance against the typically stingy Crimson Tide in the College Football Playoff semifinal.

Herman, who will take over as Houston’s head coach after coordinating Ohio State’s offense in Monday’s title game, has helped morph the Buckeyes’ offense from Meyer’s traditional system into an updated version that carries many of the hallmarks of the team OSU will face in Arlington on January 12. Specifically, Herman has shifted the Buckeyes away from the single-wing-esque QB power runs that Meyer preferred during the Tebow years and that since-injured QB Braxton Miller leaned on while leading the Buckeyes in rushing in 2012. At Florida, Meyer preferred “gap blocking” schemes: running plays designed to grind out a few years at a time, with “down” blocks from linemen to the side the play was directed, backside linemen pulling to lead the way, and Tebow often lowering his shoulder behind them.

In contrast, Herman has based Ohio State’s offense around the inside zone: an inside, downhill running play that uses zone blocking to automatically adapt to the defense, a crucial trait when used with the no-huddle, another tactic now featured far more in Columbus than it ever was in Gainesville.

Many coaches, including Meyer, have said that zone blocking plays are “finesse” runs. Meyer has always viewed his offense as a power attack, albeit one run from the spread, but Herman helped convert him, resulting in Ohio State building its offense around the inside zone, with quarterback reads and receiver screens coming off that same basic action. Meyer bought in because the Buckeyes’ version is all about power: It’s a true gut shot right up the middle, with the runner aiming for the “A” gaps next to the center.

Big runs like this one by Ezekiel Elliott against Wisconsin have become commonplace for OSU the last couple of years, with one rather notable exception: the Buckeyes’ lone loss of the season, in Week 2, when Virginia Tech employed a “Bear” or “Double Eagle” front, in which the defensive line pinches down and lines up with a nose tackle over the center and defensive linemen over each of the offensive guards. This strategy effectively shut down Ohio State’s inside zone running game, as the Buckeyes managed just 108 yards rushing on 40 attempts, with 70 of those yards coming from quarterback J.T. Barrett, who’d taken over in the preseason for the injured Miller, and who’s since given the reins to Cardale Jones after suffering a season-ending injury of his own. This wasn’t the first time a “Bear” front had proven successful against a Meyer offense, and Ohio State’s coaches knew they would need to find answers to adjust.

“Virginia Tech was the seminal game for Ohio State this season,” Ross Fulton, who studies Ohio State’s schemes for the site Eleven Warriors, told me. “The coaching staff essentially laid an egg in that game, and the rest of the season has been a reaction to it.”

The most important adjustment Ohio State made after the loss to the Hokies was to improve at running the ball on the perimeter of the defense — and to do so with the running back. Traditionally, Meyer and even Herman would have relied on the QB to pull the ball on an option play and try to get to the edge, but the Hokies crashed their safeties down on the quarterback, holding Barrett under 3 yards per carry. In response, Meyer and Herman turned to one of the staple plays of their title game opponent: the Oregon Ducks’ sweep.

Sweeps are as old as football, and the most famous is Vince Lombardi’s old Green Bay sweep. But under Kelly and offensive coordinator turned head coach Mark Helfrich, Oregon tweaked the blueprint, devising a way to run a version of the sweep in the context of a spread formation. Before this season, Meyer and his staff met with Kelly and his Philadelphia Eagles coaches, and in 2014, Ohio State made the sweep a key part of its arsenal.

The sweep is a perfect complement to OSU’s inside zone because as soon as the defense begins pinching down, Herman can call this play to get the ball to the perimeter of the defense, with several athletic linemen out in front. It’s worked: When Alabama shifted its defensive linemen down into a type of Bear front in an effort to stop OSU’s inside runs in the Sugar Bowl, Herman called for a version of the Oregon sweep, and the play went for an 85-yard Elliott touchdown — the biggest score of the game, and maybe of the Buckeyes’ season.

The similarities between the Ohio State and Oregon offenses are no coincidence. “We know Oregon,” Meyer said in his press conference after the Sugar Bowl win. “I’ll probably be able to call Oregon’s plays because we study them and they study us.” Two units focused on evolving will undoubtedly enter Monday’s game armed with new wrinkles — and each side will need those innovations against an opponent that increasingly looks like a mirror image.

The bit about the difference between gap and zone blocking is crucial. That's a big reason why I don't see us switching to a smash-mouth style any time soon.

The more I read about football schemes and personnel, the more I realize how little I know. We all ought to approach the subject (including criticism of Kelly and his staff) with a lot of humility.

 

[Old Man Mike]

Amen. Coach is trying to do something [which has consistently worked for him before] that is a little different than anyone else's scheme. Though not as dramatic as trying to get ready for Paul Johnson, the difference should work to Kelly's advantage if the players execute.

Thus far it is not the Kelly offense which screws up, it's the player execution, particularly at quarterback. This is almost obvious when one takes a step back, as our offensive scoring and yardage is often prodigious even with incompetent turnover-prone quarterback play. With those levels of turnovers {Tommy included}, any poorly designed or called offense wouldn't function at all.

Kelly believes that he can run both power and finesse at the slot/TE positions. This is because he has never just taken 4 receivers and stuck them on the field for the entire game. ND had studs like Floyd, Tate, our TE legends, TJJones, et al, and Coach would still get players like DSmith in the game. Kelly believes in coming at you in waves at the receiving positions, looking like "packages", but just when you think you "get" the package sensed out, he adds a wrinkle to it. He sets a hard-to-defend base quick-dart system out there, and then legerdemain sneaks in on top of it.

Kelly's a genius. He just needs a top drawer quarterback one of these years, and THEN with NDs receiver quality nobody will be able to slow us down. And we should quit blaming Kelly for not being a good quarterback coach --- that's not ever what he has been. Coach began on defense I believe, but what he is famous for is system design, play-calling, and wide receiver development. Blame somebody else if the QBs don't become Peyton Manning or Andrew Luck --- mainly blame the QBs themselves, if we must.

Coach needs neither a highly intelligent stationary ice-man nor a hot-running agitated Rolls Royce. He needs a Cold-blooded Killer with a fast gun and a cool mind. I see a chance that this is where Malik comes into our story. Fingers-crossed, I await [with Coach, I'd guess] this experiment to be run.

