Politics

Politics

  • Obama

    Votes: 5 1.4%
  • Romney

    Votes: 172 48.7%
  • Other

    Votes: 46 13.0%
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    Votes: 130 36.8%

  • Total voters
    353

Irish YJ

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Another voter fraud case, this one involving the en vogue "ballot harvesting". It very well may have decided a Congressional election:

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/20/us/north-carolina-voter-fraud.html

I guess they want to be like Cali, where dems made ballot harvesting legal.... there they actually have dreamers running around helping to turn out the vote!!

https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/ballot-harvesting-midterm-elections/

while the LA Times didn't want to say harvesting had an impact, they called it disturbing.

https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-ballot-harvesting-20181207-story.html

wonder how much the NY Times had to say about Cali.
 

Whiskeyjack

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Vermeule just published an article in American Affairs titled "Liberalism and the Invisible Hand":

Liberalism as a concrete sociopolitical order rests upon a series of invisible hand systems: free competition in explicit economic markets, free competition in the marketplace of ideas, institutional competition among branches of government, and so on. Yet liberal faith in these systems far outruns any of the social-scientific mechanisms or evidence adduced to support them. This is no happenstance, but a consequence of systematic problems that arise when liberal theory dispenses with the invisible hand of Providence in favor of secular mechanisms. First, a dilemma of verification afflicts invisible hand systems, in virtue of their indirect structure.1 By the terms of their creation, it is not generally possible to verify whether they are performing as promised. Second, there are self-undermining mechanisms within liberalism itself that threaten to prevent its invisible hand systems from fully realizing their promise. The main mechanisms are the depletion of preliberal social capital and public choice problems, both of which cause the agents posited by liberalism to act in ways that subvert the invisible hand processes themselves.

Given this structural propensity toward imperfect realization of liberal invisible hand systems, liberalism stands in an unhappy, and chronically unstable, halfway posture, caught between a preliberal faith in the invisible hand of Providence and self-destructive appreciation of its own contingency. Having dispensed with the superintending design of Providence in favor of contingent, indirect mechanisms, liberalism is astonished to find that there is no guiding hand to ensure the fulfillment of its own faith. The predictable reaction is liberal fideism, which insists ever more stridently on the truth of liberalism’s unverifiable and potentially self-defeating claims.

Liberalism

My main interest is in liberalism as an operating sociopolitical regime built around invisible hand systems, not in liberalism as theory. But the two are (partially) connected, and so a few preliminary words are necessary. Liberalism as theory I take to be a clan of doctrines, of which theological, political, and economic liberalism are the main branches. All these are descended more or less directly from the fateful thought that the autonomy of the individual, of the individual’s reason and desires, is of paramount importance.

In a widespread but cartoonish depiction of liberalism, especially of political liberalism, one hears people say that liberalism eschews any theory of the good in favor of a theory or theories of the right. Professional political theory, however, has long since relaxed this constraint, moving into rather interminable debates over “perfectionist” and “anti-perfectionist” liberalism. In the strands of liberalism relevant for my purposes, moreover, it is not true that liberalism even advertises itself as eschewing any concern for the good for human beings. What is true is that liberalism aims to produce human goods indirectly, through and by means of the operation of freely chosen individual actions.2 In this way, liberalism hopes to square its master commitment to autonomy, and its correlative horror of direction by authority, with concern for human goods. Those goods, according to liberal doctrine, will not be directly secured in virtue of authoritative commands, in virtue of ordinances of reason for the common good promulgated by one in authority,3 but instead will emerge indirectly, at the systemic level, out of the freely chosen acts of individuals themselves.

The invisible hand is thus no mere tool, one among others in the toolkit of liberal theory. The shift to an indirect, emergent structure is an indispensable trick that allows liberalism to square the provision of human goods with its radical horror of authoritative direction, on the one hand, and obedience on the other. Its target or antonym exists on two levels. On one level, human positive law and its rational authoritative ordinances directed towards the common good; on a higher level, the Providence of God, which in the classical conception is inherently directive, purposive, and authoritative, for Providence is the very “type of things ordered towards an end.”4

This structural account of the good in liberalism has two critical features for present purposes. First, the goods perceived by liberalism are individual goods, which may become aggregated at the social level but never become truly common. I will not discuss that important set of issues here. Second—this will be my focus—liberalism characteristically seeks to attain these individual goods indirectly, so that they arise through the decentralized action of individuals in spontaneous orders. Goods should in this way emerge at the system level—whether in economic, political, or legal systems—as “the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design.”5 The theologian Henri Grenier puts this succinctly in his outstanding treatment of liberalism:

The advocates of Liberalism imagine that the liberty of man living in society tends to what is best. Hence they hold that the end of civil society is the protection of private rights, from which peace and harmony result. This is the opinion of Quesnay and Adam Smith.6

The end of liberalism is not the protection of private rights, full stop. Rather, the structure of the claim is that liberty itself tends to produce the good indirectly; thus the goal of civil society is to protect private rights so that various goods (peace and harmony) may result from them.

The structure of decentralized individual interactions emerges clearly in Grenier’s account of economic liberalism, the only branch of liberalism he discusses at length. Under this doctrine (1) “private utility” is the “aim of economic life,” because (2) “it is the individual who can best seek, know and promote his own interests or utility,” and (3) “the first law of economics is free competition, i.e., the free play of economic individualities seeking, by any lawful means, the greatest advantages.”7 Each of these points is important. The first says that the liberal invisible hand, although anticipated to produce good(s), is directed at private individual goods (or an aggregate of such goods) rather than a genuinely common good. The second makes clear the connection between economic liberalism and the celebration of private individual judgment, initially expressed in theological liberalism.8 Friedrich von Hayek would later expand this point about the superiority of widely distributed private information into an archetypally liberal account of markets. Carl Schmitt expanded it into a liberal account of parliamentary debate (one that, needless to say, he did not share). The third point makes explicit that the main mechanism for producing these goods is self-interested competition in a decentralized structure, such as a marketplace, a marketplace of ideas, a constitutional system of “checks and balances,” and so forth.

The Invisible Hand: Analytics

The “invisible hand” as a phrase, as a shorthand for this characteristically indirect approach to the good, is of course associated with Adam Smith. Smith uses it first in a treatise on astronomy in an explicitly theistic way, then in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, and finally in The Wealth of Nations.9 The phrase’s background, however, is an enormously rich tradition of providentialist theorizing about politics and society that anticipates many of the ideas and problems of liberal theory.10 It even anticipates some of liberalism’s conclusions. Consider, for example, that Theodoret of Cyrus argued in the mid-fifth century AD that all are better off with a society featuring a division of labor, differences of wealth, and a division into rulers and ruled than they would be in an unspecialized and egalitarian society.11 Theodoret, of course, justifies his conclusions on entirely different grounds than liberal theorists would over a millennium later. For him, the social benefit represents a regulation instituted by divine Providence for the benefit of mankind, rather than a (solely) mechanical system-level consequence of decentralized self-interested interaction. The history of liberalism’s adaptation of the invisible hand, then, is a history of putative secularization, in which the superintending design of Providence is replaced by mechanisms in which system-level goods emerge without anyone necessarily intending that they do so.12 Later I will question the extent to which this arc is best described as “secularization” at all. In Smith, the secularization process is barely even underway.13

It is probably fruitless—although many have tried—to give necessary and sufficient analytic conditions for a cogent invisible hand account. As with liberalism, the idea is a classic family-resemblance complex, in which there is a kind of unity-in-variety even if there is no unique set of traits shared by all the members of the complex. For my purposes, however, the key hallmarks or notes of liberalism’s invisible hand systems are these: (1) individual agents engage in decentralized interactions, often but not necessarily competitive, such that (2) “as a result of human action, not of human design” (3) some system-level good or goods emerges. Condition (2) implies that the emergence of the system-level good(s) need not be part of the intentions of any of the individual agents, who may be pursuing strictly self-interested aims.14 Condition (3), on the other hand, does not necessarily imply that the goods that emerge are the same self-interested goods for which individuals were aiming.15

Liberalism does not promise that participants in its systems will attain the desires of their hearts, only that the quest for individual goods will cause aggregate—but not genuinely common—goods to emerge. Consider the seller in a perfectly competitive market, whose actions contribute to a system-level welfare maximum even though the seller’s own prices are driven relentlessly down to equal marginal costs. I will return to this point later. Furthermore, condition (3) is open-ended and agnostic about the nature of the relevant goods, which vary across different invisible hand stories. Welfare (preference satisfaction), truth or at least information, and political liberty have all been claimed to arise from invisible hand processes, as I will mention shortly.

Note, finally, that hybrid cases are possible. Condition (2) refers only to the agents within the invisible hand interaction, not necessarily to any agents who may have brought about the interaction. The emergent invisible hand system may itself be set up deliberately, as a result of human action and human design. Markets may be designed, as when corporations deliberately set up internal prediction or information markets to aggregate dispersed information held among their employees. Markets may also be imposed by coercion, as Hayek notoriously desired in the case of Chile.16 The point that markets may be designed or imposed, yet function in an invisible hand way, is frequently missed by those who assume that spontaneously functioning orders must emerge spontaneously.17 Even the hybrid cases are consistent with (what I have suggested is) liberalism’s horror of authoritative direction and obedience, because the designer of the system stops short of using his own substantive judgment about the appropriate goods for the agents, instead leaving them to autonomous action within the designed system. Nonetheless, in what follows, I will put aside the hybrid cases for simplicity.

