Politics

Politics

  • Obama

    Votes: 4 1.1%
  • Romney

    Votes: 172 48.9%
  • Other

    Votes: 46 13.1%
  • a:3:{i:1637;a:5:{s:12:"polloptionid";i:1637;s:6:"nodeid";s:7:"2882145";s:5:"title";s:5:"Obama";s:5:"

    Votes: 130 36.9%

  • Total voters
    352

ACamp1900

Counting my ‘bet against ND’ winnings
Messages
48,947
Reaction score
11,225
I don't listen to a lot of political talk radio... haven't listened to much at all in the last couple years really, but it is amazing how they just spout the same stuff... Out of boredom this past week I tuned into maybe five different programs, one seemingly fence riding, one left leaning and the rest conservative talk... each right leaning one mentioned, in the exact same fake ass off hand fashion while discussing Kap's mess... "I read that he converted to Islam somewhere, is that true, I don't know if that's true or not but i read that somewhere." I mean they each did it in the SAME EXACT WAY... smh, and for the record I only listened to like ten minutes of each lolol... Then I hear the local fence riding program smash on the right over the Islam stuff and smash on the left over apparent claims that Kap is a long time, proven humanitarian ... sure enough flip to a liberal radio host and she's droning on about Kap's great humanitarian record...

lol at it all.
 

IrishinSyria

In truth lies victory
Messages
6,046
Reaction score
1,921
Are you poor? Did you grow up poor? How old are you? For poor whites coming of age in 2016, they've been hearing about "white privilege" for years. In their poverty, they've never seen anything resembling "privilege" so they perceive that rhetoric as anti-white racism.

Well, before I went to law school I was pulling down about $31,000 a year as a Sergeant in the Army. Is that poor? I don't think so but *shrug*.

This is the sentence I was talking about:

"suggests that the average white person now feels that anti-white bias is a bigger problem than other forms of racial discrimination."

A couple things about this sentence. "average white person" does not suggest "poor white people." It suggests people like that Becky with the bad grades in Texas who thought she didn't get into school because of AA (event though that was verifiably false).

But also, I'm not suggesting there's no anti-white discrimination. I'm suggesting that it's really hard to look at our country- and I've spent time living in poor rural white areas and poor urban black areas and everything in-between, and conclude that anti white discrimination is a BIGGER problem than any other.

And I acknowledge that sometimes efforts to redress systemic inequalities feel like anti-white discrimination. I get that if you personally feel like you're being screwed, it's tough to step back and acknowledge the bigger issues at play. At a macro level, our economy is not a zero sum game, but at an individual level it frequently is. And I don't have any good answers for that, besides that it's worth keeping in mind when trying to craft policies to address complex problems.

But at the end of the day, if you were about to be born and you only knew that you were going to be born in the US and you were able to pick your race and nothing else and your goal was to minimize the amount of discrimination you were likely to face, the choice is clear and obvious and (spoiler alert) it's white.
 

IrishinSyria

In truth lies victory
Messages
6,046
Reaction score
1,921
I've really fallen in love with National Review this election cycle. One of the only outlets to stand on principle against Trump and now they're spitting truth about Fox News and Rush Limbaugh, two targets that you don't go after from the Right.

Fox News Hurts Conservative Movement | National Review

Rush Limbaugh, Dick Morris & Audience Trust | National Review

Can't say I've fallen in love with them but have gained respect. Theirs is a principled conservatism.
 
Last edited:

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
TAC's Samuel Goldman just published an article titled "After Conservatism":

For all his many faults, Donald Trump displays one great virtue as a presidential candidate: he is a remarkably effective dispeller of illusions. Early in the campaign, Trump dispelled the illusion that his rivals were the strongest field of candidates in the party’s history. As the frontrunner, he dispelled the illusion that “the party decides” on the nomination. As the presumptive nominee, he dispelled the illusion that candidates inevitably try to broaden their appeal beyond their core supporters. Who knows what illusions The Donald will dispel by November.

Of all the illusions Trump has dispelled, however, none is more significant than the illusion of the conservative movement. Rather than being the dominant force in the Republican Party, conservatives, Trump revealed, are just another pressure group. And not an especially large one. In state after state, voters indicated that they did not care much about conservative orthodoxy on the economy, foreign policy, or what used to be called family values.

The poor record of this orthodoxy as a governing philosophy is one reason for this indifference to conservative dogma. Some apologists blame Obama for provoking the Trump rebellion through a feat of reverse psychology. The truth is probably simpler. Many Americans remember the George W. Bush presidency as a disaster. Reasonably enough, they expect that another self-identified conservative administration would bring more of the same.

Demographic changes are also part of the explanation. The conservative movement is disproportionately comprised of middle-class white Christians. There are fewer of those than there used to be.

As the conservative movement approaches retirement age, finally, its rhetoric has become almost unintelligible to outsiders. Rather than making arguments addressed to normal people, conservative leaders invoke limited government almost fetishistically, as if the words themselves possessed the power to convince. Ted Cruz’s reputation as an orator rests on his mastery of this jargon.

The political scientist George Hawley’s Right-Wing Critics of American Conservatism is among the most serious reflections on this situation yet to appear in print. Primarily a work of intellectual history, it attempts to explain how the conservative movement reached this low point in its fortunes—and what alternatives were excluded in the process. The book’s tone is exquisitely non-judgmental, but it is clear that Hawley’s interest is not just academic. Although it was written before Trump burst onto the stage, Right-Wing Critics is a step toward answering the question: what comes after the conservative movement?

Hawley begins with the observation that the historic pillars of the American conservative movement—limited government, an assertively anti-communist foreign policy, and quasi-Christian moralism—have no necessary connection. Beginning in the early ’50s, these elements were packaged together by a group of intellectuals and activists led by William F. Buckley. The story is often told as a process of addition, in which disparate constituencies were brought into a grand coalition. Hawley emphasizes that it was also a process of exclusion, as unsuitable ideas and characters were driven out.

All students of the conservative movement know about the marginalization of Robert Welch and other leaders of the John Birch Society. Hawley reminds readers that the purges did not begin there. National Review was established partly to distance conservatism from the anti-Semitism that bedeviled the Old Right. Its founding manifesto was also a statement of protest against so-called New Conservatives of the 1950s who accepted the New Deal. Secular-minded anticommunists like Max Eastman were theoretically welcome in conservative circles but found their ostentatiously pious tone intolerable. In its first decade, the conservative movement was defined as much by who was out as who was in.

This process of self-definition did not end with the nomination of Barry Goldwater, the first movement conservative to seek the presidency. Since then, Southern nostalgists, critics of the U.S.-Israel alliance, opponents of the Iraq War, and offenders against the movement’s code of racial etiquette have all been treated to quasi-official denunciations. Skeptics of supply-side economics have also been encouraged to make their homes elsewhere. This magazine has its origin in some of those disputes.

One result of this boundary-policing is a “true” conservatism of striking narrowness and rigidity. Its less recognized corollary is the development of a diverse ecology of ideas outside the movement’s ever shrinking tent. Some of these uncultivated growths are bitter and even poisonous. Others might contain the tonic that the right needs to recover its relevance.

Hawley is a highly competent guide to this wilderness. In chapters on localists, libertarians, paleoconservatives, and white nationalists, he provides thorough summaries of major figures and arguments. Hawley justifies his selections and omissions on the grounds that all belong to the right while standing at odds with the conservative movement. Borrowing an argument from Paul Gottfried, he defines the right negatively by the rejection of equality as the highest political value.

Hawley announces early in the book that he seeks to “examine each of these ideologies dispassionately.” That is a considerable virtue when treating such politically fraught material. In particular, Hawley provides the best introduction to the strangely overlapping worlds of radical libertarians and white nationalists. Because these defiantly unconventional movements are so easily caricatured, it is important to let their advocates speak for themselves.

But Hawley’s strenuous neutrality is distorting as well as clarifying. In his effort to survey so many neglected species of the right, he gives some more attention than their influence or achievements justify. It is often forgotten that pioneers of the American right like H.L. Mencken and Albert Jay Nock were critics of revealed religion. But their epigones are few in number and have made no significant theoretical contribution. “Godless conservatism” deserves a footnote, not a chapter.

The long discussion of the European “New Right” also seems out of place. Although it is an important topic in itself, Hawley acknowledges that European writers have an extremely limited American audience.

Language barriers are part of the reason figures like Alain de Benoist and Alexander Dugin have not been received more widely, but there is a more fundamental obstacle of principle. Even when they are critics of egalitarianism, few Americans are willing to reject the basic tenets of liberal democracy. That leaves much of the ground on which the European Right has flourished off-limits.

Hawley could also be more forthcoming about where he stands in all this. One cannot blame him for wishing to avoid unnecessary controversy or prevent an academic study from becoming a polemic. But if he finds “some of the arguments discussed in this book persuasive and … others abhorrent,” he should not force readers to guess which are which.

Hawley’s analysis is mostly retrospective and focused on ideas rather than electoral strategies. He gestures, however, toward two scenarios for a post-conservative future. Neither is very appealing.

The first of these scenarios might be described as the rise of the libertarians. Libertarians have an independent network of the institutions that could survive the collapse of the conservative movement. Especially in economics, they also enjoy a certain academic legitimacy that makes their perspectives difficult to ignore in policy debates. Most importantly, libertarianism is not tied to declining demographic groups. Libertarians, therefore, should have a chance of success in a less white, less religious America.

