Theology

Old Man Mike

Fast as Lightning!
Messages
8,968
Reaction score
6,454
This is much too much of a convoluted mare's nest to enter into, so I won't bother to address these "philosophies". {which by the way are essentially irrelevant to real grass-roots people trying to do the best they can with their lives, and having a he!l of a hard time of it due to all sorts of forces [mainly economic forces that they do not benefit much from and which often kill them with slow bullets.]

The path to "sustainability" for the poor of the world [not the sort-of poor of economic juggernaut nations] has disappeared long ago thanks to two main negativities: a). "market forces" and economic philosophies outside of their control diminishing their local resources [incursions upon farmland, water supplies, forests, and now external pollution and climate shifts] and b). their own "choices" particularly concerning how many kids they have, which then exacerbates the shrinking resource base that they once had.

Could they "just have said 'no' " to these two things and tried to maintain what had been sustainable lifestyles of localism and concentrated/clever food production? They conceivably could just say no to babies, but even there the Church has, sadly, not been at all a supporter of what the world needs in terms of safe birth controls [I am not talking about abortion, which in several of the countries which ultimately achieved "replacement rate" or below became the desperation means to achieve such rates, instead of the much easier-to-swallow technologies of standard birth control. BC often negates abortion, but somehow the Church cannot have that discussion.] [And Francis has his one and only failure in Laudato Si when he caves into the pressures of his office and waffles erroneously on his one paragraph statement rejecting the need for BC.]

As to "just saying no" to the degeneration of a grass-root community's traditional resources, given the aggression, nearly unchecked almost worldwide, of big corporations, I'd say that the effectiveness of just saying no resides close to zero. In case anyone refuses to believe that grass-roots folks could make it on their own, say food wise, just read up on local Chinese and Indian "small plot food growing wisdom" from pre-techno-ravage times. Incredible productivity and effectiveness. Also, if anyone REALLY wanted to know about paths to sustainability for anyone but middle class Americans, they should read Lester Brown's WorldWatch materials from the 1980s onwards --- He!l, even the Chinese autocrats knew he had it right and called him in for consultations. But what was the result? Market Forces swept away almost all of Brown's wisdom for them even though it got approval all the way through the bureaucracy until the really high powers had their say.

Sustainability is long gone for the majority of the world's poor. They have no power and no one REALLY gives a damm about them when it comes down to dollars vs people --- we give usually phony gestures now and then. Francis knows this and he sees the dilemma [except for his cowardice on BC]. The dilemma is to allow the grass-roots people to do certain elements of their traditional ways with full use of their traditional resource base [all localism] until the wealthy persons of the world can GENTLY offer compatible bits of higher technology [especially medicine and general health care] to ease the natural burdens of their traditional lives. Ramming 21st century America in over them is not the way. Transitions are tough enough for displaced auto workers or miners in the USA let alone upending the entire cultural base of a whole non-US mini society.

LOTS of futuristic ecotopian thought exists. Almost none of it includes elephantine bigness nor the eradication of cultural diversity. It sure as he!l doesn't include the destruction of the family and local social web base that makes so much of life endurable and joyful. I could list hundreds [no joke I'm pretty sure I could make that long a list] of things that organizations like WorldWatch have recommended across the 1980-2010 era which are helpful but almost non-invasive of traditions and aim at problem-solving with future-orientation --- i.e. sustainability.

Again Francis understands this dilemma: The world's poor are in crisis threat, and with status quo behaviors by corporations there is no hope --- none. It's a completely Moral Choice issue. Francis doesn't have to "like" a big central world oversight authority at all; all he has to do is think that it's too late for these multi-millions unless something of that power level which operates on some grounds other than Market Forces comes into play.

Francis is a grass-roots-up man, not a pyramid-powder-down man --- but from his view down in the streets and on the farms, he sees no hope to counter the Powers of economic globalism without some awfully big muscle --- so that is what he recommends [plus of course we as individuals "voting with our wallets" by rejecting consumerism and attempting to achieve "One World" sustainable consumption levels ourselves, which he sees as a huge moral choice/demand for us all.]

I have no idea if Francis fears a world environmental watchdog power [if it could exist, which it can't so relax ultra-liberal capitalists] but I sense very much that he sees the necessity of the world initiating a far different set of primary values-decision-drivers than we have. Desperate times; desperate means.

For myself, I believe that it's far too late, and listening to wishful-thinking stay-the-course arguers saddens me terribly. Staying-the-course, even close to the course, is just killing people and going to kill and severely burden uncounted more. But I can't do anything about it. All I can do is separate myself from as much of the globalism as I can.

My multi-person house will have almost zero carbon footprint and we will grow a lot of our own food right here in the city. Almost all the rest will be purchased from local farmers and stock producers. We will waste almost nothing due to reduced use, composting, and recycling. We will grow food indoors throughout the winter. We will support the neighbor community. I have promised myself to get far below the "one Earth consumption" lifestyle, and, as far as I can see, it will do zero to impoverish my life. Francis, as much as he is allowed to, tries to do the same thing. Everyone one of us should --- without excuses or debate. When enough of us have done so --- sustainability.
 

wizards8507

Well-known member
Messages
20,660
Reaction score
2,661
That makes you a Christian, but not necessarily a Catholic. This also matters because if you'd simply own up to the fact that your beliefs are more in line with the Protestant than the Catholic tradition, we'd have nothing further to argue about.
But my deviation from the "tradition" is based on economics, not theology. I believe in the morality and doctrine of the Church, but they're dead wrong on the impact their prescribed solutions would actually have. Listening to the Church on economics in 2015 is no different than listening to the Church on cosmology in 1632.

I haven't ignored anything. I've asked you explain how the concept of imago dei supports neo-liberal economics, and you simply linked me to an hour+ long video which I did not have time to watch then (and still do not have time for).
Well I wish you would, because Professor Hirschfeld does a much better job articulating it than I can. She's a double-doctor with a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard and another Ph.D. in theology from Notre Dame. She tackles the issue from a Thomist perspective. The best course I took in my four years at Notre Dame was called "God and Mammon," and the lecture I linked to is essentially a 45-minute synopsis of that course.

Multiple popes have connected Western materialism and consumer culture to anthropogenic climate change, the negative effects of which are projected to be borne overwhelmingly by the global poor. Recognizing this as a grave injustice, and realizing that there is currently no supra-national authority that could address this collective action problem, they have called for the formation of such a body before billions of people are displaced by rising sea levels, drought and desertification.
This is nothing but dorm room philosophy and ignores how this would play out in the real world. You and Il Papa want a supra-national authority to regulate the effects of multinational corporations, right? Who do you think will ultimately control that supra-national authority? Answer: multinational corporations. This mega-oversight-and-enforcement agency (along with any state power anywhere) will not be a weapon used by the downtrodden to fight back against the powerful. Rather, it'll be a new weapon used by those same powerful people to further oppress the downtrodden it was supposed to protect in the first place.

With all due respect, you overall perspective is based on a misunderstanding of how we got to be where we are in the first place. In short, you're correctly identifying the symptoms but misdiagnosing the disease. "Market forces" did not bring us to the current sad state of affairs. If market forces had been allowed to rule since day one, the world would look a lot more like that for which you advocate. The modern behemoth mega-corporation was not created by market forces, it was created through collusion with state powers that used the force of law to stifle market forces. Every new and bigger regulatory program designed to control mega-entities ends up being used and abused by those same mega-entities to exacerbate the problem.

Ironically, I think you, Whiskey, and I would all like a world that looks very similar. I just think we have vastly different ideas on how you actually get there.
 
Last edited:

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
But my deviation from the "tradition" is based on economics, not theology. I believe in the morality and doctrine of the Church, but they're dead wrong on the impact their prescribed solutions would actually have. Listening to the Church on economics in 2015 is no different than listening to the Church on cosmology in 1632.

So the Church's moral judgment is valid when people are exchanging blows, bullets, and bodily fluids, but not when they're exchanging money? How does that make any sense? You're essentially stating that neo-liberal dogma as promulgated by Saint Hayek and Saint von Mises cannot be challenged, even by the Vicar of Christ, because reasons.

Well I wish you would, because Professor Hirschfeld does a much better job articulating it than I can. She's a double-doctor with a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard and another Ph.D. in theology from Notre Dame. She tackles the issue from a Thomist perspective. The best course I took in my four years at Notre Dame was called "God and Mammon," and the lecture I linked to is essentially a 45-minute synopsis of that course.

Color me skeptical, since you act like orthodox Catholics should obviously be ardent capitalists, yet you can't summarize in a few paragraphs how that follows on from imago dei?

"God is free;
Humans, made in his image, are also free;
Capitalism is the economic system most congruent with individual freedom;
Therefore, Christians should be capitalists."

Is that it?

This is nothing but dorm room philosophy and ignores how this would play out in the real world. You and Il Papa want a supra-national authority to regulate the effects of multinational corporations, right? Who do you think will ultimately control that supra-national authority? Answer: multinational corporations. This mega-oversight-and-enforcement agency (along with any state power anywhere) will not be a weapon used by the downtrodden to fight back against the powerful. Rather, it'll be a new weapon used by those same powerful people to further oppress the downtrodden it was supposed to protect in the first place.

So what's your alternative proposal? One can disagree with the Pope's suggested policy on prudential grounds, but Catholics aren't permitted to simply deny the problem exists and double down on the status quo. The ongoing civil war in Syrian was precipitated in large part by an unprecedented drought, which lead to crop failure in rural areas, driving millions of poor Syrians toward urban areas that lacked the infrastructure to receive them. More of the same and worse will be coming soon in many other countries if something isn't changed.

With all due respect, you overall perspective is based on a misunderstanding of how we got to be where we are in the first place. In short, you're correctly identifying the symptoms but misdiagnosing the disease. "Market forces" did not bring us to the current sad state of affairs. If market forces had been allowed to rule since day one, the world would look a lot more like that for which you advocate. The modern behemoth mega-corporation was not created by market forces, it was created through collusion with state powers that used the force of law to stifle market forces. Every new and bigger regulatory program designed to control mega-entities ends up being used and abused by those same mega-entities to exacerbate the problem.

In your view, "market forces" are a quasi-spiritual force for good that, once everything has been sufficiently commoditized, will lead everyone to an efficient and sanitized utopia. That's a form of idolatry which simply isn't compatible with Christian concepts of the Fall.

Markets are social constructs, just like governments. As long as "the market" is an actual place that people go to exchange goods and services, which serves a community instead of the other way around, it can definitely be a good thing. But once it becomes disembedded from a particular community, it becomes oppressive instead.
 
Last edited:

NDgradstudent

Banned
Messages
2,414
Reaction score
165
I am very interested in the capitalism/Catholicism question. I certainly agree that consumerism (understood as the effective worship of material goods) is un-Christian. I also agree that economic considerations should not act as "trumps" over all other considerations in public policy deliberations. This is something that many American conservatives (Catholic or not) already appreciate. Mass immigration raises the U.S. GDP, but this does not mitigate or outweigh its destructive effects (in my view and the view of many other conservatives).

I see three common arguments in Catholic critiques of markets:

(1) Capitalism encourages consumerism, or the worship of material goods.

This is probably true. As the theatre critic Clive Barnes remarked about television (paraphrasing): "it is the first truly democratic culture, giving people exactly what they want. The terrifying thing is what people do want." Markets are certainly good at giving people what they want. This is a problem within human nature, though, rather than markets as such.

But it is not clear to me that other economies prevent consumerism. Are people in Sweden, or North Korea, in a better moral condition because their economies are arranged differently from ours? People have been discussing original sin: mixed or command economies do not make people good or unselfish. Dante's conception of sin as disordered love -whether for money, country, family, spouse, whatever- is well applied here. Love of money, not money itself, is the "root of all evil." And this exists in a market economy as well as various types of mixed and command economies.

We don't need to claim that market economies are flawless in order to prefer them to other forms of economy. Plenty of conservatives, including non-Catholics such as Roger Scruton, have expressed reservations about market economies while clearly preferring them to the alternatives.

(2) Markets lead to exploitation of the poor or 'working classes.'

Markets have alleviated poverty throughout the world. If there is any context in which efficient business practices make a huge difference, it is in developing countries.

Again, the poor do not obviously fare better under alternative forms of economy. We are always meant to compare a market economy as it is to socialism as it could be. Instead, we should compare socialism as it is to market economies as they are, or as they could be.

Now, no country in the world has a completely "unregulated" market economy. Certainly, any country with a minimum wage requires prices for labor to be set at a particular point. Libertarians, arguing against such laws, do not simply appeal to the "liberty" that they believe is being violated. They argue that it ends up harming more people because it leads to higher unemployment.

(3) Market economics is the result of a Protestant/Lockean/liberal tradition and alien to Catholicism.

This is simply propaganda- the result, I guess, of the long shadow of Weber. Catholic political theory, in early thinkers such as Lactantius, Augustine, Aquinas, etc., ordinarily contained defenses of private property- not an obvious point, considering that the Apostles apparently owned all things in common. Later theorists such as Vitoria and Suarez have long been regarded with affection by libertarians, even atheist libertarians such as Murray Rothbard. The start of "modern Catholic social teaching," Rerum Novarum condemns socialism as such, defends private property on both natural right and consequentialist grounds, etc.

I doubt that I'm telling Whiskey anything that he does not already know. So I guess my question is: what are we really arguing about here? If we are arguing at the edges about how much the economy should be regulated, we are not really arguing about what sort of economy we should have.

This Pope, however, seems to condemn markets as such. This simply does not reflect the whole of Church teaching as expressed in tradition or in the Catechism. If you want to attack consumerism or greed or waste, do so. But these are all features of any economy, free or unfree. The difference is that a market economy also produces other good results- and does so without destroying liberty.
 

wizards8507

Well-known member
Messages
20,660
Reaction score
2,661
So the Church's moral judgment is valid when people are exchanging blows, bullets, and bodily fluids, but not when they're exchanging money? How does that make any sense? You're essentially stating that neo-liberal dogma as promulgated by Saint Hayek and Saint von Mises cannot be challenged, even by the Vicar of Christ, because reasons.

So what's your alternative proposal? One can disagree with the Pope's suggested policy on prudential grounds, but Catholics aren't permitted to simply deny the problem exists and double down on the status quo. The ongoing civil war in Syrian was precipitated in large part by an unprecedented drought, which lead to crop failure in rural areas, driving millions of poor Syrians toward urban areas that lacked the infrastructure to receive them. More of the same and worse will be coming soon in many other countries if something isn't changed.
I'm quoting you out of order because you answered your own challenge to me. I accept the Church's moral judgment on economic matters, but for pragmatic reasons cannot accept their proposed solutions. The Church says "A is a problem, therefore we should do B to fix it." I accept that A is a problem, but it is clear to me that implementing B would actually make A worse.

Example: Global carbon emissions standards are implemented as a way to combat climate change. Who do you think is better equipped to absorb the costs of those standards; Exxon and Dow, or a small utility in Uganda? Who do you think is better equipped to absorb the skyrocketing energy costs; you and me, or a single mother in the slums of Rio de Janeiro?

Example: Federal minimum wage is raised as a way to create a better life for the working poor. Who do you think is better equipped to absorb increased labor costs; Amazon, or your local bookstore? Who do you think is better equipped to absorb increased cost of consumer goods; Hillary Clinton, or a disabled veteran on a fixed income?

In both cases, policies are implemented with a noble goal; help the world's poor. Unfortunately, the consequences of those policies end up hurting the poor more than they help. The economic consequences of these policies are far more dire than whether the average global temperature moves half a degree. You get no bonus points for noble intent if the consequences of the policies implemented in the name of those noble goals proves disastrous.

Color me skeptical, since you act like orthodox Catholics should obviously be ardent capitalists, yet you can't summarize in a few paragraphs how that follows on from imago dei?

"God is free;
Humans, made in his image, are also free;
Capitalism is the economic system most congruent with individual freedom;
Therefore, Christians should be capitalists."

Is that it?
I've done it before and no, the imago dei part is not the one I'm unable to articulate. Since you objected to the Lockean conclusion of self-ownership to which my imago dei argument led, I provided the video clip to present an alternate Thomist version that you might find more palatable.

In your view, "market forces" are a quasi-spiritual force for good that, once everything has been sufficiently commoditized, will lead everyone to an efficient and sanitized utopia. That's a form of idolatry which simply isn't compatible with Christian concepts of the Fall.
Absolutely false. Market forces are neither inherently good nor inherently evil. What is inherently good is human flourishing. Human flourishing is best achieved through cooperation via markets, which allow for specialization of labor, preservation of surplus in the form of money, efficiency and variety through competition, and incentivization of work.

Markets are social constructs, just like governments. As long as "the market" is an actual place that people go to exchange goods and services, which serves a community instead of the other way around, it can definitely be a good thing. But once it becomes disembedded from a particular community, it becomes oppressive instead.
Markets are not social constructs any more than families are. Yes, they're the product of the interactions between people, but they don't need to be created, they just happen. The second you trade a cow for twenty pounds of wheat, a market has been created. Capitalism is no different than barter, it just has more moving pieces so it's a bit more complicated to follow. It's still nothing more or less than the voluntary exchange of goods and services (including labor).

EDIT: Thought this was funny, considering you've accused me of not being a real Catholic and that my profession of the Creed is insufficient:

Pope of the poor arrives in US denying he's a liberal

Joking about doubts in some quarters over whether he is truly Catholic, he said, "If I have to recite the Creed, I'm ready."
 
Last edited:

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
@NDgradstudent and wizards:

Thanks for the thoughtful replies. I will address both of your posts as soon as I'm able, which sadly isn't today since I'm slammed at work.
 
C

Cackalacky

Guest
Neuroscience backs up the Buddhist belief "the self” isn’t constant, but ever-changing - Quartz

Neuroscience backs up the Buddhist belief that “the self” isn’t constant, but ever-changing
Olivia Goldhill September 20, 2015
Bylakuppe-Tibetan Settlement
Still evolving. (Reuters/Abhishek N. Chinnappa)
While you may not remember life as a toddler, you most likely believe that your selfhood then—your essential being—was intrinsically the same as it is today.
Buddhists, though, suggest that this is just an illusion—a philosophy that’s increasingly supported by scientific research.
“Buddhists argue that nothing is constant, everything changes through time, you have a constantly changing stream of consciousness,” Evan Thompson, a philosophy of mind professor at the University of British Columbia, tells Quartz. “And from a neuroscience perspective, the brain and body is constantly in flux. There’s nothing that corresponds to the sense that there’s an unchanging self.”
Neuroscience and Buddhism came to these ideas independently, but some scientific researchers have recently started to reference and draw on the Eastern religion in their work—and have come to accept theories that were first posited by Buddhist monks thousands of years ago.
One neuroscience paper, published in Trends in Cognitive Sciences in July, links the Buddhist belief that our self is ever-changing to physical areas of the brain. There’s scientific evidence that “self-processing in the brain is not instantiated in a particular region or network, but rather extends to a broad range of fluctuating neural processes that do not appear to be self specific,” write the authors.
Thompson, whose work includes studies of cognitive science, phenomenology and Buddhist philosophy, says this is not the only area where neuroscience and Buddhism converge. For example, some neuroscientists now believe that cognitive faculties are not fixed but can be trained through meditation. And there may be scientific backing to the Buddhist belief that consciousness extends into deep sleep.
“The standard neuroscience view is that deep sleep is a blackout state where consciousness disappears,” Thompson says. “In Indian philosophy we see some theorists argue that there’s a subtle awareness that continues to be present in dreamless sleep, there’s just a lack of ability to consolidate that in a moment-to-moment way in memory.”
1
Studies of meditators’ sleep patterns suggest this might indeed be the case. A study published in 2013 found that meditation can affect electro-physical brain patterns during sleep, and the findings suggest there could be capacity to “process information and maintain some level of awareness, even during a state when usually these cognitive functions are greatly impaired,” according to the researchers.
But neither neuroscience nor Buddhism has a definitive answer on exactly how consciousness relates to the brain. And the two fields diverge on certain aspects of the topic. Buddhists believe that there’s some form of consciousness that’s not dependent on the physical body, while neuroscientists (and Thompson), disagree.
But Thompson supports the Buddhists’ view that the self does in fact exist.
“In neuroscience, you’ll often come across people who say the self is an illusion created by the brain. My view is that the brain and the body work together in the context of our physical environment to create a sense of self. And it’s misguided to say that just because it’s a construction, it’s an illusion.”
 