The Invisible Hand: Examples

Let me now turn to some examples. In the spirit of condition (3), I will begin by lumping rather than splitting, listing a large number of cases that are intuitively in the neighborhood, as it were. I mean to indicate only how the accounts go, but certainly not to affirm their truth. My whole claim will be that structural problems ensure that the accounts far outrun any mechanisms and evidence that can be adduced in their favor, and rest essentially on a fideistic will to believe.

Liberalism in general. Before moving to particular liberal systems, it is important to grasp the striking unity of liberal thought across its different branches. Carl Schmitt argued that the idea of a “balance of opposing forces” with beneficial system-level results—whether by the interaction and competition of market actors, states, estates, or branches of government—“dominated European thought since the 16th century.”18 Schmitt directly linked this obsession to liberalism, arguing that invisible hand mechanisms of balance, competition, and emergent system-level goods were at the heart of the liberal project. The main three-way analogy or parallelism in liberal thought—something like the characteristic reflex of liberalism—becomes visible when we compare welfare-production in economic liberalism, truth-production in the marketplace of ideas, and liberty-production in the constitutional balance of powers. Schmitt writes:

It is essential that liberalism be understood as a consistent, comprehensive metaphysical system. Normally one only discusses the economic line of reasoning that social harmony and the maximization of wealth follow from the free economic competition of individuals, from freedom of contract, freedom of trade, free enterprise. But all this is only an application of a general liberal principle. It is exactly the same: That the truth can be found through an unrestrained clash of opinion and that competition will produce harmony. . . . The belief in public opinion is bound to a second, more organizational conception: the division or balance of different state activities and institutions. Here too the idea of competition appears, a competition from which the truth will emerge.19

This essential unity of liberalism as a concrete sociopolitical order arises, I suggest, because the invisible hand is a device that allows liberalism to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable—to square the purposive pursuit of social aims, some good or aggregate of goods, with liberalism’s horror of authoritative direction. Jacob Viner correctly observed that “there is no logical conflict between a socially oriented teleology and individualism if the individual either has conscious social ends or by providential design serves such ends without having adopted them as his own ultimate objective.”20 Having made both obedience to the divine and public-spiritedness into matters of private choice, however, liberalism must then find arrangements for pursuing social aims that do not constrain the beliefs or motivations of autonomous individuals in those ways, arrangements that are robust to self-interested individual behavior and, by a kind of substitute miracle, transform those selfish motivations into social goods.

Of course the invisible hand is not the only strategy liberal theory uses to effect this reconciliation. Another vast set of problems involves the attempt to work out the tension introduced by positing that some subjection to authority can itself be freely chosen, self-imposed by the liberal subject, which then yields liberal theories of representation. But the existence of these other strategies does not mean that the invisible hand is a dispensable, contingent tool for liberalism. It promises to reconcile a core tension at the heart of the liberal project.

Explicit markets. “Free” markets are the paradigmatic case for the invisible hand. I will take this to be so familiar that little time needs to be spent on it. Suffice it to say that there are here two variants: the neoclassical general equilibrium model in which markets are taken to maximize aggregate preference satisfaction, and the Hayekian version in which markets are taken to produce coordinating information. In the neoclassical version, all available trades are consummated in perfectly competitive markets, ensuring both allocative and productive efficiency. The economy thereby reaches one or another Pareto-optimal state (which one depends upon initial conditions), such that any reallocation would make at least one person worse off. Nothing in this account addresses the distributive effects of the market; I will return to this point later.

In Hayek’s variant, by contrast, the main benefit of market competition is informational efficiency, which coordinates social plans. The price system impounds widely distributed, tacitly held information about the real cost of resources. In this way the market coordinates individual expectations better than any centralized planner could possibly achieve.21 Competition serves not only as a mechanism for preference satisfaction, but as an epistemic “discovery procedure”22 that reveals objective information about the world, including the plans and expectations of others.

The marketplace of ideas. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. famously wrote that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”23 Here the market is strictly metaphorical, and other metaphors flow freely in its wake, such as the “clash of opinions.” Whatever the literary situation, however, the idea is that truth will emerge from the decentralized interaction of many individuals freely expressing competing ideas. In this way truth, acknowledged to be desirable, is not pursued directly by authorities concerned with the common good. Rather it is taken to arise indirectly out of structured interactions.

The domain of this marketplace of ideas may be either throughout an ill-defined, society-wide sphere of public discourse, or more specifically within a constitutional parliament. Carl Schmitt, in a remarkable parallel to Hayek’s account of widely distributed private information in economic markets, argued that the essence of liberal parliamentarism lay in “the theory of a balance of opposing forces from which truth will emerge automatically as an equilibrium” through open discussion in Parliament, where “particles of reason that are strewn unequally among human beings gather themselves and bring public power under their control.”24

Whatever the precise domain of its application, this invisible hand account of free speech comes in both conceptual and empirical versions.25 In the conceptual version, truth is defined as whatever emerges from a suitably open process of discussion. In the empirical version, usually associated with John Stuart Mill, the claim is that truth tends to emerge on average and in the long run from a suitably open process of discussion. As we will see later, however, the problem with the former is that it is ultimately tautological, while the problem with the latter is simply that there is no particular reason to think it is true.

Checks and balances—international and constitutional. We have seen that Schmitt, in his famous treatise on constitutional theory, declared that “the idea of a counterpoise, of a ‘balance,’ of opposing forces has dominated European thinking since the sixteenth century.”26 One major strand of this, which I will mention but otherwise ignore, involves the “balance of power” as a model in international relations, in which the goods of peace and order in the international sphere are secured indirectly, in equilibrium, by the mutual checking of sovereign powers. Let me focus instead on the domestic analogue, the balance of constitutional powers. For thinkers as diverse as Montesquieu,27 Joseph de Maistre,28 and Schmitt, the crucial example was the (putative) equilibrium of the English unwritten or uncodified constitutional order. As Schmitt put it,

Of special significance for the ideal constructions of the English constitution is an idea of the tripartite balance and of the “equilibrium of powers,” out of which the free government results: king, upper house and lower house; between king and Parliament (specifically, upper house and lower house taken together), between legislature and executive, between the prerogatives of the king and the freedom of the people. All these should be “balanced.”29

The idea of a liberty-protecting equilibrium among King, Lords, and Commons30 was adapted by early modern and Enlightenment theorists, such as Montesquieu, to become a balance among institutions wielding constitutional powers—legislative, executive, and judicial.31

The framers of the American Constitution were in general heavily influenced both by Montesquieu and by the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, including Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, and theorized the invisible hand as a model for the constitutional arrangements of 1787.32 In Madison’s scheme, one major safeguard—complementing the filtering and selection of elevated characters, in and because of an extended Republic—was an invisible hand system of checks and balances, in which competition among institutions (as “ambition counteracts ambition”)33 prevents any one of them from attaining a monopoly of power, thereby protecting liberty.

Religious pluralism. Madison was also heavily influenced by Smith’s invisible hand account of religious pluralism, in which the absence of any established church meant that a variety of sects would have to compete for adherents. In Smith’s view, this competition would have the beneficial consequence that individual sects would have to moderate and soften their views, especially by acceding to a regime of mutual toleration. From the standpoint of the individual sects, each of which desires a privileged position, this need not at all be a benefit, but Smith believed that individuals generally would benefit from the resulting consolidation of the liberal order. As in explicit markets, the invisible hand system of religious pluralism would produce aggregate goods even though, or because, it constrained and defeated the individual interests of the participants.34

The extended republic and federalism. Finally, in a straightforward extension of Smith’s view of religious pluralism, Madison argued that the extended republic, built around a federal system, would produce a beneficial and mutual jarring of factions, and prevent any one of them from assembling a majority coalition, especially under conditions in which “communication is always checked by distrust.”35

The adversary system. By analogy to free speech, many have argued that an adversarial trial system—as opposed to an inquisitorial one—generates a kind of competition to produce biased information by both sides, resulting, as if by an invisible hand, in more information overall for the tribunal—a result which neither party intends as such. James Fitzjames Stephen, the barrister and judge, argued that while the inquisitorial system of criminal procedure is “beyond all question the true one,” an attainable second-best is

to consider the trial mainly as a litigation, and to allow each party to say all that can be said in support of their own view; just as the best means of arriving at the truth in respect of any controverted matter of opinion might be, to allow those who maintained opposite views to discuss the matter freely and in public. 36

The implicit claim here is that, whereas an inquisitorial system posits a magistrate who aims directly and intentionally at collecting all relevant information, an indirect, competitive, and decentralized system of adversarial production of information will yield more information overall.

The common law. There exists a whole sub-complex of liberal accounts in which the common law, or common-law judging, represents a decentralized process that yields larger social benefits, as if by an invisible hand. I will mention only one version,37 the so-called Cardozo Theorem38—a famous apothegm from Justice Benjamin Cardozo—from his book on common-law reasoning:

The eccentricities of judges balance one another. One judge looks at problems from the point of view of history, another from that of philosophy, another from that of social utility, one is a formalist, another a latitudinarian, one is timorous of change, another dissatisfied with the present; out of the attrition of diverse minds there is beaten something which has a constancy and uniformity and average value greater than its component elements.39

The interaction among judges deciding cases over time leads, without any individual judge necessarily intending it, to a body of law with socially beneficial properties.40

Liberal and Nonliberal Justifications

We have to be clear that an invisible hand account is not, by itself, necessarily a liberal account. There is a crucial ambiguity in Ferguson’s formulation “the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design.” The latter clause is consistent with either of two entirely distinct possibilities: that the emergent system-level good arises as a result of no one’s design, through some discernible but nonintentional mechanism that causes it to arise; or that it arises as a result of nonhuman design, not through human intentions but still through intentions—that is to say, through the divine design for which Providence is a shorthand.