 

[TheTurningPoint]

Great pieces and thanks for posting/finding them Whiskey. Definitely must reads for the football fan to understand concepts.

But for me, offensive scheme isnt the problem at Notre Dame. Eliminate fumbles by Golson and ND is easily 10-2

 

[irishog77]

This stuff is like catnip for me.

I never realized how advantageous our particular recruiting strengths (TE and OL) could be. If Kelly committed to a "power" spread, our multiplicity would be extremely difficult to defend.

I think a further point of discussion on the fundamentals of the "spread" offense should be the splits of the OL and the manipulation (for lack of a better word) of the wide hash marks in the college game. These influential factors are tough to grasp watching on TV, but, I think, are of equal importance as the above mentioned by the writer in dissecting spread vs. pro-style, and what a true "spread" offense actually is.

The narrower hashes and the speed of the DL in the NFL adversely effect those 2 factors and are why, I think, a true spread offense is extremely difficult to run in the professional ranks.

 

[Whiskeyjack]

SBNation's Ian Boyd just published an article titled "Modern pass defense and 'the rule of three'":

Summer 7 on 7 leagues and rule changes in the game have led to American football undergoing a slow and steady process of Euro-style evolutions in which players are groomed and equipped with skills from a young age in order to maximize their athletic potential and use it to obtain fame, scholarship opportunities, or even a shot at becoming a professional. The result is passing attacks that can shred opponents in a hurry and challenge the underlying assumption of defensive tactics that prioritize stopping the run while limiting big passing plays.

When the New England Patriots are taking down the NFL's greatest defense in a decade in the Super Bowl by relentlessly and precisely throwing quick passes to the flats, where defenses are daring you to throw the ball, you know the game is changing.

So what's the adjustment? Defenses need more players on the field who are good in coverage or else they have to give players that aren't great in coverage some really difficult assignments. Some teams could opt to find versatile players for every position but the preferable method for most teams is to align their defense in such a way that they have three good coverage players handling the opponents' best receivers and thus freeing up their safeties and linebackers to be traditional football players who are good against the run.

So the result is an iron law of defensive football in the modern era:

You have to have three good coverage players on the field to survive against the better passing teams.

The two corners have to be good, especially if the opponent has more than one good outside receiver or can move their best receiver around to create match-up advantages, and whoever is covering the slot needs to be strong as well.

Finding so many good coverage players is a real challenge that often separates the richer programs from the poorer ones, or allows particular underdog programs to stand out if they understand the law and how to stay in compliance.

In the modern era teams can often get by while just having solid players along the DL but there's no escaping your doom if you don't have some good players in the defensive backfield. An opponent will get their good receivers and passing game fixed on your poor DB play, run the ball well enough to keep you from diverting resources, and shred you.

Try to blitz them and you can just exacerbate the issue by short-manning the coverage against quick game staples that QBs can execute in their sleep. Unless you have players that can hold up long enough to take away the quick throws and buy an extra second for the blitzers, yes the rule of three makes for a better blitzing team.

Most opponents don't stack their two best receivers on the outside, 2014 West Virginia excepted, but will often put their 2nd best or even best receiver in the slot where they can counter-balance the outside receiver and help a team execute a quick passing game to march down the field.

How defenses handle the slot often determines their identity as a team. Here are a few ways that teams have looked to lock down the slot and observe this law that we've seen in the college game:

Option 1: The coverage safety

When Oklahoma determined that their 3-4 defense would work best in 2014 if they played Eric Striker as a "space-backer" to the field side rather than utilizing a nickel they were then determining that their 3rd coverage player would have to be the strong or field side safety.

With Striker coming off the edge, that left strong safety Quentin Hayes to cover the slot in what almost amounts to man-to-man coverage in their base 3-4 defense.

You'll also see some Cover 4 teams employ a similar strategy to handling the slot:

In both instances, the strong safety is dealing with that slot receiver with limited or even no help underneath from the strong side linebacker. In cover 4 he'll get help if there's no run action and the backer can help wall off and guide the slot up to the strong safety who has to be able to hand that player in open spaces in the deep field.

In cover 3 the safety is dropping down and relying on help inside from the linebackers or deep safety but is operating in a good deal of open space underneath.

The advantage here is that by deferring coverage responsibility back to the safety, the team can play a third or fourth linebacker on the field and close to the action. For teams that have big, fast athletes like Darron Lee or Eric Striker they don't want to take off the field this is an appealing option.

Option 2: The nickel corner

What if you don't have a great "space-backer" to put in the field but you do have a couple of great run support safeties you'd like to protect from coverage?

In this event, teams will often play a nickel corner who is ideally a player with a lot of short area quickness, good vision to read keys, and enough physicality to offer something in forcing or blitzing the edge. When that 3rd coverage player is a nickel corner, teams can stack the box with safeties in tight proximity to the line of scrimmage to control tight ends or run games.

That can look several different ways, a cover 4 team like Notre Dame would play the nickel in soft coverage and pack their safeties in near the box:

In this instance the outside corner isn't going to have deep help from the safety so he needs to be pretty good while the nickel can make sure to take away the deep outside throws to the slot, close on anything short, and force the receiver inside where he has help.

Kansas State in the Randall Evans era would typically play their nickel as a space-backer against two removed receivers but respond to opposing trips formations that look to create conflicts and run the ball up the middle by playing the outermost receiver in man-to-man coverage and canceling him out while turning nickel corner Evans into a de-facto outside corner:

Both of these strategies essentially dare teams to beat them by throwing the ball outside and underneath, which is a difficult throw for a college QB with low rewards if the nickel and outside corner can close on the ball quickly and tackle well. You're asking the offense to execute plays where the ball travels in the air an extra beat without actually going downfield, generally that's still a safe bet in the college game.

Cover 3 teams will follow this strategy as well and also be able to stack their safeties closer to the box while trusting the nickel to hold up underneath:

Given the open space to either side of the slot receiver, the nickel corner has to be quite good at controlling the slot receivers' initial release, breaking on the ball, and keeping an eye on the backfield to break on throws or support the run. However, there are a good many players who aren't fast enough to play corner and handle a good receiver without deep help but who are plenty quick, smart, and physical enough to play this role.

This style is better for taking away an opposing teams' quick game, unless they can punish the defense outside, at the cost of getting an extra linebacker on the line of scrimmage.