Old Man Mike

Fast as Lightning!
Messages
8,968
Reaction score
6,454
This is the usual foggy-definition-of-terms problem that leaves the Universe more ignorant than before it is stated.

The critical concept here is what are we talking about with the word "self"? This is dramatically dependent upon one's model-of-reality of human nature.

If one is essentially a materialist-reductionist, then "self" probably devolves into either some epiphenomenon involving the poorly-defined brain state called [sloppily] "consciousness", or to the mechanical biomachine complex called the human body. Applying Buddhist-thought to either of these materialisms violates the basis of Buddhist spiritual-based ontology. Unnecessary to say, but for Buddhism the temporary biomachine degenerates as a housing for the soul-spirit which releases that soul-spirit to the Karmic Wheel of Life, until it is installed into another biomachine to activate another "reincarnation."

To apply Buddhist thought to Buddhist thought is unsurprisingly a perfect tautology, and few Buddhists would, I'm guessing, be surprised to learn that [given the model of Karma] that the 'self' changes with experience --- it's Karmic Load changes towards more or less harmony or peace.

I'm more interested in something if it says anything to me about Catholic dualism's model of the "Self". In my Theology, God creates a Universe which produces "physical vessels" {bodies with brains} and also God creates the spiritual realities called "souls." The "souls" are simple creations whose primary characteristics are:
1). non-materiality, and non-restriction to material laws;
2). simplicity beginning with a tabula rasa of zero experience;
3). the need for input from elsewhere in order to become "conscious" of anything {thus one's general "unconscious" state when the physical vessel has shut down to low levels as in sleep};
4). the ability to slowly piece together an understanding of reality based upon outside inputs over time {thus the slow understanding in the child of the relation of what becomes defined internally as "self" and how that self is placed vis-a-vis other aspects of the reality experienced};
5). the continued existence of that soul after the physical vessel has degenerated, but rather than going back into a Karmic Wheel of Life, instead becomes dependent upon God for further "external input" [spiritual body/psychic input, call it what you will] allowing a continuance of consciousness and post-life awareness.

On that model, it is ingrained in the model that "Change" is fundamental. Whereas the basic nature of the soul remains unchanged, the accumulation of inputs evolves a changed vision of external reality and the "self's" relationship to it. The "self" is not the fundamental reality here, but is the soul's conscious-awareness and built-model of its relationship with all else. "Naturally" and "Supernaturally" that model changes.
 
C

Cackalacky

Guest
This is the usual foggy-definition-of-terms problem that leaves the Universe more ignorant than before it is stated.

The critical concept here is what are we talking about with the word "self"? This is dramatically dependent upon one's model-of-reality of human nature.

If one is essentially a materialist-reductionist, then "self" probably devolves into either some epiphenomenon involving the poorly-defined brain state called [sloppily] "consciousness", or to the mechanical biomachine complex called the human body. Applying Buddhist-thought to either of these materialisms violates the basis of Buddhist spiritual-based ontology. Unnecessary to say, but for Buddhism the temporary biomachine degenerates as a housing for the soul-spirit which releases that soul-spirit to the Karmic Wheel of Life, until it is installed into another biomachine to activate another "reincarnation."

To apply Buddhist thought to Buddhist thought is unsurprisingly a perfect tautology, and few Buddhists would, I'm guessing, be surprised to learn that [given the model of Karma] that the 'self' changes with experience --- it's Karmic Load changes towards more or less harmony or peace.

I'm more interested in something if it says anything to me about Catholic dualism's model of the "Self". In my Theology, God creates a Universe which produces "physical vessels" {bodies with brains} and also God creates the spiritual realities called "souls." The "souls" are simple creations whose primary characteristics are:
1). non-materiality, and non-restriction to material laws;
2). simplicity beginning with a tabula rasa of zero experience;
3). the need for input from elsewhere in order to become "conscious" of anything {thus one's general "unconscious" state when the physical vessel has shut down to low levels as in sleep};
4). the ability to slowly piece together an understanding of reality based upon outside inputs over time {thus the slow understanding in the child of the relation of what becomes defined internally as "self" and how that self is placed vis-a-vis other aspects of the reality experienced};
5). the continued existence of that soul after the physical vessel has degenerated, but rather than going back into a Karmic Wheel of Life, instead becomes dependent upon God for further "external input" [spiritual body/psychic input, call it what you will] allowing a continuance of consciousness and post-life awareness.

On that model, it is ingrained in the model that "Change" is fundamental. Whereas the basic nature of the soul remains unchanged, the accumulation of inputs evolves a changed vision of external reality and the "self's" relationship to it. The "self" is not the fundamental reality here, but is the soul's conscious-awareness and built-model of its relationship with all else. "Naturally" and "Supernaturally" that model changes.

But there is no scientific evidence of a soul but there is for the "self" and there is for consciousness. The concept of a soul is founded on assertions and can't be verified so it's unnecessary to discussions in particular this one. The author did not mention Bhuddists notion of reincarnation, rather the mutability of self which is drastically different for Montheistic and other non Asian religions. Obviously the end goal of Bhuddism is to be released from the confines of the body, but unlike other religions this does occur until perfection is achieved .

I don't think that makes me dumber for having read it. I actually learned something. I am also reading a book called the "The Self Aware Universe" which is a great read so far. Many of the things it brings up support the findings in the article I posted. Eastern philosophy tends to reflect/mirror scientific findings much more than the western religions.

Per Thich Nhat Han:
In Buddhism there are two kinds of truth: conventional truth (S: samvṛti-satya C: 俗諦) and ultimate truth (S: paramārtha-satya, C: 真諦). In the framework of the conventional truth, Buddhists speak of being and non-being, birth and death, coming and going, inside and outside, one and many, etc… and the Buddhist teaching and practice based on this framework helps reduce suffering, and bring more harmony and happiness. In the framework of the ultimate truth, the teaching transcends notions of being and non-being, birth and death, coming and going, inside and outside, one and many, etc… and the teaching and practice based on this insight help practitioners liberate themselves from discrimination, fear, and touch nirvana, the ultimate reality. Buddhists see no conflict between the two kinds of truth and are free to make good use of both frameworks.

Classical science, as seen in Newton’s theories, is built upon a framework reflecting everyday experience, in which material objects have an individual existence, and can be located in time and space. Quantum physics provides a framework for understanding how nature operates on subatomic scales, but differs completely from classical science, because in this framework, there is no such thing as empty space, and the position of an object and its momentum cannot simultaneously be precisely determined. Elementary particles fluctuate in and out of existence, and do not really exist but have only a “tendency to exist”.

Classical science seems to reflect the conventional truth and quantum physics seems to be on its way to discover the absolute truth, trying very hard to discard notions such as being and non-being, inside and outside, sameness and otherness, etc.… At the same time, scientists are trying to find out the relationship between the two kinds of truth represented by the two kinds of science, because both can be tested and applied in life.

In science, a theory should be tested in several ways before it can be accepted by the scientific community. The Buddha also recommended, in the Kālāma Sūtra1, that any teaching and insight given by any teacher should be tested by our own experience before it can be accepted as the truth. Real insight, or right view (S: samyag-dṛṣṭi, C: 正見), has the capacity to liberate, and to bring peace and happiness. The findings of science are also insight; they can be applied in technology, but can be applied also to our daily behavior to improve the quality of our life and happiness. Buddhists and scientists can share with each other their ways of studying and practice and can profit from each other’s insights and experience.

The practice of mindfulness and concentration always brings insight. It can help both Buddhists and scientists. Insights transmitted by realized practitioners like the Buddhas and bodhisattvas can be a source of inspiration and support for both Buddhist practitioners and scientists, and scientific tests can help Buddhist practitioners understand better and have more confidence in the insight they receive from their ancestral teachers. It is our belief that in this 21st Century, Buddhism and science can go hand in hand to promote more insight for us all and bring more liberation, reducing discrimination, separation, fear, anger, and despair in the world.
One of the best things about science is reaching a conclusion from different tests or sources of information
 
Last edited:

Old Man Mike

Fast as Lightning!
Messages
8,968
Reaction score
6,454
And ... as an old science prof of thirty years teaching in the trenches, one of the worst things about scientists [not science] is reaching "conclusions" which if stated in any other way than in great humility and readiness to change, give readers a wrongful feeling about those "conclusions", and are, in fact, in violation of the philosophical basis of the "scientific method".
 
C

Cackalacky

Guest
The article does not present its "conclusions " merely another line of evidence supporting a particular hypothesis very much in line with the scientific method.

Although I am not quite 40 years just over half of my life (19 years) educational and professional has been DEDICATED to the scientific method and it's practical applications. I personally am well aware of the couching and humility necessary when publishing scientific conclusions from papers. This idea that reporting on scientific discoveries must fall in line with the actual research papers is kind of misleading. It comes off as unnecessarily poo pooing any publication that reports the findings without being too technical so that lay people can understand it.
 
Last edited:
C

Cackalacky

Guest
Niels Bohr, who developed the Bohr Model of the atom, said,

For a parallel to the lesson of atomic theory...[we must turn] to those kinds of epistemological problems with which already thinkers like the Buddha and Lao Tzu have been confronted, when trying to harmonize our position as spectators and actors in the great drama of existence.[25]

Nobel Prize–winning philosopher Bertrand Russell described Buddhism as a speculative and scientific philosophy:

Buddhism is a combination of both speculative and scientific philosophy. It advocates the scientific method and pursues that to a finality that may be called Rationalistic. In it are to be found answers to such questions of interest as: 'What is mind and matter? Of them, which is of greater importance? Is the universe moving towards a goal? What is man's position? Is there living that is noble?' It takes up where science cannot lead because of the limitations of the latter's instruments. Its conquests are those of the mind.[26]

The American physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer made an analogy to Buddhism when describing the Heisenberg uncertainty principle:

If we ask, for instance, whether the position of the electron remains the same, we must say 'no;' if we ask whether the electron's position changes with time, we must say 'no;' if we ask whether the electron is at rest, we must say 'no;' if we ask whether it is in motion, we must say 'no.' The Buddha has given such answers when interrogated as to the conditions of man's self after his death; but they are not familiar answers for the tradition of seventeenth and eighteenth-century science.[27]

Nobel Prize–winning physicist Albert Einstein, who developed the general theory of relativity and the special theory of relativity, also known for his mass–energy equivalence, described Buddhism as containing a strong cosmic element:

...there is found a third level of religious experience, even if it is seldom found in a pure form. I will call it the cosmic religious sense. This is hard to make clear to those who do not experience it, since it does not involve an anthropomorphic idea of God; the individual feels the vanity of human desires and aims, and the nobility and marvelous order which are revealed in nature and in the world of thought. He feels the individual destiny as an imprisonment and seeks to experience the totality of existence as a unity full of significance. Indications of this cosmic religious sense can be found even on earlier levels of development—for example, in the Psalms of David and in the Prophets. The cosmic element is much stronger in Buddhism, as, in particular, Schopenhauer's magnificent essays have shown us. The religious geniuses of all times have been distinguished by this cosmic religious sense, which recognizes neither dogmas nor God made in man's image. Consequently there cannot be a church whose chief doctrines are based on the cosmic religious experience. It comes about, therefore, that we find precisely among the heretics of all ages men who were inspired by this highest religious experience; often they appeared to their contemporaries as atheists, but sometimes also as saints.[28]

Buddhism and The Scientific Method
 

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
It's a long read, but this First Things essay by Stanley Fish titled "Why We Can't All Just Get Along" blew me away:

Whenever I teach Paradise Lost , the hardest thing to get across is that God is God. Students invariably (one is tempted to say “naturally”) fall in with the view declared by William Empson in Milton’s God when he says that “ all the characters are on trial in any civilized narrative.” In Milton’s narrative, of course, God is a central character, and the entire story gets going, Empson observes, when Satan “doubts his credentials.” Empson analogizes the situation to that “of a Professor doubting the credentials of his Vice-Chancellor,” and remarks with some sarcasm that “such a man would not be pursued with infinite malignity into eternal torture, but given evidence which put the credentials beyond doubt.”

In this account of the matter, “civilization” and “evidence” go together and dictate our chief responsibility as readers”which is, Empson says, “to use our judgment about the characters.” It is also the obligation of the characters in the story, and the fact that they perform it differently is what gives the plot its energy: the loyalist Abdiel, Empson observes, tells Satan and his rebel followers “that God should be obeyed because he is good, and they deny that he is good,” and as far as Empson is concerned, they have good reason to do so. Actually the scene Empson is remembering is somewhat more complex. When Abdiel rises, “Among the faithless, faithful only he” (V, 897), what he says is not that God is good (which would imply a conclusion reached by submitting God’s actions to the judgment of independent criteria). Rather he says that God is God, which implies that even to put God to such an evidentiary test would be a category mistake”how can you give a grade to the agent whose person defines and embodies value?”that would constitute the gravest of sins, whether one calls it impiety (“Cease . . . this impious rage”), self-worship, or simply pride.

What Abdiel says is: “Shalt thou give law to God, shalt thou dispute / With him the points of liberty, who made / Thee what thou art?” (V, 822–24a) Earlier Satan had justified his rebellion by invoking freedom and liberty; Abdiel now points out that these terms have no weight when the agent from whom you would be free made and sustains you. Satan in turn finds this argument preposterous and replies to it with a classic statement of rational empiricism:

That we were form’d . . . say’st thou?
. . . strange point and new!
Doctrine which we would know whence learnt: who saw
When this creation was? remember’st thou
Thy making, while the Maker gave thee being?
We know no time when we were not as now;
Know none before us, self-begot, self-rais’d.

[/ (V, 853, 855–60) /]

This is the philosophy of the man from Missouri: show me, seeing is believing, and since no one, including you, has seen the moment of his creation, I don’t believe in it. There is nothing in the present scene or in my experience that leads me inescapably to the conclusion you urge. Where did you ever get this absurd notion? What’s your proof? (“Doctrine which we would know whence learnt?”) I must have made myself.

Satan’s way of thinking is contrasted directly in the poem with Adam’s. Recalling the moment not of his creation, but just after his creation, Adam reports “Myself I . . . perused . . . limb by limb” and found that I could speak and name, “But who I was, or where, or from what cause / Knew not” (VIII, 267, 270–71). Like Satan, Adam knows no time before he was what he now is, but he gives a quite different answer to the question he immediately poses: “how came I thus, how here? / Not of myself, by some great maker then / In goodness and in power preeminent” (VIII, 277b”79). The goodness and power for which Satan seeks independent evidence is here assumed by Adam; and once the assumption is in place it generates a program for action and a life”project: “how may I know him, how adore, / From whom I have that thus I move and live?” (VIII, 280–1)

I t might seem that in presenting these two moments in Paradise Lost , I am placing in opposition two ways of knowing, one by evidence and reason, the other by faith. But in fact on the level of epistemology both are the same. Satan and Adam begin alike from a point of ignorance”they know nothing prior to (the precise word is “before”) the perspective they currently occupy; and the direction each then takes from this acknowledged limitation follows with equal logic or illogic. Adam reasons, since I don’t remember how I got here, I must have been made by someone. Satan reasons, since I don’t know how I got here, I must have made myself, or as we might say today, I must have just emerged from the primeval slime.

In neither case does the conclusion follow necessarily from the observed fact of imperfect knowledge. In both cases something is missing, a first premise, and in both cases reasoning can’t get started until a first premise is put in place. What’s more, since the first premise is what is missing, it cannot be derived from anything in the visible scene; it is what must be imported”on no evidentiary basis whatsoever”so that the visible scene, the things of this world, can acquire the meaning and significance they will now have. There is no opposition here between knowledge by reason and knowledge by faith because Satan and Adam are committed to both simultaneously. Each performs an act of faith”the one in God and the other in materialism”and then each begins to reason in ways dictated by the content of his faith.

That is why each performs as he does when confronted with a new (or apparently new) situation. When Eve worries that the growth of the garden will overwhelm the unfallen couple’s efforts and prevent them from carrying out their assigned task, Adam replies by reasoning against the evidence of empirical circumstances and declaring that however things might seem, God, preeminent in goodness and power, will provide: “These paths and bowers doubt not but our joint hands / Will keep from Wilderness with ease” (IX, 244–45a), a confidence unsupported by anything either of them sees. Satan, on the other hand, rather than beginning from the first premise of a benevolent and provident God, has as his first premise the radical contingency of outcomes. In a world ruled by chance and opportunity, the world in which he can emerge, as it were, out of nothing, who knows what the next turn of fortune’s wheel might bring? Perhaps God will nod or make a misstep; after all, Satan reasons, on the evening of the first day of the war in heaven, God has thrown everything he has at us and we’re still standing; we “have sustain’d one day in doubtful fight, / And if one day, why not Eternal days?” (VI, 423–4)

“If one day, why not eternal days?” has exactly the same structure as “I wasn’t witness to my creation, therefore it didn’t happen.” In both instances, there is a refusal”no, an inability”to conceive of possibilities not already included in the field of empirical vision, the evidence of things seen. The habit of identifying the limits of reality with the limits of his own horizons defines Satan”it makes him what he is and is everywhere on display. Listen, for example, to his earlier rehearsal of the strategy he will employ in the actual temptation. He has heard Adam and Eve in conversation and found out about the forbidden fruit and the penalty attached to eating it, and he exclaims to himself:

O fair foundation laid whereon to build

Their ruin! Hence I will excite their minds

With more desire to know, and to reject

Envious commands, invented with design

To keep them low whom knowledge might exalt

Equal with Gods; aspiring to be such,

They taste and die: what likelier can ensue?

[/(IV, 521–27)/]

That is to say: God has set the conditions of their lives; if they violate those conditions they will die. I will get them to eat the apple, and they will die. What else could happen? What else could happen is that the apparently iron logic of God’s justice”he says at one point of Adam, “die he or justice must””can be broken by the exercise of his mercy, which, he has said, “first and last will brightest shine” (III, 134). The idea of mercy is literally unthinkable by Satan, who can only imagine agents with motives and goals just like his. He certainly cannot imagine an agent who would contrive to circumvent the force of his own decree and who would do so by paying himself the price his own law exacts. It is not a thought Satan could entertain because the very structure of his consciousness”grounded in self-worship and selfishness”excludes it as a possible insight.