The difficulty is that the principle that more freedom is always better is not very appealing to most people. Americans love to complain about excessive regulation and unlimited spending. Yet they also rely on an elaborate web of payments, subsidies, and services to secure them against dislocation, poverty, and disease.

Although libertarians make good cases that these programs should be simpler and more transparent, there is very little support for making government smaller on the whole. Mainstream conservatives are often criticized for their combination of libertarian rhetoric with operational progressivism. But their most libertarian positions—relatively unrestricted immigration and the privatization of entitlements—are also their least popular.

That leaves the second possibility, which Trump may already be realizing. In this scenario, the right becomes defined by ethno-class solidarity rather than a commitment to limited government. This is not exactly white nationalism, which Hawley defines as the belief “that the races should not live together in the same country at all, even if the prevailing social structure benefits whites.” But it is a form of identity politics that emphasizes the culture and interests of downscale whites—“middle American radicals,” as the sociologist Donald Warren dubbed them.

Moralizing aside, there are some serious political problems with this strategy. One is that the numbers don’t add up. In a previous work, White Voters in the 21st Century, Hawley argues that the GOP could balance its weakness among minorities by increasing its support among whites. The populist rhetoric likely to attract alienated whites, however, will drive away the dwindling portion of the suburban gentry that continues to vote Republican. Since whites’ overall share of the electorate is declining, this is like trying to run up a down escalator.

Second, no one has yet proposed a plausible agenda to help these voters. As the economist Tyler Cowen has argued in Average Is Over, no restrictions on trade are going to bring back the pre-globalization economy and no limits on future immigration will undo the demographic transformation of the last half-century. Without considerably more policy ingenuity than its advocates have shown so far, a right based on the support of blue-collar whites is likely to be little more than an exercise in trolling.

Third, the mainstreaming of white identity politics would almost certainly come at the expense of civil peace. Yet order is perhaps the most neglected of political values and one to which the right has historically been quite attentive. Actual racial nationalists might welcome further ethnic balkanization and embitterment. But no one else should.

Compared to these alternatives, the search for a middle course between libertarianism and what some scholars call “welfare chauvinism” seems less quixotic. There is no doubt that the conservative movement has become isolated, myopic, and lazy. But its vocation—to remind a democratic society that equality is not the only important thing in order to preserve that society from its tendency toward despotism—has not disappeared. Right-wing critics of American conservatism often have a point. Even so, we will miss it when it is gone.
 

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
The Week's Damon Linker just published an article titled "Liberals keep denigrating the new nationalism as racist. This is nonsense.":

Have you noticed that liberals think Donald Trump and his supporters are racists?

You may have missed it if you didn't read the lead story on the front page of Saturday's New York Times, or watch one of three late-night talk shows on Monday night, or pay attention to Hillary Clinton's "deplorables" speech earlier this month, or follow the array of articles that appeared over the following week making the case that, if anything, Clinton was too restrained in describing merely half of would-be Trump voters as motivated by xenophobic bigotry.

The latest and most ambitious of these liberal hit pieces is by Vox's Zack Beauchamp, who marshals a range of academic studies to defend the view that the electoral success of right-wing movements across the Western world — from the rise of Trump and the outcome of the Brexit referendum to recent strong showings for far-right parties in European countries from France to Hungary — is not mainly a product of economic anxiety but rather a result of "racism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia."

As Beauchamp puts it in a summary statement that verifies what an awful lot of liberals appear to believe: "The 'losers of globalization' aren't the ones voting for these parties. What unites far-right politicians and their supporters, on both sides of the Atlantic, is a set of regressive attitudes toward difference. Racism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia — and not economic anxiety — are their calling cards." (In another passage, Beauchamp adds that "the privileged" are "furious that their privileges are being stripped away by those they view as outside interlopers.")

There you have it — a perfect distillation of liberalism in 2016: Trump voters and their analogues overseas have "regressive attitudes." They're motivated by bigotry, fear, and selfishness, all of which makes them angry that various outsiders are threatening to take away their abundant "privileges." They certainly have no justification — economic or otherwise — for their grievances.

The studies that Beauchamp cites do indeed seem to show (as he puts it) that the story of the rise of right-wing nationalism "cannot be told in purely economic terms." Whether it can be told without reference to economics at all is another matter. (Usually communities that are thriving economically don't show spikes in suicide and widespread addiction to prescription pain killers.)

But the real problem with the way Beauchamp and so many others on the center-left talk about those on the nationalist right is that it displays outright contempt for particularistic instincts that are not and should not be considered morally and politically beyond the pale. On the contrary, a very good case can be made that these instincts are natural to human beings and even coeval with political life as such — and that it is the universalistic cosmopolitanism of humanitarian liberalism (or progressivism) that, as much as anything, has provoked the right-wing backlash in the first place.

Underlying liberal denigration of the new nationalism — the tendency of progressives to describe it as nothing but "racism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia" — is the desire to delegitimize any particularistic attachment or form of solidarity, be it national, linguistic, religious, territorial, or ethnic. As I explained shortly after the Brexit vote, cosmopolitan liberals presume that all particularistic forms of solidarity must be superseded by a love of humanity in general, and indeed that these particularistic attachments will be superseded by humanitarianism before long, as part of the inevitable unfolding of human progress.

For such liberals, any outlook that resists or rejects humanitarianism is an atavistic throwback to less morally pristine times, with the present always superior to the past and the imagined even-more-purely humanitarian future always better still.

Concerned about immigrants disregarding the nation's borders, defying its laws, and changing its ethnic and linguistic character? Racist!

Worried that the historically Christian and (more recently) secular character of European civilization will be altered for the worse, not to mention that its citizens will be forced to endure increasing numbers of theologically motivated acts of terrorism, if millions of refugees from Muslim regions of the world are permitted to settle in the European Union? Islamophobe!

Fed up with the way EU bureaucracies disregard and override British sovereignty on a range of issues, including migration within the Eurozone? Xenophobe!

As far as humanitarian liberals are concerned, all immigrants should be welcomed (and perhaps given access to government benefits), whether or not they entered the country illegally, no matter what language they speak or ethnicity they belong to, and without regard for their religious or political commitments. All that matters — or should matter — is that they are human. To raise any other consideration is pure bigotry and simply unacceptable.

Earlier forms of liberalism were politically wiser than this — though the wisdom came less from a clearly delineated argument than from observation of human behavior and reading of human history. "Love of one's own" had been recognized as a potent and permanent motive force in politics all the way back to the beginning of Western civilization, when Homer and Sophocles depicted it and Plato analyzed it. It simply never occurred to liberals prior to the mid-20th century that human beings might one day overcome particularistic forms of solidarity and attachment. They took it entirely for granted that individual rights and civic duties needed to be instantiated in particulars — by this people, in this place, with this distinctive history and these specific norms, habits, and traditions.

But now liberals have undergone a complete reversal, treating something once considered a given as something that must be extricated root and branch.

If people gave up their particular attachments easily, conceding their moral illegitimacy, that might be a sign that the humanitarian ideal is justified — that human history is indeed oriented toward a universalistic goal beyond nations and other forms of local solidarity. But experience tells us something else entirely. The more that forms of political, moral, economic, and legal universalism spread around the globe, the more they inspire a reaction in the name of the opposite ideals. The Western world is living through just such a reaction right now.

How far it goes and how much it destroys will depend in no small part on how long it takes humanitarian liberals to accept their own role in provoking the very thing they most want to destroy.
 

zelezo vlk

Well-known member
Messages
18,011
Reaction score
5,049
Whiskey get your high falootin' bigotry out of here. You may pick up your privilege, which you checked at the door, when you leave.
 

gkIrish

Greek God
Messages
13,184
Reaction score
1,004
Will the Left Survive the Millennials? - NYTimes.com

Midway through my opening address for the Brisbane Writers Festival earlier this month, Yassmin Abdel-Magied, a Sudanese-born Australian engineer and 25-year-old memoirist, walked out. Her indignant comments about the event might have sunk into obscurity, along with my speech, had they not been republished by The Guardian. Twenty minutes in, this audience member apparently turned to her mother: “ ‘Mama, I can’t sit here,’ I said, the corners of my mouth dragging downwards. ‘I cannot legitimize this.’ ” She continued: “The faces around me blurred. As my heels thudded against the grey plastic of the flooring, harmonizing with the beat of the adrenaline pumping through my veins, my mind was blank save for one question. ‘How is this happening?’ ”

I’m asking the same thing.

Briefly, my address maintained that fiction writers should be allowed to write fiction — thus should not let concerns about “cultural appropriation” constrain our creation of characters from different backgrounds than our own. I defended fiction as a vital vehicle for empathy. If we have permission to write only about our own personal experience, there is no fiction, but only memoir. Honestly, my thesis seemed so self-evident that I’d worried the speech would be bland.

Nope — not in the topsy-turvy universe of identity politics. The festival immediately disavowed the address, though the organizers had approved the thrust of the talk in advance. A “Right of Reply” session was hastily organized. When, days later, The Guardian ran the speech, social media went ballistic. Mainstream articles followed suit. I plan on printing out The New Republic’s “Lionel Shriver Shouldn’t Write About Minorities” and taping it above my desk as a chiding reminder.

Viewing the world and the self through the prism of advantaged and disadvantaged groups, the identity-politics movement — in which behavior like huffing out of speeches and stirring up online mobs is par for the course — is an assertion of generational power. Among millennials and those coming of age behind them, the race is on to see who can be more righteous and aggrieved — who can replace the boring old civil rights generation with a spikier brand.