This distinction points to two entirely different accounts of how an invisible hand account might work, which I will call the providential account and a liberal or mechanistic account. Accordingly there can be liberal and nonliberal versions of the invisible hand, just as, in many other areas, there can be liberal and nonliberal justifications for seemingly similar political and moral concepts.41 Architecturally similar structures may rest upon very different foundations—in one case a living, providentialist foundation, in another a mechanistic, strictly individualistic and liberal one.

For an example of the contrast, recall the “Cardozo Theorem” mentioned above, in which the biases (Cardozo’s “eccentricities”) of judges making decisions over time somehow yield a body of common-law precedent that is superior to any of the decisions taken individually, in a way that produces a body of law that is socially desirable overall. For this liberal invisible hand account to succeed, there must be some mechanism by which these biases compound or offset one another. The alternative, of course, is simply that decisionmaking according to the biases of successive judges yields an increasingly incoherent, disjointed, politicized body of law. Cardozo was filled with faith that such a result could be avoided, yet offered no real mechanism to explain his faith.

By way of comparison, Cardinal John Henry Newman offered two distinct accounts of invisible hand processes in the life of the Catholic Church, structurally similar to Cardozo’s Theorem. One was an account of the emergent moderation and balance produced by the biases of successive ecumenical councils in the history of the Church:

It would seem as if the Church moved on to the perfect truth by various successive declarations, alternately in contrary directions, and thus perfecting, completing, supplying each other. Let us have a little faith in her, I say. Pius is not the last of the Popes—the fourth Council modified the third, the fifth the fourth.42

In a second account, Newman explicitly compared the liberal account of checks and balances to the endless contest between “authority” and “private judgment” in the life of the Church:

As in a civil polity the State exists and endures by means of the rivalry and collision, the encroachments and defeats of its constituent parts, so in like manner Catholic Christendom is no simple exhibition of religious absolutism, but it presents a continuous picture of Authority and Private Judgment alternately advancing and retreating as the ebb and flow of the tide.43

But there is a crucial difference between the Cardozo Theorem, on the one hand, and the two Newman Theorems, on the other. The difference is certainly not that the former arises “as a result of human action, but not of human design.” That is equally true of both; neither rests on human design, and any suggestion that Ferguson’s formulation uniquely describes the liberal invisible hand account is a confusion. Rather, the difference is that the Newman Theorems implicitly posit the superintending, invisible, and infallible hand of divine Providence, whereas the Cardozo Theorem rests on some hypothetical, unspecified mechanism that causes the desirable system-level result to emerge without any design whatsoever, human or otherwise. The open question for liberalism’s account is, always, whether and to what extent such a mechanism can be supplied, and whether it is in fact supported by evidence. Let us turn now to that question.

Inevitably Imperfect Secularization

I am now in position to complete my thesis: liberalism attempts to replace Providence with individualist, nonintentional accounts of the production of goods, yet this secularization chronically promises more than it can deliver. The mechanisms adduced to yield the system-level emergence of the relevant goods prove—for systematic and not merely happenstance reasons—far more fragile than their liberal proponents suggest. Yet the need for general justifications for liberalism makes admission of this radical fragility threatening. The consequence is a marked tendency to liberal fideism, to ever-more fervent insistence on the scope and power of the liberal invisible hand, even in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary.

I will flesh out the point only with regard to free markets, the marketplace of ideas, and checks and balances, but I believe parallel analyses hold for the other accounts I have mentioned. Whatever the context, the point is that invisible hand mechanisms are intrinsically fragile, holding only under special conditions or highly idealized circumstances. In the following sections, I then turn to some structural mechanisms according to which the liberal invisible hand has self-undermining propensities. Taken together, these arguments show that liberalism’s invisible hand is caught between promise and performance.

Free markets. In a popular lecture series on economics, the session devoted to the invisible hand lists a long series of partially overlapping conditions that must obtain for Smith’s invisible hand to hold in the manner interpreted by the results of neoclassical general equilibrium theory: “an open market,” absence of monopoly power, absence of monopsony power, “fine-grained division of production and consumption,” no producers with “pivotal private technology,” “perfect information, more or less truthful information across the whole market” (!), and government to enforce property and contract rights.44 Needless to say, this bears roughly the same relationship to actually existing economies that Star Trek bears to actually existing navies. It is not even conceptually clear what “perfect information” might mean, in a world of limited attention and computational capacity. To be sure, a main research program of economics is to relax these conditions as far as possible, yet it remains true that the conditions for productive and allocative efficiency in competitive markets are highly fragile, requiring a rather well-defined set of circumstances.45

Hayek’s version of the free market invisible hand avoids some of these difficulties, principally by making more plausible informational assumptions, but encounters other difficulties in its turn. Let me list just a few crucial issues:46

(1) Sometimes prices supply misleading information about the real cost of resources, as in monopoly (in which the monopolist prices above marginal cost). The standard response is antitrust enforcement, which in turn creates the possibility of corruption of the enforcer or political influence, or simply differential success in litigation for the rich. I will return to these public choice problems later.

(2) Coordination problems afflict the choice of “compatibility standards” for products and technology. Such problems occur when there exists more than one mutually beneficial equilibrium for market actors; prices will not tell the actors which equilibrium to adopt.

(3) The Hayekian argument for the informational efficiency of markets notoriously suffers from its reliance upon self-undermining incentives. Roughly, market actors will have incentives to acquire costly information only if they can profit from it. But if they can, then—precisely on Hayekian grounds—their information will be transmitted via the price system to competitors who may profit as well, even though they have not made costly investments in information. Anticipating this free-rider problem, competitors may decide not to invest in information, but if that occurs, then everyone has incentives to do so—and so forth. In other words, the costliness of information creates a free-rider problem that has no general equilibrium solution, implying that markets for information are intrinsically unstable. The more efficient the price system becomes at conveying information, the worse the free-rider problem becomes, the less efficient the price system will be, and so on in a circle. In this way, it has been shown that so long as information is costly, no market can be fully informationally efficient, even in principle.47 Hayek’s appeal to the price system to give an informational rationale for free markets is in this sense self-defeating.

The marketplace of ideas. As we have seen, the marketplace of ideas hovers perpetually and restlessly between a tautology (truth is defined as whatever emerges from the conditions of free and open discussion) and an empirical thesis (conditions of free and open discussion do in fact, on average and in the long run, tend to produce truth). This equivocation papers over the extraordinary weakness of the empirical thesis: the most that can be said is that there is no general mechanism to sustain it and no evidence that it is generally true, even on average and in the long run. As Frederick Schauer observed, “people are not nearly so rational as the Enlightenment assumed, and without this assumption the argument from truth evaporates. . . . f the relevant time period is discrete and observable, history furnishes far too many counter-examples for us to have much confidence in the power of truth consistently to prevail.”48 Since that observation was offered, research programs in cognitive and social psychology and behavioral economics have radically undermined any remaining, naïve faith that truth will automatically tend to “win out” in free and open discussion. It would take a kind of miracle of providential stature for the large and motley assortment of human heuristics and biases to interact in just the right way so as to make the marketplace of ideas into a reliable truth-generating machine.

In the past generation or so we have seen democratic polities with expansive constitutional protections for free speech, emphatically including the United States, make extraordinary mistakes of policy based on distorted information and distorted, ideologically inflected processing of information—Iraq and Libya leap to mind. Domestically, these polities have fallen subject to pervasive conspiracy theorizing, emphatically including the educated elites who process and discuss information, and who partly shape the agenda for public opinion. Those elites, who pride themselves on their discursive rationality and commitment to evidence, are not obviously any less susceptible to the rationalization of political prejudices, nor any more open to evidence, than the public at large. The idea that these groups will shape the public agenda in a way that systematically tends to cause truth to win out has no obvious foundation.

Checks and balances. The liberal faith in checks and balances is powerful, even passionate. It also far outruns any mechanisms and evidence that might be adduced to support it. Three major issues have been identified. First is the gap between individual incentives and interests, on the one hand, and institutional incentives and interests on the other.49 What is good for Congress need not be good for individual legislators, and vice versa. The exact consequences of this gap are unclear; in one version, the gap between individual and institutional incentives is far less for the presidency and executive branch, which thus does a better job of pursuing its long-run institutional interests than does Congress, and tends to accrete power over time.50 Whatever the results, however, the point is that the claimed benefits of the Madisonian invisible hand of checks and balances do not materialize.

A second issue is that there is no external enforcer, standing above the constitutional system of checks and balances, to force the institutions to compete. They may decide instead that various forms of collusion, power-sharing, or delegation make them better off, in ways that undermine the check of ambition against ambition.51 In an idealized ordinary market, antitrust law and other institutions prevent firms from colluding to set prices above marginal cost. (I will relax this assumption below.) This presupposes an enforcing sovereign external to the market mechanism. As there is no such enforcer external to the constitutional order, however, there is no analogue to antitrust enforcement. The hope is that the system of checks and balances amounts to a fully self-enforcing equilibrium, but the conditions under which this will occur are rarely specified and there is no obvious reason to think that they typically obtain.