I make the point strongly because it is so alien to the modern liberal-enlightenment picture of cognitive activity in which the mind is conceived of as a calculating and assessing machine that is open to all thoughts and closed to none. In this picture the mind is in an important sense not yet settled; and indeed settling, in the form of a fixed commitment to an idea or a value, is a sign of cognitive and moral infirmity. Milton’s view is exactly the reverse: in the absence of a fixed commitment”of a first premise that cannot be the object of thought because it is the enabling condition of thought”cognitive activity cannot get started. One’s consciousness must be grounded in an originary act of faith”a stipulation of basic value”from which determinations of right and wrong, relevant and irrelevant, real and unreal, will then follow.

For the modern liberal, beliefs are what the mind scrutinizes and judges by rational criteria that are themselves hostage to no belief in particular; for Milton, beliefs”in God or in oneself or in the absolute contingency of material circumstances”are the content of a rationality that cannot scrutinize them because it rests on them. Milton’s motto is not “seeing is believing,” but “believing is seeing”; and since what you see marks the boundaries of your knowledge, believing is also knowing; and since it is on the basis of what you know”whether what you know is that there is a God or that there isn’t one”that you act, believing is acting. What you believe is what you see is what you know is what you do is what you are.

It is a tenet of liberal enlightenment faith that belief and knowledge are distinct and separable and that even if you do not embrace a point of view you can still understand it. This is the credo Satan announces in Paradise Regained when he says “most men admire / Virtue, who follow not her lore.” That is, it is always possible to appreciate a way of life that is not yours. Milton would respond that unless the way of life is yours, you have no understanding of it, and that is why, he declares in another place, that a man who would write a true poem must himself be a true poem and can only praise or even recognize worthy things if he is himself worthy.

In this, as in so much else, Milton follows Augustine. Repeatedly in his On Christian Doctrine , Augustine begins a sentence by declaring, “No one would be so stupid as to say” or “It is obviously absurd to assert” or “It is utter madness to believe” or “No reasonable person would believe in any circumstances that . . . .” What invariably follows, however, is an assertion that has been found reasonable by millions, and one wonders what Augustine means by a “reasonable person.” The answer is that a reasonable person is a person who believes what Augustine believes and who, like Augustine, can only hear assertions contrary to that belief as absurd.

Moreover, the belief whose prior assumption determines what will be heard as reasonable is not itself subject to the test of reasonableness. Reason’s chain does not ratify it, but proceeds from it. After all, Augustine explains, the logical validity of a chain of inference is independent of the validity or nonvalidity of the proposition with which the chain begins: “Correct inferences may be made concerning false as well as true propositions.” It follows that a conclusion reached will be really”as opposed to formally”true only if a true proposition anchors it, and “the truth of a proposition is inherent in itself”; that is, its truth cannot be established by some procedure to which it must submit. A reasonable mind, then, is a mind closed to the possibility that certain basic propositions”Augustine’s example is “Christ is risen””could be questioned. A reasonable mind is a mind that refuses to be open.

Of course an open mind, a mind ready at any moment to jettison even its most cherished convictions, is the very definition of “reasonable” in a post-Enlightenment liberal culture; and in the ears of those who have been socialized into that culture, a position like Augustine’s will have the sound of obvious irrationality. That is certainly how John Stuart Mill, with whom Milton is often linked, incorrectly, as a precursor of modern thought, hears it. For the Mill of On Liberty , what “no reasonable person would believe” is that the highest value is the value of obedience. Mill is incredulous before a philosophy according to which “all the good of which humanity is capable is comprised by obedience,” and he is aghast at an ethics that requires nothing of man but “the surrendering of himself to the will of God.” He thinks it barbarous that Christians hold obstinately to an article of faith and then “stigmatize those who hold the contrary opinion as bad and immoral men.” That is no way, he complains, to know the truth, which can be known only “by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion.” It is a man’s obligation to keep “his mind open to criticism on his opinions” and “to listen to all that could be said against him.” He must strike the stance not of the “impassioned partisan,” but of “the calmer and more interested bystander” who exercises his “judicial faculty” and sits “in intelligent judgment.” The duty of the reasonable man is to be tolerant of all views, and he identifies intolerance with religious thought, for “in the minds of almost all religious persons . . . the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit reserves”; that is, with the reserve of whatever position they hold sacred. It is in tolerance that leads Christians to “teach infidels to be just to Christianity” while they themselves show no disposition to be “just to infidelity.”

One wonders how Mill could have written these words without some sense of how oddly they sound: be just to infidelity, that is, to error, apostasy, evil? What could he possibly mean? In fact what he means depends on not taking the word “infidelity” seriously, that is, as a value judgement. As Mill uses it, “infidelity” is simply the name of an opinion, a point of view to which we are to accord the respect due all points of view. It is neither true nor false, good nor evil; it is rather one vendor in a marketplace whose business”a business never, by definition, concluded”it is to separate out the truths from the falsehoods, a process that cannot be fairly conducted, Mill would say, if a particular point of view”for example, “Christ is not risen””is stigmatized in advance. The trouble with Christianity, and with any religion grounded in unshakable convictions, is that it lacks the generosity necessary to the marketplace’s full functioning. Christianity, Mill declares, in what he takes to be a devastating judgment, is “one-sided,” that is, insistent upon the rightness of its perspective and deaf to the perspectives that might challenge it.

I am hardly the first to observe that Mill’s position contains its own difficulties and internal inconsistencies. The imperative of keeping the marketplace of ideas open means that some ideas”those urged with an unhappy exclusiveness”must either themselves be excluded or be admitted only on the condition that they blunt the edge of their assertiveness, and present themselves for possible correction. Willmoore Kendall asks, if a society is dedicated, as Mill urges that it be, to “a national religion of skepticism, to the suspension of judgment as the exercise of judgment par excellence,” what can it say to a man who urges an opinion “ not predicated on that view,” a man who “with every syllable of faith he utters, challenges the very foundations of skeptical society”? To such a man, Kendall answers, the society can only say, “You cannot enter into our discussions.” “The all-questions-are-open-questions society,” he concludes, cannot “practice tolerance toward those who disagree with it”; those “it must persecute”and so on its very own showing, arrest the pursuit of truth.”

This is a very powerful argument, and one to which I shall return, but it is not the argument I will finally want to stress, because to use it as a weapon against the doctrine of liberal toleration is to win a debating point but concede the larger point by accepting toleration as the final measure of judgment. If you persuade liberalism that its dismissive marginalizing of religious discourse is a violation of its own chief principle, all you will gain is the right to sit down at liberalism’s table where before you were denied an invitation; but it will still be liberalism’s table that you are sitting at, and the etiquette of the conversation will still be hers. That is, someone will now turn and ask, “Well, what does religion have to say about this question?” And when, as often will be the case, religion’s answer is doctrinaire (what else could it be?), the moderator (a title deeply revealing) will nod politely and turn to someone who is presumed to be more reasonable. To put the matter baldly, a person of religious conviction should not want to enter the marketplace of ideas but to shut it down, at least insofar as it presumes to determine matters that he believes have been determined by God and faith. The religious person should not seek an accommodation with liberalism; he should seek to rout it from the field, to extirpate it, root and branch.

Liberals, on the other hand, need not be so aggressive (although they will always be passive-aggressive) since the field, as it is presently demarcated, is already theirs. That is why Martha Nussbaum, in a recent piece in the New York Review of Books , feels that, in order to discredit him, she need only quote Michael McConnell when he argues for a notion of truth that has reference to “authority, community, and faith.” Someone who would link truth to concepts of authority and faith”the equivalents of Mill’s hated “obedience””is obviously beyond the pale and constitutes a danger, or so Nussbaum asserts, to “the very norms of academic freedom and academic objectivity.” McConnell, Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, is among the most vocal of those who have been challenging the domestication and trivializing of the religious sensibility, but a reading of the article Nussbaum cites (“God Is Dead and We Have Killed Him: Freedom of Religion in the Post-Modern Age,” Brigham Young University Law Review , Winter 1993) suggests that he poses no danger at all.

McConnell begins by examining a brief filed by Robert Abrams, former Attorney General of the State of New York, in defense of a ruling that refused a religious group the use of a public meeting room for the showing of a film. Noting that the Attorney General grounds his position in a characterization of religious experience as “inviolately private” and therefore out of place in a public forum, McConnell angrily declares it “inconceivable that a public official would say that about any other worldview”: “If feminists, gay rights advocates, Afrocentrists, or even secular conservatives tried to communicate their ideas . . . to the public Abrams would never say they should keep their ideas to themselves.” In an age, McConnell observes, “when previously marginalized voices are welcomed to the public dialogue,” only religion is “privatized and marginalized” and “must be kept under wraps.”

McConnell is here making two points which he thinks go together, but which in fact are finally in tension with one another. The first point is that a religion privatized to the extent that the world is kept quarantined from its potential influence is a religion not taken seriously. In his Areopagitica Milton pokes some high literary fun at a man who, uncomfortable with the sharp demands placed on him by religious faith, decides to hand his religious obligation over to a hired agent who will, for a fee, breathe out the appropriate prayers and perform the required acts of piety. This surrogate is well paid and provided for, “is liberally supped and sumptuously laid to sleep,” and after having been “better breakfasted than he whose morning appetite would gladly have fed on free figs between Bethany and Jerusalem, walks abroad at eight, and leaves his kind entertainer in the shop trading all day without his religion.” Milton’s scorn at this picture of a faith held so lightly that it leaves the everyday world unaltered is matched by McConnell’s distress at a public/private split that assures the same lack of practical efficacy: a religion deprived of the opportunity to transform the culture in its every detail is hardly a religion at all.

But McConnell immediately allows this point to be swallowed up by another, by the debating point I have already identified: this exclusion of the religious impulse from the public sphere runs contrary to the professed liberality of an open society. “In an open society, we presume that the uninhibited, robust, and wide-open exchange of viewpoints benefits us all.”

The key to what is happening here is the fact that the phrase “uninhibited, robust, and wide open” comes from New York Times v. Sullivan , a 1964 case in which the Supreme Court dislodged from its position of primacy in libel matters the standard of truthfulness. In place of truth, the Court substituted the standard of free-for-all debate in relation to which false and defamatory statements are on a par with true and accurate statements, on the deeply skeptical reasoning that both alike are opinions: “Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ “ they need; and “this is true even though the utterance contains ‘half-truths’ and ‘misinformation.’ “ In this and other passages, the court privileges expression as a value over the substantive worth and veracity of that which is expressed.

Religious discourse, however, cannot be unconcerned with the substantive worth and veracity of its assertions, which are in fact presupposed, and presupposed too is the urgency of proclaiming those assertions”the good news”to a world asked to receive them as the whole and necessary truth. The ethos of New York Times v. Sullivan is finally inimical to the religious impulse, which does not value talk for its own sake, but values the end”spiritual regeneration leading to regenerate action”to which some, but not all, forms of talk may bring us.

By couching his brief for religious expression in the terms of free speech doctrine, McConnell falls in with the very trivializing of religious expression he deplores, for under a New York Times v. Sullivan standard, religious expression is just one more voice in a mix that refuses the claim of any particular voice to be prior and controlling. When McConnell characterizes his own essay as a “plea for old fashioned broadmindedness””that is, for toleration”he seems not to realize that broadmindedness is the opposite of what religious conviction enacts and requires. Religious conviction, as Mill sees from the enemy position, requires narrowmindedness, the discovery of and hewing to the straight and narrow way. Broadmindedness is what liberalism requires and, by invoking it as a standard, McConnell gives the game away to his opponents.

He does it again when he unmasks the liberal claim of neutrality. “Liberal neutrality,” he complains, “is of a very peculiar sort,” for it defines “neutral” so that it means “secular””neutrality between “conceptions of the good life” so long as they are not God”centered, “as if agnosticism about the theistic foundations of the universe were common ground among believers and nonbelievers alike.” Since this neutrality has no obligation to the theism it does not recognize except as a negative limit-case, theism will lose out when the supposedly neutral state weighs its claims. “Virtually any plausible public purpose,” McConnell laments, is “deemed sufficient to override the right of religious exercise.” The result is the “strange phenomenon” of a liberalism that “proclaims its neutrality toward competing ideals of virtue . . . but is committed in practice to the promotion of particular ideals and”even more”to the eradication of others.” By marginalizing religious ideals, liberalism has failed to live up to its own ideal. The trouble with liberalism is that it is not liberal enough.

Here again is the familiar debating point, but it is itself beside the point; for what McConnell describes is not a liberalism enmeshed in self-contradiction, but a liberalism being perfectly true to its principles, a liberalism that is neutral in the only way it could be and still remain liberal. McConnell’s mistake (one he shares with many liberals) is to think that liberal neutrality is, or should be, pure, a practice of making no a priori substantive judgments at all. But liberalism rests on the substantive judgment that the public sphere must be insulated from viewpoints that owe their allegiance not to its procedures”to the unfettered operation of the marketplace of ideas”but to the truths they work to establish. That is what neutrality means in the context of liberalism”a continual pushing away of orthodoxies, of beliefs not open to inquiry and correction”and that is why, in the name of neutrality, religious propositions must either be excluded from the marketplace or admitted only in ceremonial forms, in the form, for example, of a prayer that opens a session of Congress in which the proposals of religion will not be given a serious hearing.

McConnell’s true antagonist, then, is not a liberalism gone sour, but liberalism, pure and simple; and his request that liberalism become more liberal”open itself up to forces that do not place openness in the position of highest value”will be resisted because for liberalism to accede to it would be tantamount to committing suicide. What McConnell should want is not an expansion of the marketplace of ideas, but its disbanding and replacement by a regime of virtue as opposed to a regime of process. He should want an end to the public/private split which, by fencing off the arena of political dispute from substantive determinations of value, assures the continual deferral and bracketing of value questions. He should want what Milton wants, a unified conception of life in which the pressure of first principles is felt and responded to twenty-four hours a day.

But so far is McConnell from recognizing the shape of his own interests as a committed Christian that he ends his essay by declaring that “the public/ private distinction . . . is utterly indispensable to a theory of religious freedom. We cannot have religious freedom without it.” One knows what he means: without the public/private split religion will not be protected from state action; were the state not barred from interfering with the free exercise of religion, that freedom might disappear. But of course the freedom thus gained is the freedom to be ineffectual, the freedom “to be confined to the margins of public life”to those areas not important enough to have received the helping or controlling hand of government.”

What is not allowed religion under the private public distinction is the freedom to win , the freedom not to be separate from the state, but to inform and shape its every action. That idea never even occurs to McConnell because it is so antiliberal and in the end a liberal is what he is. “From a secular point of view,” he writes, “it is difficult to appreciate the religious impulse.” His essay is a testimony to that difficulty, which registers even here in the use of the word “appreciate,” a word borrowed from the vocabulary of taste, a word that falls far short of taking the measure of what the religious impulse, fully felt, might be like.

The same failure characterizes Stephen Carter’s The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion (1993), a book that begins by calling religion a “very subversive force,” and ends by diluting that force in a theory of accommodation. There are more than a few places where Carter seems to understand that from a secular point of view it is not merely “difficult” but impossible to appreciate the religious impulse. Early on he notes that the invocation of a common rationality (in the manner of a Thomas Nagel or Bruce Ackerman) is a device for limiting the conversation to premises that would “exclude religion from the mix,” since, invariably, the “common rationality” will stigmatize as “irrational” the strong claims of religious persons. He also sees that to ask a religious person to rephrase his claims in more mainstream terms is to ask that person to cut himself off from the very source of his conviction and to become in effect the opposite of what he is, to become secular: “The proposed rules to govern discourse in the public square require some members of society to remake themselves before they are allowed to press policy arguments.” And at his strongest he points out that the fact-value distinction, which allows theorists to bracket off a public sphere whose deliberations are procedural rather than substantive, is itself a substantive stipulation that has the effect of prejudging what will and will not be considered a fact.

“Liberal epistemology,” Carter explains, “is not capable of treating as a factual inquiry a question like ‘Can the Jehovah’s Witness achieve salvation after receiving a blood transfusion?’”or for that matter, a question like, ‘Is there life after death?’ “ The liberal response would be, of course not: facts are what is verifiable by independent evidence; questions of salvation and life after death are matters of faith. But of course they are both matters of faith, for, as Carter points out, the establishment of a fact depends on “what counts as evidence.”

That is to say, evidence is never independent in the sense of being immediately perspicuous; evidence comes into view (or doesn’t) in the light of some first premise or “essential axiom” that cannot itself be put to the test because the protocols of testing are established by its pre-assumed authority. A “creationist parent whose child is being taught . . . evolution” protests not in the name of religion and against the witness of fact; he protests in the name of fact as it seems indisputable to him given the “central” truth “that God is real.” Given such a “starting point and the methodology” that follows from it, “creationism is as rational an explanation as any other”; or rather (it is the same point from the other direction), given the starting point of a material world that caused itself”the Satanic starting point”evolution is as faith-dependent an explanation as any other. This is not to debunk rationality in favor of faith, but to say that rationality and faith go together in an indissoluble package: you can’t have one without the other.

Taken to its conclusions this argument is devastating for the liberal project. For it is only if rationality and faith can be separated that one can establish a public sphere in which issues of civic concern can be discussed by persons who have left their religious convictions at home or checked them at the door. If you can’t have one without the other, behind any dispute that occurs will be a conflict of conviction that cannot be rationally settled because it is also and necessarily a conflict of rationalities, and when there is a conflict of rationalities, your only recourse is, well, to conflict since there is no common ground in relation to which dialogue might proceed. Here looms the specter of liberalism’s collapse, but Carter will not look it in the face, and in the last part of his book he puts asunder what he had previously joined.

He does this by insisting on a distinction between disagreeing, say, with the religious right or with David Koresh because their positions are “wrong” and disagreeing with them because their positions are presented in religious terms.

If the Christian right is wrong for America, it must be because its message is wrong on the issues, not because its message is religious . . . . We must be able, in our secular society, to distinguish a critique of the content of a belief from a critique of the content of a belief from a critique of its source.

What is remarkable about these statements is that they subscribe fully to the liberal assumptions that have been the object of Carter’s critique. Suddenly rationality and faith and, along with them, fact and value can be separated, and with separation returns the liberal public sphere and the possibility of assessing agendas without inquiring into the worldviews from which they emerge. As Carter uses the phrase, “wrong on the issues” can only mean wrong on the issues as they are identified apart from anyone’s religious convictions; but this assumes that the specification of what the issues in fact are can be made uncontroversially. But as Carter himself has argued (when, for example, he points out that in the mind of a creationist parent, his “child is being taught a pack of lies”) the reverse is true: in the bitterest debates, it is the very shape of the issues that is in dispute, and what ultimately fuels the dispute, and renders it incapable of resolution, are the incompatible first assumptions”articles of opposing faiths”in the different lights of which the issue takes form.

A pro-life advocate sees abortion as a sin against a God who infuses life at the moment of conception; a pro-choice advocate sees abortion as a decision to be made in accordance with the best scientific opinion as to when the beginning of life, as we know it, occurs. No conversation between them can ever get started because each of them starts from a different place and they could never agree as to what they were conversing about . A pro-lifer starts from a belief in the direct agency of a personal God and this belief, this religious conviction, is not incidental to his position; it is his position, and determines its features in all their detail. The “content of a belief” is a function of its source, and the critique of one will always be the critique of the other. Of course we can and do say, “I don’t care where you got that idea from; it’s wrong.” But what we mean is that we can’t see where such an idea came from, and we can’t see that because the place it came from is not one where we have ever been; it is the place, the source, we object to even when we fail”we could hardly succeed and be ourselves”to recognize it.