The difference between the varieties of cover 3 and cover 4 start to become obscure once you establish whether the D is relying on the safety or nickel to be the third coverage player. People face trade-offs and the personnel decision to go with a nickel is often dictated by a team having an excellent run-support safety and a desire to simply control the run rather than trying to overwhelm it with pressure.

As we've seen, having that third coverage player on the field allows a defense to feature the blitz, a really good outside linebacker, or a really good run support safety, all of which were otherwise threatened with extinction by the modern spread passing game.

Option 3: The ace up the sleeve

There is another way that can potentially allow a team to break the law against most opponents and avoid the challenging recruiting task of building a roster with multiple coverage players. A cheat, but not one you see very often.

That is, what if a team was able to recruit just enough athletes to have one truly excellent coverage player every year who was smart and coached up well enough to simply lock down the opposing teams' best player wherever they went? This would require either a team that could make rapid checks and substitutions or else that had a cast of versatile DBs that could play multiple roles in the secondary.

However, if a team had a player that could cancel out the best opposing receiver regardless of his position on the field it could be devastating. Here's how that might look...

The defense would have to rely very heavily on one base coverage so that they could train their DBs to learn multiple positions and then select the coverage athlete to serve as the "Ace" to follow around the best or most dangerous receiver. We'll use cover 4 for these examples, which has enough variety to allow a team to use a few different versions of it to get their Ace in the best possible alignment.

If the best or most dangerous receiver was lined up as the field receiver the D could respond like this:

If the best or most dangerous receiver was on the boundary you could press him up with the Ace and completely take him out of the game like Michigan State does against outside receivers:

If the best or most dangerous receiver was in the slot you could play the Ace in the nickel:

The more things the Ace can do, the more types of receivers that the defense could eliminate from the game. He'd ideally be good both in off and press coverage and if the team had multiple alerts and checks they could often protect him from doing anything other than locking down his target.

Their have only been a handful of players in college that could pull something like this off but few teams attempt to train up their DBs to even attempt anything like it. This would work best in a base nickel D so that the defense could adjust to motion without great difficulty since there would always be four other DBs on the field who understood multiple positions and could rotate to allow the Ace to follow a target.

If the offense constantly used motion to get the 2nd best receiver matched up against the 2nd or 3rd best coverage player, the defense would have to be willing to live with that but it would really complicate the offense if they had to rely on that tactic to get a favorable match-up for their 2nd best receiving option. Few college teams have enough motion in the playbook to bring enough to free up their best receiver from a defense that practiced this every week.

The goal of the "rule of three": Attack the quarterback

Very few college QBs have to deal with their security blankets being taken away and being forced to routinely rely on their second or third progression. Teams will generally cross train their better wide receivers to run different routes from different positions on the field so that they can always target their best players to accomplish different aims.

When a team can match up with the offense's top three receivers with solid to good coverage players, it really complicates things and can send a collegiate QB to a dark place, mentally. Some teams will do this with tight pattern-matching, most all are trying to do it by recruiting and developing as many good coverage players as possible, and perhaps more will try to match cross-trained receiving studs with cross-trained secondaries and "Ace" DBs.

At the end of the day, defenses that want to survive in the modern game will have to get back on the offensive and attack the quarterback's ability to quickly deliver the ball to open targets by either observing the rule of three or finding another cheat.

This helps explain why BvG utilizes Nickel personnel so often.

 

[GoldenToTheGrave]

SBNation's Ian Boyd just published an article titled "Modern pass defense and 'the rule of three'":



This helps explain why BvG utilizes Nickel personnel so often.

And why Mathias Farley is so critical to this defense. He's not an outside corner and he's not much of a safety, but he's a hell of a nickel back. He was our biggest playmaker on defense last year IMO.

 

[Whiskeyjack]

OFD's Eric Murtaugh just published an excellent article titled "Explaining the Notre Dame Linebackers in Brian VanGorder's Defense":

If I'm coaching I'm not messing with the inside linebacker combo of Schmidt and Smith. Doing so seems really risky heading into a pressure packed 2015. There's been a lot of consternation about a lack of a pass rush, but remember, Brian VanGorder's expertise is dialing up pressure from all over the field and I'd argue when the defense was healthy in 2014 things were going well on this front, especially from the linebackers.

For his part, Jaylon Smith finished with 111 tackles, 9 TFL, 3.5 sacks, and 7 QBH last year. After the conclusion of Manti Te'o's sophomore year he had 129 tackles, 8.5 TFL, 1 sack, and 3 QBH. Different players playing in different schemes but that's an enormously encouraging sign for Smith.

If you want to look for improvement in a pass rush a healthy defensive line will do wonders. So would someone like Sheldon Day (surprisingly only 16.5 TFL in 35 career games) finally putting everything together and meeting expectations as a NFL-bound lineman. I'd keep Jaylon Smith at WILL and watch him grow.

It's full of images and film clips, so I've only shared the conclusion above. Click through if you have time.

 

[TheTurningPoint]

Informative article, but it doesnt show how defenses took Jaylon out of the play by alignment alone the second half of the season either.

Sure, injuries had some impact on his stats, but Jaylon is a kid that needs to work outside in with his speed and athleticism. Watch the LSU game and see how many times he got stuck inside and couldnt work outside to make the tackle.

I couldnt disgree more on keeping Jaylon at Will. Can he play there? Yes. Most effective at Will? No.

 

[Rocket89]

Informative article, but it doesnt show how defenses took Jaylon out of the play by alignment alone the second half of the season either.

Sure, injuries had some impact on his stats, but Jaylon is a kid that needs to work outside in with his speed and athleticism. Watch the LSU game and see how many times he got stuck inside and couldnt work outside to make the tackle.

I couldnt disgree more on keeping Jaylon at Will. Can he play there? Yes. Most effective at Will? No.

The WILL position is the most difficult to scheme against so that criticism doesn't make much sense. The answer shouldn't be move Jaylon to Sam where you can still scheme against him AND he's further away from the ball on one side of the field.

Jaylon played pretty well against LSU, especially considering they did a good job of getting to the second level with their linemen. Every linebacker is going to struggle against LSU's power run game but Jaylon was still able to make plays, no small task for a sophomore linebacker playing with a still-banged up first team unit. That's hardly an indictment on him and his position.