The final issue is that the analogy to explicit competition in economic markets assumes away a critical issue: there is no price system in the constitutional order. The price system is of course the key mechanism that makes competition in explicit markets conduce to welfare (in the neoclassical version) or to information (in the Hayekian variant). As resources become costlier, the shift in relative prices determines what trades are consummated and what information is impounded in the prices themselves. What exactly corresponds to this in the “market” for constitutional checks and balances? There is no systematic reason to think that the equilibrium level of competition, or that the “balance” of power resulting from this competition, will correspond to any socially desirable state of affairs. If it does, in a particular case, it is a happy accident.

The Dilemma of Verification

In the cases I have just canvassed, the systematic inability to tell whether and to what extent invisible hand systems actually work, or work accidentally, is not itself an accident. It is built into the nature and justification of such systems. If individual goods (however defined theoretically) could be directly identified, generated, and allocated by the political authority, there would be no need for the indirection of liberalism’s invisible hand. In a famous observation about competition as a discovery procedure, Hayek noted that “it would be patently absurd to sponsor a contest if we knew in advance who the winner would be. . . . The only reason we use competition at all has as its necessary consequence the fact that the validity of the theory of competition can never be empirically verified for those cases in which it is of interest.”52

The problem bedevils any number of invisible hand systems. As to the adversary system, barring unusual cases, “[w]e can’t learn directly whether the facts are really as the trier determined them because we don’t ever find out the facts.”53 As to explicit markets, to appoint a centralized bureau to collect all the information needed to determine whether the price system in fact processes information effectively would itself be a conceptual blunder, resting on a misunderstanding of the informational rationale for decentralized prices. In this and the other cases, the very same indirect structure that allows liberalism to reconcile its commitments to autonomy with its horror of obedience also makes it structurally difficult to discern whether the invisible hand works as promised.

Self-Undermining Propensities

So far I have attempted to show that liberalism’s faith in its suite of invisible hand accounts greatly outruns any of the mechanisms or evidence supporting them. We can go farther, however: in important cases, the liberal invisible hand is self-undermining. This can happen in two ways, which I will call the depletion of preliberal social capital and the public choice problem. To the extent either of these occurs, the gap between liberalism’s faith in the invisible hand and its fulfillment will have a systematic propensity to persist for structural reasons.54

The depletion of preliberal social capital. Liberalism’s invisible hand stories malfunction when their own individualistic and mechanistic premises, the premises that enable them to function, undermine the very preconditions that are necessary for the mechanism to work—preconditions that, it is argued, preexist liberalism and that cannot be replaced by it. A variety of hypotheses have been suggested here,55 variously involving the undermining of trust, of unwritten norms and conventions, or of other forms of preliberal or nonliberal solidaristic social capital necessary for the operation of smoothly functioning invisible hand systems. An example from markets is the view that “the costs of contracting and enforcing contracts make it impossible to exclude all forms of literalism, circumvention of promises, and chicanery; norms of good faith are thus necessary to facilitate exchange.”56 When combined with the suggestion that participation in market or quasi-market systems tends to form liberal agents with dispositions that undermine the norms of good faith, the depletion problem arises.

Whatever the details, the larger point is the same across invisible hand systems. Free markets, free discourse in the public sphere, the checks-and-balances system of institutional competition—all these presuppose, even if only implicitly, background conditions that allow competition to occur within stable boundaries and under regulated conditions. The suggestion is that these implicit boundaries on competition improve on the chaotic counterfactual in which competition—economic, rhetorical, or political—becomes unconstrained and mutually destructive. On this view, political competition resembles regulated warfare, which in some times and places occurs within a stable, regulated framework that (it is claimed) makes all better off. An example is the “ethic of partisanship,”57 according to which partisan competition occurs within a framework of tacit internalized norms and expectations that constrain its worst excesses.

To be sure, hypotheses about the self-undermining of normative capital meet their opposites in the Marxist “feudal shackles thesis” and other arguments that the persistence of preliberal norms or attitudes actually hampers the free operation of liberalism’s invisible hand systems.58 There is no general answer to these debates, which is all I need for my point. The depletion of preliberal capital is a grave possibility that only adds to the debilitating uncertainty about whether liberalism’s accounts capture anything real.

The public choice problem. Earlier, I assumed temporarily that in idealized markets, antitrust rules and other institutions prevent competitive agents from subverting the process of competition itself. As public choice theorists have pointed out, however, the same premises that make the liberal invisible hand story go also suggest that the agents within the market framework will have every incentive to undermine or subvert it, through self-interested action aimed at manipulating the framework itself.59 Where the anticipated economic benefits exceed the expected costs, including legal risk, such agents will use political donations, lobbying campaigns, strategic litigation, or even outright bribery to shape the very rules of the game for enduring advantage, as by corrupting the institutions of antitrust enforcement or by procuring regulation that insulates incumbents against innovation by new challengers. The motivations attributed to the agents within liberalism’s invisible hand accounts ensure that their behavior will escape the storyteller’s control, as it were, to change the parable’s very ending.

This point may also be put in terms of the distribution of benefits from the liberal invisible hand. On close inspection, there is an equivocation in liberalism’s accounts: to whom exactly do the benefits accrue? Sellers in perfectly competitive markets, pursuing self-interest, can price no higher than marginal cost, and profits are driven relentlessly towards zero. The operation of such a market provides immediate surplus benefits to consumers. Nothing in the market setup itself necessarily ensures that the self-interested aims of the participants actually result in promoting their own interests.60 That individuals seek their own benefit need not entail that they do benefit. The self-benefit of participants may be an intended but unrealized consequence, while the system-level benefit to others is an unintended but realized consequence.61

But this creates a dilemma on liberal individualist premises. If others capture all the benefits of my participation in the system, why should that be good for me? Hence the standard neoclassical claim that ex ante free markets are potentially better for all (including producers), in a larger long-run sense, as the surplus generated by markets can be redistributed through the tax-and-transfer system. But as many have pointed out, this Kaldor-Hicks criterion, which identifies a change as desirable if it generates surplus that can be allocated so as to make all better off, is strictly hypothetical comfort. Whether all will in fact be made better off—the very different Pareto criterion62—is a fideistic assertion that outruns all evidence.

The overall point is that the uncertain gap between promise and performance is no mere happenstance, but arises out of a kind of structural propensity. Having denied the superintending role of Providence, liberalism commits itself to trust in indirect, seemingly magical or even miraculous processes for transmuting the dross of human motivations into the gold of system-level goods. But those motivations are not so easily left behind; agents who possess them may either work to undo the framework within which liberalism’s miracles occur (public choice), or else, by participating within liberal systems, lose the traits that were necessary for those systems to work in the first place (depletion of preliberal social capital).

Liberal Fideism

Constitutional arrangements, free markets, and free speech are the core institutions of liberalism. In all of these contexts, liberal faith far exceeds the causal mechanisms or evidence that suggest that liberalism’s invisible hand fulfills its promises. The result is an uneasy halfway posture, in which (1) the invisible hand must succeed so that liberalism’s indirect approach to the good may prevail, yet (2) the providentialist underpinnings of the invisible hand that would yield its success have been abandoned, and (3) it is unclear what if anything has taken Providence’s place as superintendent and guarantor.

Psychologically and analytically, the only way out of this bind is liberal fideism. It must be believed, despite or indeed because of the radical contingency and uncertainty of liberalism’s invisible hand, that the invisible hand will produce its beneficial results sooner or later, in some immanentized eschatological future. Consider the “long run” of the liberal free-speech parable, which promises that open speech conditions will definitely result in the emergence of truth, just a bit farther on—in a long run that is always somewhat longer than any actual time horizon one can observe. Having rejected providentialism, liberalism becomes increasingly insistent, and in liberal societies one encounters lay faith movements and quasireligious orders centered on evangelizing and catechizing the benefits of free markets, free speech, and constitutional liberties, centered on the separation of powers and checks and balances.

Liberalism’s standing gap between promise and performance is filled by a radiant faith, but that faith has already disavowed the premises that would support it. The result is not a rational faith, but a groundless fideism and indeed fanaticism that insists, with ever-increasing fervor, on more of the same. The answer to the problems of free markets is even more free markets; the answer to the problems generated by the operation of the separation of powers system is a renewal and reinforcement of the separation of powers; the cure for the ills generated by free speech is even more free speech. By supposing that the remedy for fire is to add fuel to the fire, this fideistic reaction merely exacerbates the failures of the liberal invisible hand, intensifying the problems it hoped to solve. The result is a regime in which liberalism’s accounts generate ever less allegiance from the populace, while elites insist upon their truth all the more fervently—a condition which, as theorists persuasively documented,63 we indeed observe.

Liberalism as Parable

Let me close not by repeating my claims, but by underscoring what I have not claimed. I have not claimed that the providentialist version of the invisible hand is unproblematic, or that it does not face analogous difficulties. The whole elaborate body of thought that struggles with divine Providence64 in history testifies to both the promises and problems. That the same sorts of arguments that I deploy against liberalism’s invisible hand accounts may also be deployed against the providentialist invisible hand is, indeed, precisely the point. Liberalism’s characteristic obscurantism is to conceal its own character as political theology, as one of the great world religions. The triumphalist version of the liberal faith65 is that, having finally transcended the great fallacy that ordered liberty requires a Designing Hand, we can now see how ordered liberty and its resulting goods arise indirectly, but not by anyone’s design.66 My suggestion is that this is simply to replace one faith and one political theology with another. Which faith is the true one is a separate question, but liberalism’s invisible hand accounts—perhaps it would be better to call them parables—are no less complex and challenging than the providentialist parables they would replace, and the necessary miracles no less astonishing.


