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Whiskeyjack

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When Sheen (and I) refer to liberalism, we're talking about the political philosophy that dominates virtually every modern Western nation; not "left of center American politics". It's an indictment of the entire system, right and left.

In that context, I don't see how either of those articles you linked contradicts Sheen's statement.
 

Whiskeyjack

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Archbishop Chaput on ND:

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en"><p lang="en" dir="ltr">+Chaput: We already have a Stanford, Princeton, and Yale. We need a University that offers a fuller vision of what it means to be human.</p>— Timothy O'Malley (@timothypomalley) <a href="https://twitter.com/timothypomalley/status/776515319686914048">September 15, 2016</a></blockquote>
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wizards8507

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Archbishop Chaput on ND:

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en"><p lang="en" dir="ltr">+Chaput: We already have a Stanford, Princeton, and Yale. We need a University that offers a fuller vision of what it means to be human.</p>— Timothy O'Malley (@timothypomalley) <a href="https://twitter.com/timothypomalley/status/776515319686914048">September 15, 2016</a></blockquote>
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To what is he referring?
 
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Ndaccountant

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Didn't see this posted anywhere.

Experts are likely to debate whether the structures described in the new report were formed biologically or through natural processes. If biological, the great age of the fossils complicates the task of reconstructing the evolution of life from the chemicals naturally present on the early Earth. It leaves comparatively little time for evolution to have occurred and puts the process close to a time when Earth was being bombarded by destructive asteroids.

The fossils were discovered four years ago but not publicized while the geologists, a team led by Allen P. Nutman of the University of Wollongong in Australia, checked out their find.

“Of course one felt very excited, but we’re not the rushing types and we took our time,” Dr. Nutman said. “We kept it secret because we wanted to present it in the most robust way we could manage.”

The fossils were part of an outcrop of ancient rock that had lost its usual snow cover. The rock layer forming the outcrop, known to geologists as the Isua supracrustal belt, lies on the southwest coast of Greenland and is some 3.9 to 3.7 billion years old.

Researchers earlier had claimed that Isua rocks had a chemical composition indicative of life, but critics said this mix of chemicals could have arisen through natural processes.

The new fossils, described on Wednesday in the journal Nature, are the first visible structures found in the Isua rocks. They are thought to be stromatolites, layers of sediment packed together by microbial communities living in shallow water.

They are some 220 million years more ancient than the oldest previously known fossils, also stromatolites. Those are 3.48 billion years old and were discovered in the Pilbara Craton of Western Australia.

The new report “provides the oldest direct evidence of microbial life,” said Gerald Joyce, an expert on the origin of life at the Scripps Research Institute in La Jolla, Calif.

.......

Several different species of microbes are involved in stromatolite creation. The Isua structures, if indeed stromatolites, would represent fairly evolved organisms.

Dr. Nutman argues that life must therefore have originated even earlier, probably in the late Hadean stage of Earth’s history, which lasted from 4.65 billion years ago — when the planet formed from debris in orbit around the sun — to 4 billion years ago.

But the Hadean was so called because of the hellish conditions thought to have prevailed, including cataclysmic meteorite impacts that boiled the oceans into steam and turned Earth’s surface into molten lava. The largest of these impacts, at 4.5 billion years ago, tore a piece from Earth that became the moon.

It is difficult to see how life could have begun under such circumstances. But some geologists now favor a milder version of the Hadean, with the rain of asteroids quickly tapering off after the moon was formed.

The early sun was much weaker then, and the threat to life, in this view, would not have been molten lava but frozen oceans, a calamity that may have been averted by a surge of greenhouse gases.

The largest Hadean impacts may have been severe, but not planet-sterilizing. Once life had developed to the point that it could spread across the planet, it would have been hard to wipe out,” said Jack Szostak, an expert on life origins at Harvard Medical School.

But the chemistry of life favors an origin on land, not the deep ocean, he said.

Still, even when the Hadean ended, a final rain of large asteroids descended on Earth at the beginning of the ensuing Archaean stage, possibly set loose when the giant planets Saturn, Uranus and Neptune drifted out into the Kuiper belt of asteroids.

This cataclysm, known as the Late Heavy Bombardment, hit Earth between 3.9 and 3.8 billion years ago.

Dr. Nutman believes life could have survived through the end of the Hadean and the bombardment. Some geologists, he notes, now think the asteroid impacts were spread over time, lessening their effects.

“The Late Heavy Bombardment is becoming less heavy as the years go by,” he said.

But others believe the bombardment was no light peppering. Evidence of these ancient craters has vanished from Earth but is still evident in the pockmarked face of the moon. And for every crater on the moon, 20 would be expected to have been made on Earth.

The moon has two craters more than 600 miles across that were created during the Late Heavy Bombardment. Some 40 craters this size may have been gouged out of our planet in the same interval, said William F. Bottke, an asteroid expert at the Southwest Research Institute in Boulder, Colo.

By comparison, the asteroid that wiped out the dinosaurs 66 million years ago left a crater only 110 miles in diameter.

If life on Earth did not begin until after the Late Heavy Bombardment, then it had a mere 100 million years in which to evolve to the quite advanced stage seen in the new fossils.

If so, Dr. Allwood wrote, then “life is not a fussy, reluctant and unlikely thing.” It will emerge whenever there’s an opportunity.

But the argument that life seems to have evolved very early and quickly, so therefore is inherently likely, can be turned around, Dr. Joyce said. “You could ask why, if life were such a probable event, we don’t have evidence of multiple origins,” he said.

In fact, with trivial variations, there is only one genetic code for all known forms of life, pointing to a single origin.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/science/oldest-fossils-on-earth.html?_r=0
 

wizards8507

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He's calling for ND to embrace its Catholic identity, instead of downplaying it in order to pursue a secular model of "success".
Yeah, I get that. Is he just saying it in general or did ND do something in particular to offend his sensibilities in that regard recently?
 

zelezo vlk

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Archbishop Chaput on ND:

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en"><p lang="en" dir="ltr">+Chaput: We already have a Stanford, Princeton, and Yale. We need a University that offers a fuller vision of what it means to be human.</p>— Timothy O'Malley (@timothypomalley) <a href="https://twitter.com/timothypomalley/status/776515319686914048">September 15, 2016</a></blockquote>
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Archbishop Chaput is a wise and orthodox man. It does not surprise me that he wishes ND to be more serious about being a Catholic university.

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BabyIrish

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Yeah, I get that. Is he just saying it in general or did ND do something in particular to offend his sensibilities in that regard recently?

I believe a pro abortion judge is being invited to speak to the students or something like that
 

Whiskeyjack

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Yeah, I get that. Is he just saying it in general or did ND do something in particular to offend his sensibilities in that regard recently?

The author of that Tweet, Timothy O'Malley, is the director of ND's Center for Liturgy. He was live-tweeting a speech by Chaput earlier today. And as BabyIrish just mentioned, I assume that the comment was prompted by ND's decision to invite Justice Ginsburg to speak on campus.

Edit: Looks like his comment was primarily about Biden's Laetare Medal:

Though Chaput was at Notre Dame, in South Bend, Ind., to deliver the 2016 Tocqueville Lecture on Religious Liberty, the university was not spared from his criticism.

He said many Catholics were deeply troubled that Notre Dame honored Vice President Biden this year with the prestigious Laetare Medal. The event was open to the public and was held in the Hesburgh Library.

"For the nation's leading Catholic university to honor a Catholic public official who supports abortion rights and then goes on to conduct a same-sex civil marriage ceremony just weeks later, is - to put it kindly - a contradiction of Notre Dame's identity," Chaput said.

"It's a baffling error of judgment. What matters isn't the vice president's personal decency or the university's admirable intentions. The problem, and it's a serious problem, is one of public witness and the damage it causes both to the faithful and to the uninformed," the archbishop said.
 
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woolybug25

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The author of that Tweet, Timothy O'Malley, is the director of ND's Center for Liturgy. He was live-tweeting a speech by Chaput earlier today. And as BabyIrish just mentioned, I assume that the comment was prompted by ND's decision to invite Justice Ginsburg to speak on campus.

She came with the agreement of steering away from the topics of abortion and same-sex marriage. She addressed neither topic. I think it's foolhardy of Chaput to want the school to restrict the student's ability to hear from people like Supreme Court justices, simply because he doesn't like their politics. It would be one thing if they were coming to promote issues the church disagrees with, but you can't expect an elite academic institution to only allow speakers that have common personal political and religious views. The world is a big place and I think the student body is intelligent enough to form their own opinions and filter out the things they disagree with in order to have broad academic experiences.