Jaylon's speed and athleticism are neutered at Sam. He can't flow to the ball as often. He's engaging flat footed with a tight end/lineman at the line more often (see LSU's first touchdown, don't know why anyone wants Jaylon filling that role the majority of the time). He's running with a slot receiver more often, which depending on your perspective, shows off his athleticism but is really an easy way to take him out of the game and happened all the time in 2013.

I don't understand why Jaylon being a great fit at Will is so hard understand, I really don't. Especially considering that BVG moves him around enough to utilize his disruptive abilities off the edge.

 

[Wild Bill]

Informative article, but it doesnt show how defenses took Jaylon out of the play by alignment alone the second half of the season either.

Sure, injuries had some impact on his stats, but Jaylon is a kid that needs to work outside in with his speed and athleticism. Watch the LSU game and see how many times he got stuck inside and couldnt work outside to make the tackle.

I couldnt disgree more on keeping Jaylon at Will. Can he play there? Yes. Most effective at Will? No.

If he's the SAM in a 4-3 under, he'd have the same issues. I think it would be worse at SAM, actually, because he'd have to hold the point of attack and shed blockers in less space than he would have at the WILL position. He's just easier to block if he's within striking distance of the blocker at the snap than he is if the blocker has to track him, run ten yards and get a body on him.

It's hard to be critical of a guy as good as Jaylon but he needs to improve his physical strength and he needs to improve his ability to shed blocks. The defensive line is a factor as well. They need to do a better job of keeping blockers off of their backers (Romeo and Trumbetti, specifically). It's amazing how much better Jaylon-type backers play when their defensive linemen prevent offensive linemen from releasing to the second level untouched. Get hands on offensive linemen, throw them off course and let Jaylon use his speed to beat everyone to the play.

They need to use him more to get after the QB, IMO. Everyone knows he can get pressure from the outside but I'd like to see him blitz the A gap more often, especially early in drives when Jarron isn't gassed. A fresh Jarron is going to drive/attract blockers into whatever gap he shoots and it'll give Jaylon a window to blitz through the opposite gap.

 

[Rocket89]

If he's the SAM in a 4-3 under, he'd have the same issues. I think it would be worse at SAM, actually, because he'd have to hold the point of attack and shed blockers in less space than he would have at the WILL position. He's just easier to block if he's within striking distance of the blocker at the snap than he is if the blocker has to track him, run ten yards and get a body on him.

It's hard to be critical of a guy as good as Jaylon but he needs to improve his physical strength and he needs to improve his ability to shed blocks. The defensive line is a factor as well. They need to do a better job of keeping blockers off of their backers (Romeo and Trumbetti, specifically). It's amazing how much better Jaylon-type backers play when their defensive linemen prevent offensive linemen from releasing to the second level untouched. Get hands on offensive linemen, throw them off course and let Jaylon use his speed to beat everyone to the play.

They need to use him more to get after the QB, IMO. Everyone knows he can get pressure from the outside but I'd like to see him blitz the A gap more often, especially early in drives when Jarron isn't gassed. A fresh Jarron is going to drive/attract blockers into whatever gap he shoots and it'll give Jaylon a window to blitz through the opposite gap.

Exactly, good points.

 

[Irish#1]

I think a further point of discussion on the fundamentals of the "spread" offense should be the splits of the OL and the manipulation (for lack of a better word) of the wide hash marks in the college game. These influential factors are tough to grasp watching on TV, but, I think, are of equal importance as the above mentioned by the writer in dissecting spread vs. pro-style, and what a true "spread" offense actually is.

The narrower hashes and the speed of the DL in the NFL adversely effect those 2 factors and are why, I think, a true spread offense is extremely difficult to run in the professional ranks.

IMO, it's not so much the hash marks as it is the speed of the players. It's a very simple concept and why so many schools HS & college run spread regardless of the type. There are plenty of weaknesses in the defense in HS. In college not as many because only the better players are still playing. None the less, there are still plenty of weaknesses and the offensive player still has the advantage. Put guys out in space where the defensive player doesn't have help and it's a lot easier to score. That's why you see so many teams have great offenses. IU is a good example. Wilson comes to IU and they instantly are lighting up the scoreboard, but still fail to have a decent record. It's because their defense sucks and they can't recruit the top defensive players. Then when they run into the teams that can recruit the top defensive players, they can't score as easily. I think there are far fewer top elite defensive players that can handle their position without help. That's the reason a lock down CB is so important. Since he doesn't need help it allows you to move guys in and around depending on the offensive formation.

It's all about match ups.

 

[ShakeDown]

SAM, WILL, who cares what you call him. Jaylon will be utilized the same way no matter his title. Murtaugh had it right when he stated Smith's position is "PLAYMAKER"

Our SAM was marginalized based on scheme, or our scheme was marginalized based on the talent we had at SAM? Which came first, the chicken or the egg?

If Morgan is ready to bang at WILL Smith will be moved to SAM imo. The idea is to get your best personel on the field and put them in the best position to succeed. No matter their title, or more accurately our puny paradigm of what they should be doing based on their title.

Either way, one thing is for sure... I gaurentee BVG does not see the positions the way we do.

 

[TheTurningPoint]

I think you are missing my point. Jaylon can play Will effectively and had success there in 2014.

Sliding him to SAM would allow Notre Dame to role out
Will: Nyles Morgan
Mike: Schmidt or Grace
SAM: Jaylon Smith

You have your three best LB's on the field vs keeping them off the field. Morgan is way more phyiscal at the POA than Jaylon, and can really fill/attack the A-Gap more on those blitzes than Jaylon. Watch Jaylon blitz up the middle vs UNC, Louisville and NW...no success.

The point about the Will being hard to scheme against isnt exactly true either according to Brian Kelly. BK stated during the season that offenses figured out how they could take Jaylon/Will out of the box and then take the play to the opposite side of the field. If you need an example of this, the USC game would be a great one. I understand there were injuries that game, but just watch the scheme of the USC offense. They got Jaylon out of the box, then ran or threw screens to the opposite side of the field.

If Jaylon is at the SAM and they go away from him, they actually play their offense into the boundary side of the field. Boundary = Short Side of the field. That would be ideal for any defense to have an offense working in tighter, smaller and condensed space.

You remember the interception Jaylon had against USC in 2013 when he read the play, got in space and beat Nelson Algohlor for the ball? Those plays are at a greater chance with getting Smith in space and where he can truly use his athletic ability vs being matched up with a guard inside where he isnt the strongest or most physical LB.