American Affairs has been killing it recently. If you're the sort who subscribes to magazines, this one is well worth your money.
 

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I've got two related articles to share today. The first is a short essay by Daniel McCarthy in The Spectator titled "Why libertarians are wrong":

My libertarian friends object to some of my recent writings — in particular, an essay for First Things proposing a moderate economic nationalism as ‘A New Conservative Agenda.’ The various intellectual factions on the American right are all susceptible to utopianism and dangerously wishful thinking when they dwell too much in their own minds: they all need the benefit of a look through someone else’s eyes once in a while, even to see their own concerns more clearly. In the letter below, I respond to some friends’ objections and summarize — tidily, I hope — a few vital questions to which libertarians offer inadequate answers.

My interlocutors’ major points can be sketched as follows: what’s wrong with America’s economy and politics is the result of over-centralization and de-centralization — turning power back to the states and smaller units — is the necessary remedy. No nationalist program for strengthening manufacturing for the sake of the middle class is workable because the social philosophers Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises demonstrated that all economic interventions by government involve insufficient knowledge of consumer preferences and specific market circumstances. Economic decisions have to be made by those directly involved in market transactions; an economy is too complex for anyone else to act wisely. (That’s a crude gloss, but it gets the gist.) Rather than worrying about industrial employment and the middle class, what we ought to worry about, my friend characteristically argues, is the national debt and cost of government’s unfunded liabilities, especially entitlements.

Here’s my reply:

I’m skeptical whether any decentralization short of secession would be meaningful for purposes of this discussion, and secession simply produces nationalism for a smaller, weaker unit. Short of secession, you have a financial system, including the Federal Reserve, and a central government whose policies are never going to be a libertarian’s idea of natural or neutral. Pharmaceutical companies, the financial sector, agribusiness, and the administrative class do not seem to have any trouble identifying what their interests are and how they can use federal policy to advance those interests: they don’t suffer from a complexity or knowledge problem. Or to the extent they do, they know what the solution is: bailouts and rent-seeking. Libertarians complain about that, but complaints carry no weight compared to the bottom line. Libertarians prophesy that there will be hell to pay — but exactly who is going to pay, and when does the end come? The people making economic decisions today have a limited time horizon for their concerns and plenty of ability to offload their costs.

It seems to me the timeline for political crisis is shorter than the timeline for economic crisis. Before we reach the point where bailouts and prop-ups are no longer possible — as Adam Smith himself observed, there’s a lot of ruin in a country — there will be a hard left or hard right political turn, or simply a hard turn away from the present dispensation. If I’m wrong about the comparative crisis timelines, I nonetheless foresee a gradual continuing degeneration of our politics and class balance. The urban administrative overclass will continue to grow in power and wealth, the urban and suburban lower class will become increasingly servile (or else restive), and the old middle class and heartland will be economically sidelined and in many places depopulated. I don’t know why libertarians are not more alarmed by this likelihood, unless they believe they will comfortably be among the administrative overclass themselves. Frankly, looking at the class positions that actual high-profile libertarians occupy — the many who are professors are beneficiaries of government largesse toward the education system, whether they are at state or private institutions — they might indeed be serving their self-interest, if not their advertised values, correctly.

If this America without a middle class is more politically stable than I think it will be, I suspect it will nonetheless face insuperable external challenges. China won’t have to fight a war with us; it will just outgrow us. When the differential of power and economic productivity is great enough, China will determine the strategic and economic environment in which we live. The cultural and religious environment will also be strongly influenced, if not determined, by the growth of Islam, particularly if Islam succeeds in dominating sub-Saharan Africa. Europe will have to deal with that to a greater extent than we will, of course.

I’m not sure that Hayek or Mises are the relevant texts for understanding any of this. Does a libertarian even care whether Islam displaces Christianity or China displaces America, as long as there are no tariffs on steel? You might not have freedom of religion or freedom of speech in the post-Western future, and those cheap consumer goods won’t be so cheap any more, but a libertarian will rest content knowing he fought to import as much foreign-subsidized steel as possible. This is why I consider libertarianism to be every bit as much a suicidal ideology as left-liberalism. In some ways it is even more so, as libertarians are more oblivious than left-liberals to the consequences for themselves of hewing to their ideology.

It seems to me that a healthy polity needs a middle class, and a country that is going to remain economically viable for as a long as possible needs to have a commanding advantage in high-end manufacturing and producing goods that the rest of the world wants to buy. We still have some of these advantages right now, but we’re forsaking them. Our country went from being underdeveloped at its founding to being a techno-industrial powerhouse in the 19th and 20th centuries while employing a great many economic policies that libertarians don’t like. We built the largest middle class the world had ever seen. We may not be able to repeat past performance, but we should not overlook the tools that proved useful before. If they think I’m wrong about that, I would hope that libertarians nonetheless take the diagnosis of the problem seriously and speak up about what their alternative is: that is, an alternative to rebuild the middle class or to show why a middle class is unnecessary and an elite-servant-deadweight tripartite class structure is compatible with modern liberty.

Yet I know I’m asking for blood from a stone. Libertarians take for granted the conditions of the 20th century and don’t imagine anything could ever really change. The New Deal from 80 years ago is still the only threat to worry about. If we just cut taxes and de-regulate hair-braiding, the market will take care of the rest. Only it won’t: the market depends on our civilization and our country as much as or more than they depend on it. A country’s way of life can survive its government’s bankruptcy or an upheaval in the private economy; it can’t survive the global transformation that’s coming if we do nothing.

And the 2nd is an essay by Gladden Pappin in American Affairs titled "Toward a Party of the State":

As critiques of liberalism have become more pronounced, alarm bells about possible alternatives to liberalism have grown louder. These alarms, ironically enough, have often been sounded most emphatically by American writers who otherwise describe themselves as conservatives.

In response to the recent challenges to liberalism, conservatives have generally dropped the pretense that they are anything other than liberals, or “classical liberals,” as they prefer to say. But what has enabled the conservative recolonization of liberalism is precisely the fact that no one else—that is, no “liberals” or progressives—any longer bothers to occupy the territory, or live up to the standards, of “liberalism.” The Left forfeited the contest over liberalism years ago, as it steadily (and often with good reason) transformed the liberal moniker into the progressive one. Conservatives, true to form, simply took up the ownership of a passé label. Only conservatives, it seems, have a bad conscience that requires them to prove that they are “good liberals”; progressives do not concern themselves with proving their “liberal” bona fides, much less their inner conservatism. More importantly, progressives also do not accept conservatives’ claim to be “liberal”—in spite of the fact that conservatives have reduced their project to precisely this point.

For at least fifty years, however, the intellectual project of the American Right had been to argue that it was something more than merely the rear guard of liberalism. In doing so, the Right was challenging a common view, articulated by Louis Hartz in the early 1950s, that America is by nature a “liberal society” inhospitable to any authentically conservative political stance. The Right responded by arguing that the basic “liberal” features of American society were “conservative” (i.e., old and English) in origin and therefore that conservatives provided their surest safeguard.

The publication of Why Liberalism Failed by Notre Dame political theorist Patrick Deneen proved to be a turning point in this respect. Most conservatives rushed to distance themselves from its comprehensive rejection of liberalism. Some, like R. R. Reno of First Things (May 2018), cast themselves as defenders of a liberal “tradition” and “set of institutions” rather than a liberal ideology. The Summer 2018 issue of Modern Age, subtitled A Conservative Review, carried the title “Two Cheers for Liberalism.” In a similar vein, David Frum at the Atlantic (November 2018) called for the revival of a “liberal Republicanism” that accepts certain features of the modern welfare state but seeks to impose some market discipline on it. “What conservatives are conserving, after all,” Frum wrote glibly, “is a liberal order”—though in a world of parapolitical neoliberal governance structures and globally mobile capital, it is not clear what referent conservatives intend by the “liberal order.”

Conservatives who understand themselves as defenders of liberalism face yet another problem. Speaking of “conservatism” risks giving the impression that conservatives hold a position of power or might otherwise have some opportunity to conserve the things they profess to cherish. In fact, conservatism is primarily a would-be courtly ideology, a mirror of princes which neither interests the prince nor itself offers much to guide the exercise of princely powers. Conservatives have focused almost exclusively on the theoretical underpinnings of republican government and market-oriented society, but this self-understanding has made them unable to wield power effectively and largely uninterested in doing so.

A Roof without Foundations

Since 2016, the problems of “liberal” conservatism have only become more obvious, both domestically and as a matter of political positioning abroad. For the first time in a long time, the Right holds power in an array of countries, including a majority of Latin American countries, above all Brazil, as well as in significant parts of central and eastern Europe and the United Kingdom. Yet establishment or “liberal” conservatives can hardly take credit for these electoral successes—indeed, they have often sought to undermine them—and they have steadfastly refused to update their policy agenda to address the new situation. Unfortunately, the only attempt to provide coherence for the new “nationalist-populist” movements has been the tawdry effort of Steve Bannon, which was decisively rejected in 2018 by Matteo Salvini and Marine Le Pen. Not realizing the irony, Bannon sought to create something of a “Nationalist International”—a project for which no nationalist leader would ever seek leadership from an American populist out of power. Meanwhile, as Nancy Fraser has argued, the Left has largely abandoned its classic focus on the working classes for the trendier (and more profitable) ground of progressive neoliberalism—a commitment to furthering the paradigm of globally mobile capital, with a veneer of personal liberation adopted as a part of its marketing.