One understands why Carter wants to separate the message from its source: he is bothered by the fact that liberals tend to dismiss certain views just because they are motivated by religious conviction. But when he urges that we bracket the conviction and attend just to the view, he does exactly what he inveighs against: he asks religious persons to “remake themselves before they can legitimately be involved in secular political argument,” or, rather, he invites us to remake them when he urges that we receive them respectfully so long as their arguments can be made sense of in secular terms.

When he counsels us to reject Patrick Buchanan’s views on the merits and not because they come provided with a “religious justification,” he is producing one more example of “how American law and politics trivialize religious devotion.” Religious devotion is trivialized when its words are admitted into the forum, but its claims to be not just one truth but the truth are disallowed. This “accommodation,” as Carter calls it, is the very program of liberalism that will always “accommodate” religious doctrine so as to avoid taking it seriously. Accommodation is a much better strategy than outright condemnation, for it keeps the enemy in sight while depriving it of the (exclusionary) edge that makes it truly dangerous; and best of all, one who accommodates can perform this literally disarming act while proclaiming the most high-sounding pieties.

It is the history of this killing of religion by kindness that is the great subject of George Marsden’s The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establishment to Established Nonbelief (1994). The book begins with a question””How was it that distinctively Christian teaching could be displaced so easily from the substantive role that it held in American higher education for over two centuries and in the universities of Christendom for many centuries before that?””and then proceeds to answer it in twenty-two closely reasoned and densely packed chapters.

The answer has many components, including the Jeffersonian project of softening sectarian aggressiveness and establishing a general religion of peace, reason, and morality, the identification of common sense philosophy with Christian morality within the assumption that each supported the other, the rise of the cult of the expert whose skills and authority were independent of his character or religious faith, and the substitution for the imperative of adhering to an already-revealed truth the imperative of continuing to search for a truth whose full emergence is located in an ever-receding future.

This last was particularly important because if truth was by definition larger and more inclusive than our present horizons declared it to be, obedience to traditional norms and values was no longer a virtue, but a fault, and a moral fault at that.

The higher truth was an ever progressing ideal toward which the human community . . . always moved, yet never reached. Since truth was by definition always changing, the only thing ultimately sacred was the means of pursuing it. No religious or other dogmatic claim could be allowed to stand in its way.

It is not the business of a university, declared Charles Eliot of Harvard, “to train men for those functions in which implicit obedience is of the first importance. On the contrary, it should train men for those occupations in which self-government, independence, and originating power are preeminently needed.” (Or, in Satan’s more succinct formulation, “self-begot, self-raised.”)

As Marsden is quick to note, “Freedom was the principle that tied everything else together.” If it is assumed, as it was by many, that the truth to which free inquiry is leading us is the same truth that religion names “God,” then, as one cleric put it, “the cause of Christ and the Church is advanced by whatever liberalizes and enriches and enlarges the mind.” The more capacious and inclusive the individual consciousness, the closer one is to comprehending the life-principle or soul of the universe. “Hence,” Marsden concludes, “any entirely free and honest inquiry into any dimension of reality simply was part of true religion.”

The only thing excluded, then, was exclusion itself; that is, any position that refused to submit its basic premises to reason’s scrutiny. Princeton’s Francis Patton declared that “the rationality or rather the reasonableness of a belief is the condition of its credibility.” That is, you believe it because reason ratifies it, a view Augustine would have heard with horror, one that John Webster, writing in 1654, rejects as obviously absurd. “But if man gave his assent unto, or believed the things of Christ . . . because they appear probable . . . to his reason, then would his faith be . . . upon the rotten basis of human authority.” By the end of the nineteenth century, human authority has been put in the place of revelation; or rather human authority, now identified with the progressive illumination afforded by reason, has become the vehicle of revelation and of a religion that can do very nicely without any strong conception of personal deity.

Of course, this process by which an ethic of free inquiry supplants and liberalizes an older ethic of obedience to settled truth was not without opposition, and Marsden duly records the voices that were raised in protest. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Yale’s Noah Porter scoffed at the supposed neutrality and evenhandedness of secular educational theory, which, he pointed out, was its theology: “The question is not whether the college shall or shall not teach theology, but what theology it shall teach”theology according to . . . Moses and Paul or according to Buckle and Draper.” By the beginning of this century it was all too evident which of these directions had been taken by American education. In tones recently echoed by conservative polemicists, the editors of Cosmopolitan magazine complained in 1909 that

In hundreds of classrooms it is being taught daily that the decalogue is no more sacred than a syllabus; that the home as an institution is doomed; that there are no absolute evils . . . that the change of one religion to another is like getting a new hat; that moral precepts are passing shibboleths; that conceptions of right and wrong are as unstable as styles of dress.

“The neutrality we have,” thundered William Jennings Bryan in 1923, “is often but a sham; it carefully excludes the Christian religion but permits the use of the schoolroom for the destruction of faith and for the teaching of materialistic doctrines.” From a quite different perspective, Walter Lippmann agreed: “Reason and free inquiry can be neutral and tolerant only of those opinions which submit to the test of reason and free inquiry.” What this means, as Marsden points out, is that “two irreconcilable views of truth and education were at issue”; but of course the issue was never really joined, because the liberal establishment thought of itself as already reconciled to everything and anything and therefore was unable to see how exclusionary its policy of radical in clusion really was: “Groups that were excluded, such as Marxists and fundamentalists, often raised the point that they were being excluded by liberal dogmatism, but they were seldom heard.”

That they were not heard is hardly surprising, since what they were saying was that a state of “warfare” existed, and warfare”deep conflict over basic and nonnegotiable issues”was precisely what liberalism was invented to deny; and it manages that denial by excluding from the tolerance it preaches anyone who will not pledge allegiance to the mimicry of tolerance.

This then is the story Marsden tells, and he tells it with a dispassionate equanimity that sits oddly with the strong point of view he announces in his introduction. “My point of view,” he declares, “is that of a fairly traditional Protestant of the reformed theological heritage. One of the features of that heritage is that it has valued education that relates faith to one’s scholarship. Particularly important is that beliefs about God, God’s creation, and God’s will . . . should have impact on scholarship not just in theology, but also in considering other dimensions of human thought and relationships.” But in the long narrative that follows, these beliefs become objects of study rather than informing principles of the scholarship. It is as if Marsden had discharged his obligation to his “point of view” simply by announcing it, and can now proceed on his way without being unduly influenced by its values. “It is perfectly possible,” he asserts, “to have strong evaluative interests in a subject, and yet treat it fairly and with a degree of detachment.”

But it is possible to detach yourself from a “strong evaluative interest” only if you believe in a stage of perception that exists before interest kicks in; and not only is that a prime tenet of liberal thought, it is what makes possible the exclusionary move of which Marsden, McConnell, and Carter complain. If such a base-level stage of perception does in fact exist, it can be identified as the common ground in relation to which uncommon ”that is, not universally shared”convictions (like, for example, Christ is risen) can be marginalized and privatized. By claiming to have set aside his strongly held values in deference to the virtue of fairness”a virtue only if you are committed to the priority of procedure over substance”Marsden agrees to play by the rules of the very ideology of which his book is in large part a critique.

He is still playing by those rules in a concluding postscript in which, he tells us, his own interest, hitherto not strongly in play, will be elaborated. He now adds himself to the list of those who complain that “the only points of view . . . allowed full academic credence are those that presuppose purely naturalistic worldviews.” The resulting exclusion of religious perspectives, he explains, was justified by the supposed objectivity and neutrality of naturalistic descriptions, but since post-structuralism and postmodernism have denied the claims of any discourse to be objective and neutral, “there seems no intellectually valid reason to exclude religiously based perspectives.” This, however, is a self-defeating argument because it amounts to saying that when it comes to proof, religious perspectives are no worse off than any other. It is an argument from weakness”yes, religious thought is without objective ground, but so is everything else; we are all in the same untethered boat”and if a religious perspective were to gain admittance on that basis, it would have forfeited its claim to be anything other than a “point of view,” a subjective preference, a mere opinion. It would have joined the universe of liberal discourse but at the price of not being taken seriously. If a religious perspective is included because there is “no intellectually valid reason” to exclude it, neither will there be any intellectually valid reason to affirm it, except as one perspective among others, rather than as the perspective that is true, and because true, controlling.

That is what Marsden should want: not the inclusion of religious discourse in a debate no one is allowed to win, but the triumph of religious discourse and the silencing of its atheistic opponents. To invoke the criterion of intellectual validity and seek shelter under its umbrella is to surrender in advance to the enemy, to that liberal rationality whose inability even to recognize the claims of faith has been responsible for religion’s marginalization in the first place. Marsden wants to argue against that marginalization, but his suggestion for removing it is in fact a way of reinforcing it. He calls it “procedural rationality.” The procedure is to scrutinize religious viewpoints and distinguish between those that “honor some basic rules of evidence and argument” and those that “are presented so dogmatically and aggressively as not to be accommodated within the procedural rules of pluralistic academia.”

One could hardly imagine a better formula for subordinating the religious impulse to the demands of civil and secular order. Presumably it will not be religion that specifies what the rules of evidence and argument to be honored are; and it surely will not be religion that stigmatizes as dogma any assertion that does not conform to the requirements of those rules. Dogma, of course, is a word that once had a positive meaning: it meant the unqualified assertion of a priori truths and was indistinguishable from a truly strong religiosity. It is only under the liberal dispensation that dogma acquires the taint of obdurateness, of a culpable refusal to submit to the test of reasonableness as defined by the standards and norms of the civil establishment.

It is no accident that Marsden here begins to speak of the “enforcement of rules of civility,” of rules that protect the flow of conversation from those who would bring it to an authoritative conclusion, for in spite of his profession of religious faith, civility has become his religion. When civility is embraced as a prime value, tolerance and freedom cannot be far behind, and it is in the name of this quintessentially liberal trinity that Marsden makes his appeal in the closing pages of a book that began by invoking the will of God.

In the end Marsden’s own argument enacts the journey he has been describing, from a religious conviction so strong that it requires no justification to a religious impulse so weakened that he can say of it, without any irony, that it poses “scarcely any danger” to the ideal of “free inquiry.” On the back of the jacket cover one prepublication reviewer predicts that “George Marsden’s book will raise hackles.” It is not clear whether that is an expression of anxiety or hope; what is clear is that whichever it is, it will not be realized.

What does it all mean? What can we conclude from these examples of three intelligent and learned men who lament the trivialization of religious discourse at the hands of liberal rationalism, but who turn to the vocabulary of that same rationalism when it comes time to offer remedies and alternatives? One thing we can conclude is that in the end McConnell, Carter, and Marsden are moved more by what they fear than by what they desire. What they desire is the full enfranchisement of religious conviction. What they fear is the full enfranchisement of religious conviction, for if the religious impulse were unchecked by the imperatives of civility, tolerance, and freedom of inquiry, the result would be the open conflict the Enlightenment was designed to blunt.

It is simply too late in the day to go back; as a member of one of Carter’s audiences put it, “We already had the Enlightenment” and religion lost. The loss is not simply a matter of historical fact: it is inscribed in the very consciousness of those who live in its wake. That is why we see the spectacle of men like McConnell, Carter, and Marsden, who set out to restore the priority of the good over the right but find the protocols of the right”of liberal proceduralism”written in the fleshly tables of their hearts.

I've argued here many times that Christianity and Liberalism are fundamentally incompatible, but Fish explains why much more articulately than I ever have.

Also need to add Paradise Lost to my reading list. So much classic fiction to catch up on.
 

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
Here's an excellent dialogue re the ongoing Synod on the Family between a "conservative" Catholic (Ross Douthat of the NYT) and a "liberal" Catholic (James Martin, SJ).
 

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
Here's an obituary of French philosopher/ theologian Rene Girard:

There was a kind of grandeur about René Girard—a creator of grand theories, a thinker of grand thoughts. Born in France, he spent most of his career in the United States, before slipping away this month, age 91, at his home in California. But to read him, even to meet him, was to feel as though you’d been taken out of time, catapulted back into the presence of one of the capacious minds of the past.

Tall, with thick, expressive eyebrows and a great tousle of hair, René was like a figure out of the 1800s who had somehow been born a hundred years late, striding through the second half of the twentieth century without any concern that large claims about the human condition had fallen out of fashion. Without any concern that the great run of theorists, from Hegel to Freud, had dwindled away to almost nothing. Without any concern that the thought of late modernity had taken a hard, antifoundationalist turn into a kind of skeptical cynicism.

Girard followed his insights, step by step, into one last grand theory, one last grand set of thoughts. His sheer existence sometimes seemed an indictment of our suspicious, small-minded time. Living the life of the mind, René Girard was a great man in an age that had few such men.

I have to plead special circumstances: René Girard has influenced me more than any other thinker I’ve ever met, and I find his accounts of culture generally persuasive. For that matter, I found him personally charming beyond measure. The first time we threw a dinner party for him, my wife decided, in some fit of hubris, to make difficult soufflés for the Frenchman’s visit. After dinner, he bent down from his great height, kissed her hand, and announced with a Maurice Chevalier twinkle, “It was superb, just as my mother would have made.” I think my wife—and everyone else there—would have followed him out the door, if he had only asked.

After finishing an undergraduate history degree in Paris, Girard came to the United States in 1947 to do graduate work at Indiana University on the history of French-American relations. It was only a one-year fellowship, but he was invited by the university to stay and finish his doctorate, on condition that he teach a course in French literature. The topic caught his imagination, and a series of provocative essays on Gallic authors led to a successful academic career in comparative literature at Duke, Bryn Mawr, Johns Hopkins, SUNY Buffalo, and Stanford.

His first book, published in 1961, was a French study of novelistic forms, translated into English five years later with the title Deceit, Desire, and the Novel. It’s hard to remember all the swirls and eddies of intellectual politics in those days, but, in Paris, the book was the beneficiary of a laudatory review by the influential Marxist critic Lucien Goldmann. It was, in French circles, the kind of review that makes a young critic’s career—even if Goldmann praised the book mostly because Girard seemed to provide a way to read literature as a critique of bourgeois life, without the un-Marxist Freudian psychologizing that dominated literary criticism at the time.

The Marxists were right, at least, about Girard’s rejection of Freud, even if they missed the religious impulse that Girard would later insist he was unpacking in all his work, ever since a breakthrough insight he had back in 1959. Reading figures from Flaubert to Dostoyevsky, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel points out that a series of triangular relations appears over and over in Western literature, especially in the competition of rivals over a love interest.

Our greatest literary artists tell us, in other words, that we learn what we want at least in part from what other people want. Freud had argued that human desire comes prepackaged in certain shapes: the Oedipal complex, the death wish, penis envy, and so on. But Girard insisted that literature teaches instead that desire is mimetic: If we want the mother, it’s because the father wants her. If we want an unattainable love interest, it’s because others have that interest. Our desires aren’t packaged into predetermined forms; they’re created in imitation of the desires of others. We catch desire like a disease.

From there, it was a small step into anthropology and the publication of Girard’s second book, Violence and the Sacred, in 1972. The contagion of desire spreads through a culture, multiplying the number of antagonistic rivals, until only violence can resolve the situation. A careful reading of mythology, which Girard undertook in his 1982 study The Scapegoat, suggests that the sacrificial rituals of archaic religion are always born from, and reenact, primal murders—culture-founding deaths in which someone is singled out as both the blameworthy cause of and the sacrificial solution to the crisis of escalating cultural violence.

In 1978, Girard published Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, a strangely constructed book that addressed for the first time the Christianity that would become central to his later work. His early writing on literary structures had pulled him into anthropology, and that led him, in turn, to an investigation of the curious problem the Bible poses for cultural anthropologists.

Perhaps the easiest way to understand the biblical problem, as Girard perceived it, is to start with the ancient nonbiblical religions. Violent sacrifice—what Girard calls the “scapegoat mechanism”—is woven into all the ancient myths of cultural foundation. It’s there, for example, in the primal murders reenacted with the human sacrifices the Carthaginians offered to their god Baal, and the children burned to death by the Ammonites for their god Moloch. This theme of sacred violence is written in the myths of ancient Rome, a city founded when Romulus murders his brother Remus, just as it appears in the deaths that follow in the wake of Oedipus in the mythological history of Thebes.

Add it all up, and the role of scapegoating violence in archaic religion seems clear enough: All cultures fear the breakdown of society into universal violence, an escalation of the cycles of revenge into all-out civil war. And against such culture-destroying violence, the ancient myths offer the solution of a different violence, a culture-preserving violence: not the war of all against all, but the war of all against one—a sacrificial violence in which a single sacred figure is identified as the source of the cultural contagion and murdered or expelled. Those who remain, with the relief and fellowship that follow peace, come to see that figure as the founder of a new culture.

The Bible, however, regularly suggests the innocence of the people accused of causing cultural contagion—identifying the object of the scapegoat mechanism as simply a victim of murder. In other words, if mythology demands that we see sacred violence as the solution to cultural breakdown, then the Bible is not mythological but antimythological. If the root of religion is a stabilizing of society through sacrifice, then Christianity is not a religion but an antireligion.

As Girard increasingly came to see, Judeo-Christian insights into the scapegoat mechanism of myth suggest that biblical faith lies beyond the power of anthropological analysis to explain. Noting anthropologists’ efforts, over the last hundred years, to fold the Bible into some general category of archaic religion, he would mock as intellectually inexcusable “the inability of the greatest minds in the modern world to grasp the difference between the Christian crib at Christmas-time and the bestial monstrosities of mythological births.”

To some extent, Girard fell out of critical favor in his later years, mostly because of his turn to theology. He would write—provocatively and presciently—about how the idea of victimhood, stripped of its Christianity, could itself become a device of cultural violence, with people mimetically competing for the status of victim. And in some of his last writings, he would suggest that through such dechristianized devices, the historical and intellectual triumphs of Christianity could themselves help bring about the apocalypse that is, he argued, a theme inextricably woven into the New Testament.

In 2005, Girard was elected to the Académie Française, and shortly after I received a letter from him, in his terrible handwriting. He had been put in a side room, dressed in the uniform of an embroidered frock coat, while awaiting his induction. And, exploring the room, he discovered stationery in the drawer of a writing desk.

So, he wrote, he asked himself who would appreciate a note on académie letterhead—and he settled on me. It was sweet and unexpected, somehow both comic and grand. It was a gesture of the kind that René alone, of all the people I’ve ever known, was capable. A gesture, I’ve always thought, a century out of its time.

His work is fascinating. For those who are interested, here's an article he wrote for First Things about the Gospels as Anti-Myth.
 
C

Cackalacky

Guest
Commision on Religion and Belief in British Life published their findings of a two year assessment of the role of religion in society and came to the conclusion that Brittain must be systematically de-Christianized... I shit you not...

My first reaction was ...sure...ok...let's see what this is all about...

Britain is no longer a Christian country and should stop acting as if it is, a major inquiry into the place of religion in modern society has concluded, provoking a furious backlash from ministers and the Church of England.
A two-year commission, chaired by the former senior judge Baroness Butler-Sloss and involving leading religious leaders from all faiths, calls for public life in Britain to be systematically de-Christianised.
It says that the decline of churchgoing and the rise of Islam and other faiths mean a "new settlement" is needed for religion in the UK, giving more official influence to non-religious voices and those of non-Christian faiths.


The report provoked a furious row as it was condemned by Cabinet ministers as "seriously misguided" and the Church of England said it appeared to have been "hijacked" by humanists. The report, by the Commission on Religion and Belief in Public Life, claims that faith schools are "socially divisive" and says that the selection of children on the basis of their beliefs should be phased out. It also accuses those who devise some RE syllabuses of "sanitising" negative aspects of religion in lessons and suggests that the compulsory daily act of worship in school assemblies should be abolished and replaced with a "time for reflection".