Look at Su'a Cravens for example. USC moved him to SAM to maximize his skill set. Cravens can play safety just as well as Jaylon can play WILL, but SAM maximizes their God given speed and athleticism. SAM allows both players to rush the passer and be more disruptive in the box.

Von Miller is another example. He is a guy that has the ability to play inside in the NFL, but he is elite on the outside.

 

[IrishLax]

I just don't know why it has to be binary SAM or WILL. Why can't he play both SAM and WILL? I agree that you get the most downs with Jaylon involved in the play if he's at WILL, but that doesn't necessarily mean it's the best value added for your team.

When you look at how SAM was used last year when it was on the field (which was rare in its own right) it's impossible not to see how Jaylon would be a vast upgrade there. Whereas at ILB, you have at least 3 if not 4 guys that can play effectively MIKE/WILL. A truism of all sports is get your best players on the field. Who else can do what Jaylon potentially can at SAM?

It seems to me that you'd be best served by moving Jaylon all over the field so that the offense cannot gameplan to take him out of the game like we saw at times last year. You line him up at SAM and the defense has no idea whether he'll drop or rush on passing downs and he can be proficient at both. He can also be superior at defending the run relative to the alternative options. Then when you want to go nickel you have him at WILL.

If this defense is supposed to be exotic, then let it be exotic.

 

[ShakeDown]

Amen.

There are no cookie cutter titles for Jaylon. He will play everywhere based on down, situation and distance.

 

[Whiskeyjack]

I just don't know why it has to be binary SAM or WILL. Why can't he play both SAM and WILL?

Jaylon for WHAM backer.

 

[TheTurningPoint]

I just don't know why it has to be binary SAM or WILL. Why can't he play both SAM and WILL? I agree that you get the most downs with Jaylon involved in the play if he's at WILL, but that doesn't necessarily mean it's the best value added for your team.

When you look at how SAM was used last year when it was on the field (which was rare in its own right) it's impossible not to see how Jaylon would be a vast upgrade there. Whereas at ILB, you have at least 3 if not 4 guys that can play effectively MIKE/WILL. A truism of all sports is get your best players on the field. Who else can do what Jaylon potentially can at SAM?

It seems to me that you'd be best served by moving Jaylon all over the field so that the offense cannot gameplan to take him out of the game like we saw at times last year. You line him up at SAM and the defense has no idea whether he'll drop or rush on passing downs and he can be proficient at both. He can also be superior at defending the run relative to the alternative options. Then when you want to go nickel you have him at WILL.

If this defense is supposed to be exotic, then let it be exotic.

I agree, he can be moved around a lot in this defense. Problem is, BVG didnt adapt to the hurry up well and got caught with subs and alignment problems. Hopefully this is something he can adapt to this offseason and that will help immensly

 

[Rocket89]

I think you are missing my point. Jaylon can play Will effectively and had success there in 2014.

Sliding him to SAM would allow Notre Dame to role out
Will: Nyles Morgan
Mike: Schmidt or Grace
SAM: Jaylon Smith

You have your three best LB's on the field vs keeping them off the field.

No, I think I understand this point perfectly. As I mentioned here a while back this entire discussion began making the rounds based almost exclusively on the notion that Morgan is one of the three best linebackers and needs to be in the starting lineup.

There is a lot of common ground with the discussions between Sam and Will, especially with the flexibility Jaylon provides the coaching staff. I think we can all agree that Jaylon will be good anywhere.

But Morgan has not come close to proving that he deserves to start and force Jaylon to switch positions. It's possible that Morgan proves it eventually but not at this point. And this doesn't even get into the argument about whether the defense is best served using 3 linebackers all pushing 240 on the field at once versus utilizing a nickel corner more often.

 

[TheTurningPoint]

No, I think I understand this point perfectly. As I mentioned here a while back this entire discussion began making the rounds based almost exclusively on the notion that Morgan is one of the three best linebackers and needs to be in the starting lineup.

There is a lot of common ground with the discussions between Sam and Will, especially with the flexibility Jaylon provides the coaching staff. I think we can all agree that Jaylon will be good anywhere.

But Morgan has not come close to proving that he deserves to start and force Jaylon to switch positions. It's possible that Morgan proves it eventually but not at this point. And this doesn't even get into the argument about whether the defense is best served using 3 linebackers all pushing 240 on the field at once versus utilizing a nickel corner more often.

I am just going off the statement in the article that said Jaylon should stay at Will. Notre Dame is best if they can keep Schmidt off the field in passing downs in my opinion. Yet, BVG is the one who failed to adapt in the area of substitutions last year. It's an adjustment coming from college to the NFL and he put the defense in places to not succeed based off personnel.

Nyles Morgan proved a lot in the few games he got to play. He definitely needs to gain more experience, but he was effective in the scheme. In talking to a source, Morgan had his assignments correct more often than not, but it was actually the defensive line that had theirs incorrect. I agree Morgan needs to have a big Spring, but I haven't seen or heard anything from Winter workouts that he isn't progressing the way Notre Dame wants him to.

 

[Irish#1]

I am just going off the statement in the article that said Jaylon should stay at Will. Notre Dame is best if they can keep Schmidt off the field in passing downs in my opinion. Yet, BVG is the one who failed to adapt in the area of substitutions last year. It's an adjustment coming from college to the NFL and he put the defense in places to not succeed based off personnel.

Nyles Morgan proved a lot in the few games he got to play. He definitely needs to gain more experience, but he was effective in the scheme. In talking to a source, Morgan had his assignments correct more often than not, but it was actually the defensive line that had theirs incorrect. I agree Morgan needs to have a big Spring, but I haven't seen or heard anything from Winter workouts that he isn't progressing the way Notre Dame wants him to.

Agree, I think the best thing that happened to him was JS getting injured. I expect Morgan to have a very good year. Good enough to raise eyebrows.

 

[stlnd01]

Morgan's going to be a very good ballplayer, but as the OFD piece pointed out, is he good enough to justify moving Jaylon out of what appears to be his optimal position?
For that matter, why not put Morgan at SAM? It's a more physical role, and he's more of a banger than Jaylon. In passing situations you swap in Farley.