White washing the world by only giving students exposure to people they "like" is a good way to turn the university into a school only well regarded in religious study, rather an elite academic school with values based in Catholicism. We would be no better than Boston College.
 

Whiskeyjack

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She came with the agreement of steering away from the topics of abortion and same-sex marriage. She addressed neither topic.

Her invitation to speak on campus is less scandalous than I feared then. Still not a good thing for America's flagship Catholic university to be doing, though. Keep in mind that just a few months ago, the Notre Dame College Democrats were permitted to invite Wendy Davis to campus, a politician who's only claim to fame is her rabid pro-abortion advocacy...

I think it's foolhardy of Chaput to want the school to restrict the student's ability to hear from people like Supreme Court justices, simply because he doesn't like their politics. It would be one thing if they were coming to promote issues the church disagrees with, but you can't expect an elite academic institution to only allow speakers that have common personal political and religious views. The world is a big place and I think the student body is intelligent enough to form their own opinions and filter out the things they disagree with in order to have broad academic experiences.

I assume you missed my last post on the previous page. He was not advocating for censoring those whose politics he disagrees with, but for ND to cease scandalizing the Catholic Church by publicly honoring politicians who promote grave injustices like abortion.

White washing the world by only giving students exposure to people they "like" is a good way to turn the university into a school only well regarded in religious study, rather an elite academic school with values based in Catholicism. We would be no better than Boston College.

Conversely, if ND downplays its Catholic identity in a misguided attempt to be more like the elite secular universities, it risks turning into the next Georgetown-- a second-rate university with a second-rate faculty completely lacking in any distinctive features. Catholicism is the bedrock of all the good things ND has accomplished. We depart from it at our peril.
 
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Veritate Duce Progredi

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Archbishop Chaput is a baws. He was over the Denver diocese when we were there and wrote a book, "Render Unto Caeser" which is really good (from what I remember).

He is not of the simple-minded variety.
 

Whiskeyjack

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Just found a transcript of the speech +Chaput gave last Thursday:

I want to thank Dr. [Vincent] Muñoz [director of Notre Dame’s Tocqueville Program for Inquiry Into Religion and Public Life] and Father [John] Jenkins [president of Notre Dame] for inviting me to speak this afternoon. It’s a privilege and a pleasure to be here.

A lecture named after Alexis de Tocqueville will naturally involve politics. That’s a good thing, and we’ll have plenty to talk about. But I don’t want to begin there today.

I spent much of last week helping my brother and his wife with the funeral of their daughter Allison, my niece. Allison was 32. She was intelligent, beautiful and set to be married on Oct. 1. In May, she was diagnosed with cancer. Last week, she discovered that her medical treatments had failed. She died a few days later. I mention this not to cast a shadow on our discussion today — in fact, quite the opposite. Allison had a great life. She loved well, had a lot of joy and was very deeply loved. And that love will continue to live in the people who knew her.

I mention Allison because the farthest thing from anyone’s mind as she and we measured her life last week was politics.

Leon Bloy, the great French-Catholic convert, once said that — in the end — the only thing that matters is to be a saint. That’s the ultimate task of a place like Notre Dame. It’s not to help you get into a great law school, or to go to a great medical school, or to find a great job on Wall Street, as good as those things clearly are. It’s to help you get into heaven — which is not some imaginary fairyland, but an eternity of life in the presence of a loving God. If you don’t believe that, you’re in the wrong place.

Life is a gift, not an accident. And the point of life is to become the kind of fully human person who knows and loves God above everything else and reflects that love to others. That’s the only compelling reason for a university that calls itself Catholic to exist. And it’s a privilege for Notre Dame to be part of that vocation.

My comments this afternoon are simple. They come in three parts. I want to speak, first, about the impending election. Then we’ll move to the theme of today’s talk: sex, family and the liberty of the Church. Then we’ll touch on a few things we might want to remember going forward as Catholic Christians.

I come from a place where the state attorney general was just convicted of nine felonies. The FBI is investigating Philadelphia’s district attorney. Philadelphia’s second district U.S. congressman, Chaka Fattah, was forced to resign and then convicted of racketeering and influence-peddling. And several members of the state assembly from the Philadelphia area, as well as three state Supreme Court justices, were caught in various scandals.

This has all happened just in the five years I’ve been archbishop of Philadelphia. Pennsylvania has its own Wikipedia category — “Pennsylvania Politicians Convicted of Crimes” — with 58 separate entries. But the really curious thing about listing these bad actors is this. They’re familiar. They’re almost reassuring in the modesty of their appetites and lack of imagination. Selling your state assembly vote for the price of a necklace is wrong. But it’s hardly a new kind of bad behavior. And it doesn’t shake the foundations of the republic.

Regrettably, other things do.

I turn 72 later this month. I’ve been voting since 1966. That’s exactly 50 years. And in that half-century, the major parties have never, at the same time, offered two such deeply flawed presidential candidates. The 1972 Nixon/McGovern race comes close. But 2016 wins the crown.

Only God knows the human heart, so I presume that both major candidates for the White House this year intend well and have a reasonable level of personal decency behind their public images. But I also believe that each candidate is very bad news for our country, though in different ways. One candidate, in the view of a lot of people, is a belligerent demagogue with an impulse-control problem. And the other, also in the view of a lot of people, is a criminal liar, uniquely rich in stale ideas and bad priorities.

So where does that leave us? The historian Henry Adams once described the practice of politics as “the systematic organization of hatreds.” And there’s plenty in our current political season that invites cynicism. But Christians don’t have that option. We’re not allowed the luxury of cynicism for at least five reasons.

First, too many honest public officials already exist who do serve our country well.

Second, even in a year of bad presidential choices, good candidates for other public offices exist in both major parties.

Third, if Christians leave the public square, other people with much worse intentions won’t. The surest way to make the country suffer is to not contest them in public debate and in the voting booth.

Fourth, the essence of a Christian life, as Pope Francis reminds us, is hope and joy, not despair. The choices we make and the actions we take do make a difference. Like Benedict and John Paul II before him, Francis sees politics, rightly lived, as a vehicle for justice, charity and mercy. The political vocation matters because, done well, it can ennoble the society it serves.

Fifth and finally, Christians are not of the world, but we’re most definitely in it. Augustine would say that our home is the City of God, but we get there by passing through the City of Man. While we’re on the road, we have a duty to leave the world better than we found it. One of the ways we do that, however imperfectly, is through politics.

In other words, elections do matter. They matter a lot. The next president will appoint several Supreme Court justices, make vital foreign-policy decisions and shape the huge federal administrative machinery in ways over which Congress has little control. It’s good to remember that Congress didn’t create the politically vindictive HHS mandate. The Obama White House did that.

But here’s my larger point: We’ve reached a moment when our political thinking and vocabulary as a nation seem exhausted. The real effect that we as individuals have on the government and political class that claim to represent us — the big mechanical Golem we call Washington — is so slight that it breeds indifference and anger.

As Christians, then, our political engagement needs to involve more than just wringing our hands and whining about the ugly choice we face in November. It needs to be more than a search for better candidates and policies, or shrewder slogans. The task of renewing a society is much more long term than a trip every few years to the voting booth. And it requires a different kind of people. It demands that we be different people.

Augustine said that complaining about the times makes no sense because we are the times. And that means, in turn, that changing the country means first changing ourselves.

So, what does any of this have to do with sex, family and the liberty of the Church? I’ll answer the question this way.

I’ve been a priest for 46 years. During that time, I’ve heard something more than 12,000 personal confessions and done hundreds of spiritual-direction sessions. That’s a lot of listening. When you spend several thousand hours of your life, as most priests do, hearing the failures and hurts in people’s lives — men who beat their wives; women who cheat on their husbands; the addicts to porn or alcohol or drugs; the thieves, the hopeless, the self-satisfied and the self-hating — you get a pretty good picture of the world as it really is and its effect on the human soul. The confessional is more real than any reality show because nobody’s watching. It’s just you, God and the penitents, and the suffering they bring with them.

As a priest, what’s most striking to me about the last five decades is the huge spike in people — both men and women — confessing promiscuity, infidelity, sexual violence and sexual confusion as an ordinary part of life and the massive role of pornography in wrecking marriages, families and even the vocations of clergy and religious.

In a sense, this shouldn’t surprise. Sex is powerful. Sex is attractive. Sex is a basic appetite and instinct. Our sexuality is tied intimately to who we are; how we search for love and happiness; how we defeat the pervasive loneliness in life; and, for most people, how we claim some little bit of permanence in the world and its story by having children. The reason Pope Francis so forcefully rejects “gender theory” is not just because it lacks scientific support — though it certainly has that problem. Gender theory is a kind of metaphysics that subverts the very nature of sexuality by denying the male-female complementarity encoded into our bodies. In doing that, it attacks a basic building block of human identity and meaning — and by extension, the foundation of human social organization.