The report backs moves cut the number of Church of England bishops in the Lords and give places to imams, rabbis and other non-other non-Christian clerics as well as evangelical pastors.Meanwhile the coronation service for the next monarch should be overhauled to include other faiths, the report adds. Controversially, it also calls for a rethink of anti-terror policy, including ensuring students can voice radical views on campus without fear of being reported to the security services.And it also recommends new protections for women in Sharia courts and other religious tribunals – including a call for the Government to consider requiring couples who have a non-legally binding religious marriage also to have a civil registration.

It also suggests that Thought of the Day on BBC Radio 4's Today programme should include non-religious messages. The Commission on Religion and Belief in Public Life has attracted particular controversy because of the seniority of those behind it. Its patrons include Rowan Williams, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Woolf, the former chief justice, and Sir Iqbal Sacranie, the former general secretary of the Muslim Council of Britain.
While gathering evidence the commissioners met key players including Justin Welby, the Archbishop of Canterbury; Ephraim Mirvis, the Chief Rabbi; the Home Secretary Theresa May, and senior executives at the BBC and Channel 4. The Church of England said the report was a "sad waste" and had "fallen captive to liberal rationalism". Abolishing current human rights laws will create uncertainty and give clever lawyers a field day, says former Lord Chief Justice

A spokeswoman for the Church of England said: “The reportt is dominated by the old fashioned view that traditional religion is declining in importance and that non-adherence to a religion is the same as humanism or secularism." A source close to Nicky Morgan, the Education Secretary, described the report's recommendations on faith schools as "ridiculous". The source said: "Nicky is one of the biggest champions of faith schools and anyone who thinks she is going to pay attention to these ridiculous recommendations is sorely misguided."
The report highlights figures showing the decline in people who say they are Anglicans from 40 per cent in 1983 to less than a fifth in 2013.

It says: "Three striking trends in recent decades have revolutionised the landscape on which religion and belief in Britain meet and interact. "The first is the increase in the number of people with non-religious beliefs and identities. The second is the decline in Christian affiliation, belief and practice and within this decline a shift in Christian affiliation that has meant that Anglicans no longer comprise a majority of Christians. "The third is the increase in the number of people who have a religious affiliation but who are not Christians. It goes on to say: "The increase in those with non-religious beliefs, the reduction in the number of Christians and an increase in their diversity, and the increase in the number of people identifying with non-Christian religions: these are the settled social context of Britain today and for the foreseeable future, as is the unsettled and unsettling context of the international environment".

Its central recommendation is for a national consultation exercise to draw up a 21st Century equivalent to the Magna Carta to define the values at the heart of modern Britain instead of the Government’s controversial “British values” requirements. “From recent events in France, to the schools so many of our children attend and even the adverts screened in cinemas, for good and ill religion and belief impacts directly on all our daily lives,” said Lady Butler-Sloss.

“The proposals in this report amount to a ‘new settlement for religion and belief in the UK’, intended to provide space and a role for all within society, regardless of their beliefs or absence of them.” The 150-page report sets out a major shift away from Christianity in Britain – particularly the Church of England – with the number of people describing themselves as having no religion jumping from less than a third of the population to almost half in just 30 years.

At the same time it highlights the growth of non-Christian faiths, especially Islam, and an explosion in the number of newer Pentecostal and evangelical Churches outside of the traditional denominations.
But the report stops short of calling for the disestablishment of the Church of England, arguing that the special status of Anglicanism in England and the Church of Scotland north of the border, has helped other faith groups and “enables them to make their voice heard in the public sphere”. But it adds: “The relationship of the Church of England to the state has changed and is changing, and could change further.

“The pluralist character of modern society should be reflected in national forums such as the House of Lords, so that they include a wider range of worldviews and religious traditions, and of Christian denominations other than the Church of England” It goes on to call for all national and civic events – including the next coronation – to be designed to reflect “the pluralist character of modern society”. Although the commission does not call for the abolition of faith schools, it questions the fundamental premise on which they exist. “In England, successive governments have claimed in recent years that faith schools and free schools create and promote social inclusion leading to cohesion and integration,” it says.

“However, it is in our view not clear that segregation of young people into faith schools has promoted greater cohesion or that it has not been socially divisive, leading to greater misunderstanding and tension.”
But it also questions the approach to religion in universities and colleges, including measures to curb extremism on campus- particularly demands for lecturers to report students showing signs of extremism.
“Free debate should be possible without fear of students being labelled as extremists or attracting the attention of the security services,” the report argues. “That all said, universities will deal better with religion if they approach it as something that belongs to their intellectual discussions rather than an external factor with which they have to cope.”

It also urges the Government to rethink its approach to the Muslim community in general, including consulting those it considers to have less “palatable” views on policy. It says: “In its selection of organisations with which to engage the Government must guard against the perception that it is operating with a simplistic good Muslims/bad Muslims distinction, or between ‘mainstream moderates’ and ‘violent or non-violent extremists’.”
The report also suggests setting up an “advisory panel” of religious “experts” to examine complaints about coverage of religion in the press. Keith Porteous Wood, executive director of the National Secular Society, said the report did not go far enough.

“There are some sensible recommendations in the Commission’s report, but there is no escaping that the Commission is composed of vested interests and is unlikely to make recommendations for any radical change. Disestablishing the Church of England should be a minimum ambition for a modern Britain in the 21st century.”
“This report promotes a multi-faith approach to public life which is completely at odds with the religious indifference that permeates British society."

The Rt Rev Michael Nazir-Ali, the former Bishop of Rochester, said: “As to the next coronation, I hope it doesn't come for a long time but when it comes, it will be an important occasion to reaffirm the constitutional basis of the nation. “This is Judaeo- Christian through and through, with the monarch promising to uphold 'the Laws of God and the true profession of the Gospel'.” Rabbi Danny Rich, chief executive and senior rabbi of Liberal Judaism, said: “If we fail to recognise the diverse nature of our society in our civic institutions, our national events, our legal system, schools and media, we risk alienating large sections of our community who will see themselves as ‘the other’. “This in turn leads to them feeling excluded not just from the rights of British citizens, but also the obligations and standards of behaviour which go with being a full partner in British society.
"This is a huge a growing threat to us all."
 
Last edited:

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
For an eye-opening preview of where the radical feminist and gay rights movements are taking us, here's an interview with Jill Soloway, the producer of Transparent. Most interesting to me is the last paragraph:

When we talked, Myles was in Washington, D.C., with Soloway, who had been invited to the White House, to honor the Transgender Day of Remembrance for victims of hate crimes. “And Jill’s moppa is here!” Myles said. “I just met him last night and that was great. He’s British . . . she’s British . . . they’re British.” (Carrie isn’t particular about nomenclature. “You go into a cab as ‘sir,’ and you come out as ‘ma’am,’ ” she told me. “You can’t train people; they’re going to say what they see.”) I asked Myles if, as a poet, she struggled to refer to an individual person as “they.” She said, “It’s not intuitive at all. But I’m obsessed with that part in the Bible when Jesus is given the opportunity to cure a person possessed by demons, and Jesus says, ‘What is your name?’ And the person replies, ‘My name is legion.’ Whatever is not normative is many.” She liked the idea of a person containing more than one self, more than one gender.

Reminiscent of how radical Marxists used to approvingly quote the "Non serviam" of Lucifer from Milton's Paradise Lost. If you ever find yourself compelled to say, "Gee, that demon has a really good point," it might be time to reassess your philosophy.
 

Veritate Duce Progredi

A man gotta have a code
Messages
9,358
Reaction score
5,352
For an eye-opening preview of where the radical feminist and gay rights movements are taking us, here's an interview with Jill Soloway, the producer of Transparent. Most interesting to me is the last paragraph:



Reminiscent of how radical Marxists used to approvingly quote the "Non serviam" of Lucifer from Milton's Paradise Lost. If you ever find yourself compelled to say, "Gee, that demon has a really good point," it might be time to reassess your philosophy.

Startling.
 

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
Edward Feser recently published a compelling article describing how Liberalism and Islam are both Christian heresies, and why they're fundamentally incompatible with each other:

In an article in The New Criterion over a decade ago, the late political scientist Kenneth Minogue noted a developing tendency in contemporary progressivism toward “Christophobia,” a movement beyond mere disbelief in Christian doctrine toward outright hostility. The years since have hardly made Minogue’s observation less timely. The New Atheism, the first stirrings of which Minogue cited in the article, came to full prominence (and acquired the “New Atheism” label) later in the decade in which he wrote. The Obama administration’s attempt to impose its contraception mandate on Catholic institutions evinces a disdain for rights of conscience that would have horrified earlier generations of liberals. Opponents of “same-sex marriage” have in recent years found themselves subject to loss of employment, cyber-mobbing, and even death threats -- all in the name of progressivism. If contempt for Christian moral teaching still hides behind a mask of liberal neutrality, Hillary Clinton let that mask slip further still when she recently insisted that “deep-seated cultural codes, religious beliefs and structural biases have to be changed” in order to accommodate easy access to abortion. Not all liberals approve of these developments, of course. But demographic trends indicate that a Christophobic brand of progressivism may have little difficulty finding new recruits.

Now, how do contemporary liberals view Islam? How would one expect them to, given their principles, and given the principles and practice of Islam? Consider that, like Christianity, Islamic moral teaching unequivocally condemns homosexual behavior, extramarital sex, and the sexual revolution in general. Feminism has, to put it mildly, had little effect on Islam, which is traditionally highly patriarchal. In Islam, men can have multiple wives, but wives cannot have multiple husbands. Men can marry non-Muslim women, but women cannot marry non-Muslim men. The authority of husbands over wives goes far beyond anything feminists objected to in 1950s America. Rules governing divorce, custody of children, inheritance, and legal testimony all strongly favor men. In many modern Muslim countries, the implementation of this patriarchal system takes forms which modern Western women would find unimaginably repressive. Women are expected to cover their bodies in public to a greater or lesser extent, the burqa being the most extreme case. In Saudi Arabia, women are forbidden to drive, to go out in public without a chaperone, or to interact with men to whom they are not related. In some Muslim countries, husbands have a right to discipline their wives with beatings. In some, female genital mutilation is widely practiced. “Honor killings” of women thought to have brought shame upon their families often occur not only in Muslim countries, but in Western countries with large Muslim populations. Of course, not all Muslims approve of all of this. Nor or is it by any means the whole story about women in Islamic society, and Muslims emphasize the way Islam improved the situation of women compared to pre-Islamic Arabia. The point, though, is that it is far from being a marginal part of the story.

Consider also that the punishments for crime traditionally sanctioned within Islam can be unbelievably harsh by modern Western standards -- cutting off the hands of thieves, whipping fornicators, stoning adulterers, and so forth -- and while such punishments have been abandoned by most Muslim countries, there are a few in which they are still employed. Liberal standards of freedom of thought and expression have no echo in traditional Islamic doctrine. No Muslim is permitted to convert to another religion, and apostasy may be punished with death. There is nothing comparable to the liberal separation of religion from politics, and Islam is expected to dominate the public sphere no less than the private. While Jews, Christians, and other “People of the Book” are afforded some liberty of religious practice, historically they were expected to obey the Islamic political authority and to pay a special tax. Adherents of other religions, particularly polytheists, had no rights. Again, not all Muslims would agree with every aspect of traditional practice. Moreover, modern Muslim countries do not all implement this privileging of Islam to the same extent. Still, in some -- Saudi Arabia being a notorious example -- the freedom of non-Muslims to practice their own religion is severely restricted.

Consider too that theological liberalism has few takers in contemporary Islam. In particular, historical-critical methods of studying scripture, and accommodations of theological doctrine to philosophical naturalism, modern science, and post-Enlightenment moral and political sensibilities, have had little influence within the Islamic world. Then there is the fact that the history of Islam from its beginnings through the medieval period and down to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is unambiguously imperialistic and militaristic. Modern terrorism is largely (even if not entirely) a jihadist phenomenon, just as public perception would have it and occasional spin to the contrary notwithstanding. As in other contexts, so too where war is concerned, not all contemporary Muslims would approve of every aspect of traditional Islamic practice. Certainly many contemporary Muslims would condemn terrorism and attacks upon civilians. Still, and needless to say, the antiwar idealism that has been so much a part of liberal rhetoric (if not always of liberal practice) since the 1960s finds little echo in the Islamic world.

All of this is, of course, well known. My point in rehearsing it here is neither to compare Islam unfavorably to other religions, nor, for the moment, to suggest that any of the facts rehearsed reflects inherent (as opposed to historically contingent) features of Islam, though I will address that question below. The point is rather this. Western Christianity has largely accommodated itself to liberalism. Give or take a few standout episodes (such as the French Revolution), it has less political power now than at any time since before Constantine. And the more any of its tenets are out of sync with liberalism, the less likely even prominent churchmen are to talk about those tenets in public or to put much emphasis on them in private. Christianity, in short, has effectively been “tamed” by liberalism. And yet liberal Christophobia has only increased. You might think, then, that Islamophobia would be an even greater tendency within liberalism, given how very much farther out of sync contemporary Islam is with contemporary liberal mores and policy. And a few prominent left-of-center voices -- Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, Bill Maher -- have indeed been highly critical of Islam.

But in fact most liberals exhibit exactly the opposite tendency. Probably many liberal readers of this article, including those happy to rehearse the purported sins of Christianity, will have been made uncomfortable by the list of facts about Islam rehearsed above. To say anything which might seem in any way to put Islam in a bad light is to risk having flung at one the now-routine accusation of “anti-Muslim bigotry.” The tendency is to downplay every aspect of historical and contemporary Islam which is irreconcilable with liberalism, to search out and call attention to aspects which are (or can be interpreted as) favorable to or at least compatible with liberalism, and to insist that the latter alone are representative of “genuine” Islam. In his New Criterion article, Minogue noted how Christophobia has been conjoined with an “extraordinary solicitude for Islamic sensibilities in Western states since 9/11” -- since 9/11, take note. Despite 9/11, and indeed, one is tempted to say even because of 9/11. Every new jihadist attack seems, as if by a kind of reverse inductive reasoning, to make some liberals even more confident in their judgment that there is no essential connection between Islam and terrorism, and that Islam and liberal values are ultimately reconcilable.

The concomitant of Christophobia, then, seems to be not Islamophobia but rather a kind of Islamophilia, and the condemnation of Islamophobia as itself a manifestation of the purported evils of traditional Christianity. Nor is it only in liberal perception of current events that Christophobia and Islamophilia are conjoined. As Minogue also observed, one of the ritualistic liberal expressions of Islamophilia is an incessant “apologizing for the Crusades” -- this despite the fact that the Crusades, while far from morally spotless in their execution, were essentially defensive responses to medieval Islamic aggression, as actual historians of the Crusades like Jonathan Riley-Smith and Thomas Madden never tire of demonstrating. Modern Westerners apologizing for the Crusades is like Eliot Ness’s descendents apologizing to Al Capone’s descendents for some of Ness’s men having gotten a bit rough with some of Capone’s men.

So, we have a paradox. Considered both historically and in terms of its contemporary manifestations, Islam would appear to be the least liberal of religions. Nor is it easy to see why any devout Muslim would want to accommodate his religion to liberalism -- especially when he sees how liberals have come to treat Christianity after having tamed it. Yet liberals by and large seem to think such an accommodation is not only possible but highly likely. Why? Is there something in Islam that liberals have seen that others have not? Or are liberal hopes delusional?

The answer, I would say, is that liberal hopes are delusional, breathtakingly delusional, almost preternaturally delusional. There is no hope whatsoever for any accommodation between Islam and liberalism. Since I am neither a liberal nor a Muslim I do not mean this either as criticism or as praise of either system of thought, but just as a straightforward statement of fact grounded in an analysis of the nature of each of the systems.

The key to understanding the nature of each system, and to seeing why they are incompatible, also happens to be the key to understanding why liberalism is prone to both Christophobia and Islamophilia. That key is to see that each of these systems is a kind of heresy. The term may seem polemical, but I am using it in an analytical rather than a polemical sense. “Heresy” derives from the Greek hairesis -- a “choosing” or “taking,” from some system of thought, one part of it to the exclusion of the rest. For example, monophysitism is a Christological heresy which “chooses” Christ’s divine nature to the exclusion of his human nature; Sabellianism is a Trinitarian heresy which “chooses” the unity of God to the exclusion of the distinctness of the divine Persons; and so forth. As these examples indicate, a heresy typically involves taking an aspect of a system of thought that also includes another, crucial balancing aspect, and leaving out the balancing aspect. When I say that liberalism and Islam are heresies -- and I do mean Christian heresies, specifically -- what I mean is that each has, in effect if not in explicit intention, “chosen” or “taken” certain aspects of Christianity to the exclusion of other, balancing aspects.

Which aspects? Christianity draws a clear distinction between the natural order and the supernatural order, and between the sacred and the secular, and has tried to maintain a proper balance between each side of each of these distinctions. Islam, by contrast, tends to emphasize the supernatural and the sacred to the exclusion of the natural and the secular. Liberalism, at the other extreme, tends to emphasize the natural and the secular to the exclusion of the supernatural and the sacred. I don’t mean to say that the exclusions are always thoroughgoing; they are not. There have, in the centuries since Muhammad, been Muslim thinkers who take the natural and the secular seriously, and there have in the centuries-old liberal tradition been thinkers who have taken the sacred and the supernatural seriously. But the exclusionary tendencies are real and they are strong, and that they are tendencies in diametrically opposed directions should give some clue as to why any attempt to harmonize liberalism and Islam is doomed to failure. But let’s examine all of this more closely, beginning with the Christian balance which each of these other systems upsets.

Church and state

Christianity arose in a position of extreme weakness relative to the state, and remained in this position for centuries. Moreover, despite unambiguously affirming the state’s legitimacy (as in chapter 13 of St. Paul’s letter to the Romans, for example), the early Church was subject to relentless persecution by the state. These contingent historical factors might have been enough to guarantee that Christianity would come to regard Church and state as having fundamentally different missions. But Christian doctrine entails that in any case. Though the Jews of his day hoped for a political Messiah who would take up arms and free them from Roman domination, Christ famously declared: “My kingdom is not of this world” (John 18:36). He also commanded: “Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's” (Mark 12:17), indicating that the political and religious orders are distinct. The letter to the Hebrews teaches that the patriarchs of old -- who are models for the Christian to follow -- “were strangers and foreigners on the earth” who “desire[d] a better country, that is, a heavenly one” and that God has indeed “prepared a city for them” (Hebrews 11: 13, 16). The letter to the Philippians says that “our commonwealth is in heaven” (3:20). St. Augustine distinguished between the “earthly city” and the City of God. And so forth.

There has from the very beginning of Christian teaching, then, been a clear distinction between the religious and the political, between the sacred and the secular, between Church and state. (Notice that I said a “distinction” between Church and state; I did not say a “separation,” which is a very different idea, to which I will return below.) The distinction would eventually come to be given a theoretical articulation in terms of a further distinction between the natural order and the supernatural order.