When I was growing up in the ’60s and early ’70s, conservatives were the enforcers of conformity. It was the right that was suspicious, sniffing out Communists and scrutinizing public figures for signs of sedition.

Now the role of oppressor has passed to the left. In Australia, where I spoke, Section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act makes it unlawful to do or say anything likely to “offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate,” providing alarming latitude in the restriction of free speech. It is Australia’s conservatives arguing for the amendment of this law.

As a lifelong Democratic voter, I’m dismayed by the radical left’s ever-growing list of dos and don’ts — by its impulse to control, to instill self-censorship as well as to promote real censorship, and to deploy sensitivity as an excuse to be brutally insensitive to any perceived enemy. There are many people who see these frenzies about cultural appropriation, trigger warnings, micro-aggressions and safe spaces as overtly crazy. The shrill tyranny of the left helps to push them toward Donald Trump.

Ironically, only fellow liberals will be cowed by terror of being branded a racist (a pejorative lobbed at me in recent days — one that, however groundless, tends to stick). But there’s still such a thing as a real bigot, and a real misogynist. In obsessing over micro-aggressions like the sin of uttering the commonplace Americanism “you guys” to mean “you all,” activists persecute fellow travelers who already care about equal rights.

Moreover, people who would hamper free speech always assume that they’re designing a world in which only their enemies will have to shut up. But free speech is fragile. Left-wing activists are just as dependent on permission to speak their minds as their detractors.

In an era of weaponized sensitivity, participation in public discourse is growing so perilous, so fraught with the danger of being caught out for using the wrong word or failing to uphold the latest orthodoxy in relation to disability, sexual orientation, economic class, race or ethnicity, that many are apt to bow out. Perhaps intimidating their elders into silence is the intention of the identity-politics cabal — and maybe my generation should retreat to our living rooms and let the young people tear one another apart over who seemed to imply that Asians are good at math.

But do we really want every intellectual conversation to be scrupulously cleansed of any whiff of controversy? Will people, so worried about inadvertently giving offense, avoid those with different backgrounds altogether? Is that the kind of fiction we want — in which the novels of white writers all depict John Cheever’s homogeneous Connecticut suburbs of the 1950s, while the real world outside their covers becomes ever more diverse?

Ms. Abdel-Magied got the question right: How is this happening? How did the left in the West come to embrace restriction, censorship and the imposition of an orthodoxy at least as tyrannical as the anti-Communist, pro-Christian conformism I grew up with? Liberals have ominously relabeled themselves “progressives,” forsaking a noun that had its roots in “liber,” meaning free. To progress is merely to go forward, and you can go forward into a pit.

Protecting freedom of speech involves protecting the voices of people with whom you may violently disagree. In my youth, liberals would defend the right of neo-Nazis to march down Main Street. I cannot imagine anyone on the left making that case today
.
 
Last edited:

wizards8507

Well-known member
Messages
20,660
Reaction score
2,661
Good read. Fortunately, there's a counter-force growing primarily on the Internet in response to the SJWs. The Tumblristas are mocked by the likes of Milo Yiannopoulos, Ben Shapiro, Dave Rubin, Steven Crowder, Paul Joseph Watson, Sargon of Akkad, Karen Straughan, Chris Ray Gun, Laura Southern, Thunderf00t, and on and on. Gamergate will be remembered years from now as the start of something big.
 

wizards8507

Well-known member
Messages
20,660
Reaction score
2,661
<iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/JcJTPK2KHcs" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>

There's a very interesting back-and-forth in there about the Libertarian Party and how it has actually made America less libertarian. The Libertarians have effectively ghettoized and/or gerrymandered themselves into a political party that is never going to win anything rather than working within the Republican and Democrat parties to make them more libertarian.
 
Last edited:

phgreek

New member
Messages
6,956
Reaction score
433

To answer, no.

But I think the left and right both have some things to rectify. I think we'll see left and right move to independent and libertarian parties and remake them into what the left and right once were. And then from the new high ground(s) will rebuke and eviscerate the radicals before they follow.

Right now the "normal" folks won't rally, and expel that bad apples for fear of party collapse...I think both parties need to collapse.
 

IrishinSyria

In truth lies victory
Messages
6,046
Reaction score
1,921

Protecting freedom of speech involves protecting the voices of people with whom you may violently disagree. In my youth, liberals would defend the right of neo-Nazis to march down Main Street. I cannot imagine anyone on the left making that case today.

So I guess people like Barack Obama, myself, and the ACLU no longer count as the left?

There's a lot of disagreement right now on the left regarding the outer boundaries of free speech, but I think there's actually a lot of lefties who would not want to see the government intervene if the nazis tried to march.
 

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
cc: zelezo vlk

cc: zelezo vlk

Here's a recent blog post by Daniel Saunders on the difference between nationalism and patriotism:

It existed once before the nineteenth century, briefly, as part of the vast imperial structure of the Roman Empire. Before that it had been a vague idea from myth; later it was a clearer hope of statesmen and romantics, but still mostly unattainable and undesirable. It was the notion of Italia, a unified and coherent polity encompassing the peninsula stuck between the Alps and five seas. Despite having “the most clearly demarcated fatherland in Europe,” in the words of the nineteenth-century nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini, Italy has forever struggled to unite its disparate peoples under one banner, and the reason is simple: there are simply too many Italies for there to be one Italy.

Since its hasty inception in 1861, the modern state of Italy has generally failed to achieve the success of its Western neighbors. The events of the Risorgimento—formerly the hallowed, unquestionable orthodoxy of the fledgling state—turn out to have engendered an uninterrupted string of disasters, from civil war, poor diplomacy, and fascism to poverty, the rise of the Mafia, and perennially ineffective government. This is the story that British historian David Gilmour tells in his excellent book The Pursuit of Italy, which is part history and part polemic. (The title is a reference to a line Virgil gives Aeneas—a sort of omen that Italians may be fated to chase after something they cannot achieve.) Gilmour spares no criticisms in his assessment of the Risorgimento myth and wonders whether Garibaldi and the other “fathers of the fatherland” were mistaken in attempting a hopeless unity between Piedmontese, Genoese, Lombards, Venetians, Tuscans, Romans, Neapolitans, and Sicilians.

“Until the end of the eighteenth century,” writes Gilmour, “Italy remained a literary idea, an abstract concept, an imaginary homeland or simply a sentimental urge…. For a large majority of the population it meant nothing at all.” (In some parts, this remained true even into the twentieth century: Gilmour recounts how the social activist Danilo Dolci met poor Sicilians who had never heard of Italy.) Unlike their German and French neighbors to the north, Italians were historically discouraged from the nationalistic impulse by natural barriers of geography and language. The Apennines, the mountain range which splits the peninsula down the middle, created a cultural and linguistic division between east and west almost as prominent as the stereotypical division between north and south. Incredibly, Gilmour notes that before modern infrastructure, Romans found it faster and more convenient to travel to Ancona by boat (a distance of some 1,000 miles) than cross the interior of the peninsula (only 130 miles).

Similarly, regional dialects were so distinctive that people in neighboring valleys often found it hard to understand each other. The modern language of Italian, essentially a successor of the language spoken by Florentine aristocrats, is so different from the Sicilian and Venetian dialects—not to mention the dialects of northern peasants—that many twentieth-century schoolchildren had to learn their nation’s official tongue as a foreign language.

These differences meant that Italy’s regions developed mostly autonomously, with their own traditions, histories, styles of government, and interests. Venice was established before Charlemagne was crowned and lasted as a self-ruled republic for over a thousand years before it was given up to Austrian control in the Napoleonic Wars. Virtually every other city of the north also boasted a tradition of self-rule, which stood in marked contrast to the cities of the Papal States and the southern Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily; but even these regions, which were slow to grow out of feudalism, maintained their own distinctive cultures and largely successful economies.

It is thus easy to sympathize with Gilmour when he laments the absence of modern-day mini-republics in Venice, Florence, and Genoa, or an independent Naples, Sicily, and Rome, each with their own thriving and distinctive cultural identities cemented in autonomous regional governments. The reason for this absence is the Risorgimento, which, more than anything, was a kind of flattening, cultural imperialism imposed on other areas by the then Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia, the de facto leader in the saga of Italian unification. Gilmour shows how the annexing tactic of “piedmontization” proved largely destructive, economically and culturally, for cities such as Venice and Naples. Camillo Cavour, Piedmont’s prime minister, was naive enough to believe that the values of this conservative and (almost farcically ostentatious) martial state could be exported to his countrymen. But he was also savvy enough to know that political unification required cultural unification as well, at whatever cost. Cavour was a typical progressive of his day, who assumed that all ideologies must finally bend to the guiding will of history—which, as it happened, favored the fortunes of a piedmontized Italy.

In many ways, the history of modern Italy represents a failure of political liberalism. Despite the utopian dreams of Cavour and other advocates of the Risorgimento—dreams of progress, the free market, European dominance, and ancient civic engagement translated to the national stage—the reality has been much bleaker. Much of Italy’s tumultuous twentieth-century history has been a direct reaction to that failure. The fascist movement, with its violent appeal to primordial and masculine values, was only one of the first attempts to respond to the poverty, political over-extension, and international humiliation the liberal state had wrought.