But let’s get back to the confessional. Listening to people’s sexual sins in the sacrament of penance is hardly new news. But the scope, the novelty, the violence and the compulsiveness of the sins are. And remember that people only come to confession when they already have some sense of right and wrong; when they already understand, at least dimly, that they need to change their lives and seek God’s mercy.

That word “mercy” is worth examining. Mercy is one of the defining and most beautiful qualities of God. Pope Francis rightly calls us to incarnate it in our own lives this year. Unfortunately, it’s also a word we can easily misuse to avoid the hard work of moral reasoning and judgment. Mercy means nothing — it’s just an exercise in sentimentality — without clarity about moral truth.

We can’t show mercy to someone who owes us nothing; someone who’s done nothing wrong. Mercy implies a pre-existing act of injustice that must be corrected. And satisfying justice requires a framework of higher truth about human meaning and behavior. It requires an understanding of truth that establishes some things as good and others as evil; some things as life-giving and others that are destructive.

Here’s why that’s important. The truth about our sexuality is that infidelity, promiscuity, sexual confusion and mass pornography create human wreckage. Multiply that wreckage by tens of millions of persons over five decades. Then compound it with media nonsense about the innocence of casual sex and the “happy” children of friendly divorces. What you get is what we have now: a dysfunctional culture of frustrated and wounded people increasingly incapable of permanent commitments, self-sacrifice and sustained intimacy, and unwilling to face the reality of their own problems.

This has political consequences. People unwilling to rule their appetites will inevitably be ruled by them — and, eventually, they’ll be ruled by someone else. People too weak to sustain faithful relationships are also too weak to be free. Sooner or later they surrender themselves to a state that compensates for their narcissism and immaturity with its own forms of social control.

People too worried or self-focused to welcome new life, to bear and raise children in a loving family, and to form them in virtue and moral character, are writing themselves out of the human story. They’re extinguishing their own future. This is what makes the resistance of so many Millennials to having children so troubling.[1]

The future belongs to people who believe in something beyond themselves and who live and sacrifice accordingly. It belongs to people who think and hope intergenerationally. If you want a portrait of what I mean, consider this: The most common name given to newborn male babies in London for the past four years in a row is Muhammad. This, in the city of Thomas More.

Weak and selfish individuals make weak and selfish marriages. Weak and selfish marriages make broken families. And broken families continue and spread the cycle of dysfunction. They do it by creating more and more wounded individuals. A vast amount of social data shows that children from broken families are much more likely to live in poverty, to be poorly educated and to have more emotional and physical health issues than children from intact families. In other words, when healthy marriages and families decline, the social costs rise.

The family is where children discover how to be human. It’s where they learn how to respect and love other people; where they see their parents sacrificing for the common good of the household; and where they discover their place in a family story larger than themselves. Raising children is beautiful, but also hard work. It’s a task for unselfish, devoted parents. And parents need the friendship and support of other like-minded parents. It takes parents to raise a child, not a legion of professional experts, as helpful as they can sometimes be.

Only a mother and father can provide the intimacy of maternal and paternal love. Many single parents do a heroic job of raising good children, and they deserve our admiration and praise. But only a mother and father can offer the unique kind of human love rooted in flesh and blood; the kind that comes from mutual submission and self-giving; the kind that comes from the complementarity of sexual difference.

No parents do this perfectly. Some fail badly. Too often the nature of modern American life helps and encourages them to fail. But in trying, parents pass along to the next generation an absolutely basic truth. It’s the truth that things like love, faith, trust, patience, understanding, tenderness, fidelity and courage really do matter, and they provide the foundation for a fully human life.

Of course, some of the worst pressures on family life come from outside the home. They come in the form of unemployment, low pay, crime, poor housing, chronic illness and bad schools.

These are vitally important issues with real human consequences. And in Catholic thought, government has a role to play in easing such problems — but not if a government works from a crippled idea of who man is, what marriage is and what a family is. And not if a government deliberately shapes its policies to interfere with and control the mediating institutions in civil society that already serve the public well. Yet this could arguably describe many of the current administration’s actions over the past seven years.

The counterweight to intrusive government is a populace of mature citizens who push back and defend the autonomy of their civil space. The problem with a consumer economy, though — as Christopher Lasch saw nearly 40 years ago — is that it creates and relies on dependent, self-absorbed consumers. It needs and breeds what Lasch called a “culture of narcissism,” forgetful of the past, addicted to the present and disinterested in the future. And it’s hard to argue with the evidence. In his inaugural speech of 1961, John F. Kennedy could still tell Americans, quite confidently, to “ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country.” Today, I wonder how many of us might find his words not only naïve and annoying, but an inversion of priorities.

If we want strong families, we need strong men and women to create and sustain them with maturity and love. And as a family of families, the Church is no different. The Church is strong when her families and individual sons and daughters are strong; when they believe what she teaches and then witness her message with courage and zeal.

She’s weak when her people are too tepid or comfortable, too eager to “fit in” or, frankly, too afraid of public disapproval to see the world as it really is. The Church is “ours” only in the sense that we belong to her as our mother and teacher in the family of God. The Church does not belong to us. We belong to her. And the Church, in turn, belongs to Jesus Christ, who guarantees her freedom, whether Caesar likes it or not.

The Church is free even in the worst persecution. She’s free even when many of her children desert her. She’s free because God does exist, and the Church depends not on numbers or resources, but on her fidelity to God’s word. But her practical liberty — her credibility and effectiveness, here and now, in our wider society — depends on us. So we should turn to that issue in the time remaining.

In his classic work Democracy in America, Tocqueville noted that the success of American democracy depended, in large part, on the strong American attachment to family and religious faith.[2]

In effect, families and churches stand between the individual and the state. They protect the autonomy of the individual by hemming in the power of government, resisting its tendency to claim the entirety of life. But they also pull us out of ourselves and teach us to engage generously with others.

As families and religious faith break down, the power of the state grows. Government fills in the spaces left behind by mediating institutions. The individual is freed from his traditional obligations. But he inherits a harder master in the state. Left to itself, as Tocqueville saw, democracy tends toward a kind of soft totalitarianism in which even a person’s most intimate concerns, from his sexual relations to his religious convictions, are swallowed by the political process.

We now live in a country where marriage, family and traditional religion all seem to be failing. And — inevitably — support for democracy itself has dropped. Fewer than 30% of U.S. Millennials think that it’s vital to live in a nation ruled democratically. Nearly a quarter of those born in the 1980s or later see democracy as a bad way to run a country. And nearly half of Americans surveyed feel that experts, not government, should “make decisions according to what they think is best for the country.” Undemocratic feelings have risen especially among the wealthy.[3]

This didn’t happen overnight. And it didn’t happen by accident. We behaved ourselves into this mess by living a collection of lies. And the essence of those lies is summed up in the so-called “mystery clause” of the 1992 Planned Parenthood v. Casey Supreme Court decision upholding the Roe v. Wade abortion decision.

Writing for the majority in Casey, Justice Anthony Kennedy claimed, “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” This is the perfect manifesto of a liberal democratic fantasy: the sovereign, self-creating self. But it’s a lie. It’s the very opposite of real Christian freedom. And to the degree we excuse or cooperate with it, we make ourselves liars.

The Gospel of John reminds us that the truth, and only the truth, makes us free. We’re fully human and free only when we live under the authority of the truth. And in that light, no issue has made us more dishonest and less free as believers and as a nation than abortion. People uncomfortable with the abortion issue argue, quite properly, that Catholic teaching is bigger than just one issue. Other urgent issues also need our attention. Being pro-birth is not the same as being pro-life. And being truly “pro-life” doesn’t end with defending the unborn child.

But it does, and it must begin there. To borrow some words from one of Notre Dame’s distinguished alumni: Abortion has been “the beachhead for an entire ethic that is hostile to life, hostile to marriage and, as we see from the [HHS] contraceptive mandate, increasingly hostile to religion, religious Americans and religious institutions.”[4] Abortion poisons everything. There can never be anything “progressive” in killing an unborn child, or standing aside tolerantly while others do it.

In every abortion, an innocent life always dies. This is why no equivalence can ever exist between the intentional killing involved in abortion, infanticide and euthanasia, on the one hand, and issues like homelessness, the death penalty and anti-poverty policy on the other. Again, all of these issues are important. But trying to reason or imply them into having the same moral weight is a debasement of Christian thought.