The natural order of things is just the world of creatures acting in a way that reflects their natures. Lions hunt their prey, birds fly, trees grow, water flows, and so on, just by virtue of being lions, birds, trees, water, etc. It is just natural for these things to act in those particular ways. “Natural” here contrasts both with what is contrary to nature and with what is beyond the power of nature. For example, a lion’s lacking four limbs or having no desire to eat would be contrary to nature in the sense that these are not the sorts of things that would be true of a mature and healthy lion. A lion which has fewer than four limbs or which has no desire to eat would be defective in some way, would fail to manifest the characteristics that naturally flow from having the nature of a lion. A lion which could fly through the air, on the other hand, would be acting in a way that is beyond the power of nature, since there is nothing in the nature even of mature and healthy lions which would give them such an ability. Only something outside the lion -- a human being strapping a jet pack onto the lion, say, or God causing a miracle -- could impart such a power to it.

What is “natural” in this sense determines what is good or bad for a thing. Given its distinctive nature, a lion has to hunt and eat if it is to survive and flourish; given its distinctive nature, a tree has to sink roots and take in nutrients through them if it is to survive and flourish; and so on. Lions or trees that failed to do these things would be defective qua lions or trees, would in that sense be bad specimens of their kind. Lions and trees which do realize these ends are to that extent good instances of their kinds.

Human beings are also part of the natural order. Their nature is that of rational animals, and so not only their corporeal activities (eating, sleeping, reproducing, walking, seeing, hearing, and so forth) but also their intellectual and volitional activities (i.e. thinking and willing) are natural in the relevant sense. Now, being rational animals, human beings can (unlike inanimate things, plants, and non-human animals) understand their nature and choose whether or not to pursue what that nature determines to be good for them. This is why their realization of that good, or failure to realize it, can be morally good or bad. And because we can therefore know what is morally good or bad for us just by virtue of knowing our nature, there is such a thing as a natural law, a body of moral knowledge that is available to us apart from any special divine revelation.

Now for the Christian tradition, just as for the classical Western philosophical tradition that Christianity incorporated, human beings are also by nature social and political animals. It is natural for us to form families, larger communities, and governments to administer the affairs of those larger communities. The state is in that sense a natural institution. It is something the need and legitimacy of which can be known as part of the natural law. Part of what that entails is that it is not something that is entirely our invention, any more than our natures are our invention. We determine the specific forms the state may take, but the need for and legitimacy of some state or other is not something we determine, but flows from nature. That the state is a natural institution also entails that it is not something which exists only as a result of some special divine action, like the sending of a prophet. It could and indeed would exist even if no prophets had ever been sent.

To be sure, the natural order of things is by no means to be understood in atheistic terms. On the contrary, nothing could exist or operate even for an instant without divine conservation of things in being and concurrence with their every activity. Moreover, for the mainstream Christian tradition, this is something which can be known via purely philosophical arguments, i.e. by way of natural theology. And a complete system of natural law would take account of the truths of natural theology. Hence it would include, as part of our natural obligations, the duty to worship God, both individually and communally. To that extent, even the state as a purely natural institution would be obliged to recognize and honor God. And it would uphold other aspects of natural law as well.

However, it is only God as understood by way of natural theology, the God of the philosophers, that the natural law teaches all human beings to recognize, and that the natural law directs the state to recognize. Special divine revelation -- the sort of theological knowledge which Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all claim to have, and which goes beyond anything which natural reason or philosophy could arrive at -- has nothing to do with it. And thus the Church has nothing to do with it. Given just the natural law, there could -- in principle, at least -- have been a situation in which the state exists, and in which the state even recognizes the God of the philosophers, but in which there were no prophets sent, no miraculous suspensions of the natural order, no special divine revelation, no divinely inspired books, no Church founded. This would not have been an atheistic order of things, but it would not have been a Christian order of things either. It would have been a purely natural order of things, and in that sense (even if not in the modern, desiccated sense) a purely secular order.

What Christianity introduces, and what the Church introduces, is something supernatural -- “supernatural,” not in the idiotic sense modern people associate with that word (having to do with ghosts, goblins, werewolves, etc.), but rather in the original sense of something that goes beyond, exceeds, and adds to a thing’s nature. In particular, Christianity teaches that God has in his grace opened to us the possibility of knowing Him in a far more intimate way than we would ever naturally be able to via mere philosophy. It promises the possibility of the beatific vision, a direct knowledge of the divine essence which the unaided human intellect could never even in theory attain. God gives us a small foretaste of this knowledge by specially revealing to us his Trinitarian nature, something we could not possibly have arrived at through natural theology alone. He has become Incarnate to remedy the loss of this supernatural end suffered by our first parents, to whom it was offered. To the virtues of which human beings can have knowledge via natural law (such as justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom) he adds the theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity). And so forth. He institutes the Church -- a supernatural institution in the sense that it is founded by a special divine act and did not arise merely in the natural course of human affairs -- to assist us in realizing this supernatural end, by means of the sacraments, by means of her teaching authority, etc.

Now, our supernatural end, and the Church’s supernatural mission in helping us to achieve it, do not negate the natural law or natural institutions like the state. Grace raises nature to something it could not have otherwise achieved, but it does not destroy it in the process. The state remains a natural institution, the Church a supernatural one. The state is still grounded in natural law, the Church in special divine revelation. The state retains its mission of facilitating the realization of our natural ends, the Church her mission of facilitating the realization of our supernatural end. Hence the state and the Church remain distinct. Are they separate, though? That is to say, though different institutions with different origins and different missions, should they work together and assist one another in realizing their respective purposes? Or should they run on parallel and completely disconnected tracks?

That depends. In the Catholic context, the traditional teaching, vigorously and repeatedly upheld by the 19th century and pre-Vatican II 20th century popes, is that ideally Church and state ought to cooperate. Contrary to an annoyingly common misunderstanding, these popes were not teaching that non-Catholics ought to be coerced by the state into becoming Catholics. Nor were they teaching that non-Catholics should be forbidden from practicing their own religions in the privacy of their own homes, their own church buildings or synagogues, etc. Rather, the issue was whether, in a country in which the vast majority of citizens were Catholic, non-Catholics ought to be permitted to proselytize and thereby possibly lead Catholics to abandon their faith. It was not denied that there can be circumstances in which such proselytizing might be tolerated for the sake of civil order. The question was whether non-Catholics have a strict right in justice to proselytize even in a majority Catholic society. And the pre-Vatican II popes taught that they did not have such a right, and that in a Catholic country the state could in principle justly restrict such proselytizing (even if there are also cases where the state might not exercise its right to such restriction, if this would do more harm than good).

This was the teaching which Vatican II seemed to reverse, though the relevant document, Dignitatis Humanae, explicitly taught that it was “leav[ing] untouched traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ.” Yet whether the principles set out in Dignitatis Humanae really can be reconciled with the principles set out by the pre-Vatican II popes, how exactly they are to be reconciled if they can be, and which principles are more authoritative and ought to be retained if they cannot be reconciled -- these have all been matters of controversy. They are controversies most Catholics, including conservative Catholics, have avoided. The reason, it seems to me, is that the older teaching is extremely unpopular in modern times, and thus whatever its current doctrinal status, most Catholics are happy to let it remain a dead letter and leave its precise relationship to Dignitatis Humanae unsettled. Yet a question unanswered and ignored is still a real question, and there are scholars who have in different ways attempted to apply to this one a “hermeneutic of continuity,” including Thomas Storck, Fr. Brian Harrison, and Thomas Pink.

But this is not a question which can be, or needs to be, settled here. What is clear even on the most conservative interpretation is that since the state is a natural institution and the Church a supernatural one, it is possible for there to be states which are not per se unjust even if they do not give any special recognition or assistance to the Church. For of course, it could have turned out that there was no divine supernatural offer to us at all, and thus no Church at all, but in which the natural law, and thus the state, still existed. And of course, there were states in existence before the Church existed, and they weren’t per se unjust merely because there wasn’t yet any Church around for them to recognize and assist. Furthermore, there are and have been since the time the Church was founded states in which few or none of the citizens are Christian, and thus in which the Church has no presence at all. And not even the most conservative Catholic position on matters of Church and state would say that such states are intrinsically unjust merely for that reason.

The bottom line, then, is this. According to Christian teaching, Church and state are irreducibly distinct institutions, each with its own unique foundation and mission. They may assist one another and in that sense not be “separate.” On the most conservative interpretation of Catholic teaching, under some circumstances they ought to assist one another and thus not be “separate.” But a circumstance in which the state does not give special recognition or assistance to the Church -- or, more generally, to some theological doctrine specially revealed via a prophet, sacred book, etc. -- is at worst not ideal. It is not per se abnormal, unnatural, or unjust. The secular order (which, you’ll recall, is not the same thing as an atheistic order, even if it is not a Christian order) has a legitimacy of its own. This, as we will see, is very different from the way Islam views things. But first let’s look more closely at liberalism.

Liberalism and religion

The liberal tradition essentially begins with Hobbes and Locke. What it inherits and preserves from Christianity is the idea that Church and state are distinct and have different missions, and that the state’s mission is something which can be determined from natural law or unaided reason rather than special divine revelation. But it departs from the Christian tradition in several crucial ways. First, it introduces a highly desiccated notion of the “natural” and thus a highly desiccated notion of reason and natural law. Second, it does not regard the state as natural but as entirely man-made, though it still regards the state as rational insofar as it takes us to have good rational grounds for creating it. Third, it tends to regard revelation, and indeed religion in general, not only as distinct from the order of natural or unaided reason, but as positively at odds with reason. Fourth, for that reason it regards the Church as something which is not only distinct from the state but which ought always and in principle to be kept rigorously separate from the state, or indeed even subordinate to the state. Fifth, given its desiccated notion of “nature” and tendency to pit religion in general against reason, it also has a tendency to exclude even the generic theism of natural theology from the political order. In short, from Christianity, liberalism “chooses” or “takes” the natural and secular, radically redefines them, and excludes the supernatural and the sacred. And in that sense it is a kind of “heresy.”

But let’s walk through this more slowly. In Hobbes we see the transformation of the natural law tradition into “state of nature” theory. In Hobbes’s state of nature, there is no state, and there is no nature either, not in the sense in which the ancients and the medievals understood “nature.” For Hobbes rejects the classical philosophical categories in terms of which natural law had traditionally been understood. As a nominalist, he denies that there are any universal natures or essences of things. As a mechanist, he denies that there are in nature any final causes, any ends towards which things are by nature directed. So, there is for him no such thing as any good toward which all human beings are naturally directed. There are just the individual human beings and the diverse desires they actually happen to have, and that’s that. Reason is not a faculty by which we might discover what we should desire given our nature or essence qua human, but just a tool we use to calculate the best way to get what we do in fact desire as individuals. For Hobbes, then, our natural state is just to do whatever it is we want to do. The “state of nature” is a state of perfect license.

Hobbes was well aware that this by no means entailed a hippie paradise. On the contrary, he famously judged in Leviathan that the inevitable result of everyone pursuing his idiosyncratic desires would be complete chaos, with “continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” So, though we’re naturally not social or political, but rather just individuals pursuing our idiosyncratic desires, it is in our self-interest to “contract” with one another to form the state, as an instrument by which the chaos might be prevented. Laws which we are obliged to obey come into existence with the state, and we are obliged to obey them only because we have contracted to do so by virtue of having contracted to form the state. But part of the deal is that this state must have absolute power, because if it does not -- if there is a separation of powers within the state, or institutions of civil society which might balance state power, and in particular a Church which is not subject to the state -- then the chaos will simply be relocated rather than eliminated. Rather than individuals with their idiosyncratic aims -- none of which is objectively better than any other -- constantly in conflict with one another, we will have institutions with their idiosyncratic aims -- none of which is objectively better than any other -- constantly in conflict with one another. So, everything must be subject to the state, including the Church.

Locke was, to say the least, not happy with the more illiberal consequences of Hobbes’s liberal premises. So he tinkered with the premises to get a happier outcome. (Call it an early exercise in John Rawls’s method of “reflective equilibrium.”) Like Hobbes, he rejects the classical metaphysics of the medieval natural law tradition, and like Hobbes, he does not regard the state as a natural institution but a man-made one. But unlike Hobbes, he thinks there are laws binding on us even in the state of nature, before governments are founded and even apart from our consenting to those laws. Since, given his metaphysics, he cannot ground these natural laws in human nature in quite the way the medievals did, he grounds them instead in God’s ownership of us. That is to say, even in the state of nature, there are moral grounds for us not to harm others, since to do so would be to damage God’s property. Hence the state of nature is not as nasty as Hobbes made it out to be, and the remedy to its defects therefore needn’t be as drastic as Hobbes’s remedy. That is to say, it needn’t be an absolutist state, but a far more limited government.

So far Locke might seem much closer to the medievals than to Hobbes. Indeed, so central is natural theology to his conception of natural law that he took the view that atheism should not be tolerated even by the liberal state, since he regarded it as inherently subversive of the moral and political order. However, appearances are deceiving. First, and again, like Hobbes, Locke does not regard the state or the social order as natural to us but as man-made. Second, he conceives of the rights we derive from God as essentially a kind of property rights over ourselves. God may own us ultimately, but for everyday practical purposes we can treat ourselves and others as self-owners. Third, his natural theology notwithstanding, Locke does not think of social and political life as essentially geared toward anything especially noble, such as facilitating our adherence to natural law and thus fulfilling our social nature and attaining moral virtue. As he makes clear in the Letter Concerning Toleration, the state exists only to enable us more easily to pursue the private earthly individual interests that would have been our focus in the state of nature:

The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests. Civil interest I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.

Fourth, Locke’s natural theology, stripped as it is of the classical philosophical foundations to which ancient and medieval natural theology appealed, is in any case underdeveloped and problematic, and had little influence on the later liberal tradition.

Fifth, Locke’s position on relations between the state and revealed religion (as opposed to natural theology) is far from the medieval Christian position. For one thing, not only are Church and state distinct, but they must in his view be kept separate, and the state not only need not but may not offer any special recognition or assistance to any religious body, even if its citizens were to consent to this. For another thing, while the state must therefore tolerate various competing religions, this toleration is to be extended only to those religions compatible with the liberal conception of politics. Locke goes so far as to work this into his conception of true religion, claiming in his Letter Concerning Toleration that “toleration [is] the chief characteristic mark of the true church.” And for these reasons Locke held that Catholicism should not be tolerated. For Catholicism does not hold (and certainly did not hold in Locke’s day) that religions other than itself must be tolerated, and it requires that Catholics’ first loyalty be to the pope rather than to the liberal state. (See my book Locke for more detailed discussion of the various aspects of Locke’s philosophy.)

So, what survived from Locke is essentially the idea that we are self-owning individuals who create society and government for the purpose of facilitating the pursuit of our private earthly interests, and that religions can be tolerated only to the extent that they conform themselves to this liberal conception of the social and political order. The “selective toleration” side of Lockeanism today echoes most loudly in the work of John Rawls, who insists that the liberal state be neutral between all “comprehensive doctrines” -- religions, metaphysical systems, systems of morality, and so forth -- but only insofar as they are “reasonable.” And what makes a comprehensive doctrine “reasonable” is that it endorses liberal egalitarian political institutions, and grounds its public policy recommendations exclusively on premises constituting the common ground or “overlapping consensus” that exists between itself and other such liberal-friendly doctrines. In short, Rawlsian liberalism is “neutral” between all and only religions and philosophies that are willing to conform themselves to Rawlsian liberalism.

The “self-ownership” side of Lockeanism has been especially influential in contemporary libertarian versions of liberalism, which seek to “privatize” as much of human life as possible, shrinking the state further or even eliminating it altogether, and modeling all human relationships on contractual agreements or market exchanges. Libertarians and Rawlsians alike would also strenuously object to any suggestion that the state might in any way officially recognize even the generic theism of natural theology, or uphold natural law moral principles.

Whether in its Hobbesian, Lockean, Rawlsian, or libertarian form, then, liberalism “chooses” or “takes” from its Christian inheritance the secular aspect of public life, radically redefines it, and excludes entirely from public life, in principle and not merely pragmatically, the sacred and supernatural. In this way it is from the point of view of Christian political thought a kind of “heresy.” (And notice that I have been talking here about the Anglo-American liberal tradition, which is typically regarded as less hostile to religion than the continental liberal tradition.)

Continued in the next post...
 

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
Continued from the previous post:

Islam and the state

Let us turn now to the opposite extreme point of view represented by Islam. That Islam is a kind of Christian heresy is a thesis put forward by Hilaire Belloc in his book The Great Heresies. Belloc wrote:

Mohammedanism… began as a heresy, not as a new religion. It was not a pagan contrast with the Church; it was not an alien enemy. It was a perversion of Christian doctrine. Its vitality and endurance soon gave it the appearance of a new religion, but those who were contemporary with its rise saw it for what it was -- not a denial, but an adaptation and a misuse, of the Christian thing. It differed from most (not from all) heresies in this, that it did not arise within the bounds of the Christian Church. The chief heresiarch, Mohammed himself, was not, like most heresiarchs, a man of Catholic birth and doctrine to begin with. He sprang from pagans. But that which he taught was in the main Catholic doctrine, oversimplified. It was the great Catholic world -- on the frontiers of which he lived, whose influence was all around him and whose territories he had known by travel -- which inspired his convictions. He came of, and mixed with, the degraded idolaters of the Arabian wilderness, the conquest of which had never seemed worth the Romans' while.

He took over very few of those old pagan ideas which might have been native to him from his descent. On the contrary, he preached and insisted upon a whole group of ideas which were peculiar to the Catholic Church and distinguished it from the paganism which it had conquered in the Greek and Roman civilization. Thus the very foundation of his teaching was that prime Catholic doctrine, the unity and omnipotence of God. The attributes of God he also took over in the main from Catholic doctrine: the personal nature, the all-goodness, the timelessness, the providence of God, His creative power as the origin of all things, and His sustenance of all things by His power alone. The world of good spirits and angels and of evil spirits in rebellion against God was a part of the teaching, with a chief evil spirit, such as Christendom had recognized. Mohammed preached with insistence that prime Catholic doctrine, on the human side -- the immortality of the soul and its responsibility for actions in this life, coupled with the consequent doctrine of punishment and reward after death.

If anyone sets down those points that orthodox Catholicism has in common with Mohammedanism, and those points only, one might imagine if one went no further that there should have been no cause of quarrel. Mohammed would almost seem in this aspect to be a sort of missionary, preaching and spreading by the energy of his character the chief and fundamental doctrines of the Catholic Church among those who had hitherto been degraded pagans of the Desert. (pp. 42-43)

As Belloc goes on to note, what Muhammad rejected -- the Incarnation, the Trinity, the Eucharist and with it the priesthood, theological matters which have led to so many doctrinal quarrels in the history of the Church -- amounted to a drastic simplification of Christian teaching. And this simplicity is a key part of Islam’s success. This is why it is by no means a mere academic quibble, or a concession to political correctness, to argue as I did in a recent post that Christians and Muslims are, despite their deep theological differences, talking about the same God. For unless one understands this, one will fail to understand the true nature of Islam as a kind of “heresy,” a transformation of Christianity rather than an entirely novel religion.

Plato famously distinguished three parts of the soul -- the rational part, the spirited part, and the appetitive part. You might say that Christianity, with its highly complex system of theological doctrine and otherworldly ethos, appeals most strongly to the rational part of the soul. Liberalism, which promises material security and license, appeals most strongly to the appetitive part of the soul. And Islam most appeals to the middle part of the soul, the spirited part -- the part moved by anger at perceived injustice, by honor and shame, by the martial virtues, by command and submission rather than endless talk and theological hair-splitting. It is best understood as a streamlined variation on Christianity, a kind of “Christianity lite,” and in particular a Christianity tailor-made for the man of action.