Gilmour’s persuasive argument implicitly points to nationalism as the culprit in Italy’s modern troubles. But what kind of nationalism? It is worth recalling here a distinction George Orwell made in 1945:

Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism. Both words are normally used in so vague a way that any definition is liable to be challenged, but one must draw a distinction between them, since two different and even opposing ideas are involved. By ‘patriotism’ I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power. The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality.

Italy’s birth was quite openly fueled by this desire for power and prestige, and patriotism, in Orwell’s definition, was largely absent from the cause. Even in figures like Garibaldi, love of particular places and customs, even if present, was superseded by the nebulous love of a unified state and a romantic lust for dominance. (Although for Garibaldi, even this might be questioned; as his adventures in South America show, he at times seems truly to have loved only the thrill of fighting for the underdog.) For Cavour, patriotic sentiment was valuable not in itself but only as a way to get Italy a seat at the same table as Great Britain, France, Prussia, and Austria; of course, to these superpowers, the notion of Italy as an equal was laughably inconceivable. The Risorgimento could easily dispense with where Italy had been if it meant getting Italy to where its architects wanted it to be.

But Gilmour is far from being entirely cynical is his assessment of Italy. If Italians have been unable to thrive under the forced and arbitrary framework of nationalism, it is only because they have been more concerned with ties closer to home. Orwell’s “patriotism” echoes campanilismo, a term Italians use to describe loyalty to the “municipal bell tower,” or commune, where citizens hold the freedom to govern themselves. It is campanilismo, not nationalism—nor still an even more abstract internationalism—that has more deeply shaped Italian politics and psychology through the centuries; the medieval city was literally built around it, and it still informs life in many of the towns that are the communes’ direct descendants. Gilmour writes:

Campanilismo is by definition limiting and has thus been mocked, as Lampedusa mocked it, as a breeder of narrow minds…. Yet provincialism in Italy is less parochial than in any other country I know.

Campanilismo is fidelity to an historical and essentially self-contained form of society designed many centuries ago to cater to the needs of its citizens…. Campanilismo brings reassurance and a sense of identity to a society which perceives the state to be hostile or indifferent. Local administration regulates an urban life as civilized as any on the planet in scores of towns such as Trento and Bergamo, Pistoia and Arezzo, Mantua and Verona, Lecce and Bressanone. Cremona in Lombardy is a fine example: a lovely city of pinks and duns, of yellows and ochres, a place of slow rhythms and old, unhurried cyclists, of clean streets and well-kept museums, of small workshops where master craftsmen still fashion exquisite violins. So agreeable and well run is the town that its children want to live there, remain there and die there.

siena-pano.jpg


As Gilmour writes, it is hard not to see this as the true Italy. Indeed, this is the Italy I experienced on my first trip there this summer: towns with over a thousand years of thinking about and implementation of just, effective governments; towns built to a human scale, where any place is accessible by foot; towns intentionally crafted to be as aesthetically pleasing and harmonious as possible; towns who claim their citizens to such a degree that those citizens will say they are Tuscan or Roman before they are Italian. The Risorgimento feels irrelevant in a place like Siena, whose medieval splendor is still as evident today as it must have been in 1215, when its magnificent cathedral was consecrated.

As is evident above, Gilmour’s book truly shines when he poetically describes this Italy, both in its medieval history and in its present day reality. It makes one yearn for the bell tower, and what it might have become in Italy’s history had it been recognized at the crucial moment as the greatest good.
 

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
Thank you. Whiskey, how do you know which blogs to follow?

I find all this stuff on Twitter. Follow the right people there, and the best of the web gets served up for you every day. My account is @whisk3yjack; just check out the list of accounts I'm following.
 

zelezo vlk

Well-known member
Messages
18,011
Reaction score
5,049
Tsk tsk. I ask for advice on whom to follow and Whiskey takes his chance to whore for more Twitter followers. Never thought I'd see the day. ;)

Sent from my SAMSUNG-SM-G900A using Tapatalk
 

irishog77

NOT SINBAD's NEPHEW
Messages
7,441
Reaction score
2,206
Whiskey has is sights set on overtaking Shakira and the Biebs for most Twitter followers.
 

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
Tsk tsk. I ask for advice on whom to follow and Whiskey takes his chance to whore for more Twitter followers. Never thought I'd see the day. ;)

Whiskey has is sights set on overtaking Shakira and the Biebs for most Twitter followers.

Be warned: I am not an entertaining follow. I've only tweeted twice this year, and they were both simple RTs without any added commentary. If you're interested in the stuff I post here, pilfering my "Following" tab is the most my sad little account can offer you.
 

irishog77

NOT SINBAD's NEPHEW
Messages
7,441
Reaction score
2,206
Be warned: I am not an entertaining follow. I've only tweeted twice this year, and they were both simple RTs without any added commentary. If you're interested in the stuff I post here, pilfering my "Following" tab is the most my sad little account can offer you.

No worries. It's fine if you're an utter bore on Twitter-- I don't even have an account. :eek:grin:
 

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
The NYT's Ross Douthat recently published an article titled "Among the Post-Liberals":

THE Western system — liberal, democratic, capitalist — has been essentially unchallenged from the inside for decades, its ideological rivals discredited or tamed. Marxists retreated to academic fastnesses, fascists to online message boards, and Western Christianity accepted pluralism and abandoned throne-and-altar dreams.

The liberal system’s weak spots did not go away. It delivered peace and order and prosperity, but it attenuated pre-liberal forces – tribal, familial, religious — that speak more deeply than consumer capitalism to basic human needs: the craving for honor, the yearning for community, the desire for metaphysical hope.

Those needs endured, muted but not eliminated by greater social equality and rising G.D.P. Nonetheless the liberal consensus seemed impressively resilient, even in the midst of elite misgovernment. 9/11 did not shake it meaningfully, nor did the Iraq war, and it seemed at first to weather the financial crisis as well.

Now, though, there is suddenly resistance. Its political form is an angry nationalism, a revolt of the masses in both the United States and Europe. But the more important development may be happening in intellectual circles, where many younger writers regard the liberal consensus as something to be transcended or rejected, rather than reformed or redeemed.

I’ve written about some of these ideas before, but a taxonomy seems useful. The first post-liberal school might be called the new radicals, a constellation of left-wing writers for whom the Marxist dream lives anew. In journals-of-ideas like Jacobin and n+1 and in the crucible of protest politics, they have tried to forge a unified critique of the liberal-capitalist order out of a diversity of issues: structural racism and sexism, climate change, economic inequality and more.

No full-spectrum agenda uniting Thomas Piketty and Naomi Klein and Ta-Nehisi Coates has yet emerged. But the left’s fractiousness, its complicated race-sexuality-class feuds, have an energy that’s conspicuously absent closer to the neoliberal center. And they are infused with an exasperation with procedural liberalism, an eagerness to purge and police and shame our way toward a more perfect justice than the post-Cold War order has produced.

The illiberalism of these new radicals is mirrored among the new reactionaries, a group defined by skepticism of democracy and egalitarianism, admiration for more hierarchical orders, and a willingness to overthrow the Western status quo.

As on the left there is not yet a defining reactionary agenda, and neo-reaction looks different depending on whether you associate it with the white nationalism of the alt-right, the mordant European pessimism of Michel Houellebecq, or the techno-utopian impulses of Silicon Valley figures like Peter Thiel.

But that very diversity means that the new reaction has appeal beyond anti-P.C. tweeters and Trumpist message boards. Reactionary ideas have made modest inroads in the mainstream right: The intellectuals’ case for Trump that I wrote about last week includes a thin but striking “regime change at home” thread. And they have appeal in areas like the tech industry where mainstream conservatism presently has little influence, because (like fascism in its heyday) the new reaction blends nostalgia with a hyper-modernism — monarchy in the service of transhumanism, doubts about human equality alongside dreams of space travel or A.I.

Then finally there is a third group of post-liberals, less prominent but still culturally significant: Religious dissenters. These are Western Christians, especially, who regard both liberal and neoconservative styles of Christian politics as failed experiments, doomed because they sought reconciliation with a liberal project whose professed tolerance stacks the deck in favor of materialism and unbelief. Some of these religious dissenters are seeking a tactical retreat from liberal modernity, a subcultural resilience in the style of Orthodox Jews or Mennonites or Mormons. But others are interested in going on offense. In my own church, part of the younger generation seems disillusioned with post-Vatican II Catholic politics, and is drawn instead either to a revived Catholic integralism or a “tradinista” Catholic socialism — both of which affirm the “social kingship” of Jesus Christ, a phrase that attacks the modern liberal order at the root.

Let me stress that these are very marginal groups. But like the radicals and neo-reactionaries they have an energy absent from the ideological mainstream. And all three post-liberal tendencies are in synch with aspects of the populisms roiling the West’s politics: the radicals with Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn and Podemos and Syriza, the neo-reactionaries with Trump and Brexit and Le Pen, the Catholic integralists with Eastern Europe’s rightward turn.

So their ideas are, perhaps, genuinely dangerous to the order we take for granted in the West. Or — it all depends — they might be beneficial, because liberal civilization’s flourishing has often depended on forces that a merely procedural order can’t generate, on radical and religious correctives to a flattened view of human life.

When those correctives are in short supply, the entire system becomes decadent. When they re-emerge, it’s best to learn from them — or else the next correction will be worse.
 