This is why so many Catholics — beginning, to his credit, with Bishop [Kevin] Rhoades [of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Indiana] — were so deeply troubled when Vice President [Joseph] Biden received the university’s Laetare Medal earlier this year.

For the nation’s leading Catholic university to honor a Catholic public official who supports abortion rights and then goes on to conduct a same-sex civil marriage ceremony just weeks later, is — to put it kindly — a contradiction of Notre Dame’s identity. It’s a baffling error of judgment. What matters isn’t the vice president’s personal decency or the university’s admirable intentions. The problem, and it’s a serious problem, is one of public witness and the damage it causes both to the faithful and to the uninformed.

I mention this less to criticize than to encourage. Unlike so many other institutions that describe themselves as “Catholic,” Notre Dame really is still deeply Catholic, not just in its marketing, but in its soul. Brad Gregory, Mary Keys, John Cavadini, Gerard Bradley, Patrick Deneen, Ann Astell, Father Bill Miscamble, Carter Snead, Nicole Garnett, Richard Garnett, Christian Smith, Francesca Murphy, Dan Philpott, Dr. Muñoz and so many others — all of these exceptional scholars teach here. And they privilege the Catholic community with their fidelity, their intellects and their service.

Of course, from those who receive much, a lot is expected. It’s quite stunning to walk this campus and see the beauty of the buildings, the scope of the stadium, the energy of the students and the constant pace of growth. But I hope Notre Dame never stops examining the fundamental why of its mission. What kind of success is really success? It seems to me that we already have a Princeton, a Stanford and a Yale. We don’t need a Catholic version of any them.

What the Church needs now is a university that radiates the glory of God in an age that no longer knows what it means to be human. What the people of God need now is a university that fuses the joy of Francis with the brilliance of Benedict and the courage, fidelity and humanity of the great John Paul.

I said at the start of my remarks that the task of renewing the life of our nation requires a different kind of people. It demands that we be different people. The power of the powerless, Václav Havel once wrote, consists not in clever political strategies, but in the simple, daily discipline of living within the truth and refusing to lie. Surely there’s no better way to begin that work than here and now. And creating the “different kind of people” we need is — and should be — the mission of this university.

[1] Ironically, Millennials are less sexually active than Baby Boomers and Gen X individuals were at the same age and are either delaying child-bearing or avoiding it altogether. See, among other stories, Catherine Rampell, “Bad news for older folks: Millennials are having fewer babies,” The Washington Post, May 4, 2015; Claritza Jimenez, “The sex lives of Millennials,” The Washington Post, June 30, 2016; R. R. Reno, “While we’re at it,” First Things, October 2016; Isabelle Kohn, “9 brutally real reasons why Millennials refuse to have kids,” The Rooster, September 1, 2016; etc.

[2] See “Democracy and Religion” in Pierre Manent, Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy, Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, MD, 1996, p. 83-107

[3] Rebecca Burgess, “When it’s democracy itself they disavow,” American Enterprise Institute, August 22, 2016; data drawn from Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mouk, writing in the Journal of Democracy

[4] Rachel O’Grady, The Observer, August 30, 2016, interview with William McGurn of The Wall Street Journal
 

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Whiskeyjack

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Did he say anything about the morality of keeping BVG and his deplorable defense around campus?

He spent a good chunk of the speech condemning abortion. That's a fair description of BvG's defense, no?
 

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He spent a good chunk of the speech condemning abortion. That's a fair description of BvG's defense, no?

I'll take it! Then it's settled-- even Archbishop Chaput is against BVG. I keep liking him more every time I read something by or about him.
 

zelezo vlk

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There's a reason that Denver seems to have a good number of strong and orthodox men joining seminary, and Chaput was a huge part of it.

Sent from my SAMSUNG-SM-G900A using Tapatalk
 

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The Atlantic's David Frum just published an article titled "What Would It Mean for France to Accommodate Muslims?":

It is only by the greatest good luck that we are not this month mourning dozens of victims of mass-casualty terrorism in New York, Jew Jersey, and Minnesota. There was no Chelsea massacre in September 2016, no St. Cloud slaughter, to join the sad toll: Orlando, June 2016; San Bernardino, December 2015; Chattanooga, July 2015; Boston, April 2013; Fort Hood, November 2009.

Perhaps because they failed to generate fear and sorrow, the Chelsea attempt and the St. Cloud attack succeeded in generating lively controversy. Chelsea, St. Cloud, Orlando, San Bernardino, Chattanooga, Fort Hood—they seem to form a pattern, but do they? And if so, a pattern of what?

That question became instantly controversial on the night of September 17. Politicians tussled over whether to call the attacks “terrorism,” and if terrorism, of what kind.

“Hillary Clinton won't even say the words ‘radical Islamic terrorism.’ She won't say the words.” That was Donald Trump’s message to supporters in Toledo, Ohio, on September 21.

Clinton had already faced—and replied to—similar criticism after the Orlando massacre.

“From my perspective,” she said, “it matters what we do more than what we say. And it mattered we got bin Laden, not what name we called him. I have clearly said we—whether you call it radical jihadism or radical Islamism, I’m happy to say either. I think they mean the same thing.”

When commentators dismiss such concerns as “mere semantics,” they mean to say: “This is a futile, pointless discussion.”

That’s a mistake. Semantics is the branch of linguistics and logic that deals with meaning. When we argue over what to call a crime like the stabbings in St. Cloud and the bombings in New York and New Jersey, we are arguing over what they mean. That’s a supremely important conversation.

Last year, a distinguished French philosopher named Pierre Manent attempted to offer an answer in a book-length essay, Beyond Radical Secularism. He began writing after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015, and published just before the atrocious mass murders of November 2015.

The book was very widely debated and discussed in France. Americans may have more trouble assimilating it, because of its very French style. Beyond Radical Secularism is a book of bold assertions and heroic generalizations. We flinch from those on the western side of the Atlantic (if I may hazard a bold assertion and heroic generalization of my own). But if we flinch in this case, we’ll miss something important—not only to our French friends and partners, but to ourselves.

Pierre Manent writes: “If, in order to analyze the same phenomenon, one person repeatedly uses the word ‘Islam,’ whereas another recommends above all that this word be avoided, it is clear that we are condemning ourselves to going around in a sterile circle, and not without the ritual exchange of offensive epithets.”

Manent is one of those who want to use the word “Islam,” not in order to blame or condemn a group of people (he very sedulously refrains from doing anything like that), but in order to identify more precisely the challenge Western societies face in consequence of the large-scale migration from Muslim-majority lands. The French version of the challenge is particularly extreme: It has entailed not only spectacular acts of terrorism, but a proliferation of lower-intensity confrontations between Muslim citizens and state authority. One view, often heard in the United States, attributes France’s difficulties with Muslim migration not to the migration, but to the society receiving the migration.

“France seems to alienate many more of its citizens and residents, well beyond those who actually join the Islamic State,” wrote the sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar in The New York Times in July 2016. Khosrokhavar’s explanation of this alienation will sound familiar, for it is often heard in the United States:

Britain and Germany give non-local minorities ample leeway to publicly express and practice their religious and communal preferences. France insists—in the name of republicanism—that religion should remain a strictly private affair. An ideological nation par excellence, it focuses on symbolic issues like wearing headscarves or holding collective prayers in public places.

This is a reassuring message, if not for the French, then for everybody else. Avoid French mistakes, and you avoid French results. Only … other nations are experiencing French results, in lesser degrees—the United States very much included. Alongside the roster of terrorist crimes over the past decade should be considered the longer tally of failed, foiled, or botched attempts: a car bomb in Times Square, a model-aircraft bomb allegedly destined for the Pentagon, and so on. These attempts often look incompetent, even ridiculous, after they are thwarted. Unlike the terrorists of 15 years ago, the people involved in such plots in the United States operate with much less, if any, support from international networks. Yet what they do indicate is that the difference between the French and other Western countries may be explained less in terms of France’s Revolutionary tradition, much more in terms of France’s—until recently—much larger Muslim minority population (almost 8 percent). As migration has recently swelled Muslim minority populations in Sweden and Germany, they too have experienced higher levels of alienation and conflict, most notoriously the New Year’s Eve sexual assaults of December 31, 2015.

Manent wants to inscribe religious and cultural conflict into the very center of this story.

The immense majority of our Muslim fellow citizens have nothing to do with terrorism, but terrorism would not be what it is, it would not have the same reach or significance, if the terrorists did not belong to this population and were not our fellow citizens. These terrorist acts would simply be odious crimes subject to ordinary justice if they were not guided by an aim of war and by the intent to ruin the very possibility of a common life. … It is not because of a few actions by the ‘unbalanced’ that the French state has given military protection to the Jewish institutions of France, including especially Jewish schools.