And Muhammad and his followers were definitely men of action. This brings us to the political side of Islam, which is our main concern here. Muhammad’s program was religious, to be sure, but by no means merely religious. Or to be more precise, he did not regard the cultural, moral, legal, economic, military, and political spheres as something distinct from the religious sphere, to which religion may or may not be applied. They were all just parts of one sphere, the religious sphere, from the get go. Muhammad was prophet, statesman, legislator, general, and cultural and moral exemplar, all rolled into one. And Islam was, accordingly, not merely a program of religious reform, but a program of complete social and political reform, every aspect of which -- not merely the theological aspect -- was grounded in the revelation Muhammad claimed to have received from God.

Not that everyone got with the program, at least not initially. Muhammad faced opposition, so much so that he famously had to flee from Mecca to Medina. But this opposition did not succeed for long, and soon the entirety of Arabia, as well as North Africa, the Levant, Mesopotamia and Persia, knew the power of Islam -- its temporal power, its political and in particular its military power, no less than its spiritual power. Muhammad’s kingdom, unlike Christ’s, was from the start very definitely of this world, and his servants certainly fought. And unlike the Church during the first centuries of Christianity, Islam was not in a weak position relative to the state. That is not because Islam controlled the state. It is because Islam was the state. The caliphate was not a secular power over which Islam had acquired an influence, not a state to which a distinct Islamic “Church” had been annexed. It was “Church” and state in one. Or rather, it was all just Islam, because there is in Islam no such thing in the first place as the notion of a “Church” understood as a purely religious institution, which might be distinguished from some other institution called “the state,” to which it may or may not be fused.

It is a fundamental error, then, to try to understand Islam or its history on the model of the relationship between Church and state in Christian history. To do so -- and to suggest on the basis of this analogy that the separation between Church and state that liberalism achieved might be duplicated in the Muslim context -- is simply to ignore the actual history of Islam (and, ironically, to impose alien Western categories on Islam in the very act of trying to defend it against its Western critics). It is particularly absurd to propose, as some Western liberals do, a “separation of mosque and state,” as if the notion of the mosque were the Islamic equivalent of the notion of the Church. For one thing, the word “church” is ambiguous in English. It can mean a certain kind of building, or it can mean the Church as an institution, distinct from other institutions like the state, the family, a business corporation, etc. There is no parallel ambiguity in the word “mosque.” It’s just a building. For another thing, it is not a building devoted merely to what Westerners think of as purely religious affairs. Rather, it is a place wherein the Muslim preacher might also just as well discuss politics, culture, economics, etc. -- because, again, these are all just as much a part of the concerns of Islam as purely religious matters are. The idea of a “separation of mosque and state” is therefore a muddle.

Another part of the radical simplification of Christianity represented by Islam, then, is the collapse of the distinction between the sacred and secular spheres, but in a direction opposite to the collapse to be found in liberalism. It is a “choosing” or “taking” of the sacred to the exclusion of the secular, what Roger Scruton calls in his book The West and the Rest Islam’s “confiscation of the political” (p. 91). And it is also, at least for the most part, an absorption of the natural into the supernatural. For law, in Islam, is essentially the divine law given through the Prophet, and especially through the Quran. There is no natural law in the sense in which Christianity affirms a natural law. That is to say, there is no moral and political sphere grounded in a purely natural order distinct from the supernatural order, knowable in principle by unaided reason from the study of that natural order, and having a legitimacy of its own whether or not God specially reveals a distinct supernatural end to which the natural order might be raised.

(To be sure, occasionally one hears of “Islamic natural law theories,” as in the recent book Natural Law: A Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Trialogue, by Anver Emon, Matthew Levering, and David Novak. But they turn out on closer inspection to be rather anticlimactic from a Christian point of view. Emon, a Muslim, acknowledges that pre-modern Muslim jurists were “somewhat nervous” about granting unaided reason authority where law is concerned, and even where they do apply it, it is to questions not already addressed by the Quran or hadith (pp. 148-9). Furthermore, the approach does not involve appealing to the natures of things, including human nature, considered by themselves, but rather starts with God’s goodness -- something primarily known from revelation -- and infers to the goodness of his creation, from which further conclusions relevant to law might be inferred. All of this is very different from the idea that there is a natural order entirely independent of divine revelation from which very general moral and political conclusions might in principle be drawn by unaided reason.)

As I have said, for Christianity, a social and political order that exists utterly independently of special divine revelation in general or the Church in particular is at worst less than ideal. It is not per se evil, abnormal, or unnatural. Accordingly, it can have of its own nature a legitimate authority over the Christian, and we can owe our allegiance to it even if our first allegiance is to the Church. But for Islam, things are very different. A social and political order that exists utterly independently of Quranic revelation is deeply unnatural and abnormal. We cannot regard it as having any authority of its nature, but at best as something we might put up with for the time being for pragmatic reasons. Our only truly binding allegiance is to Islam, understood as a single complete religious, social, political, economic, and cultural system. And the thing to do with non-Islamic political and social orders in order to make them healthy and normal is, ultimately, to convert them to Islam.

Now, just as it is only the naïve reading of Western categories into Islam that could lead one to compare Islamic history to the history of relations between Church and state, so too only a naïve reading of Western categories into Islam could lead one to think that a historical-critical reading of the Quran might lead Islam to liberalize its conception of the political. For the Quran is not to be understood on the model of the Bible as Jews and Christians understand it. The Bible was written by human beings, and bears the marks of the personalities of its authors and the historical and cultural contexts in which they wrote. No Jew or Christian, no matter how theologically conservative, denies this. They merely claim that these human authors were divinely guided in writing in such a way that they were preserved from error.

That is not how the Quran is understood in Islam. It is not in any sense the work of Muhammad. He did not write it, not even under divine inspiration. Rather, it is the direct word of God himself, eternally pre-existing its revelation through Muhammad, which “came down” to him from heaven. To say that the Quran somehow got things wrong is not, for the Muslim, like saying that there are errors in the Bible. It is more like saying that Christ himself got things wrong. And to suggest that Quranic teaching reflects a merely contingent historical epoch is like saying that what Christians call the Word, the second Person of the Trinity, reflects a merely contingent historical epoch (whatever that could mean). For the Muslim to give up this view of the Quran would be like the Christian giving up the infallibility and divinity of Christ. It would be to give up the religion itself.

The inclusion within the sacred of what Westerners regard as the secular is therefore not the “fundamentalist” Islamic position, but simply the Islamic position full stop. The illusion that things are otherwise no doubt stems in part from the fact that there are secular states in the Islamic world today. But this is a historically contingent and highly artificial circumstance that has nothing to do with Islam itself. It is a holdover from colonial powers like the English and the French, who imposed Western-style systems on the Muslim populations -- systems which have been preserved after the departure of the colonial powers, not by the consent of the majority of these populations, but by secularizing autocrats like Muammar Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Hafez al-Assad, and the like. Hence, as Muslim scholar Muzammil Siddiqi notes, “there is a de facto separation of religion and state in the Muslim world,” which is an inheritance from the colonial period:

But the whole legal system of these states, their economic system, political system, educational system are not Islamic. There is no caliph ruling these states… People have very little say on who runs the government and how. Muslim countries are divided on ethnic, racial, tribal, linguistic and nationalistic lines. These are not the principals of an Islamic state… In the Muslim countries today, governments are quite free to interfere in religious matters, but religious people are not allowed to criticize political leaders and governmental authorities. (The Abraham Connection: A Jew, Christian, and Muslim in Dialogue: David M. Gordis, George R. Grose, Muzammil H. Siddiqi, edited by George Grose and Benjamin Hubbard, at pp. 140-41)

Asked whether the American model of separation and Church and state might nevertheless be a model for Muslim governments to adopt, Siddiqi comments:

I do not think that can be done because Islam has its own political system… In order to secularize a society, you have to privatize its religion. You have to say that religion is a private matter and it is something that a person does with his solitude, between him or her and God. A state should have its own rules and should function on those principles without any reference to God or a higher authority.

But Islamic law is comprehensive and covers all aspects of life. It deals with economy, politics, education, international relations, etc. How can one privatize this religion without reducing it considerably? Muslim societies have refused to become secular in spite of all the attempts and pressures from inside and outside during the past two centuries. People do not consider religion as a private matter. So how can one establish a secular state among Muslims? (p. 141)

It should be noted that this is the opinion of a mainstream American Muslim scholar who was twice invited by President George W. Bush to represent Islam at national prayer services, at Washington National Cathedral and Ground Zero in New York. (In the interests of full disclosure, I suppose I should also note that Siddiqi was a professor of mine when I double-majored in philosophy and religious studies at California State University, Fullerton, in the early 1990s.)

Religion of peace?

Now, Siddiqi also says that the Islamic political system “guarantees the religious freedom of all people without separating the religion from the state” though he allows that “on the issue of religious freedom, I believe there is need for… further elaboration and refinement by Muslim jurists” (p. 141). That is putting it mildly, since religious freedom is not the first thing one thinks of when reading the history of Islam.

To be sure, a famous Quranic text declares that “There shall be no compulsion in religion” (The Cow 2:256, Dawood translation), and Jews, Christians, and some others are given a special regard as “People of the Book.” Then there is the idea that the word “Islam” has the same root as the Arabic word for “peace,” so that Islam can be characterized as a “religion of peace.” It is also often said that jihad is really about one’s spiritual struggle with himself rather than war with non-Muslims. Robotically citing such factoids -- and thereby essentially engaging in the method of “argument by proof-text” they would dismiss as shallow if employed by a fundamentalist Christian -- some liberal Westerners feel justified in rolling over and resuming their dogmatic slumbers. And taken in isolation, these do seem to provide materials by which a Muslim thinker might develop a justification for some kind of religious toleration.

The problems come when we do not take them in isolation but instead look at them in the context of Islamic teaching as a whole. Start with the “There is no compulsion in religion” passage. As is well known, there are also Quranic passages that point in the opposite direction, such as:

Fight against such of those to whom the Scriptures were given as believe neither in Allah nor the Last Day, who do not forbid what Allah and His apostle have forbidden, and do not embrace the true faith, until they pay tribute out of hand and are utterly subdued. (Repentance 9:29)

“Those to whom the Scriptures were given” are Jews and Christians. That they are not quite as highly regarded by the Quran as some Western liberals suppose is also evident from this passage:

Had the People of the Book accepted Islam, it would have surely been better for them. Few of them are true believers, and most of them are evil-doers. (The Imrans 3:110)

Then there are those who are not “People of the Book,” the polytheists:

Tell the unbelievers that if they mend their ways their past shall be forgiven; but if they persist in sin, let them reflect upon the fate of their forefathers.

Make war on them until idolatry is no more and Allah’s religion reigns supreme. (The Spoils 8: 38-39)
We need to take account also of the haditha or sayings of Muhammad outside the Quran, which carry a high degree of authority in Islam. A famous saying from the hadith collection of al-Bukhari is:

I have been commanded to fight people until they testify that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, and perform the prayer, and pay zakat [religious tax]. If they say it, they have saved their blood and possessions from me, except for the rights of Islam over them.

And on the subject of apostasy from Islam, another famous hadith from the same collection says: “Whoever changes his religion, kill him.”

As to the idea that “jihad” pertains to a spiritual struggle with oneself, the problem is that while the word can mean that, that is simply not its only meaning nor its usual meaning. Its usual meaning is “holy war” in the sense of military struggle against the enemies of Islam. Neither the Quran, nor the hadith, nor Islamic history and tradition as a whole give any grounds whatsoever for claiming otherwise.

As to the “religion of peace” idea, while it is true that “Islam” has the same root as an Arabic word often translated “peace,” this has nothing whatsoever to do with pacifism, or a hippie “live and let live” ethos, or anything else some liberal Westerners apparently want to read into Muhammad’s original message in the face of all the overwhelming evidence. “Islam” means “submission” or “surrender,” and the idea is that we are not at peace either with ourselves or with each other because we resist the will of God. To be at peace, then, requires ceasing this resistance, and submitting or surrendering to God’s will. Which, of course, for Islam means accepting Islam.

This is why, in Islamic tradition, the world is traditionally conceived of as divided up between the “House of Islam” and the “House of War,” between those peoples who have submitted to the Muslim religious and political order and those who have not yet done so. Historically, non-Muslims within the borders of Islamic countries who were willing to accept dhimmi status -- a second-class citizen arrangement which entails paying a special tax not imposed on Muslims, a lack of some of the political rights Muslims have, and refraining from proselytizing or practicing non-Muslim religions in a conspicuous way -- were often tolerated. But non-Muslims who refused to do this, and peoples outside the boundaries of the Muslim world, were regarded as a threat in principle to the Islamic order and at least technically, even if not always in practice, in a state of war with Islam. And what might count as a “threat” to Islam can be construed fairly broadly. It might include attempts to convert Muslims, attempts to introduce a secular political order in Islamic countries, and so forth.

So, is there a sense in which Islam has historically been concerned with securing peace? Absolutely. Does this entail that Islam has historically been concerned with securing peace as Western liberals understand it, viz. achieving a pluralistic society in which people of all religions and none, and adhering to radically different philosophies and moral codes, live together on equal terms, freely exchanging ideas? Absolutely not; exactly the opposite, in fact.

It is quite absurd, then, for Western liberals to cite proof texts and factoids like the ones referred to above as if they were evidence that Islam is reconcilable with liberalism. To be sure, this does not entail that a devout Muslim might not make a principled case that in the present age, military struggle is not the appropriate means by which either to propagate Islam or to defend it against its enemies. And it certainly does not entail that a devout Muslim could not condemn terrorism and attacks upon civilians. It is simply unjust, uncharitable, and ignorant to insist that any Muslim would, to be consistent, have to approve of the tactics and program of al-Qaeda or ISIS. A devout Muslim may, consistent with the principles of his religion, advocate an entirely peaceful approach to furthering Islam -- through proselytizing, voting, getting legislation passed, and so forth.

However, it simply doesn’t follow that Islam is compatible with liberalism -- with the separation in principle of religion and politics, with the Lockean conception of toleration, with Rawlsian or libertarian neutrality, etc. It also simply doesn’t follow that a more belligerent approach is not also at least equally defensible given Islamic premises. For example, a Muslim could perfectly well argue that the “no compulsion” passage in the Quran was meant by God only to apply to circumstances like the specific one Muhammad faced when he was in a weak position relative to his enemies. Or he could (as J. Budziszewski has noted) argue that the passage has wider application than that, but that in light of other Quranic passages and hadith, the toleration the passage requires has to be understood very narrowly, i.e. that it rules out forced conversions, but still allows for punishment of apostasy and of non-Muslim proselytizing, and is consistent with imposing dhimmi status on non-Muslims. There are no grounds whatsoever for regarding such positions as somehow less authentically Islamic than a more moderate interpretation would be. Moreover, if the examples of Muhammad himself and of the earliest Muslim communities are regarded as normative for Muslims of all eras, then the more hard-line interpretations might claim to have a stronger case for being regarded as authentically Islamic.

Of course, many liberals would respond by citing Old Testament passages commanding conquest of non-Israelite cities, brutal suppression of idolatry, etc. If most modern Christians advocate religious diversity despite such passages, why (the liberal asks) couldn’t most modern Muslims come to advocate religious diversity despite the rougher Quranic passages and haditha? But the comparison is specious, for three reasons. First, more or less all Christians agree that the Mosaic law was intended only for a limited time, as preparation for the Incarnation, and does not in any direct way apply to Christians. Hence there are principled grounds in long-standing Christian doctrine for denying that the passages in question have any relevance today. There is no parallel to this in Islam, no precedent in Islamic history for regarding the harsher Quranic passages as somehow no longer having any application.

Second, the Catholic tradition has, in the Magisterium of the Church, an authoritative interpreter of scripture, which can decisively settle disputes among Catholics about how to understand and apply various biblical passages. And neither the Church nor any Catholic would hold that the Old Testament passages in question require Christians to make war upon non-Christians, to execute idolaters, etc. By contrast, there is no authoritative interpreter in Islam, no Magisterium which can require all Muslims to read Quranic passages in a certain specific way, etc.

Third, while it is true that Protestantism also lacks such an authoritative interpreter, it is also the case that the idea of religious toleration has a long history and central place within Protestantism. Indeed, liberalism and its doctrine of toleration were precisely outgrowths of Protestant Christianity, spurred by Protestantism’s conflict with the Catholic Church. This deep and longstanding tendency in Protestant thought counteracts any possibility of reading the Old Testament passages in question as having application today. But there is no corresponding tendency or tradition in the history of Islam, which might counteract the possibility of reading the harsher Quranic passages and hadith as having contemporary application.

Oil and water


This last set of issues illustrates one of the reasons so many Western liberals have such difficulty seeing the incompatibility of liberalism with Islam. Many of them simply have too little respect for religion to bother studying it very carefully, and thus end up saying silly and ill-informed things when they do comment on it. This is as true of touchy-feely Islamophilia-prone liberals as it is of shrill New Atheist-type liberals. Their idea of “religion” is determined mostly by whatever it is they know about Christianity -- which often isn’t much -- and they suppose that other religions are more or less like that but with the names changed. Hence they suppose that the Quran is more or less like the Bible, that a mosque is more or less like a church, that Muhammad is more or less like Jesus or at least like an Old Testament prophet, and so forth.

A second problem is that when educated liberals encounter non-Christian religious believers, they are often likely to encounter the most liberal adherents, and wrongly to generalize from the impressions they get from those adherents. Hence if (while in college, say, or at an academic conference, or working at an NGO) they encounter individual Muslims who happen to have liberal or even secular attitudes, they might infer that Islam in general and considered as a system must be compatible with liberalism and secularism. But that simply doesn’t follow, and the sample isn’t necessarily representative.

A third problem is that the workability of liberalism as a system requires that all “comprehensive doctrines,” or at least all those with a large number of adherents within a liberal society, are compatible with basic liberal premises (and thus “reasonable,” as Rawlsian liberals conceive of “reasonableness”). If there is a “comprehensive doctrine” with a large number of adherents which is simply not compatible with basic liberal premises, that will be a very serious problem for the entire liberal project. Hence there is tremendous reluctance to conclude that there is any such “comprehensive doctrine,” or to look for evidence that might support such a conclusion.

Fourth, egalitarianism is one of the dogmas of modern liberalism, just as the divinity of Christ is a dogma of Christianity or the divine origin of the Quran is a dogma of Islam. Many liberals find it almost impossible to understand how anyone could rationally deny it, and thus how such denials could be anything but expressions of unreasoning hatred. Hence epithets like “bigot” play, within liberalism, the same role that words like “heretic” often do within religion. They are a means of silencing dissenters and sending a warning to anyone even considering dissent from egalitarianism. Many liberals are inclined a priori to suppose that any suggestion that Islam and liberalism are not compatible simply must be an expression of bigotry.

Fifth, liberalism is heavily invested in a narrative according to which the pre-liberal European civilization against which it reacted -- that is to say, medieval and early modern Christian civilization -- was especially oppressive, both to Europeans and non-Europeans. Now, historically Islam has been the great political and military rival to Christianity. Hence, even though that history has largely been a history of Islamic aggression against Christian states, it is extremely tempting for the liberal to pretend that the Christian side was as aggressive, or even more aggressive. Hence all the absurd apologizing for the Crusades. It is also extremely tempting for the liberal to regard contemporary Muslims as allies in liberals’ political disputes with conservative Christians (even if Muslims are far closer to conservative Christians where “social issues” are concerned than they are to liberals).