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
Commonweal's Bernard G. Prusak just published an article titled "Women & Children First":

Several presidential election cycles ago, in 2004, the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre published a short article, “The Only Vote Worth Casting in November,” arguing that the responsible choice in that election was not to vote at all. “When offered a choice between two politically intolerable alternatives,” he wrote, “it is important to choose neither.” His argument provoked considerable debate. Were the alternatives in fact intolerable? Is our system so broken as that?

Among MacIntyre’s recommendations for redressing the ways in which he considered our system broken was his call for a child-centered politics. In his view, a prime question we should be asking in our political debates is, “What do we owe our children?” His answer is that

we owe them the best chance that we can give them of protection and fostering from the moment of conception onwards. And we can only achieve that if we give them the best chance that we can both of a flourishing family life, in which the work of their parents is fairly and adequately rewarded, and of an education which will enable them to flourish.

It follows, he went on, that our politics must be invested “in providing health care for expectant mothers, in facilitating adoptions, in providing aid for single-parent families and for grandparents who have taken parental responsibility for their grandchildren,” and finally in demanding “the provision of meaningful work that provides a fair and adequate wage for every working parent, a wage sufficient to keep a family well above the poverty line.” Given such prescriptions, it’s understandable why MacIntyre wished a pox on both parties: such a child-centered, pro-life, pro-labor, pro-welfare politics has found a home nowhere among Democrats or Republicans, whether in 2004 or 2016.

The limited political possibilities of today, however, by no means foreclose the political possibilities of tomorrow. As Pope John XXIII reminded the assembled bishops in his opening address to the Second Vatican Council fifty-four years ago, history gives the lie to “prophets of gloom, who are always predicting decay, as if the destruction of all things were at hand.” The student of history knows, by contrast, how much has changed over the millennia, and such knowledge gives us hope that the Spirit is not done with us yet. Yet the “new order” of things Pope John discerned will not come to pass unless we act to facilitate it. To this end, we need to scrutinize the signs of the times, as the council fathers enjoined the church to do in Gaudium et spes.

What, then, are signs of the times that a child-centered politics must address? One critical sign, I propose, is the changing role of the father.

Here’s what Gaudium et spes has to say about fathers:

The family is a kind of school of deeper humanity. But if it is to achieve the full flowering of its life and mission, it needs the kindly communion of minds and the joint deliberation of spouses, as well as the painstaking cooperation of parents in the education of their children. The active presence of the father is highly beneficial to their formation. The children, especially the younger among them, need the care of their mother at home. This domestic role of hers must be safely preserved, though the legitimate social progress of women should not be underrated on that account.

It is worth noting that while the active presence of the mother is taken for granted in these reflections—enfolded within the “domestic role” that Gaudium et spes sets out to safeguard—the active presence of the father is not a given. Instead, that presence must be summoned and encouraged. There was evidently a distance fathers needed to travel.

Several key developments in the fifty-plus years since then measure how far that journey has been accomplished. One is the significant extent to which the roles of mothers and fathers have converged. According to the Pew Research Center, mothers in the United States now do much more paid work than they used to, and fathers do much more housework and child care. Another is the rise of the two-working-parent household—now roughly 60 percent of all two-parent households with children under age eighteen, according to Pew. Moreover, as the New York Times reported in 2015, social scientists have found that “millennial men—ages eighteen to early thirties—have much more egalitarian attitudes about family, career and gender roles [in] marriage than generations before them.” Such attitudes are clearly related to the growth of stay-at-home dads: in 2012, 16 percent of all at-home parents were men, representing a near-doubling since 1989.

To be sure, discrepancies remain in men’s and women’s family roles, and while millennial men have notably egalitarian attitudes about parenting, research shows that work-life conflicts still tend to push women back into the home far more often than men. All in all, though, we might conclude from these findings that, in the United States at least, fathers have answered Gaudium et spes’s call: they are “actively present” in children’s lives to an extent the council fathers didn’t imagine. Yet this is also only half the story, and the other half is not nearly so happy.

TO UNDERSTAND WHY, we need to take other developments into account. One is what the bioethicist, cultural critic, and former Commonweal editor Daniel Callahan called the “infantilization of males,” a phenomenon he linked to the practice of artificial insemination with the sperm of anonymous donors. Since the birth of the first baby through in-vitro fertilization in 1978, this practice has created several million children whose daddy’s name is “Donor,” as one study provocatively put it. Writing in 1992, Callahan viewed the practice as abetting a more general dereliction of male duty, and condemned “using anonymous sperm donors to help women have children apart from a permanent marital relationship with the father” as posing “a long-standing source of harm for women” even as it symbolically attacked the foundations of family life. “What action,” he asked, “could more decisively declare the irrelevance of fatherhood...?”

Since then, the claim that dads are dispensable has ceased being provocative or controversial, and indeed now seems something of a commonplace. Consider the remarks of actress Jennifer Aniston, who, while promoting her 2010 movie, The Switch, defended her character’s decision to opt for single motherhood via sperm donation. “Women are realizing…more and more,” Aniston mused, “that they don’t have to settle with a man just to have that child.” Data would seem to support this claim. According to the Pew Research Center, in 2013, 34 percent of children lived with a single parent (over 80 percent of whom were women)—up from just 9 percent in 1960. According to the U.S. Census, one in four children under the age of eighteen today—a total of about 17.4 million—are being raised without a father. And while in 1960 only 5.3 percent of all births were to unmarried women, by 2013 it was 40.6 percent. That is a stunning change.

One other statistic has generated a lot of commentary: the fact that, in 2013, about 72 percent of non-Hispanic black births were to unmarried mothers. Why? One answer resides in the mass incarceration of black men over the past forty years. Since the 1970s, the prison population in the United States has quadrupled to 2.2 million, with the number of children with fathers in prison rising from 350,000 to 2.1 million. While black men constitute just 6 percent of the U.S. population, they account for 40 percent of the current prison population; this high rate of incarceration creates a gender gap among men and women in the marriage-age African-American population.

Another factor needs to be taken into account in the overall picture—namely, that the institution of marriage has fallen on hard times. Less and less is it viewed as the only proper context for having children. A 2014 Washington Post article reports that in the early 1990s, a quarter of the single women who got pregnant married the father of their child, while today that figure is down to just over 5 percent—with another 18 percent opting to cohabit with the father without marrying. Against the background of the widespread loss of well-paying, middle-income jobs through globalization, outsourcing, and automation, it seems clear that cohabitation is becoming what social scientists call the poor person’s marriage. “Marriage, as a context for childbearing and childrearing,” the Post article notes, “is increasingly reserved for [our] middle- and upper-class populations.” And cohabitation has proven considerably more fragile than marriage. According to the National Center for Health Statistics, while the probability of a first marriage ending within five years is 20 percent, the same probability for cohabitation is 49 percent. After ten years, the breakup rates rise to 33 percent and 62 percent respectively. Inasmuch as cohabitation is less stable than marriage and most children go with the mother when a relationship ends, more cohabitation ends up meaning less active fathering.

And thus the half of the story that is not nearly so happy. Yes, the father’s role has grown significantly since 1965—in two-parent households. Fathers in those households are actively present in children’s lives to an extent that the Vatican Council fathers could hardly imagine. Yet the two-parent household is less and less the rule, and increasingly reserved, as we have seen, for the better-off. And so the stunning, eightfold increase in births to unmarried women since 1960 translates to a greater absence of fathers for those children who arguably need fathers most: children afflicted by poverty and by the effects of racial discrimination. According to Brad Wilcox’s research for the National Marriage Project, statistics for teen delinquency, depression, and pregnancy all correlate significantly with whether or not a child is living with his or her father. What matters, after all, is not whether the parents are legally married, but whether the father is living with his children. And far too many aren’t.

HOW MIGHT Catholic social teaching about fathers and families best respond to these cultural, social, and political circumstances? I want to make two claims.

The first is that the contemporary church would do well to look to the medieval one. This may sound surprising, since, as the moral theologian Jean Porter has put it, “there is probably no point at which we feel the distance between the [medieval] scholastics and ourselves more sharply than in [the] evaluation of sexuality.” The scholastics had a hard time acknowledging the goodness of sexual desire, which we moderns have a hard time even questioning. Instead, they were concerned—as Augustine had been—about the power of sexual pleasure to distort our reason and will, to blind us to other goods of human life, and to bind us to destructive patterns of behavior. Yet the scholastics were unable to deny the goodness of procreation, by which they understood, Porter writes, not “simply biological reproduction but the extended process by which children are educated and prepared” to participate fully in the life of a community. Commitment to the goodness of procreation followed from the basic faith commitment to the goodness of creation itself.

Put aside whether procreation, in this extended sense, is the only licit purpose of sex, or whether every sex act must be open to it. The important point for the contemporary church is that scholastic natural law with respect to the family took its bearings not from some vision of what marriage or the family or even the sex act must be like: remarkably, medieval natural lawyers were open to entertaining forms of marriage other than one man and one woman, such as polygamy. Instead, it derived from a concern that procreation be served—which is to say, that children be enabled to flourish and develop appropriately into adults. From this perspective, Pope Francis is being medieval (in a good sense) when he decries those who “insist only on issues like abortion, gay marriage, and the use of contraceptive methods,” and asserts instead that “when we speak about these issues, we have to talk about them in a context.” Context in this regard includes both the good news of God’s saving love and mercy, as Francis is always keen to proclaim, and the bad news of our politics’ failure to focus on ensuring the well-being of our children. And that failure is exactly what Catholic social teaching today must help correct.