In this context, defense-of-liberalism conservatism has nowhere to fit. Conservatives like to speak about market-based economies (in reality, the deployment of market-based sorting mechanisms with an eye to private rather than public interests) and liberal constitutionalism, as though conservatives provide the essential support upon which such modern accomplishments rest. In reality, however, the governing ideology of neoliberalism has, thus far, successfully provided its own support by redefining itself as progressive. Gestures toward progressive concepts of personal liberty legitimate and, therefore, support the nexus of neoliberal corporations and governments (or more accurately, captured regulatory environments). Liberal conservatism has thus failed in two respects. It provides support for an ideology, classical liberalism, which isn’t the regnant one now, if it ever was. And by its own standard of providing support, it has failed to find anyone who wants its advice. Continuing to live off the largesse of the fusionist institutions of old, it has become a roof without foundations.

In other words, liberal conservatives seek to justify themselves before a standard of “liberalism” that is self-defined and self-judged, but these conservatives are at the same time rejected by self-identified liberals who label them reactionaries instead. And when conservatives reply that these “liberals” have ceased to be “truly liberal,” they simply beg the question of whether the liberal order they purportedly defend actually exists in any substantial way.

This mode of conservative argumentation has been going in circles for more than fifty years. It was 1964 when William Henry Chamberlin, the conservative theorist, echoed George Dangerfield in complaining of “the strange death of that respectable political and economic doctrine known as liberalism,” and in maintaining that conservatives were the true liberals. Yet even in 1964, the “liberal” quest to construct optimal markets had already been exposed as a cloak for the will to power (for example, by the Frankfurt School). And the key features of modern markets and liberal politics, as any reader of the poststructuralists knew, were not the price mechanism and political neutrality but the mastery of human behavior and the realization of a consumer society. Whatever conservatism’s excuse was in 1964, that excuse no longer exists today.

Liberalism and the State

Resolving assertions of “liberalism” into their constituent parts can be clarifying. If we accept an account typical in the writings of Pierre Manent, original liberalism rested on the distinction between civil society and the state: a certain limited set of concerns justified the creation of the state, which in turn would protect civil society as the true field of human liberty. The imposition of this distinction subsequently prompted, among figures such as Rousseau and Marx, a reaction that sought to cure the separation at the heart of liberalism while also seeking to preserve, if on a higher level, the liberty at which liberal politics aimed.

To distinguish civil society and the state requires an articulation of the roles of each, anchoring the most important human activities (for liberals) in the former and limiting the objects pursued by the latter. In its fullest sense, then, liberalism has always involved (1) a justification of the power of the state (whether in state-of-nature terms or utilitarian terms, etc.), which in turn (2) establishes a separation between matters of state and the operation of society. In this sense, “liberalism” is not a society (as in “liberal society”) but rather an account of the power of the state and its purpose, albeit a limited one. The elements of political power—“state capacity,” law courts, judicial procedure, etc.—already existed before the new political theory which explained them arose, but the new political theory gave an explanation that in turn shaped how they were used. It is this dynamic which causes anachronistic expansions of the history of liberalism to include, for example, claims to originating judicial procedure in the common law, even when such procedures can be traced to Roman law rather than “liberal” sources.

What we call “liberal society” is one that results from the liberal orientation of political power toward “liberty,” both in theory and in the design of fundamental law. Almost every particular civil liberty shows this development. Liberty of the press, for example, originally meant only liberty from prior restraint in the operation of presses (i.e., no licensing) but eventually entailed, on the basis of liberal-expressivist theories of human behavior, the liberalization of censorship, blasphemy, sedition, and other laws legally distinct from liberty of the press. Though American conservatives often speak of the Progressive movement as a corruption of liberalism, it is a natural, even correct outgrowth of the liberal achievement in a democratic context to be concerned with identifying and expanding the conditions of liberty (health, security, etc.)—and this expansion was precisely what the Progressives attempted to bring about. For this purpose they successfully employed the means of state.

By contrast, because the American conservative defense of liberalism has emphasized the “moral conditions” of liberalism, or the “traditional” elements of “Western civilization” that have enabled liberalism to flourish, conservatives have neglected the state. Such neglect could not be said of Founding-era “conservatives” like Alexander Hamilton. Speaking of “the authorities essential to the care of the common defence” along with other responsibilities of the federal government, Hamilton in Federalist no. 23 says that “these powers ought to exist without limitation.” Modern American conservatives, on the other hand, in making their task the defense of liberalism in its market-oriented and social aspects, have made themselves unable to articulate the purpose of power, and unable to understand the origins of a “neoliberalism” at ease with the use of power to establish markets.

Liberalism was a theory to explain the state; and conservatism was a theory to explain liberties, but not the state. Accordingly, neoliberalism triumphed and neoconservatism (that is, all liberal forms of conservatism) failed for a very simple reason: while neoliberalism embraced the state without the common good, thus leading to the very definition of a bad regime, liberal conservatism embraced the common good without the state. Conservatives never sought to explain “the state”; instead they sought to explain the (supposed) precursors to the state. Hence they constructed a political position of perfect moral purity (“We are the ones for the common good”) while, in practice, merely criticizing the progressive moral posture of the regnant neoliberals. And since neoliberalism made its bargain with progressive rather than conservative moralism, the conservative position became one with no political reference points whatsoever.

As a political project, the modern conservative effort of articulating the moral underpinning of markets, as well as antiquated approaches to the limitation of political power (e.g., balance-of-power theory), has reached a terminus. This endpoint should, however, be a harmless one, since conservatism is not the regnant political ideology. The current holder of executive power in the United States is not a conservative of the “classical” (modern) variety; and by the conservatives’ own account, former limitations on political power have already been outstripped by the rise of the administrative state. Thus the end of liberal conservatism should involve no crisis of state, since according to conservatives the state has already ceased to be “truly liberal.” Instead of the fireworks of a great political conflagration, then, the decline of conservatism will merely produce, as it has produced, the histrionics of anger and self-doubt.

Returning to the Court

There was a time when political writers authored “mirrors of princes” as a way of outlining the virtues princes should cultivate and the deeds they should perform, as well as (for educational purposes) the reasons for pursuing those virtues and deeds. Modern political writing has taken another direction, however, creating instead ideologies that operate within the existing framework of a political party to justify its fundamental position and bolster its platform in various respects—“mirrors of parties” aimed at cultivating one combative political stance rather than the politics of a ruling prince. Conservatism is once such mirror, articulating the underpinnings of the (present) Republican Party platform while calling for minor tweaks to its fundamental positions.

What the rise of “populist” sentiment signifies in the United States and elsewhere is, as many have noted, merely that previously regnant parties are insufficiently differentiated on the political matters motivating popular sentiment. To grasp this point, we simply have to return to our earlier account of neoliberal regimes as “the state without the common good.” The principal policy position of neoliberals, hence of the Western political class as a whole, has been to use the powers of state to sublimate the state’s own authority in favor of the nondemocratic, parapolitical institutions we call “the liberal order.” And because this regime legitimates itself by selectively appealing to progressive moral principles, social progressives have succeeded in obtaining their agenda (through the use of cultural institutions, with the considerable assistance of business corporations as well as at least the toleration of the state). The proper politics of the state, however, has remained obscured by the dominant neoliberal ideology, which both “mirrors of parties” reflect but do not challenge or even comprehend.

In response to this dynamic, many conservatives have adopted a version of the “Tocqueville critique.” Toward the end of Democracy in America, Tocqueville foresees the transformation of the people into a “herd of timid and industrious animals,” cowed before an impressive administrative apparatus that would stifle the liberty that the modern state was supposed to facilitate. Like supplementalist conservatives who believe that conservatism provides the necessary undergirding of the modern liberal order, Tocquevillian conservatives present themselves as friends of liberalism who see liberalism’s faults and seek to restrain the egalitarian principles at work in modern democracies. They therefore tend to argue for administrative decentralization and a return of the civic-oriented virtues that enabled the democracy of the New England townships, which they believe could be valuable to the American polity as a whole.

But it is doubtful whether the noble moderation of Tocquevillian conservatism is sufficient to address the problems it identifies—because these problems are not merely consequences of an immoderate egalitarianism but are in fact necessary conditions for the functioning of the present economic system. The restraints on egalitarian democracy that Tocqueville praised, from self-interest properly understood to religious guidance of the American imagination, worked only as culturally embedded practices dependent on the traditions of aristocratic centuries. Today, however, Tocquevillian conservatism has been co-opted by a liberal paradigm that uses Tocqueville to define the acceptable limit of its critique, and to steer conservative energies toward virtuous citizenship and local initiatives—important projects in themselves but projects which have no effect on how the state itself wields power. To be sure, Tocqueville has provided access to the deepest tendencies of American democracy, but the conservative attempt to become friends of liberalism by charitable correction has been rebuffed, and the friendship is now one-way. When the other party conceives of you as an enemy, then you are enemies, not friends.

Transcending the Left-Right Dichotomy

If we are to speak accurately, then the Left-Right paradigm, as Guillaume de Thieulloy has emphasized, describes agency rather than content. The action of the Left marks off the boundaries of the Right; whatever is not admitted by the Left is the Right. From 1789 onward, the politically motive force sat on the left wing of the National Assembly, and on the right were those adopting a more moderate but still revolutionary line. The market-oriented liberal position claimed by many conservatives today was a left-wing opinion when Frédéric Bastiat took his seat on the left in the National Assembly of 1848.