 

[Whiskeyjack]

SBNation's Ian Boyd just published an article titled "Football's 4th Phase: Building a package or winning time":

It's hard to argue that there's a better strategy for moving the ball quickly than up-tempo, "RPO" (run-pass option) offense. With multiple pre-snap and post-snap options available, quarterbacks can be trained to run the show from the field and pick defenses apart while they gasp for air.

The strategy is taking over at the college level with programs like Auburn, Ole Miss and Baylor and is becoming the preferred strategy at the high school levels. The x's and o's battle of football is quite compelling for coaches, but victory usually comes down to who holds the chalk last. With RPO offense and tempo, the offense can equip the QB with most every answer he'll need on a given snap and prevent defensive coaches from having a chance to counter.

Yet there remains a problem for these teams, what happens after points have been accumulated and all that remains necessary for victory is holding onto a lead until the clock runs out?

With eleven minutes to go in 2014, TCU held a 21 point lead and was close to doing something that hadn't been done since 2012, beating Baylor in Waco. However, they couldn't hold the lead despite bringing in their mega-back to try and run the ball. Left with the option of stopping the run or losing, most defenses can stop a spread running game by daring the offense to throw the ball. Baylor put an extra man in the box and TCU couldn't account for him except by throwing.

This is the flaw with option strategies, ultimately they allow the defense to choose how you beat them. If they choose to prevent you running the ball and dare you to beat them with the quick throws, what happens if you miss a pass? Throw a pick? It's the same story for the spread passing teams that use tempo. When it comes time to run out the clock how do you do it?

Of course, this came back to Baylor when they surrendered a 20 point lead in the 4th quarter of the Cotton Bowl against Michigan State.

Of the 15 fastest-paced offenses in 2014, nine managed to blow double digit leads they held in the 2nd half of the football game. This is a huge hole in tempo offensive strategy preventing it from totally catching on at bigger universities who prefer to impose their will with man-ball.

As the Football Outsiders have noted, four minute offense may be one of the more under-appreciated elements of the game. If you can maintain possession of the ball and run out the clock when you have a lead, you can't lose.

So why can't the HUNH spread teams manage to do so?

The challenges of situational football

Much of the success from HUNH and RPO tactics is that they allow the offense to attack the defense simultaneously with speed on the outside and power in the middle. Spacing is essential to these tactics since the offense is looking to find defenders to put into conflict.

Besides the DL, everyone on the defense has a coverage assignment either in zone or in man coverage. RPO teams will use alignment to find those conflict defenders and then have the QB read them while placing the ball in the belly of the running back and either handing off where the offense has a numerical advantage or pulling it and throwing the quick pass if the defender vacates his coverage assignment.

With schemes like this, an RPO team can run the ball "downhill" on a defense but only if the defense chooses to leave themselves susceptible to that option.

When the defense tries to answer all of these threats by playing man coverage across the board, the 3rd generation spread-option offense will then look to beat them over the top with vertical routes and pick the best match-up to do so.

Various ways of running the concept such as this one can put a lot of stress on multiple defenders. Can the boundary corner handle the "X" receiver without help? How do the nickel and corner handle the combination of the post route and the wheel route? If the deep safety follows the "H" on their deep post who will help cover the "Z" receiver?

The problem is that assembling a roster that can put multiple threats on the field like this requires focusing on stockpiling slot receivers and big, outside receivers. Even if this team utilizes flexed-out tight ends they are going to be players who excel and practice more in the receiving game than in blocking.

If the defense responds with an alignment or strategy like the one drawn below and dares the offense to throw it deep, they have little other choice. That might result in expanding the lead...or it might result in a quick "three and out" or an interception:

What's more, most of the playbook and focus for a HUNH/RPO teams' base offense is going to be devoted to option concepts and execution rather than carrying a lot of run schemes designed to beat a defense that is playing to stop the run.

When Michigan State started running their six-man zone blitzes every other snap against Baylor, the Bears were left to either have Petty pick his way through the under-manned zone coverage or hand-off into numbers. At that moment, having such a loaded WR corps may have given them a big lead but keeping them on the field didn't help to secure the victory.

Four-minute offense isn't the only time this problem creeps up on spread teams. There's also the goal-line and other short-yardage situations. Games are won in specific situations and spread teams' best players are often unhelpful in those crucial moments when the situation calls for shoving the ball down the defense's throat.

This was apparent in the Super Bowl when the Patriots responded to Seattle's attempt to "spread to run" on the goal-line by inviting the pass play against the goal-line defense.

The solution?

As noted with Baylor, or with Seattle's unfortunate alignment in the Super Bowl, there are often crucial situations in a football game where normal offensive personnel don't provide the best chance to win and the bigger blockers with marginal roles who come in may not be good enough to secure victory. But are those the only players available?

Texas HS state champion and RPO/Tempo offensive adherent Joe Willis of Cedar Park notes, "When you look the game today, most people look at X's and O's, the three phases of offense, defense, and special teams. Now there's the 4th phase, which is getting the best 11 athletes on the field in the right situations to win games."

For Willis and Cedar Park that means using special teams portions of practice to work on their situational offensive package intended for four-minute offense. In that package, Cedar Park will use 22 personnel (two running backs, two tight ends) and feature some of their better defensive players on the field to allow them to win crucial physical battles and impose their will at the end of the game.

With a bigger athlete running inside at quarterback (Cedar Park uses a DE/TE), the best physical athletes on the team blocking at fullback and tight end, and then a couple of speedy ball carriers at receiver and running back the offense can methodically drive the field and eat clock.

At these times an offense only wants to have run options and not give the defense the chance to dictate a pass, perhaps even putting someone on the field besides the Quarterback to execute the package. This should be fairly straightforward for most college teams, who generally have former option quarterbacks all over their offense and defense. If not, you still see teams employ their better DL as lead blockers on the goal line, why not embrace a similar philosophy to get the best players on the field to protect a 4th quarter lead?

Teams have stumbled upon the beginnings of this new strategy already. In 2008, Texas had a brilliant quick passing game with QB Colt McCoy and a four-wide receiver package that featured effective receivers at every skill position, including running back. However, when they wanted to pound the ball on the goal-line they brought out big, 250 pound Cody Johnson and used future NFL defensive tackles like Roy Miller and Lamarr Houston at fullback to pave the way for him. In Texas' "jumbo package" he produced 24 touchdowns in two years finishing drives for McCoy.