My second claim is that—as some Catholics might reply to Francis—when we put what has happened to the family and fatherhood over the past fifty years into context, we have to include issues like abortion and contraception. It’s not only structural causes such as job loss and welfare policy that explain the erosion of marriage and the stunning increase of out-of-wedlock births. There are moral and cultural changes that must also be reckoned with.

Twenty years ago, a paper co-authored by Janet Yellen, current chair of the Federal Reserve, made just this argument. According to Yellen’s paper, “the magnitude of [the] changes” to family structure cannot be explained either by the expansion of the welfare state in the 1960s or the decline in jobs for less-educated men since then. Yellen and her co-authors proposed a “technology shock” explanation, zeroing in on the increased availability of contraception and legal abortion as factors that profoundly changed relations between men and women. Access to contraception and abortion, they argued, freed women to engage in premarital sex without fear of consequences, and as a result, “the norm of premarital sexual abstinence all but vanished.” This change proved problematic for those women who lack access to contraception—or don’t use it effectively—and are unwilling to have an abortion. Such women, said Yellen and her co-authors, are at a competitive disadvantage: amid changed sexual mores, they are badly positioned to leverage “the promise of marriage in the event of a pre-marital conception.” Instead, Yellen and her co-authors argued, the man involved is likely to reason as follows: “‘If she is not willing to obtain an abortion or use contraception, why should I sacrifice myself to get married?’”

Whatever the limits of such explanations might be, certainly those who would hold men responsible for the children they help bring into being have reason to be wary of arguments that cast abortion as the rightful choice of women no matter the moral status of the fetus. As the philosopher Elizabeth Brake has argued, “if women’s partial responsibility for pregnancy does not obligate them to support a fetus, then men’s partial responsibility for pregnancy does not obligate them to support a resulting child.” Put simply, if a woman may morally choose to abort an unborn child, then a man should be able to choose not to parent that child—a choice that in fact seems modest next to the woman’s power over the unborn child’s life and death. The director of the New York–based National Center for Men speaks in this regard, inelegantly, of a man’s right to a “financial abortion.”

It will strike some as paradoxical that the church’s greatest contribution to the lives of women over these past fifty years may have been its opposition to abortion on demand. Yet should abortion come to be seen as a morally indifferent act, many people will arrive inevitably at the belief that it is unfair to hold a man responsible for a woman’s choice to carry a pregnancy to term. Pope Francis has remarked along these lines that the church’s defense of unborn human life is not “subject to alleged reforms or ‘modernizations,’” dismissing the notion that one can “resolve problems by eliminating a human life.”

To be sure, holding the line against abortion on demand is not the same as helping women and children. Nor will sounding the trumpet for a renewal of character suffice. The sexual revolution of the 1960s is not about to be overturned, nor is economic globalization likely to be reversed. So what, concretely, is the church to do? One answer Francis has given us is to cultivate “the ability to heal wounds and to warm the hearts of the faithful.” The church, he counsels, “needs nearness, proximity”; it needs to serve as “a field hospital” for the many wounded in our world.

How to do this? Indeed, how might we go even further, and advocate for preventive care, so to speak? One clear step, I think, is to call an end to the culture war over marriage, a war that is not merely beside the point, but antithetical to the kind of child-centered politics advocated by Alasdair MacIntyre in the essay I started off with. As for MacIntyre, in that brief essay he goes on to offer a very far-reaching proposal. Reminding us that “the costs of economic growth are generally borne by those least able to afford them,” while “the majority of the benefits of economic growth go to those who need them least,” he puts forth a never-realized idea of Milton Friedman’s: a negative income tax, which would provide payments to all families below a certain income level. Securing a sufficient minimum living for every family, McIntyre writes, would represent “a large and just redistribution of income” in the United States.

Supporting such a policy would require a politician to acknowledge, as MacIntyre argues, that “the pro-life case” and “the case for economic justice...are inseparable, that each requires the other as its complement” in the formation of a truly child-centered politics. Now that is a candidate I for one would gladly cast my vote for, this November or any other. And do our children deserve any less?
 

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
The American Interest's Jason Willick just published an article titled "Why the House Leans Right":

In 2012, Democrats held the White House and made gains in the Senate but failed to wrest control of the House of Representatives from the GOP, despite winning a greater share of the popular vote in Congressional elections. As the lower chamber declined to cooperate with President Obama for the next two years, many liberal pundits and politicians grumbled about this seemingly-anti-democratic outcome: How could Republicans convert a one-and-a-half-million vote deficit into a recalcitrant House majority? The conventional wisdom was that post-2010 GOP state legislatures used gerrymandering in 2010 to lock in an unfair advantage for their party’s candidates.

The 2016 election also looks likely to deliver the same split outcome, and we can expect similar grumbling over the next two years when a Republican-controlled House resists elements of Hillary Clinton’s agenda through 2018—especially if (as again looks likely) more voters cast their ballots for Democratic Congressional candidates than for Republicans.

In the New York Times, Alec MacGillis offers a pre-emptive corrective to such liberal protestations. The primary cause of the Democrats’ structural disadvantage in House contests is not nefarious redistricting; it’s that the Democratic platform appeals most strongly to voters clustered in major metropolitan centers, so no matter how districts are drawn, Democratic votes tend to be “wasted” building supermajorities in deep-blue urban areas rather than pushing competitive races over the edge:

Democrats today are sorting themselves into geographic clusters where many of their votes have been rendered all but superfluous, especially in elections for the Senate, House and state government.

This has long been a problem for the party, but it has grown worse in recent years. The clustering has economic and demographic roots, but also a basic cultural element: Democrats just don’t want to live where they’d need to live to turn more of the map blue.

“It would be awfully difficult to construct a map that wasn’t leaning Republican,” said the University of Michigan political scientist Jowei Chen. “Geography is just very unfortunate from the perspective of the Democrats.”

Since 2010, gerrymandering has played a role in tilting the Congressional playing field in the GOP’s direction. But its role has been wildly exaggerated by Democrats seeking to raise doubts on the legitimacy of Republican political power in the House and state legislatures. So while it’s almost certainly a good idea, as Larry Diamond has argued in these pages, for non-partisan commissions rather than state legislatures to draw House districts, there should be no expectation that this will substantially strengthen the Democratic position.

There are two ways Democratic elites might look at this dilemma. First, they could conclude that, even if gerrymandering isn’t the cause, the deck is unfairly stacked against their party—that territorial representation is a constitutional anachronism, an anti-democratic stumbling block for liberalism not worthy of deference from other institutions. It might not be possible to switch to a proportional system for electing the legislature (the type in place in many non-Anglo democracies), but Democrats could get around their geographic handicap in other ways: For example, a Democratic president could wield executive power more aggressively when the House resists her (this might seem especially appealing if she won a majority of votes but House Republicans did not) and liberal judges could defer less to the will of a GOP-controlled House when evaluating legislation or policing the separation of powers. The point would be for the Democrats to use their existing presidential majority coalition to impose their agenda, even if that majority, because of the way it is geographically distributed, struggles to deliver 218 representatives to the House.

Alternatively, Democratic elites could regard their lower-house handicap as evidence of a deficiency in their electoral strategy that the party should try to solve rather than circumvent. Instead of saying, “our voters are inefficiently distributed,” Democrats might say, “we should try to appeal to a different coalition of voters.” Alert to the possibility of factionalism, the framers deliberately designed the constitution to force compromise not only between numerical majorities and minorities, but also between discrete territorial units. One way of viewing the Democrats’ seemingly “built-in” Congressional disadvantage is that the constitutional system is punishing the party for building a hyper-concentrated political coalition and rewarding the GOP for drawing on a broader geographic base.

How might Democrats tweak their coalition to ameliorate this problem? Put simply, they would probably need to selectively taper their drive toward more expansive social liberalism and cultural cosmopolitanism. The liberal causes that have aroused particular passion on the left during the Obama years—immigration liberalization, gun control, expanded abortion rights—are increasingly popular in the dense metropolitan areas that Democrats already win but still viewed with skepticism outside them. A Democratic Party espousing (Bill) Clinton-style centrism on select culture war questions could fare marginally better in House races outside of populous coastal urban enclaves.

America’s territory-based representative institutions were devised in a very different time, but it’s still possible to see wisdom in the idea that government works better if ruling majorities have stakeholders distributed across the country. Many scholars have pointed out that one reason our political conflicts are so vituperative is that the parties have built coalitions that are increasingly geographically segregated from one another, so partisans are less likely to live alongside and interact with people who disagree with them.

In a healthier polity, the structure of the House would act as a check against the trend toward extreme partisan sorting by nudging the Democratic Party to court voters outside of cities more aggressively to create a more “efficiently distributed” coalition. The reality is that thanks to demographic forces, interest group lobbying, and elite pressure, the Democrats are likely to be pushed further down the path of cosmopolitan gentry liberalism for the foreseeable future, leading to even greater levels of blue hyper-concentration around metropolitan areas. The increasing power of the president and the judges and administrative officers she appoints also encourage this trend. If Democrats can increasingly sideline the Congress, then winning the White House becomes a higher priority than reaching 218 in the lower house. And in presidential elections, it’s not necessarily harmful to run up huge majorities in urban centers at the expense of rural or suburban districts: For the purposes of the Electoral College, a vote in Cincinnati counts just as much as a vote in Middletown.