Responding to the demise of liberal conservatism, therefore, cannot simply be a matter of forging a new intellectual synthesis (e.g., a “new conservatism”) that pairs, say, a liberal approach to free speech with a right-wing approach to religious institutions; every such platform is necessarily located on the right, so long as the Left exists. Since the boundaries are set by the Left, a different combination of right-wing and left-wing stances, in itself, does nothing to change the direction of political agency.

At the same time, conservative and progressive efforts to articulate a “mirror of parties” have failed because such an approach necessarily obscures the substantive goals of the state. Hence the political or state-oriented element of party platforms has remained fixedly neoliberal, with most political parties and associated ideologies altering it only at the margin. So what are conservatives, or progressives for that matter, to do?

Overcoming the Left-Right dynamic, and neoliberal ideological hegemony, is only possible through the selective adoption of compatible left-wing and right-wing political positions into an essentially unchallenged political force. The Left-Right dichotomy can be transcended when such platforms are implemented by national unity governments exercising political agency, as in situations as disparate as Italy and China.

This prospect is considerably less alarming than it might seem; indeed, such alarm helps to illustrate the current political predicament. For already the state apparatus is “captured” by interests that orient it toward a consistent neoliberal or managerialist policy, and it has sought to insulate that policy by institutionalizing it in transpolitical governing bodies and legal structures. Even in the process of sublimating the state’s authority toward a liberal end (of no directly intended common good), then, neoliberals have facilitated the construction of an enormous state apparatus, whose political force has increased in spite of all challengers.

Indeed, early liberalism’s emphasis on the role of the state provides a sufficient pretext for reclaiming it through politically assertive movements. The defining element of the new “nonliberal” regimes in the West has been to turn the power of the state back toward national interests, from the standpoint of sovereignty, cultural coherence, and to a lesser extent (so far) economic policy—goals which are justified even within the liberal tradition, although they do not depend on it. Insofar as such movements can propose a unitary model of the state’s purposes in contrast to the self-weakening neoliberal model under which Western states now operate, they would return to the lost genre which proposed a scheme of action for a political ruler. As movements on both the left and the right engage in this sort of activity, we could see political reorientations toward national unity governments form with suddenness and rapidity. To answer that situation, nonliberals on the left and the right must conceive their policy positions well in advance. In place of lending credibility to party platforms, they will have to outline the agenda not simply of a current political party, but of the state itself. The mirror of princes was once located in precisely this space.

Friends of Nonliberalism?

Discussion of postliberal political orders is often shrouded in confusion, as though it were unclear or always potentially dangerous to speak of a coming nonliberal position. Arguably the reverse is the case. Liberal political orders always underspecify their intended goal; they speak of cultivating or enabling liberty, but remain deliberately indeterminate about what that liberty would be ordered to. To speak of a political order outside the terms of liberalism, however, is simply to specify the good at which it aims and articulate the means toward achieving it. This possibility is already embedded in conservative attempts to supplement liberalism with reminders of the importance of virtue and the common good; and it is embedded in economic progressivism’s vision of shared prosperity.

To be sure, liberal political orders have attempted to justify themselves on the grounds that conflicting accounts of the good create irreconcilable conflict that can only be addressed through sophisticated procedural mechanics. Here lies the irony of attempts to claim that neoliberal political projects such as the European Union do not suffer from a democratic deficit. The argument that substantively democratic results (greater guarantee of rights and equality, for example) cover over the lack of procedural democracy, an argument deployed to defend the EU, can be employed with even greater facility for nonliberal purposes. A government acting beyond liberal limitations on the scope of political power can, by the same logic, claim a substantively democratic result on the basis of securing its people’s national interests, as full procedural accountability was already rejected at an earlier stage of neoliberal policy development. The late-liberal governance framework may thus provide an unintended reason for articulating political positions simply in terms of the common good.

Since the conservative buttressing of liberalism has proved unwelcome to liberals, several benefits would accrue to conservatives were they to shift instead toward friendship with—including friendly critique of—the coming nonliberalism. In the first place, such a stance should open up conservatives to the consideration of policy options outside, for instance, the restrictive American constitutional space marked off by the limited “mirror of parties” strategy. The platform of a national unity government could draw on populist economic strategies, left-wing interest in labor representation, and right-wing corporatism. Such an approach would also help rectify what Pierre Manent called in 1997 “the transatlantic misunderstanding”—the lack of exchange between the American conservative “party of society” and the European “party of the state.” Moreover, since conservatives failed to secure their ground in society, they have no alternative but to use the state for the furtherance of their ends. As they do so, American conservatives will have nowhere to look but at policy options articulated by regimes with more open consideration of their state capacity.

At the same time, self-described liberals frequently burden themselves with the ideology of liberalism even in cases in which they simply want to obtain a substantive good, e.g., better access to health care. In these cases, a robust concern for state capacity and the unifying power of the nation-state is present in a wide variety of liberal positions. (As the British liberal Hobhouse put it, “There is no opposition between liberty as such and control as such, for every liberty rests on a corresponding act of control.”) If liberals, as conservatives say, aren’t truly liberal any more, then it may be easier for “nonliberal” conservatives to find something to agree with them about—for example, certain elements of protectionist trade policy, or even labor-oriented rationales for immigration restriction.

It may thus be possible to achieve a wider level of cooperation than one might expect on what could be called the “first-wave” restoration of the role of politics and the state in orienting human beings toward the common good. In the present situation, there are many viable forms of “common good” justifying policy programs: some are welfarist (aimed at a base line of human welfare through state mechanisms), others are national-interest-based (aimed at civic solidarity and international competitiveness), and others still religious in certain contexts (aimed at clarifying the unavoidable spiritual element of every polity).

After Liberalism

In the face of relentless criticism of liberalism, conservatives have, strangely in the end, admitted that they are liberals after all. There’s only one problem: aside from themselves, there are no other “true” liberals left, at least not liberals of the “neutralist” variety. On both the “liberal” or progressive and the “nonliberal” side, politics in Western countries can increasingly be understood in terms of nation-state-based, welfarist policies. And while it is true that a common-good-oriented politics need not be limited to welfarism, it is a step in the right direction. “Ordinary” people want “the common good” and understand that in terms of national integrity and the benefits enjoyed in common, whether monetary or cultural/religious. For all the recent discussion of “integralist” theses on the spiritual power, for example, “first-wave integralism” describes an approach to political power that would draw considerable support.

Rather than asking the question “What should conservatives/progressives do?” considerable advances can be made through certain purely practical considerations: “How can the integrity of the national political community be assured?” “How can commercial activity and technological development continue to be turned toward the common good, and toward our own strategic advantage?” “What can we do with the reins of power, that is, the state, to ensure the common good of our citizens?” Questions such as these are not “antiliberal”—they are simply questions that one asks when one’s political thinking isn’t distorted by liberal limitations on the scope of politics.

On the politically active left and the politically rising right, the state now occupies a much greater role than it has heretofore in postwar and modern conservative thought. Those outside the neoliberal paradigm should thus think of themselves as writers in the “mirror of princes” tradition, advising the state on its wielding of political power. For conservatives this may mean learning to advise on the use of the administrative state rather than plaintive, nostalgic, and counterproductive calls for its abolition. It may mean giving greater aid and comfort to assertive, but still politically responsible, nation-state-oriented forces in Europe. When conservatives position themselves as friends of “nonliberal” political thought, it doesn’t mean uncritical acceptance of every illiberal movement; nor does it require tossing out elements of our legal tradition that liberalism has unfairly taken credit for. It simply means thinking and acting politically to defend common interests, and to use the state effectively. That can partly be explained by, but does not depend upon, “liberalism.”
 

IrishLax

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This Dianne Feinstein ambush is insane. Democrats are going to end up eating their own over this Green New Deal... there is going to be a serious division between people trafficking in facts/reality/pragmatism and those that want to be on the "right side" of progressives.
 

Irish#1

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[“We’re quickly approaching the point of no return after which climate harms become irreversible and catastrophic, threatening the lives and futures of Alaska’s youth and posterity,” Andrew Welle, co-counsel for youth plaintiffs and staff attorney with Our Children’s Trust, said.


From the article you posted.

I'll play Devil's advocate. How do we know this? Assuming man is the only reason we're effecting change, why is it people think it can only be effected in a negative way or things can't be reversed? I believe we have an effect, but I really wonder how much? Is all of this due to man or is this Mother Nature? The ice age is a good example where the climate was changed when man wasn't around. Mount St. Helens erupted on her own and the scientists were positive the land around that area would never recover, yet it did on its own.

I have no problem in working to improve the ecology. I do my little bit with recycling and using our own grocery bags, but I think we need to be more pragmatic. Some of these lawsuits are wasting time, money and resources.
 

Legacy

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One more state is needed to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment. It won't be Virginia (Governing)

Arizona?
Will Arizona be crucial 38th state to ratify Equal Rights Amendment?
(AzCentral)

Ratification Map

The deadline for states to ratify it as an amendment into the U.S. Constitution expired in 1982, which means that even if a state's resolution was approved by both chambers, Congress would have to act to reopen the ratification process.

Last week the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which needs to renewed every five years, expired and Congress failed to reauthorize it.
The Violence Against Women Act has expired. Advocates say that sends a dangerous message and are pushing for permanent protections. (Chicago Trib)

Although the act is no longer in place, federal funding for programs that carry out its protections remain secure because that money was appropriated in spending bills, separate from any reauthorization of the act. That funding, like many government programs, is up for renewal every year and was included in legislation that reopened the government last month following the longest shutdown in history.
 