Oklahoma had similar success when they realized that their massive, Yeti-like QB Blake Bell might have some use to the team on the goal line with his 6'6" 260 pound frame and conceived of "the Belldozer package" to feature him in short-yardage situations. With no one else on the field for the offense save for big blockers and maybe a single receiver, it was nearly impossible for defenses to get tacklers to Bell with enough momentum to stop him from plunging forward for yardage.

From 2013 to 2014 Alabama has gone eight for 17 on 4th down rushing the ball, good for 47%. In the span of 2011 to 2012 when the Belldozer was in vogue, Oklahoma went 12 for 15 rushing the ball on 4th down for 80%.

For a spread, up-tempo team that struggled to impose their will running the ball unless the defense was gassed this was a huge boon to the Sooner offense. For whatever reason, despite that success they haven't pursued any such package again with a different player.

Finally there's linebacker Myles Jack, whom the UCLA Bruins have called upon as a short-yardage runner for 66 carries10 TDs over the last few years. Jack might represent the future of the game.

Given what's happening at the high school level, it's only a matter of time before more college programs determine that it's worth their while to build situational packages that put their best football players on the field for the moments when games are won or lost.

Since their need for effective four-minute offense to protect leads is so dire, don't be surprised if more HUNH spread teams look to create a unit for winning the "4th phase" of the game that involves the best players available from both the offense and defense.

This has definitely been a perennial weakness in Kelly's system as well. We've got the size and talent to play Man Ball when we need to. Hopefully Sanford puts that into practice.

 

[BobbyMac]

If I have any criticism of the Kelly era besides not being undefeated national champions each year (sorry, I had to) it's:

Decide who you are... and be that team 100% of the time.

It seems the Irish are caught between old school and new school schemes instead of defining and perfecting a conflation of "Man Ball" and the Oregonian revolution.

.

 

[Whiskeyjack]

SBNation's Ian Boyd just published an article titled "The attacking 8-3 defense, flipping the script on the spread":

Once given the chance to become the head coach, many spread-option offensive coordinators will immediately hire a 3-4 defensive coach. Much like the defensive coach who wants to install whatever offense gave him the most trouble as a coordinator, spread-option coaches simply can't stand facing three down linemen defenses.

Their reasons are similar to those reasons that cause Tom Brady or Peyton Manning to struggle against those defenses in the NFL, it's not as easy to dissect opponents if you aren't totally sure what they are doing. The nature of the 3-4 is that it offers flexibility in which defenders end up performing which roles after the snap.

As difficult as this is for NFL QBs to decipher when trying to find the right coverage match-ups to attack, it's even harder for a spread-option team that chooses where the ball should go based on which defender is put into conflict by the play design.

Much of what has made systems like the Air Raid so lethal is the way the quarterbacks are transformed into machines that quickly process the defense and quick trigger the ball to the right playmaker. When their ability to quickly discern what's happening and act on muscle memory is disturbed, they can become ordinary very quickly.

Today there are numerous schools of three down lineman defenses that have a similar approach to that of the spread-option offenses and are evolving the classic 3-4 defense into something new, the 8-3.

While the spread looks to use space and options to attack their opponent rather than size up front, the 8-3 defense eschews trying to "line up sound and make 'em beat us" and instead looks to win on a mental level through disguise, dictation, and disruption.

It's ultimately a 3-4 defense in terms of positions on the field and pre-snap alignment, but instead of matching power up front with two-gapping DL, the 8-3 is defined by the eight stand-up players will shift around to assume different roles. It's descended from the 3-3-5 but uses more 3-4 alignments while bringing a similar philosophy of flexibility. It's the counter-point to the spread, using space and options to present conflicts and dilemmas to force the offense to play defense.

Flipping the script

Defenses have traditionally been defined first by how many down linemen are on the field and then by how many linebackers the scheme employs. The 5-2 "Monster" defense, the 4-3, the 3-4, the 4-2-5, they all follow this pattern.

But this point, defenses are actually designed from the top down with the coverage determining the front as coaches try to first ensure that they are in strong or at least sound position to stop the pass. Nevertheless, teams are still defined first by what they are doing up front.

The branding of modern varieties of the 3-4 as the 8-3 reverses that trend by defining the defense around the eight players standing up in the defensive backfield.

Teams relying on these types of schemes, such as Boise State, BYU, West Virginia, or now Missouri can play eight-man coverages, any number of four-man rush/seven-man coverage zone or man defenses, zone blitz, or bring the heat and back it up with man coverage and zero deep help.

The goal in finding and developing personnel is to find players that can perform as many roles in the defensive backfield as possible and having positional rules that will allow players to compartmentalize and play in multiple defenses.

Attacking with disguise

The obvious advantage of having eight defenders standing up before the snap is that it's hard for the offense to know exactly what you're going to be doing. So long as an 8-3 defense has simplified rules and a compartmentalized approach, in which players learn a few different roles in the defense and fill them in different calls, it's possible to throw a lot of different defenses at the offense.

That's useful for a number of reasons, first for preventing the offense from easily identifying which defenders can be put in conflict by RPO plays that punish aggressive run fits with a quick pass.

The 8-3 can morph into the 4-1 look that's become a popular anti-spread approach:

The difficulty in this defense is that the offense can put the outside linebackers, in this instance the Buck and Raider, in run pass conflicts with inside runs paired with quick outside passes into their respective zones. However, if the offense doesn't know which players will be in conflict until the moments immediately after the snap it becomes harder to exploit.

There offense also to be aware of the fact that there might not even be conflict defenders to target because either because everyone's dropping back:

Or everyone's coming:

There's a wide range of possibilities the offensive players have to be aware of before the snap which can create a mental strain that leads to missed opportunities if not costly errors.

Again, so long as each player in the defensive backfield knows how to fill a few different roles then the number of blitzes and defenses that can be thrown from the 8-3 alignment are numerous. Keying in on the weaknesses is difficult since the defense can shift players into the positions where they'll be best against a given opponent or hide when they'll be in vulnerable spots.

Attacking by dictating

The next advantage to building a defense around having eight stand-up players in the defensive backfield is the ability to dictate time and space to the offense.