Francis Fukuyama concluded his searching examination of political sclerosis in America noting dryly, “We have a problem.” And we do indeed. After 2016, many in Hillary Clinton’s Democratic Party will likely identify the Constitution’s counter-majoritarian institutions as the root of that problem, and seek to double down on their agenda and impose it over the will of an uncooperative House. The worry is that the decay runs far deeper than that, and that efforts to circumvent constitutional commands could make things far, far worse.
 

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
WaPo just published an article on the growing number of non-terminal mentally ill people that are being euthanized in Belgium and the Netherlands. Coming soon to a state near you!
 

phgreek

New member
Messages
6,956
Reaction score
433
WaPo just published an article on the growing number of non-terminal mentally ill people that are being euthanized in Belgium and the Netherlands. Coming soon to a state near you!

Admittedly, I don't even have a cursory understanding of the laws in Belgium. I do believe we have a collision between such acts and how our legal system appears extremely sensitive to mental capacity (as long as you are out of the birth canal). I mean the going in position for patients with mental challenges is, you can't sign your own death warrant, as that in itself is evidence of diminished capacity. If you take a statistical approach...how many people kill themselves. That number is clearly an outlier from the vast majority of the population, and is deviant (not the judgmental connotation) behavior, which puts us well on the way to a mental diagnosis, and diminished capacity. By our rule of law...I see BIG issues, and a ton of push back.
 
Last edited:

Whiskeyjack

Mittens Margaritas Ante Porcos
Staff member
Messages
20,894
Reaction score
8,126
Here's a 1994 article written by Edward Lutrak in the London Review of Books titled "Why Fascism is the Wave of the Future":

That capitalism unobstructed by public regulations, cartels, monopolies, oligopolies, effective trade unions, cultural inhibitions or kinship obligations is the ultimate engine of economic growth is an old-hat truth now disputed only by a few cryogenically-preserved Gosplan enthusiasts and a fair number of poorly-paid Anglo-Saxon academics. That the capitalist engine achieves growth as well as it does because its relentless competition destroys old structures and methods, thus allowing more efficient structures and methods to rise in their place, is the most famous bit of Schumpeteriana, even better-known than the amorous escapades of the former University of Czernowitz professor. And, finally, that structural change can inflict more disruption on working lives, firms, entire industries and their localities than individuals can absorb, or the connective tissue of friendships, families, clans, elective groupings, neighbourhoods, villages, towns, cities or even nations can withstand, is another old-hat truth more easily recognised than Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft can be spelled.

What is new-hat about the present situation is only a matter of degree, a mere acceleration in the pace of the structural changes that accompany economic growth, whatever its rate. But that, as it turns out, is quite enough to make all the difference in the world. Structural change, with all its personal upheavals and social disruptions, is now quite rapid even when there is zero growth, becoming that much faster when economies do grow. The engine turns, grinding lives and grinding down established human relationships, even when the car is stopped; and reaches Ferrari-like rpms at the most modest steamroller speeds.

One obvious cause of the increased destructiveness of the capitalist process is the worldwide retreat of public ownership, central planning, administrative direction and regulatory control, with all their rigidities inimical to innovation, structural change, economic growth, individual dislocation and social disruption alike. From Argentina to Zambia, with the entire Communist world in between, state ownership of economic enterprises was once accepted as the guarantor of the public interest: it is now seen as the guarantee of bureaucratic idleness, technical stagnation and outright thievery. Central planning, once honoured as the arithmetic highway to assured prosperity, is now known to be impossible simply because no group of mere humans can predetermine next year’s demand for every one of hundreds of different polymers, not to mention two to three million other items, from tower cranes to toothpicks. Administrative direction, once gloriously successful in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, at least helpful in France, a famous failure in George Brown’s Britain, and ineffective or corrupt, or ineffective and corrupt, almost everywhere else, is now being abandoned (slowly) even in Japan, having been abandoned long ago almost everywhere else.

As for regulatory controls, they do not cease to increase in number, because even if steam locomotives need no longer be prevented by speed limits from causing cows to abort, many rather more recent technical novelties entail regulation, and some positively demand it – for example, to allocate frequencies. Other reasons for regulation are legion, but commercial (e.g. airline) as opposed to health and safety and environmental regulation has definitely retreated, and continues to do so. With that, efficiency increases, once-secure enterprises face the perils of the market, and employees once equally secure no longer are so.

Another partly related and equally obvious cause of accelerated structural change is the much-celebrated unification of the puddles, ponds, lakes and seas of village, provincial, regional and national economies into a single global economic ocean, and thus the increasing exposure of those same puddles, ponds, lakes and seas to the tidal waves of change in the global economic ocean, owing to the removal of import barriers, capital-export prohibitions, investment controls and licensing restrictions on the sale of transnational services; the advent and rapid geographic spread of reliable, cheap and instant telecommunications that ease the formation of new commercial relationships both materially and psychologically; the diminishing significance of transport costs due to the waning material content of commerce, as well as to the cheapening of transport with the improvement of air services, harbours and roads – notably rural roads in Asia and Latin America if not Africa; the diffusion of up-to-date technologies for the production of export goods or components, even within otherwise backward local economies; and the hammering-down of once diverse consumer preferences into uniformity by transnational mass-media imagery and advertising.

The overall effect of ‘globalisation’ is that any production anywhere, can expand enormously, far beyond the limits of the domestic market, insofar as it is competitive – and of course that any production anywhere, and the related employment, can be displaced at any time by cheaper production from someplace else in the world. Life in the global economy is full of exciting surprises – and catastrophic downfalls.

Still another cause of disproportionately rapid structural change is the rather sudden arrival of the long-awaited, very long-delayed, big increases in administrative and clerical efficiency that machines for electronic computation, data storage, reproduction and internal communication were supposed to ensure long ago. Partly because with generational change even senior managers can now themselves work those machines if they want to, thereby allowing them to understand their uses, abuses and non-uses; partly because more junior managers are increasingly compelled to use those machines in place of clerical help and clerical companionship; and partly because computer networks allow managers at the next level up literally to oversee, right on their own screens, the work that their underlings are doing or not doing, thereby giving it the same transparency as assembly-line work, with the same immediate visibility of inefficient procedures, inefficient habits and inefficient employees – for all these reasons the long-awaited, long-delayed increase in the efficiency of office-work has finally arrived, exposing hitherto more secure white-collar workers to the work-place dislocations, mass firings or at least diminishing employment prospects that have long been the lot of blue-collar industrial workers in mature economies.

At the present time, for example, even though the US economy is in full recovery, white-collar job reductions by the thousand are being announced by one famous corporation after another. They call it ‘restructuring’ or, more fancifully, ‘re-engineering the corporation’, and duly decorate the proceedings with the most recently fashionable management-consultant verbiage, those catchy, suggestive yet profoundly shallow slogans coined by the authors of the latest business-book bestsellers, who proclaim them expensively and with evangelical insistence on the corporate lecture circuit, with the result that they are then repeated with great solemnity to audiences of deferential, bewildered employees in corporate briefings, ‘workshops’ and ‘retreats’. But the real economies that Wall Street anticipates by bidding up the shares – thereby hugely rewarding mass-firing top executives who have stock options – come not from the background music of the management-consultant verbiage but rather from the displacement of telephone-answering secretaries by voice-mail systems, the displacement of letter-writing secretaries by computer word-processing and faxboards, the displacement of filing secretaries by electronic memories, and the consequent displacement of clerical supervisors; as well as from the displacement of junior administrators by automated paperflow processing and the consequent displacement of their administrative supervisors; as well as from the displacement of all the middle managers who are no longer needed to supervise the doings and undoings of both clerical and administrative employees. That is why corporations whose sales are increasing are nevertheless not adding white-collar positions; corporations whose sales are level are eliminating some white-collar positions; and corporations in decline are eliminating very many – tens of thousands in the case of the sick giants IBM and GM.

Economists have long deplored the disappointing productivity gains of the administrative superstructure in advanced economies, in spite of the proliferation of office electronics. This was numerically irritating to the fraternity, because the goods-producing sector, whose productivity did keep increasing very nicely, has long been of diminishing significance, so that the productivity lag of administrative activities was lowering the numbers for the economy as a whole. Those particular economists need fret no longer: office-work productivity is finally increasing at a fast pace, allowing employers to rid themselves of employees just as fast.

There may be additional explanations for the acceleration of structural economic change. What counts, however, is the result: Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction’ – the displacement of old skills, trades and entire industries with their dependent localities, by more efficient new skills, trades and entire industries – is now apt to span years, often very few years, rather than generations. And that is quite enough to make the colossal difference aforementioned. The same rate of structural change that favours global prosperity, that benefits many nations and regions, and that many other nations and regions can at least cope with, now brutally exceeds the adaptive limits of individuals, families and communities. When the sons and daughters of US steelworkers, British miners or German welders must become software-writers, teachers, lawyers or for that matter shop attendants, because the respective paternal industries offer less and less employment, few of them have reason to complain. But when the same mechanisms of change work so fast that steelworkers, coalminers or welders must themselves abandon lifetime proclivities, self-images and workplace companions to acquire demanding new skills – on penalty of chronic unemployment or unskilled low-wage labour – failure and frustration are the likely results. To be sure, nothing could be more old-hat than to worry about the travails of steelworkers, miners or welders, obsolete leftovers of the hopelessly passé white/male industrial working class. So the big news is the dislocation of white-collar employment as well.