In short, liberal attitudes about Islam and are -- ironically, given liberals’ self-conception -- often shaped by prejudice, stereotypes, wishful thinking, dogmatism, and partisanship. But not entirely. For there really are critics of Islam who say stupid, ill-informed, and bigoted things, and seem willing to believe only the worst of it. Such hotheads give aid and comfort to those who would dismiss any critical analysis of Islam as “bigotry.” And they should learn that you cannot effectively counter a rival unless you are willing to understand it and acknowledge its strengths as well as its weaknesses.

In any event, as opposite departures from Christianity -- one in the direction of emphasizing the sacred to the exclusion of the secular, the other in the direction of emphasizing a desiccated notion of the secular to the exclusion of the sacred -- Islam and liberalism agree only in their insistence that the moral and political order has no foundation in nature. For liberalism it derives from us, for Islam from special divine revelation, and the Christian middle ground disappears. In every other way, Islam and liberalism are like oil and water.

A further difference between them, I think, is that Muslims see this in a way liberals do not. Nor is this the only respect in which liberalism is prone to delusion. Materially, liberalism is at the apex of its strength. But spiritually it is at its lowest ebb. It has lost all confidence in the superiority or even the basic goodness of the civilization from which it sprang. It has lost any sense of limits, any awareness that moral and social institutions cannot be molded and remolded at will, any thought that one cannot borrow and spend indefinitely, any ability to think beyond election cycles and what the mob happens to be demanding at the moment. It is Hubris that cannot see Nemesis implacably speeding toward it.

Materially, Islam is at an historical ebb. But spiritually -- now, as when Belloc marveled at the fact in the 1930s -- it is undiminished, as confident as it ever was in the basic rightness of its cause, the inevitability of its victory, and the vast numbers of human beings it can call upon to live by it, suffer persecution for it, and fight and die for it.

This should not be surprising. Liberalism appeals to our animal side, to our craving for physical comfort and pleasure, which always get us into trouble in the long run. Islam appeals to our social and religious side, to the call to self-control, sacrifice for the community, and submission to God, which seem onerous only in the short run but invariably guarantee that something larger than ourselves will survive into the future when we as individuals are long dead. That is to say, Islam simply preserves more of its Christian inheritance than liberalism does.

As a Catholic, I have no doubt that the Church will survive the various crises through which she is currently suffering -- just as it survived Roman persecution, the Arian heresy, wave after wave of jihadist onslaughts, the Reformation, the French Revolution, Stalin and his legions, and all the rest. Which of its two ancient rivals -- liberalism or Islam -- is more likely to survive alongside it into the future? The smart money’s on Islam.
 

zelezo vlk

Well-known member
Messages
18,009
Reaction score
5,048

wizards8507

Well-known member
Messages
20,660
Reaction score
2,661
You can't be serious. The walls are from its history. Oh and St Peters isn't protected by a wall. The piazza is quite open.
Give me a break, you don't see the hypocrisy here? Francis is out there shaming America for daring to have a border but the Vatican's borders are the most secure in the world. Wall or not, Pope Francis is quite literally a dictator and he could admit the great unwashed masses of Italy and surrounding countries. The city-state would be destroyed. By sheer size, the destruction of the United States from the importation of an underclass that's not assimilating into the culture is happening slowly, but happening it is.

Probably just as much as I look forward to Pope Francis continuing to tear down Donald Trump.
I can't stand Donald Trump, but that doesn't mean the open borders for which Francis advocates would be (and currently are) anything but an unmitigated disaster.

I don't know which candidate made the point, but I believe it was Marco Rubio. You don't lock your door because you hate the people outside. You lock your door because you love the people inside.
 
Last edited:

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126

Here's the actual text of what he said:

Paloma García Ovejero, Cadena COPE (Spain): Holy Father, for several weeks there’s been a lot of concern in many Latin American countries but also in Europe regarding the Zika virus. The greatest risk would be for pregnant women. There is anguish. Some authorities have proposed abortion, or else to avoiding pregnancy. As regards avoiding pregnancy, on this issue, can the Church take into consideration the concept of “the lesser of two evils?”

Pope Francis: Abortion is not the lesser of two evils. It is a crime. It is to throw someone out in order to save another. That’s what the Mafia does. It is a crime, an absolute evil. On the ‘lesser evil,’ avoiding pregnancy, we are speaking in terms of the conflict between the fifth and sixth commandment. Paul VI, a great man, in a difficult situation in Africa, permitted nuns to use contraceptives in cases of rape.

Don’t confuse the evil of avoiding pregnancy by itself, with abortion. Abortion is not a theological problem, it is a human problem, it is a medical problem. You kill one person to save another, in the best case scenario. Or to live comfortably, no? It’s against the Hippocratic oaths doctors must take. It is an evil in and of itself, but it is not a religious evil in the beginning, no, it’s a human evil. Then obviously, as with every human evil, each killing is condemned.

On the other hand, avoiding pregnancy is not an absolute evil. In certain cases, as in this one, such as the one I mentioned of Blessed Paul VI, it was clear. I would also urge doctors to do their utmost to find vaccines against these two mosquitoes that carry this disease. This needs to be worked on.

There's literally nothing new here, but watch the media take more off-the-cuffs comments by Pope Francis and completely misconstrue them as some tectonic shift in Catholic doctrine. Pope Paul VI issued an exceptional dispensation to celibate nuns active in Belgian Congo during the Congo Crisis to take contraceptives in order to avoid pregnancy in the likely case that they would be raped by militants. Such nuns were not engaging in consensual intercourse, so in seeking to avoid a rape-induced pregnancy, they were not sinning.

That extraordinary situation has virtually zero relevance for Catholic audiences generally, except to confirm that avoiding pregnancy through periodic abstinence isn't sinful. Why Francis thought mentioning such a bizarre case would be illustrative is beyond me, though...


And here are his actual words:

Phil Pullella, Reuters: Today, you spoke very eloquently about the problems of immigration. On the other side of the border, there is a very tough electoral battle. One of the candidates for the White House, Republican Donald Trump, in an interview recently said that you are a political man and he even said that you are a pawn, an instrument of the Mexican government for migration politics. Trump said that if he’s elected, he wants to build 2,500 kilometers of wall along the border. He wants to deport 11 million illegal immigrants, separating families, etcetera. I would like to ask you, what do you think of these accusations against you and if a North American Catholic can vote for a person like this?

Pope Francis: Thank God he said I was a politician because Aristotle defined the human person as 'animal politicus.' At least I am a human person. As to whether I am a pawn, well, maybe, I don't know. I'll leave that up to your judgment and that of the people. And then, a person who thinks only about building walls, wherever they may be, and not building bridges, is not Christian. This is not in the Gospel. As far as what you said about whether I would advise to vote or not to vote, I am not going to get involved in that. I say only that this man is not Christian if he has said things like that. We must see if he said things in that way and in this I give the benefit of the doubt.

In context, it's pretty obvious that he's condemning Trump's divisive rhetoric (note the contrast with "building bridges"), and not the literal act of building walls.
 
Last edited:

zelezo vlk

Well-known member
Messages
18,009
Reaction score
5,048
Give me a break, you don't see the hypocrisy here? Francis is out there shaming America for daring to have a border but the Vatican's borders are the most secure in the world. Wall or not, Pope Francis is quite literally a dictator and he could admit the great unwashed masses of Italy and surrounding countries. The city-state would be destroyed. By sheer size, the destruction of the United States from the importation of an underclass that's not assimilating into the culture is happening slowly, but happening it is.

The Vatican has been the refuge of the poor and oppressed for quite a while now. There's no need for il Papa to declare an open doors policy, for the gates are open:

Pope Francis to open 30-bed homeless shelter a few steps from Vatican walls - Religion News Service
Pope Francis’s Homeless Guests ‘Are All Moving’ to St. Peter’s Square - The Daily Beast

Walls aren't going to prevent an unassimilated underclass from destroying America. They'll only further the divide and animosity between those within and those outside.
 
B

Bogtrotter07

Guest
Give me a break, you don't see the hypocrisy here? Francis is out there shaming America for daring to have a border but the Vatican's borders are the most secure in the world. Wall or not, Pope Francis is quite literally a dictator and he could admit the great unwashed masses of Italy and surrounding countries. The city-state would be destroyed. By sheer size, the destruction of the United States from the importation of an underclass that's not assimilating into the culture is happening slowly, but happening it is.


I can't stand Donald Trump, but that doesn't mean the open borders for which Francis advocates would be (and currently are) anything but an unmitigated disaster.

I don't know which candidate made the point, but I believe it was Marco Rubio. You don't lock your door because you hate the people outside. You lock your door because you love the people inside.

I have nothing with you, or what you are saying, really.

But doesn't douche-clown, on drugs realize we have the technology to render walls obsolete?
 

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126

Unless Sotomayor breaks with the Progressive block in a fit of Catholic nostalgia, they're going to lose. A 4-4 decision means the holding from the Appeals Circuit is upheld by default.

Here's an article from The Spectator's Dan Hitchens called "What conservative gay Christians want":

The LGBT rights movement — so the story goes — has split the Christian churches in two. On one side are the progressives, who believe that Christianity should accept gay people and recognise gay marriage. Lined up against them are the conservatives, who hold fast to the belief that being gay is sinful. It’s not entirely false, that story. There are just a vast number of Christians who don’t fit into it.

Ed Shaw is an evangelical pastor in Bristol and is gay — or, as he puts it, he ‘experiences same-sex attraction’. It’s a less misleading term, he tells me. ‘If I say to people in conversation, “I’m gay,” they tend to presume that I’ll be delighted if they match me up with their gay friend Barry.’ Which isn’t what he’s looking for: ‘I’d love to meet any of their friends, but I don’t want to be match-made with people because I’m not interested in that sort of relationship.’

Shaw is one of the founders of Living Out, a website written by gay people who are also traditionally minded Christians. As he points out, this is quite a large constituency. The ‘horror stories’ about churches rejecting LGBT people dominate media coverage, he says: Living Out exists partly to record more positive experiences.

Shaw’s is one of them. ‘As a pastor,’ he says, ‘I thought being open about my sexuality would be a disqualification for the job, and would mean that people would stop coming to me.’ Instead, they started calling on him more than ever. ‘Because they think, this guy finds life tough, it’s not easy for him, he might be able to help me. I think previously I thought the deal was, try and fake it as a perfect person, and then people will listen to you.’

When Shaw writes in praise of the ‘real elements of beauty’ in gay relationships, or laments how the C of E’s ‘hypocrisy’ has ‘hurt a lot of people’, he sounds like a liberal Anglican. At other times, he sounds like anything but. Sex is ‘not a small issue that we can afford to disagree on’, he says; ‘marriage between a man and a woman, union in difference, sex within that’ is one of the most important ‘pictures of God’s love for us’. The Bible starts with a marriage in Eden and ends with a marriage between Christ and the Church. ‘It’s not just a couple of verses in Leviticus that we need to change,’ Shaw argues: reconstructing marriage would mean ‘ripping out the heart of almost every part of scripture’.

For gay people who believe this, the question remains of how a celibate life can be anything other than a lonely one. It is easy to say that friendships are intimate and fulfilling, too — but that can sound glib, because the modern world neglects friendship to an extent that would have amazed previous centuries.

Abraham Lincoln and Joshua Speed slept in the same bed and wrote letters of passionate devotion to each other. Michel de Montaigne, who treated erotic love as a rather embarrassing and second-rate experience, wrote at the death of his friend (in John Florio’s translation): ‘We were co–partners in all things… I was so accustomed to be ever two, and so inured to be never single, that methinks I am but half my self.’ Nowadays people rarely talk about their friends like that, only (sometimes) their spouses. Is that a gain?

The cult of romantic love, as the gay liberal Catholic Andrew Sullivan once put it, elevated ‘the longing for union with another being, the sense that such a union resolves the essential quandary of human existence, the belief that only such a union can abate the loneliness that seems to come with being human’. By contrast, Christian churches might have preserved the importance of friendship: for most of history, Christians regarded marriage as inferior to celibacy, and friendship as one of the greatest goods. Instead, Sullivan observes, the churches became ‘our culture’s primary and obsessive propagandists for the marital unit’ and made it synonymous with happiness. This not only leaves out the widowed, the lonely, the young, the unlucky in love and any married people who do not, in fact, discover every possible joy in being coupled-up; it also tells gay people that if they don’t get married they will always be missing something indispensable.

Eve Tushnet, the author of Gay and Catholic, says that when she converted she didn’t know what she was supposed to do. ‘The biggest issue for a gay Catholic,’ she says on the phone from Washington DC, ‘is: “What is my future going to look like?” I guess the other big one is “Why is God doing this, why is this happening in my life?” ’

For Tushnet, the future became clearer when she asked where specifically God was calling her to love — which led to volunteering at a crisis pregnancy centre, and to a deepening of friendship. Tushnet sees this life as an expression of her sexuality, not a denial of it. ‘The desire for same-sex intimacy and love and the recognition of beauty in people of the same sex — these are inherently good things, and in many ways basic human needs.’ Some people find it possible, she says, ‘to take all of that energy and intensity of erotic love and let it flow into a relationship to women or to beauty or to God’. That kind of ‘sublimation’ has always made intuitive sense to her.

‘For other people, that’s not intuitive at all, and if you say “sublimation” they’re like, “Yeah, OK. Or I could just bang my head on a wall 15 times, that would be equally sensible.” And I think for them, often people do end up developing a really deep and beautiful theology of the sacrifice of one’s sexuality.’ Which can help them to ‘view it as something that’s beautiful — that even in the sacrifice you are doing something that is deeply beautiful and honoured by God’.

Tushnet suggests a couple of things which would make life easier for LGBT Christians. First, for people to recognise and affirm the ‘real power’ of their friendships and leave behind the fear that depending on your friends is ‘clingy’ or ‘weird’. Secondly, she wishes the Church would remember its original role as a family for its members: ‘the people who would take care of them when they’re sick, the people who they could share their secrets and their fears and their hopes with, the people who they could make a life with’.

When the Anglican synod meets this month, there will be a lot of talk of how the recognition of gay people’s experiences could change Christian doctrine. What it might do instead, in the long run, is leave the doctrine standing and change everything else.

For anyone who's interested in this subject, Eve Tushnet (who writes for TAC) is really good. Wesley Hill, who runs the blog Spiritual Friendship, is also excellent.
 
C

Cackalacky

Guest
People in the ancient world did not always believe in the gods, a new study suggests – casting doubt on the idea that religious belief is a “default setting” for humans.


Early societies were far more capable than many since of containing atheism within the spectrum of what they considered normal
Tim Whitmarsh
Despite being written out of large parts of history, atheists thrived in the polytheistic societies of the ancient world – raising considerable doubts about whether humans really are “wired” for religion – a new study suggests.

The claim is the central proposition of a new book by Tim Whitmarsh, Professor of Greek Culture and a Fellow of St John’s College, University of Cambridge. In it, he suggests that atheism – which is typically seen as a modern phenomenon – was not just common in ancient Greece and pre-Christian Rome, but probably flourished more in those societies than in most civilisations since.

As a result, the study challenges two assumptions that prop up current debates between atheists and believers: Firstly, the idea that atheism is a modern point of view, and second, the idea of “religious universalism” – that humans are naturally predisposed, or “wired”, to believe in gods.

The book, entitled Battling The Gods, is being launched in Cambridge on Tuesday (February 16).

“We tend to see atheism as an idea that has only recently emerged in secular Western societies,” Whitmarsh said. “The rhetoric used to describe it is hyper-modern. In fact, early societies were far more capable than many since of containing atheism within the spectrum of what they considered normal.”

“Rather than making judgements based on scientific reason, these early atheists were making what seem to be universal objections about the paradoxical nature of religion – the fact that it asks you to accept things that aren’t intuitively there in your world. The fact that this was happening thousands of years ago suggests that forms of disbelief can exist in all cultures, and probably always have.”

The book argues that disbelief is actually “as old as the hills”. Early examples, such as the atheistic writings of Xenophanes of Colophon (c.570-475 BCE) are contemporary with Second Temple-era Judaism, and significantly predate Christianity and Islam. Even Plato, writing in the 4th Century BCE, said that contemporary non-believers were “not the first to have had this view about the gods.”

Because atheism’s ancient history has largely gone unwritten, however, Whitmarsh suggests that it is also absent from both sides of the current monotheist/atheist debate. While atheists depict religion as something from an earlier, more primitive stage of human development, the idea of religious universalism is also built partly on the notion that early societies were religious by nature because to believe in god is an inherent, “default setting” for humans.

Neither perspective is true, Whitmarsh suggests: “Believers talk about atheism as if it’s a pathology of a particularly odd phase of modern Western culture that will pass, but if you ask someone to think hard, clearly people also thought this way in antiquity.”

His book surveys one thousand years of ancient history to prove the point, teasing out the various forms of disbelief expressed by philosophical movements, writers and public figures.

These were made possible in particular by the fundamental diversity of polytheistic Greek societies. Between 650 and 323 BCE, Greece had an estimated 1,200 separate city states, each with its own customs, traditions and governance. Religion expressed this variety, as a matter of private cults, village rituals and city festivals dedicated to numerous divine entities.

This meant that there was no such thing as religious orthodoxy. The closest the Greeks got to a unifying sacred text were Homer’s epics, which offered no coherent moral vision of the gods, and indeed often portrayed them as immoral. Similarly, there was no specialised clergy telling people how to live: “The idea of a priest telling you what to do was alien to the Greek world,” Whitmarsh said.

As a result, while some people viewed atheism as mistaken, it was rarely seen as morally wrong. In fact, it was usually tolerated as one of a number of viewpoints that people could adopt on the subject of the gods. Only occasionally was it actively legislated against, such as in Athens during the 5th Century BCE, when Socrates was executed for “not recognising the gods of the city.”

While atheism came in various shapes and sizes, Whitmarsh also argues that there were strong continuities across the generations. Ancient atheists struggled with fundamentals that many people still question today – such as how to deal with the problem of evil, and how to explain aspects of religion which seem implausible.

These themes extend from the work of early thinkers – like Anaximander and Anaximenes, who tried to explain why phenomena such as thunder and earthquakes actually had nothing to do with the gods – through to famous writers like Euripides, whose plays openly criticised divine causality. Perhaps the most famous group of atheists in the ancient world, the Epicureans, argued that there was no such thing as predestination and rejected the idea that the gods had any control over human life.

The age of ancient atheism ended, Whitmarsh suggests, because the polytheistic societies that generally tolerated it were replaced by monotheistic imperial forces that demanded an acceptance of one, “true” God. Rome’s adoption of Christianity in the 4th Century CE was, he says, “seismic”, because it used religious absolutism to hold the Empire together.

Most of the later Roman Empire’s ideological energy was expended fighting supposedly heretical beliefs – often other forms of Christianity. In a decree of 380, Emperor Theodosius I even drew a distinction between Catholics, and everyone else – whom he classed as dementes vesanosque (“demented lunatics”). Such rulings left no room for disbelief.

Whitmarsh stresses that his study is not designed to prove, or disprove, the truth of atheism itself. On the book’s first page, however, he adds: “I do, however, have a strong conviction – that has hardened in the course of researching and writing this book – that cultural and religious pluralism, and free debate, are indispensable to the good life.”

Battling The Gods is published by Faber and Faber. Tim Whitmarsh is A G Leventis Professor of Greek Culture and a Fellow of St John’s College, University of Cambridge.


The text in this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. For image use please see separate credits above.

- See more at: Disbelieve it or not, ancient history suggests that atheism is as natural to humans as religion | University of Cambridge
.
 
Top