Here’s what Manent sees:

The Muslim world in North Africa, the Middle East, and West Asia has entered a period of crisis and failure. Millions of people have emigrated from this world to the West. They brought their old faith, culture, and habits of life with them—and the receiving countries were too morally enfeebled to impose change upon them. Those receiving countries have lost faith in their old religions, and in their own nationhoods.

This is not a story of right and wrong, in Manent’s telling.

It would be quite inappropriate for Europeans and more generally Westerners to be scandalized, since they have for four centuries been the great expansive force in the world and have for four centuries laid down the law for the world. Human things do not stand still; they go forward or backward, either momentum is on their side or it is not. … There was an immense tide that came from Europe and covered the world, or almost. The shrinkage we are now witnessing is less spectacular, but it is much more significant because, rather than retracting or withdrawing the often-artificial or unjust extensions of its power, Europe is disarming itself at its core.

Yet if it is not a scandal, it remains a shock for Europeans, for the first time in a long time, to see their societies reshaped from outside, rather than from within. But this reshaping is not a morality tale either, from Manent’s point of view.

We did not impose conditions upon their settling here, and so they have not violated them. Having been accepted as equals, they thus have every right to think that they were accepted “as they were.” We cannot reverse this acceptance without breaking the tacit contract that has accompanied immigration over the last forty years.

That short phrase “as they were” expresses the assumption on the author’s part likely to seem most obvious to a French reader—and most frustratingly in need of substantiation to an American reader.

Is it really true that the Muslim immigrants to Europe are not assimilating to European ways? Manent insists that they are not, not in an argumentative way, but rather in a tone that makes clear that he is saying something his audience will find obvious and uncontroversial. Americans—with their passionate conviction of the inevitability of assimilation—may wonder at Manent’s pessimistic certainty.

We may grant the diversity of individual paths and the social and moral heterogeneity that exists among French Muslims, but it remains that in our country we are we witnessing the extension and consolidation of Muslim practices rather than its shrinking or relaxation. This social fact is also the major political fact that we must take into account. To take it into account is first of all to accept the fact that on this matter we have very little power. Our Muslim fellow citizens are now too numerous, Islam has too much authority, and the Republic—or France, or Europe—too little for things to be otherwise. I therefore conclude that our regime must concede, and frankly accept their ways, since the Muslims are our fellow citizens.

Americans may likewise be jarred by Manent’s easy “us” and “them.” American public discourse often holds that “we” have no religious identity—and that “they” instantly become “us” by the act of naturalization. President Obama has boldly ventured even further, repeatedly (and anti-historically) insisting that “Islam has always been part of America.”

Manent has no patience for any of this.

Islam, as a human association and a way of life, is just as external to France’s history as Catholicism has been internal to it. … To be internal is not in itself meritorious, and to be external is no disgrace; but this difference of situation obviously has immense consequences for the social ... possibilities that are before us.

Manent stresses that he does not write as a Catholic, or even as a believer. A former student of the French sociologist Raymond Aron, he upholds France’s embattled liberal tradition. He writes generously and movingly of France’s Jewish minority, of Christian Europe’s guilt in the Holocaust, and of the meaning and importance of the state of Israel. History however remains history, and France remains “a country of Christian mark,” in the ingenious phrase of Manent’s translator, Ralph C. Hancock of Brigham Young University. Thus, while France had to emancipate itself from political Catholicism in order to become liberal, nobody ever worried about how to integrate Catholics into French society. To be French is precisely to belong to a country shaped by Catholicism and by Christianity more generally—and likewise, to belong to a country not shaped by Islam except—until comparatively recently—as something foreign, exotic, and often dangerous.

But if Manent does not hold anyone up to blame, the results of the process he describes remain in his view highly blameworthy: an accelerating breakdown of national life, as ever-greater numbers of French citizens reject both the law of the state and the norms of society. To make a success of the migration, he argues, the law and those norms must be reimposed—and in order to be reimposed, they must adapt to new circumstances.

What would “adaptation” mean?

It probably sounds uncouth in French, but a social-science-minded American might call Manent’s solution “tragic asymmetrical multiculturalism.”

Multiculturalism: Western society should, he argues, find room for Muslim faith and cultural practices. The hijab and other religious symbols should be permitted in public and official places. Where requested, public swimming pools should set hours for single-sex swimming. Local governments should subsidize the creation of Muslim prayer spaces where they are in short supply. Manent proposes only two exceptions to the rule of accommodation: no tolerance for polygamy or for face-veiling. The latter practice, he argues, attacks the possibility of common life by cutting human beings off from interaction with follow citizens.

Asymmetrical: The quid pro quo for accommodation of the minority is the acceptance by the minority that it is a minority within a society that will continue to reject many of its core beliefs. French Muslims do not “enter into an empty space, but will have to find their place within a world that is full,” Manent writes. What France can offer is permission to “form a distinct community within a larger community that is not Muslim and that everybody knows is not Muslim.” What it cannot accept is a minority “wishing secretly to rule.” Crucial to achieving this balance is a rediscovery by non-Muslim French of their own identity and nationhood. Manent remarks how strange it is that while everybody willingly names French Muslims, there is no name for French non-Muslims. One community can be identified by what it is; the other only only as those who happen not to belong to that one identifiable community. A community defined only by what it is not, is no community at all—and certainly not a community that can successfully coexist with a sub-community strongly defined by its own obligatory rule of morals and customs.

Finally, tragic: The solution proposed by Manent is not a solution that he welcomes. On the contrary: “[W]e are forced to make concessions that we would rather not make, or to accept a transformation of our country that we would have preferred to avoid, and that even sometimes deeply saddens us.” He puts little faith in promises that Islam will modernize in ways that Westerners will find more congenial: “[W]e renounce the vain and somewhat condescending idea of an authoritarian ‘modernizing’ of their way of life.” Such talk “overestimates enormously the powers of secularism while underestimating Islam’s capacity of resistance or affirmation.”

Americans will find Manent’s analysis and prescriptions very strange, but maybe less strange than they might have in former years. Liberal-minded Americans resist interpreting men like the Chelsea bomber as religiously motivated, lest that interpretation open the door to intolerance. This resistance leads them to deny the killers’ and would-be killers’ own stated explanation for their actions. Even more ludicrously, it drives the president of this secular republic to issue pronouncements on what is and what is not truly Islamic.

Manent is writing in a French manner for French people about French problems. Americans face different problems, and they talk about them in different ways. Yet there is wisdom to be gained from Manent’s profound intelligence despite this. As one listens to the frantic circumlocutions of politicians and law-enforcement officers after incidents like those of September 17, it would be well to keep in mind this sharp and mercilessly witty observation from Paris:

We have ... borrowed from Islamic propaganda the notion of Islamophobia that now plays a major and troubling role in our social and political life. It has no meaning, but it has a function. The notion of Islamophobia makes it possible tendentiously to disqualify all speech on Islam or on the Muslims. Anyone who begins a sentence by the term “Muslims” knows that he must be careful about the words that follow, for an offense is in the making. It is possible to speak calmly of Muslims only in order to give voice to legitimate complaints that they address or could address to the rest of the social body. … We can speak of Muslims to say that they have too few mosques and of Christians to say that they have too many churches. Once the notion of Islamophobia is established and validated, it is impossible to speak of Muslims except to state their grievances, and they cannot speak except to complain.
 

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Sohrab Ahmari just published his conversion story in the Catholic Herald titled "My journey from Tehran to Rome":

On July 26, I announced my decision to join the Catholic Church. Hours earlier, a pair of jihadists had attacked a church in France and murdered a priest, Fr Jacques Hamel, while he was celebrating Mass.

Two months before that, I had begun studying one-on-one with a priest in London, reading Catholic books and immersing myself in the catechumen’s life. But I had no intention of going public with my conversion, not until after being received into the Church.

When news of the killing first broke, I knew next to nothing about Fr Hamel. Photos online showed an octogenarian priest with wispy white hair and a look of quiet, ordinary holiness.

This priest, this man, had been forced to kneel and had his throat slit in the name of ISIS – an evil act that demanded a response. So like any good millennial, I took to my Twitter account and wrote: “#IAmJacques Hamel. In fact, this is the right moment to announce I’m converting to Roman Catholicism.” It was an impulsive thing to do, not exactly in keeping with our Lord’s teaching to be as wise as serpents.

Over the next 48 hours, thousands of people re-tweeted me, and hundreds contacted me through social media. Then my announcement made its way to Christian media. Well-meaning journalists read my Wikipedia entry, noted that I’d been born and raised in Iran, and concluded: Fr Hamel’s final act had been to convert a Muslim.