I have no statistics that measure the decline in security of employment. But statistics do show very clearly the impact of a weakening demand for white-collar labour in the decline of white-collar earnings. Back in the early Eighties, when trade-union officials and incurable proletariophiliacs were bitterly complaining that American workers were being extruded from well-paid industrial employment into minimum-wage ‘hamburger-flipping’ jobs, the lusty defenders of the infallibility of free-market economics silenced them in Wall Street Journal editorials by pointing to the rapid increase in ‘money-flipping’ jobs in banking, insurance and financial services, as well as in then-booming real-estate offices. That is where the debate ended – prematurely. By the end of 1992 more than 6.8 million Americans were duly employed in the financial sector (banking, insurance, finance and real-estate offices). One might assume, as the Wall Street Journal certainly presumed, that these people were a well-paid lot: but the average earnings of the 4.9 million non-supervisory employees among them were only $10.14 per hour, as compared to $10.98 for production workers in manufacturing. The 1.1 million clerks, tellers and other rank-and-file employees of banks earned much less than the sector’s average at $8.19 per hour, while 48,500 of their counterparts in stock and commodity brokerages – at the very heart of ‘money-flipping’ – duly earned much more at $13.53 per hour. Still, if any disemployed industrial workers did equip themselves with the obligatory broad red suspenders to seek their fortunes on Wall Street, they would have found the rewards surprisingly modest.

At a time when it was forever being explained that it was silly to worry about the decline of manufacturing jobs in the age of ‘services’, the much larger story is that service employees throughout the US economy are actually paid much less than their counterparts still holding industrial jobs. Moreover the average hourly earnings of service employees have been going down for years in real dollars net of inflation. In the entire retail trade, for example, from department stores to street-corner news-stands, the 17.7 million ‘non-supervisory’ employees earned an average of $6.88 per hour in November 1990. In fact, their hourly average went down from a peak of $6.20 in 1978 to $5.04 in 1990 in constant 1982 dollars. To be sure, the retail trade is full of teenagers still in school who work only on weekends and holidays, and married women who work only part-time. That can he expected to depress earnings, and it does. Besides, many retail employees get commissions that are not reported to the collectors of labour statistics. But neither part-timers with modest demands nor commissions are to be found in transportation and public utilities (including railroads, local bus services, mass transit, trucking, courier services, river barges, airlines, telephone companies etc). Nevertheless, the 4.9 million non-supervisory employees in that entire sector had average hourly earnings of $13.07 in November 1990 – substantially more, $2.09 more as it happens, than their counterparts in manufacturing, but still substantially less than those same employees had earned in the Seventies in real money. In fact their earnings peaked in 1978 at $11.18 per hour in constant 1982 dollars – as opposed to $9.58 at the end of 1990 in those same dollars.

In the varied mass of service employees as a whole, there are predictable highs, e.g. the 135,400 non-supervisors in film-making who earned $18.87 per hour, and the rank-and file employees of computer and data-processing services at $15.29 per hour, who numbered only 87,700 in 1972, but reached the impressive total of 637,700 by the end of 1990. The lows are just as predictable. The 1.3 million in hotel/motel non-supervisory jobs were paid only $7.14 per hour on average – though quite a few also receive tips, no doubt. But nobody tips the 436,900 line employees of detective, armoured-car and security agencies who earned only $6.35 per hour on average. From advertising to zoo-keeping many service jobs paid better than that, of course, but the average earnings of all non-farm, non-government employees were less, at $10.17 per hour, than those of manufacturing workers at $10.98 – so the brave new service economy obviously pays less than old-fashioned industry. Even that is only half the story, because the higher volatility of services makes those jobs less and less secure. In other words, the relative impoverishment of those working lives is accompanied by even more dislocation.

Even bigger news is the dislocation of managerial lives. That is the latest trend in the always progressive United States – and it is most definitely a structural trend, rather than merely cyclical. Now that the dull-safe ‘satisficing’ corporation (moderate dividends, moderate salaries, steady, slow growth) is almost extinct, top managers as a class earn very much more than before, rank-and-file managers who can keep their jobs earn rather less, and it is very difficult for those managers who are forced out to find any comparable jobs elsewhere. Few are destined to grace the pages of business journals as entrepreneurial wonders, not born but made by unemployment. Some adjust undramatically if painfully, by accepting whatever middle-class jobs they can get, normally with reduced pay. Others are much worse off. The 50-55 year old male, white, college-educated former exemplar of the American Dream, still perhaps living in his lavishly-equipped suburban house, with two or three cars in the driveway, one or two children in $20,000 per annum higher education (tuition, board and lodging – all extras are extra) and an ex-job ‘re-engineered’ out of existence, who now exists on savings, second and third mortgages and scant earnings as a self-described ‘consultant’, has become a familiar figure in the contemporary United States. They still send out résumés by the dozen. They still ‘network’ (i.e. beg for jobs from whomever they know). They still put on their business suits to commute to ‘business’ lunches with the genuine article or to visit employment agencies, but at a time when more than 10 per cent of the Harvard graduates of the class of 1958 are unemployed, lesser souls in the same position have little to hope for.

Just in case the sentimental anecdotage is unpersuasive, or seems absurdly disproportionate as compared to the plight of, say, indebted Indian peasants, there are now statistics that quantify the downward slide of the entire population from which the class of middle managers is drawn. The median earnings of all males in the 45-54 age bracket with four years of higher education – some two million Americans, all but 150,000 of them white – actually peaked in 1972 at some $55,000 in 1992 dollars; they stagnated through three downward economic cycles until 1989, before sharply declining to $41,898 by 1992. From other evidence we know that those numbers average out two phenomena that are equally unprecedented in the American experience: in that same population, the combined total income of the top 1 per cent of all earners increased sensationally, and the combined total of the bottom 80 per cent declined sharply. Again, that implies in one way or another a more-than-proportionate quantum of dislocation. Needless to say, individual working lives cannot be dislocated without damaging families, elective affiliations and communities – the entire moss of human relations which can only grow over the stones of economic stability. Finally, it is entirely certain that what has already happened in the United States is happening or will happen in every other advanced economy, because all of them are exposed to the same forces.

In this situation, what does the moderate Right – mainstream US Republicans, British Tories and all their counterparts elsewhere – have to offer? Only more free trade and globalisation, more deregulation and structural change, thus more dislocation of lives and social relations. It is only mildly amusing that nowadays the standard Republican/Tory after-dinner speech is a two-part affair, in which part one celebrates the virtues of unimpeded competition and dynamic structural change, while part two mourns the decline of the family and community ‘values’ that were eroded precisely by the forces commended in part one. Thus at the present time the core of Republican/Tory beliefs is a perfect non-sequitur. And what does the moderate Left have to offer? Only more redistribution, more public assistance, and particularist concern for particular groups that can claim victim status, from the sublime peak of elderly, handicapped, black lesbians down to the merely poor.

Thus neither the moderate Right nor the moderate Left even recognises, let alone offers any solution for, the central problem of our days: the completely unprecedented personal economic insecurity of working people, from industrial workers and white-collar clerks to medium-high managers. None of them are poor and they therefore cannot benefit from the more generous welfare payments that the moderate Left is inclined to offer. Nor are they particularly envious of the rich, and they therefore tend to be uninterested in redistribution. Few of them are actually unemployed, and they are therefore unmoved by Republican/Tory promises of more growth and more jobs through the magic of the unfettered market: what they want is security in the jobs they already have – i.e. precisely what unfettered markets threaten.

A vast political space is thus left vacant by the Republican/Tory non-sequitur, on the one hand, and moderate Left particularism and assistentialism, on the other. That was the space briefly occupied in the USA by the 1992 election-year caprices of Ross Perot, and which Zhirinovsky’s bizarre excesses are now occupying in the peculiar conditions of Russia, where personal economic insecurity is the only problem that counts for most people (former professors of Marxism-Leninism residing in Latvia who have simultaneously lost their jobs, professions and nationalities may he rare, but most Russians still working now face at least the imminent loss of their jobs). And that is the space that remains wide open for a product-improved Fascist party, dedicated to the enhancement of the personal economic security of the broad masses of (mainly) white-collar working people. Such a party could even be as free of racism as Mussolini’s original was until the alliance with Hitler, because its real stock in trade would be corporativist restraints on corporate Darwinism, and delaying if not blocking barriers against globalisation. It is not necessary to know how to spell Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft to recognise the Fascist predisposition engendered by today’s turbocharged capitalism.

More relevant today than when it was published over 22 years ago. For both conservatives and Progressives, if the direction of our politics concerns you, one ought to carefully consider withdrawing support for liberalism entirely. Things are only going to get worse.
 
Last edited:

greyhammer90

the drunk piano player
Messages
16,825
Reaction score
16,089
Here's a 1994 article written by Edward Lutrak in the London Review of Books titled "Why Fascism is the Wave of the Future":



More relevant today than when it was published over 22 years ago. For both conservatives and Progressives, if the direction of our politics concerns you, one ought to carefully consider withdrawing support for liberalism entirely. Things are only going to get worse.

I'm slow, can you please explain in a concrete way, what the laws and policies of a post liberal society would be? I try to read some of the things about liberalism with a capital L that you post but they all tend to discuss from a theoretical/moralist focused perspective and frankly my eyes glaze over.

Writing prompt to Whiskey for some vbucks: You get to rewrite America without Democrats or Republicans. We are in a post liberal society, what does that look like? What are the laws? What are the hot button issues? What are the likely social/political parties (if there are such things)? Go!
 
Top