Since 1968, the year that the modern right-of-center political majority was born, Republican presidents have made twelve appointments to the Supreme Court; Democratic presidents have made just four. Yet those twelve Republican appointments, while they did push the court rightward, never delivered the kind of solid 6-3 or 7-2 conservative majority that one might have expected to emerge. Instead, John Paul Stevens, David Souter and Harry Blackmun all went on to become outspoken liberals, Blackmun and Anthony Kennedy went on to author decisions sweeping away the nation’s abortion laws and redefining marriage, Sandra Day O’Connor and Kennedy both ratified Roe v. Wade — and so on down a longer list of disappointments and betrayals.
Meanwhile, none of the four recent Democratic appointees, whether “moderate” or liberal, have moved meaningfully rightward during their tenures. On the crucial cases of the last decade (including the cases Stern lists) they’ve reliably voted as a bloc. The most genuinely unpredictable of the four, Stephen Breyer, is basically crusading to eliminate the death penalty already. The more moderate of President Obama’s two appointments, Elena Kagan, has voted with the more liberal Sonia Sotamayor more reliably (especially in 5-4 decisions) than, say, Scalia voted with John Roberts. And the court’s only actual swing vote remains, of course, a Republican appointee.
So telling Republicans that they should accept a moderate liberal lest they risk a real liberal is likely to inspire a bitter chuckle, since from the perspective of conservatives they risk at least a moderate liberal in practically every appointment anyway. (Including the last Republican president’s, since most fairly or not many conservatives feel they dodged a bullet with Harriet Miers.) And if you’re starting from that kind of disadvantage, you simply can’t afford to throw away even a chance at appointing a real conservative in the name of a play-it-safe compromise: If there’s one thing conservatives have learned from forty years of judicial appointment battles, it’s that when you compromise, you lose.
Further, you lose the most on the issues that animate the party’s socially-conservative voting base — as opposed to donors, think-tankers and the Chamber of Commerce —because it’s social issues where time and again the elite consensus has tugged Republican appointees leftward.
So it’s not just that conservatives have good reasons to be more skeptical than Stern that even a “moderate” Obama appointee would ultimately hesitate to overturn (or at least carefully undercut) some of the precedents he cites; it’s that on certain issues they have extremely well-grounded anxieties. Tell the average conservative voter that they should accept an Obama appointee in the hopes of preserving Citizens United and McCutcheon, and they’re likely to stare blankly and then shrug when you explain the campaign-finance law implications. But tell them that, despite having a fighting chance to replace him with a conservative, they should trade their great champion and bulwark on abortion, marriage and religious liberty — to borrow from one eulogy, “the mighty rearguard in our long and slow defeat” — for an Obama appointee at a moment when social liberalism is ascendant and the legal and cultural consequences of same-sex marriage are beginning to ripple across the country and the courts … well, they’ll look at you like you’re insane.
And they would be right to do so. There is some gambling involved in resisting an Obama pick, certainly; there’s some chance of a worse outcome overall. But given the plausible hope of replacing the court’s most important conservative with another conservative, accepting a supposedly-moderate liberal without an electoral fight would be remembered forever as the G.O.P.’s greatest betrayal of social conservatives, its final surrender in the culture wars.