Thousands more shared these news stories on Twitter and Facebook, usually accompanied by the famous saying of Tertullian that “the blood of martyrs is the seed of the Church”. I wished my road to Rome had been as easy as “Moslem Writer Moved by Priest’s Martyrdom to Convert to Catholicism” (an actual headline from a Catholic outlet). The real story was much longer and more complicated.

When I was 12, I decided that there was no God. I remember the circumstances only vaguely. The year must have been 1997. I was on holiday with my parents in northern Iran, by the Caspian Sea. Many middle-class Iranians from the capital, Tehran, own modest cottages on the Caspian shore. My parents didn’t, but they had friends who did, and the summertime “villa trip” was a tradition.

I trace some of my happiest memories to these trips. There were usually other children – a delight for me, an only child. The days were invariably spent on the beach. Sharia law demanded strict separation of the sexes at sea. At most public beaches, the regime curtained off the water to create separate men’s and women’s areas. Everywhere there were banners and posters that read: “My sister, mind your veil. My brother, mind your eyes.”

But my parents and their friends usually found hidden corners where men and women could share the beach, away from the watchful eyes of the Islamic Republic’s morality committees. They would even bring bottles of araq, Iran’s searing home made spirit, in defiance of official prohibition. If the morality police showed up in their signature Toyota 4x4s, all wasn’t lost. Most of the officers could be bribed to overlook such iniquities.

The adults in the party would receive a stern scolding. They would make excuses, apologise and vow never to do it again.

Then the officers would say: “Well, if you’re having a good time, give us a taste of your candy.” This was the signal for the men to reach for their wallets, pool their cash and pay off the provincials. (There was always a non-zero chance, however, that the officer in charge was a true believer. Then a flogging could be in order.)

One night during that summer of 1997, in the borderland between childhood and pubescence, I began thinking seriously for the first time about all this. We’d returned to the villa from the beach. The air inside was dank with humidity. Evenings were reserved for cards and a barbecue, but I didn’t feel like sitting at the adult card table or horseplaying with the other kids. Maybe I’d had some dispute with the adults, though I can’t recall the substance.

I do remember retreating to my bunk bed upstairs and cursing everything. Religion, I concluded right then and there, was little more than a ritual of public hypocrisy – one that I’d be expected to perform. In our roshan-fekr (urbane, intellectual) milieu, piety was a sign of backwardness. But we feigned piety in public to keep our heads in the Islamic Republic. The trick was to take care that one’s double lives didn’t intersect.

Well, not if I could help it. At school, I had already begun clashing with my Koran teacher, whose real job was to inculcate students in the regime’s ideology, a mix of Shia chauvinism, anti-Americanism and Jew-hatred. When we returned from holiday, I escalated the war at school. Had I been a bit older it would have landed me in jail. But I was emboldened by the knowledge that soon my mother and I would be granted US green cards and immigrate to America.

At home, I air-drummed to Pink Floyd and read my father’s weather-beaten copy of Catcher in the Rye. My parents had divorced in 1991, but for my sake they’d kept up a charade of being married and living under the same roof. Now the marital theatre was over. The Floyd tapes, the Persian-language Salinger novel and a Japanese Noh mask were my father’s last gifts to me before my mother and I left Iran. I haven’t seen him since.

Eden, Utah (population 600) is a ski resort nestled in the Rockies, a couple of hours’ drive north of Salt Lake City. Eden was where my mother and I first arrived after emigrating from Iran. My uncle, my mother’s brother, had settled there not long after Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, and so the Beehive State became our home when we followed him two decades later. We were now in the heart of Mormon country.

Utah was a place of astonishing natural beauty, with a deeply religious and conservative culture. Alcohol in beer was capped at three per cent by law. Coffee was considered sinful. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints maintained seminaries right next to most public schools. It taught that ancient Israelites had come to America, attempted to convert the natives and recounted their trials and New World revelations in golden tablets that form a sort of sequel to the Bible.

Mormonism came as a shock, and the shame of becoming déclassé compounded it. We weren’t wealthy in Tehran, but we lived respectably, in a vast two-storey house my grandfather had built.

In Utah, we initially lived in a tiny mobile home in a college town called Logan after moving out of my uncle’s. When I hitched rides with school friends, I’d ask them to drop me off a few blocks away so they wouldn’t find out where I lived.

Then there was the sheer awkwardness of being fresh off the boat. Thanks to private tutoring and years spent watching American movies in the Islamic Republic, I was nearly fluent in English before ever setting foot in the US. But mastering American mores was tougher. Being secular-minded in Iran was one thing; the free and close proximity to girls in school something else.

Well, all this was fuel for the revolution I’d first launched in the old country. If Shia Islam, with its rich iconography and theology, was all hypocrisy, then Mormonism and America’s Protestant ethic and cheerful consumerism were even more contemptible – and equally repressive in their own way. I’ve moved from one theocracy to another, I used to joke. It was an obscene comparison, but it helped me make sense of my circumstances.

I began dressing in black every day, contrived a gloomy persona and – this last probably saved me – read voraciously. Just before university, I discovered Friedrich Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra in a Salt Lake City bookstore. It set me off on an intellectual and spiritual road that, many years later, would bring me to an unlikely destination: the Roman Catholic Church.

Reading important books on your own in your late teens is an intoxicating business. Your critical faculties are still only half-formed. So you read each author thinking, “He’s so right!” and “Isn’t it just so!” – without pausing to note the differences among the various authors, let alone your own doubts and objections.

That was the case with me, anyway. If I could go back, I would try to read the great books in some coherent order, closely and critically, preferably with a good teacher. I didn’t lack for opportunities to do that. But I was too arrogant to allow anyone to tell me how and what to read.

I began with the half-mad Nietzsche. He proclaimed that God is dead and that Judeo-Christian morality is the product of a slave mentality, allowing the weak to vent their ressentiment at the strong. Well, wasn’t it just so with these obedient Mormons, these American bumpkins? Zarathustra spoke to my soul. I missed most of Nietzsche’s biblical allusions, but it didn’t matter. The point was to surpass God, and good and evil, to arrive at a new morality (whatever that meant).

Nietzsche opened up the whole constellation of existentialist philosophy (mainly Sartre and Camus) and the existential-ish novel (Bataille, Dostoevsky, Hesse and Kafka). I majored in philosophy as an undergraduate, and I would get decent marks with essays arguing, for example, that “the very possibility of a metaphysics is foreclosed after Auschwitz and Hiroshima”, or that “we are condemned to responsibility in a world divested of meaning” (or some such).

My confidence was born of the fact that I had almost no real sense of the things I was writing about – of the gravity of real life. I lived totally in my head. There, the world was meaningless; and if there was any point to life, it could only be reached on the far side of God’s absence.

Camus and Sartre, my existentialist heroes, disagreed over what to do in this meaningless world. Camus favoured a kind of personal and situational ethics over grand political projects. Man’s tragic destiny, the fragility and absurdity of his life, lent him a certain dignity, and the point for Camus was to uphold that dignity. Sartre, the communist, thought it was class struggle that opened the way to man’s true ground of freedom and commitment. I went the Sartre route.

The next stop was Marxism – specifically Trotskyism, a more romantic strand of the totalitarian ideology. In retrospect, it’s obvious why Marxism appealed to me: it went well with the latent anti-Americanism still imprinted on my Iranian mind. With Marxism, I could oppose the US as the evil capitalist hegemon without having to buy into any fanatical Shia mumbo-jumbo. It also assuaged my own class anxieties. My economic displacement, you see, was but a small ripple in the dialectic.

I signed up to a Trotskyite group called Socialist Alternative. In my free time, I hawked its pamphlets and joined labour union picket lines (rest assured, I did my share of hooking up, hard drinking and drugs, too). I wept after finishing The Prophet, Isaac Deutscher’s three-volume hagiography of Trotsky. I wept for a Soviet leader, and became insufferably self-righteous.

But Marxism never was able to answer questions having to do with my inner life. It didn’t banish my personal demons, or give a satisfying account of what I now would call fallenness – my own and others’. Nor, for that matter, did Lacanian psychoanalysis, the Frankfurt School, post-structuralism, queer theory or any of the other fashionable philosophies I tried on, each in turn.

Glancing at life’s rear-view mirror, there is always a temptation to impose more cohesion on one’s thoughts than they possessed at the time. I’m no doubt doing that now. But if I were to boil down my worldview as a young man, before I came to the faith, to a single idea, it would be this: man’s place in the world is unsettled; we are homeless.