In a 4-3 set, the defense has handicapped their own ability to deny angles or space to the offense since they have one fewer player who can easily move around on the field to address different offensive strengths or leverage advantages. Let's say the opposing team has a very good slot receiver they rely on to get open in the middle of the field to move the chains:

They can rotate into a three-deep zone that brackets that slot receiver with the outside linebacker and down safety playing zone with their eyes on him while the inside linebacker and deep safety help inside. Where is the slot receiver going to find open grass with all of that attention focused his way? The offense will have to look elsewhere and they'll need to do it before the blitz gets home.

Let's say that the team's most dynamic feature is the QB and his ability to run the ball on zone read concepts:

With the end slanting wide and the whip outside linebacker sitting in the flat the QB will have a clear "give" read on the zone-read and the running back will be forced to make the play happen while the inside linebackers are freely keying off his movements. Once again, the offense is forced into a position where someone other than the star is forced to make the play while the defense defers their own stress point somewhere manageable.

In this instance, the slot receiver has a lot of space to work in but with the QB's eyes focused on the back side he's unable to take advantage. To successfully attack this defense the offense will have to start calling something else.

The 8-3 defense can also align in one call to encourage a response and then shift. Perhaps the offense's favorite check at the line when they see the defense lining up to deny the QB a chance to run the ball is to call a quick game concept that features the slot receiver, but the defense anticipates this and drops back after the snap to smother the slot receiver with zone defenders.

The spread offense is no longer playing a cat-mouse game where they force the defense to pick their poison but are now drawn into a chess match.

Attacking with disruption

Teams love specialization of personnel as it allows them to form systems that draw tremendous value from a unit and get a sum that is greater than the parts. You can see the art of specialization at work on the offensive line where units are typically broken down as follows:

Left tackle: Athletic pass protection specialist who protects the QB's "blindside."

Left guard: Quick in pass protection and mobile to either reach block the backside of a play or pull to the strong side on a run scheme.

Center: Good with calls and with getting the snap off cleanly before helping double team a DL.

Right guard: A straight ahead mauler, best at moving the pile in the run game.

Right tackle: A more athletic mauler who can dominate the edge on a running play.

This standard breakdown holds true for many lines and it's designed to combat 4-3 fronts. Overall they want to be able to hold up to pressure on the left side and blow you away on the right and they are best designed for handling strong 3-tech tackles or blindside edge rushers.

The 8-3 doesn't put all of its eggs in one basket in the pressure game and the fact that so many different players are in stand-up positions makes it easy to move them around and attack where ever the protection is most likely to break down. With four linebackers near the line of scrimmage it's a simple matter to bring numbers and overload the softest part of the offense's protection, even against spread sets that can counter with hot routes:

The defense can show pressure on the edge from the middle linebacker before the snap, but after the snap they drop three shallow zone defenders to the trips side to take away the quick hot routes as well as another linebacker underneath the X receiver to prevent a quick route from him.

Meanwhile the nose and left end slant inside, requiring some careful communication and movement from the center and the right guard to prevent one of them from quickly blowing through the middle and wrecking the play. Then the buck linebacker crosses the right guard's face and looks to turn up field for quick pressure. The running back and right tackle are likely concerned with the middle linebacker first and so the blitzing buck has time to attack and his movements are shielded by the DL's slant and the middle linebacker's feint.

Blitzes like these are challenging for an OL to pick up, particularly if the attacking players are explosive athletes who know how to disguise their movements, and the 8-3's structure allows these blitzes to attack the OL that are least effective in pass protection.

Even if one the boundary outside linebackers is the strongest pass-rusher on the team the 8-3 allows the defense to send him flying off the edge, potentially unlooked for, or stunting into an interior gap where the OL is deemed to be weak.

Attacking the spread offense

The natural response of many defensive coaches against the spread is to recruit speed and find ways to play sound defense while hoping for the offense to shoot itself in the foot or turn the ball over at some point along the way to the end zone.

The more skilled spread attacks are totally unafraid of this approach since it allows them to zero in on weaknesses, put defenders in conflict with the option, and do exactly what they practice every day to do. It's becoming less and less of a good bet that college players will be unable to sustain drives if you hole up and dare them to come after you unless you are recruiting NFL athletes at most positions.

The 8-3 is going to find more and more usage from defensive coaches that prefer to attack the offense, dictate what they're able to do, and try to see if college players can handle facing a defense that forces them to think through both their own options as well as those of the defensive coordinator.

 

[Rocket89]

Inside linebacker, new home of the elite athlete? - Football Study Hall

The result has been teams beginning to prize speedsters rather than big thumpers at the inside linebacker positions. Ohio State has been ahead of the curve here, starting with weakside linebacker Ryan Shazier, who brought freakish athleticism to the position. Despite sizing in at 6'1" 237, he ran the shuttle in 4.21 seconds (faster than many CBs) and the 40 yard dash in under 4.4 seconds (faster than most RBs).

They've since found another athletic player in Darron Lee, who is also able to bring classic linebacking skills to the more wide open, modern game.

Then Notre Dame found Jaylon Smith, a 6'3" 235 pound player rumored to have run a 4.4 (probably closer to 4.6, but still) and plugged him in at linebacker as well. Moving back and forth between either outside linebacker positions based on whether the Irish were in a base 4-3 or nickel set, led the team with 112 tackles as a sophomore.

More absurdly athletic linebackers are on their way to the college game. In Charlie Strong's 2015 class at Texas he signed Malik Jefferson, a SPARQ all-star who posted absurd numbers running the 40 in 4.38 seconds, the shuttle in 4.19 seconds, and managing a vertical leap of 39.7" at 6'2" 225.

The state of Louisiana features high school junior-to-be and current LSU commit Dylan Moses, who as a sophomore was somehow able to run a 4.57 40, 4.13 shuttle, and leap 37.1 inches at 6'2" 225. His eventual home as a weakside linebacker in the Tiger defense will elevate their team speed to an even greater level.

Teams are lining these players up in the box where their size allows them to play between the tackles but their speed to pursue the ball or skill players to the edge prevents spread teams from easily flanking them.

These elite athletes will undoubtedly push further evolutions to the linebacker position as defensive coordinators figure out how to best use such rangy and versatile athletes to stop spread attacks.

 

[Legacy]

“A very wise coach once told me, ‘If you really want play-action, you better pull a guard'” — Andrew Luck and Robert Griffin III agree"