Capitalism’s pitiless destruction of older social forms, Darwin’s discovery of evolution, Freud’s conquest of the unconscious, the political horrors of the 20th century – all these things had made it impossible to cling to any eternal or permanent truth about humanity. The ancient prophets and philosophers had deluded themselves. Everything about people was a product of historical conditions and social power dynamics. And therefore people were infinitely malleable.

There were only two problems. First, these ideas didn’t withstand the scrutiny of real life. After university, I was accepted into a programme called Teach for America – the British equivalent is Teach First – which dispatches recent graduates to classrooms in the inner cities and underserved rural areas. My assignment took me to the Rio Grande Valley region of Texas, on the US-Mexico border. Nine out of 10 students at my school received subsidised lunches from the government, and the region was (and is) caught in the crossfire of America’s war on drugs.

As a committed leftist, I had to believe that the achievement gap between rich and poor students was purely a problem of redistributive justice. If only schools in the Valley were as richly funded as those in white, suburban districts, there would be no achievement gap.

My teaching career quickly disabused me of these notions. Even in the direst classrooms, great teachers – I wasn’t one, by the way – could make tremendous gains with students by setting high expectations and emphasising hard work, honesty and tough discipline.

That may not sound like an earth-shattering realisation to you, but it was for me. It didn’t lead me directly to Almighty God, but it suggested that there were gradations of character in all human circumstances. That there was great wisdom in old moralistic notions I used to sneer at. And, maybe, that there were permanent things about what makes all people tick. To judge the moral gradations implied some universal standard. And more often than not, that standard arose, not from anything external, but from a voice inside (a whisper in my case).

Well, as CS Lewis would ask: where did that whisper originate? And was it a coincidence that the other view – the one that said that morality is merely a function of power, history, biology, language and so on – gave me an alibi for shutting out the whisper when it became inconvenient?

If there were differences among individuals – if some ideas about right and wrong were better than others – the same held for nations. I’d spent enough time in the US and Iran to tell the difference. Ideologies that saw citizens as infinitely malleable to the whims of the state – modern political Islam is one of them – were capable of any monstrosity. Whereas societies that treated man as inherently dignified, while far from perfect, fostered genuine human flourishing. They were manifestly more pleasant to live in.

Well, where did the West get this curious notion that human beings have an inherent dignity that overrides the whims of Pharaoh? Recognising the Judeo-Christian foundations of the West didn’t make me a Christian, of course. But it helped. If I enjoyed the beauty and ordered liberty I saw around me, then I had to give credit to the ideals that gave birth to it. You couldn’t have one without the other. The beauty and order reflected an underlying truth. It wasn’t my truth, but I no longer lightly dismissed faith.

If pressed back then, I would say: “I don’t have the gift of faith, but I profoundly respect people of faith and their contributions, etc etc.” It was a sort of reverent boilerplate that I’d perfected for the occasion.

it wasn’t true. And this brings me to the second problem I ran into with my materialism. All along, going back to that 12-year-old profession of atheism, when I really wanted something or when I was in trouble, I’d recite the few Koranic verses I knew. Or, more often, I’d supplicate a non-denominational Almighty in the sky. Then, once the desired thing was obtained or trouble past, I’d feel a bit silly and return to my materialist certainties.

My hunger for God persisted, though, and I’d feel the pangs most acutely in moments of great shame. My life’s overall trajectory was upward, but it was marked by bursts of dangerous anger and self-destructive behaviour. Shame begat shame, and the cycle repeated itself, even as I went from material success to success. I needed something or someone to break the cycle.

Twice following bouts of heavy drinking in my early 20s I found myself instinctively, almost spontaneously, going to Catholic Mass. I really couldn’t tell you why, but I just sat in the back pews and felt waves of peace wash over me – without having any clue as to what was going on.

There was no definitive moment that led from those early experiences with the Mass to my knocking on a priest’s door and asking him to instruct me earlier this year. There were no visions or sudden epiphanies.

Somewhere along the way, I resolved to be honest with myself, if not others, about my need for Almighty God. One milestone was Benedict XVI’s visit to America in 2008. I was deeply impressed by his ministry and remember thinking to myself that this was a very holy man.

I picked up his book Jesus of Nazareth. It went over my head, mostly because my grasp of Scripture was still terribly spotty, and you can’t make sense of Jesus of Nazareth without knowing the Bible. I’d read the Passion story in one of the Gospels as an undergraduate and Robert Alter’s marvellous translation of the Pentateuch after college. That was it. The one thing that stayed with me from Benedict XVI’s book was the Pope’s profound meditation on the idea that Almighty God had become man and entered our history – which is to say, the central mystery of Christianity. Et incarnatus est.

Making some sense of the Incarnation “unlocked”, if you will, the civilisational glories of the West and imbued them with real meaning for me.

Take Caravaggio’s The Denial of St Peter, my favourite painting, a work that can bring me to tears. I could have told you all about Caravaggio’s tumultuous life, spoken at length about why the painting is considered a masterpiece, and recounted the basics about the events he was portraying. But then I came to understand why any of this mattered: that the Person whom St Peter is denying isn’t just his great friend and teacher, but the very God Himself, God from God, who has entered our fallen world. And whose greatest act is to endure humiliation, be spat upon, crucified and even denied by his friends.

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The Denial of St Peter, by Caravaggio

The beauty of the painting became, for me, a sign of the underlying truth. The story of the three denials, in other words, was no longer just a moving narrative, but part of an event upon which all of cosmic history pivots. More than that: an event and an idea that shook me to my core.

Still, I continued aestheticising my spirituality. Among friends I’d sometimes inject Christian themes into the conversation only to quickly add: “You know, I don’t take this stuff to be true – but it is all very beautiful, isn’t it? It’s been a civilising force, no?”

St Peter had nothing on me in the denial department. Until one day I stopped denying.

You may still ask: why Catholicism? Well, I dabbled for a couple of years with Evangelical Christianity. Catholics don’t exactly send you text messages asking: “Would you and your wife like to join us for Sunday service?” Evangelicals do.

My mother was Born Again a few years ago, and as a journalist, I would occasionally write about persecuted Christians in Iran and the Arab world. One of my sources, a conservative Evangelical activist who campaigns for the persecuted Church, became a great source of encouragement in my Christian journey.

In the end, though, I couldn’t do anything with Evangelical Christianity. I admired Evangelicals, but their theology didn’t satisfy. I couldn’t just blink and conclude “I’ve been saved.”

Life experience had led me to see the Christian idea of the Fall, and our Lord’s gift of radical repentance, as the most sensible solution to the brokenness all around me. That much was clear. But with Catholicism there was the added assurance that came with two millennia of continuous authority. The Church’s hierarchical character, which so repelled my Evangelical friends, was one of its attractions for me. It meant that, having seen off a thousand heresies, Rome would be less likely to permit the Christian idea to be distorted by the passing fads of the day. And those fads – from leftist politics to “mindfulness” to Indian banana treatments – looked like so many third-rate substitutes for Catholic sacramental life.

Then there was the liturgy. I longed for worship that gave full expression to the mysteries of the Christian faith. The Cross had to be there, but also our Lord’s crucified body – with the pierced side, and the bloodied hands, the scourged and welted back, and the thorns cutting into the forehead. The sacrifice had to be restaged, and His Mother had to be there, too, because she was our link to His divinity, to His becoming flesh. I longed for the Mass, in other words.

So I returned to the Mass. And eventually I knocked on that priest’s door and told him that I wanted to become a Catholic. “OK,” he said simply. “I shall instruct you.” Now, I can pray, more often than not without feeling a shred of hypocrisy, “Hail, Mary, full of grace …” And add with confidence: “Fr Hamel, pray for us.”
 
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zelezo vlk

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Beautiful.

ETA: I'm glad that he gave a shout out to Benny. The Pope Emeritus is quickly becoming a huge influence of mine.
 
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Whiskeyjack

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Happy Lepanto Day:

Battle_of_Lepanto_1571.jpg


RR Reno just published an article in the Catholic Herald titled "Decline and fall of the post-Christian elite":

A recent poll has Donald Trump leading Hillary Clinton. Handicapping this horse race is futile, given the volatile American electorate. But the question remains: how can a reality TV “blowhard” with an enlarged, fragile ego, impulse-control problems and bad hair be so close to becoming President of the United States? Some answer that it’s economic hard times for those left behind by globalisation. Others point to income inequality. Still others blame an increasingly minute and punitive political correctness. And of course there’s the omnibus explanation that lots of Americans are racists, homophobic and anti-immigrant.

Each true, perhaps, at least to some extent. Something else is at work, however. Over the past generation, our ruling classes have become increasingly homogeneous and now form a global elite. They present themselves as indispensable technocrats, ensuring global prosperity and protecting human rights. Trump’s unexpected ascendancy, like the shocking Brexit vote and rising populism in some countries in continental Europe, is a vote of no confidence in the ruling class.

What defines this ruling class? Crucially, they are anti-metaphysical: economic analysis, they believe, gets us to the bottom of what’s really going on in human affairs. More than 50 years ago, the University of Chicago economist Gary Becker pioneered economic analysis of social phenomena that, at first glance, seem far removed from the marketplace. He wrote about the economics of racial discrimination and family life. In this work a key anthropological assumption gets made. The essential characteristic of the human person is “preference maximisation”.

In itself, emphasis on preference maximisation captures a deep truth. As St Augustine wrote, “Our hearts are restless, until they find their rest in thee.” His Confessions are, in a sense, accounts of the economy of the God-desiring human heart. However, our global elite prefers preferences that are oriented toward material well-being. Technical expertise concerns that which can be measured. Economic analysis, therefore, ends up reinforcing a reductive materialism. This same is true for the technocratic elite who claim expertise in other areas.

The anti-metaphysical dogma leads to the rhetoric of unmasking. If Northumbrian voters opted to leave the European Union, it is because they resented (wrongly, according to some experts) wage competition from immigrants. Or they suffer from a psychological disorder: xenophobia. It’s difficult for a member of the global elite to formulate in his mind the possibility that someone cherishes patriotic solidarity for its own sake. The anti-metaphysical dogma rules out such desires, just as it rules out a desire to rest in God.

Economics serves as the first philosophy for today’s global elite, so let’s take a look at the central bankers. The chair of the Federal Reserve, Janet Yellen, is an outlier: her PhD is from Yale University. Her predecessor, Ben Bernanke, got his from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where, as an assistant professor, he shared an office with former Bank of England Governor Mervyn King, then a visiting scholar. Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, got his PhD from MIT.

With a few exceptions, economists in powerful positions have degrees from five or six US economics departments, all of which teach the now world-dominant consensus developed at MIT after 1960. Perhaps the best term for this consensus – a vexed term, admittedly – is “neo-liberalism.” London’s Institute for Fiscal Studies was an early outpost of this consensus. At lower levels of the global economic elite, educational backgrounds are more diverse, but they too trace their heritage back to neo-liberalism.

A neo-liberal presumes the superior efficiency of free markets and marries this to a further assumption that our understanding of the laws of economics provides tools to expand markets and adjust and regulate them in ways that promote the common good. The remarkable homogeneity of the kind of training which economists in positions of power have received, over the last generation, has globalised neo-liberalism. This means that dogmatic anti-metaphysical beliefs have been globalised too.

So has another belief: the efficacy of expertise, which supersedes political leadership as the key to a more prosperous and just future. Well-trained economists can formulate policies that reduce the extremes of the business cycle, promote economic growth, guide redistribution and generally alleviate the politically volatile dimensions of capitalism that were so destabilising in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The dogma of economic expertise encourages a broader technocratic mentality. The global elite assumes that smart people with the right technical skills are the key to progress. By this way of thinking, the well-trained people are not making political decisions. Technocrats are just bringing society into alignment with the laws of economics and “progress”. Or they are applying legal definitions of human rights arrived at by legitimate international bodies. Or they are implementing therapeutic and multicultural techniques of social management that are value-neutral.

A good example can be found in recent musings by the Yale economist Robert Shiller (another MIT PhD). He argues that our increasingly globalised economic system will eclipse the nation state, ushering in a more just world in which economic benefits will be more evenly distributed. This transformation is not a political project. It is being driven by technological change and the laws of economics (Paul Samuelson’s “factor-price equalisation theorem”). Shiller allows that the inevitable future “still faces strong competition from patriotic impulses”. There’s political work to be done, perhaps, but we only need statesmanship to remove inherited impediments and blunt popular resistance to the emerging empire of utility.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, capitalism in one form or another has become the default assumption. It’s wrong, therefore, to treat anti-establishment sentiment as anti-capitalist. Instead, voters have become sceptical of the dogma that the smart, the well-trained and the credentialed can make life better.

During the first half of the post-war era most people in the West got healthier and richer. Things were getting better all the time. During the past few decades, not so much. The European Union was sold as crucial for maintaining peace – and yet the European Community was impotent in the face of the crisis in Yugoslavia, and the EU may end up unable to maintain Europe’s political stability amid a refugee crisis. It was also sold as the key to renewed economic prosperity, a return to the glorious post-war decades. That promise has not been fulfilled.

In the United States, we went from a technology stock bubble to a housing bubble to what is now nearly a decade of radical experiments in central bank policy without much general prosperity. Over the past three decades, the economic experts have succeeded only in sustaining congenial conditions for the rich.

It hasn’t only been the economic experts who have failed. In Europe, cultural experts sought multicultural harmony. It was to be brought about by carefully designed diversity programmes, therapeutic empathy and affirmative welcome. That doesn’t seem to be working.

In the United States, black Americans are angry and frustrated. Marriage is collapsing and life expectancies are declining for lower-class whites. Elite American universities have become fraught, unhappy environments. All of this is taking place after decades of politically correct cultural experts have talked a lot about empowerment and inclusion.

Neo-liberalism’s technocratic dogma, that experts can make life better for everyone, is being discredited. The economic engineers and multicultural managers are pulling levers with greater and greater urgency, and yet without positive results.

It’s hard to know if technocratic policies truly work. Maybe we would be even worse off, economically, without those MIT-trained economists running our central banks. Perhaps our societies would be even more riven with conflict without the ministrations of the multicultural therapists. Counter-factuals always caution against a rush to judgment.

Which is why I believe it’s the other elite dogma I mentioned – the anti-metaphysical dogma – that provides the more powerful explanation of why our global elite is losing legitimacy.

The populism ascendant throughout the West revolves around concerns about the future of our national projects. It’s not a coincidence that this resurgent nationalism comes in response to the threats Islam poses in Europe. Muslims are not confused about the foundations of society, which they know are legitimated by a still deeper loyalty to the divine. We should be thankful for that clarity. It guides us towards a better understanding of today’s populism, not just in Europe but in the United States: it reflects a desire for loyalty to something higher – and more particular – than the neo-liberal empire of utility.

Faced with this desire, our global elite is at a loss. Robert Shiller accounts for our “patriotic impulses” in the following way. They are “rooted in a social contract among nationals who have paid taxes over the years or performed military service to build or defend what they saw as exclusively theirs”. Patriotism is really nothing more than the impulse to protect one’s investments. He seems unable to imagine patriotism as a natural love, a desire to inherit and pass on a living tradition worthy of self-sacrifice.

Others offer cruder and more derisive explanations of today’s populism. They fall back on familiar tropes: racism, fascism, xenophobia, and so forth. But these slurs follow the same pattern as Shiller’s. All of them are downward-moving, reductive explanations. What was once thought to be a noble sentiment is really mundane, or even malign. Our global elite, trained in the neo-liberal consensus, which is part of a larger post-World War II culture of unmasking, looks below for the true explanation of events. And thus their leadership is always taking us toward a baser, more animal-like existence.

I believe we are heading towards a political and cultural crisis in the West. The most important and perilous political reality of the 21st-century West is a resurgent nationalism. After World War II, for obvious reasons, the West sought to expel from its political imagination the perennial impulse towards strong loyalties and national solidarity. The Cold War delayed the full force of this project. After 1989, it took hold without resistance. This is why neo-liberalism became so dominant, not just as an approach to economic management but also as an overarching vision for social reality as a whole. Now we are rejoining the rest of the world, where an intense loyalty to place, culture, faith and nation is the norm.

As this is occurring, those most credentialed and certified to lead us are worse than useless. The very training that they imagine legitimates their power blinds them. The global elite, which is really an Ameri-centric Western elite and their Western-trained (again, Ameri-centric) clients, cannot grasp the true economics of the soul, which St Augustine described so well. They cannot see that men do not wish to live in an empire of utility overseen by the hearth gods of health, wealth and pleasure. We long for nationalism because we long for something higher and more rooted, nobler and more alive.

The affairs of men are muddy and uncertain, now perhaps more so than at any point in recent decades. Plato knew that. He teaches that we live in a cave, bewitched by the play of shadows we imagine to be reality. Today’s populism participates in deceptions of this sort, and is therefore politically dangerous, as public passions always are. But the spiritual trajectory of Plato’s thought is otherwise than that of today’s global elite. The truths that can purify our confused, even perverted worldly loyalties, are above, not below.
 

zelezo vlk

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It was also the Feast Day of Our Lady of the Rosary.

If anybody is interested, Niccolò Capponi's Victory of the West is a very good book on Lepanto and its effects on the history of the West.
 
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