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Ndaccountant

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This Dianne Feinstein ambush is insane. Democrats are going to end up eating their own over this Green New Deal... there is going to be a serious division between people trafficking in facts/reality/pragmatism and those that want to be on the "right side" of progressives.

The funny thing is, something like the carbon fee and dividend would most likely be rejected by progressives. Hell, you have AOC going on record saying people should reconsider having children and if you are not with her, you are a climate denier. Strange world.
 

connor_in

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The funny thing is, something like the carbon fee and dividend would most likely be rejected by progressives. Hell, you have AOC going on record saying people should reconsider having children and if you are not with her, you are a climate denier. Strange world.

Hey! Stop catcalling AOC! She actually proposed something so she's the BOSS!
 

connor_in

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Colorado governor will sign bill aimed at bypassing Electoral College - The Hill

aka How to disenfranchise your own state in a presidential election

Seriously, this is madness and I wonder if this would hold up in court if a CO citizen filed a lawsuit to that effect. I mean the state could choose presidential candidate A by popular vote of the people of CO, but if presidential candidate B won the national popular vote, then CO's electoral votes would go to presidential candidate B. Technically invalidating the will of the people of CO.
 

Whiskeyjack

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Walther just published an article titled "Trump is turning the 2020 election into an abortion referendum. And he's winning."

I have never felt entirely comfortable with the phrase "God of surprises," a slogan that began as the title of a memoir by a heretical Scottish priest. Still, it's hard to argue that the Author of History is humorless. Who, for example, would have guessed that the 2020 election might end up being fought not primarily on trade or immigration or the economy but on social issues such as abortion?

No one who watched Trump's rise in 2016 could have mistaken him for a Rick Santorum clone. His genius was for kulturkampf of a very different sort — anti-immigrant fear-mongering, mawkish sentimentality about "the troops," "the flag," harder hits in football, 1950s clichés about relations between the sexes. This was brilliant not least because for good or ill most of these things matter a great deal not only to most traditional social conservatives but to millions of Americans who have no strong feelings about abortion and other conservative causes. Now Democrats are helping Trump expand the range of anti-abortion voters — arguably his single most reliable constituency — from religious conservatives to Americans in the broad muddled middle of the most important political debate in this country's history.

Late on Monday afternoon, the Born-Alive Abortion Survivors Protection Act was defeated in the Senate. This legislation would have required doctors to give medical treatment to infants who survive abortion. One Republican, Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, abstained; two others, Tim Scott of South Carolina and Kevin Kramer of North Dakota, were missing in action. Only three Democrats — Alabama's Doug Jones, Pennsylvania's Bob Casey, and West Virginia's Joe Manchin, broke with their party's leadership to support the bill. Among the 44 others who voted against it were all six Democratic senators who have declared for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination so far. Many of them argued that the 2002 Born-Alive Infants Protection Act already guarantees the rights of abortion survivors, something that is true only in the broadest theoretical sense. The 2002 legislation neither specifies what treatment — immediate care, transportation to a hospital — infants should receive nor imposes penalties upon doctors who refuse to comply.

These senators will be owning up to this vote next year. This issue is not going away. Gov. Ralph Northam of Virginia may have survived his racist folk art scandal, but his attempt to defend a bill that would have made abortion legal up to the moment of birth and, in his telling, even afterwards made an unmistakable impression on the American people. In the space of only a month, the percentage of Americans who identified themselves as "pro-choice" dropped by nearly 10. Some 47 percent of Americans call themselves pro-choice; the same percentage say they are pro-life. This has not been the case in a decade. This sudden and radical shift is unprecedented in the history of the Marist poll, which has asked the same question using the same language for many years.

Americans, like most people, are not especially good at logic. But they have got a conscience. How someone could believe that it is licit to take the life of a human being in utero but murder to deny medical care to the same infant the minute it is no longer in his or her mother's womb is, well, beyond me. To their dubious credit Democrats who support the former and the latter alike are simply being consistent.

This consistency will be their doom. The same Americans who are lukewarm about abortion because it does not seem to affect their own lives, who would rather not discuss the issue, who care more about their tax bill or their dogs, or what Colin Kaepernick is doing before football games, will not countenance undisguised infanticide.

It was their recognition of this complacency grounded in sloppy logic that led the Democratic Party to its previous position of "safe, rare, and legal." It is the same wooly thinking that makes it possible for some moderate Republicans to argue that murdering an unborn baby should be illegal unless the circumstances under which he or she was conceived were sufficiently bad. It makes no sense. It is also genuinely how people feel.

Trump will exploit this, as he is sure to do with the recent judicial decision in favor of including women in a future military draft and the debates about transwomen participating in female athletic competitions. The president does not need to pretend that he has lived a life of chastity and charity in humble service to God. All he has to do is say that letting a baby die on a table is wrong.
 

Irish YJ

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<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en"><p lang="en" dir="ltr">Hi AOC, why is your Chief of Staff eating a hamburger? smh <a href="https://t.co/sJanAC1Oz2">pic.twitter.com/sJanAC1Oz2</a></p>— Caleb Hull (@CalebJHull) <a href="https://twitter.com/CalebJHull/status/1100593824857051136?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">February 27, 2019</a></blockquote>
<script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script>
 

ACamp1900

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Modern day US leftists, young and old, are terrifying. I pray for a political and nonviolent civil war.

I mean you want a civil war? Because taking the electoral college and scraping it in favor of LA and NYC deciding every election moving forward is a pretty good way about going about getting one... I’m so tired of the emotionally driven garbage, regardless of which side it comes from (tho it definitively comes from one side more than the other).
 

Polish Leppy 22

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I mean you want a civil war? Because taking the electoral college and scraping it in favor of LA and NYC deciding every election moving forward is a pretty good way about going about getting one... I’m so tired of the emotionally driven garbage, regardless of which side it comes from (tho it definitively comes from one side more than the other).

I'd like to see a political civil war, completely nonviolent and no one harmed. Let the socialists identify their states and run them as they wish, and let the capitalists take their states and run them as they wish. We'll see if people flee socialism for capitalism or the other way around.
 

BleedBlueGold

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I'd like to see a political civil war, completely nonviolent and no one harmed. Let the socialists identify their states and run them as they wish, and let the capitalists take their states and run them as they wish. We'll see if people flee socialism for capitalism or the other way around.

BREAKING: Socialists rats get tired of eating dog food as a method to cure climate change; Move to nearby Capitalist states in order to taste a hamburger.
 

Legacy

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Federal judge temporarily blocks Texas from purging voters in citizenship review
U.S. District Judge Fred Biery called the review "ham-handed" and ordered counties not to remove voters from the rolls without his approval and "a conclusive showing that the person is ineligible to vote."
(Texas Tribune)

Excerpts:
In a major victory for voting rights groups, a federal judge has ordered that no Texas county should purge suspected noncitizen voters from the rolls or issue letters demanding that they prove their citizenship “without prior approval of the Court with a conclusive showing that the person is ineligible to vote.”

The Wednesday order from U.S. District Judge Fred Biery comes a month after the Texas secretary of state flagged nearly 100,000 voters for citizenship review — and a flurry of civil rights groups filed three lawsuits to block state and county officials from purging voters based on what has proven a deeply flawed set of data.

Biery ordered that as the litigation continues, counties can “continue to find out if in fact someone is registered who is not a citizen” — some local officials have proposed comparing lists of flagged voters with names of individuals made citizens at recent naturalization ceremonies, for example — but may not communicate directly with any particular individual on the list. Reaching out to a voter to demand proof of citizenship starts the clock on a process that can lead to that voter being purged from the rolls.

The number of voters who turn out to be naturalized citizens on the rolls lawfully is expected to grow as efforts to review the list proceed. But many counties, after receiving the Jan. 25 advisory from state election officials, immediately began sending notices to flagged voters. The state has since backed off from its initial advisory, arguing it was up to the counties to decide whether to send notices of examination. Local officials counter that if the state didn’t want them to begin the process of purging voters, state officials shouldn’t have so publicly blasted out the list — complete with a form letter demanding proof of citizenship to mail to flagged voters and public statements issuing a “VOTER FRAUD ALERT.”

“Almost immediately upon sending the list, the government had an ‘oops’ moment, realizing that 25,000 names should not have been included,” Biery wrote in reference to the naturalized citizens erroneously flagged for review. “It appears this is a solution looking for a problem.”

The entire initial list — including those 25,000 voters the state acknowledges were wrongfully flagged — was referred to the Texas Attorney General’s Office for criminal investigation and potential prosecution on Jan. 25, before counties had the opportunity to do any fact-finding. The attorney general’s office has given contradictory indications of whether it has initiated any such investigations.

Most if not all Texas counties had already suspended notifying suspected illegal voters from the state's list to confirm their citizenship when the mistakes came to light.

Judge orders Texas not to purge voters after botching list (Fox San Antonio)
 
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Irish YJ

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I'd like to see a political civil war, completely nonviolent and no one harmed. Let the socialists identify their states and run them as they wish, and let the capitalists take their states and run them as they wish. We'll see if people flee socialism for capitalism or the other way around.

well we know where business would flee from. and I'd be happy to offload all the cows from Cali.

but i'm with you. let the country divide, and only maintain a shared defense/military.

fiscally, every NEern state except NH is ranked in the bottom 3rd (fiscal health). Toss in Cali (42nd) and IL (50th) and you have the who's who of bad fiscal policy.
 

Polish Leppy 22

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well we know where business would flee from. and I'd be happy to offload all the cows from Cali.

but i'm with you. let the country divide, and only maintain a shared defense/military.

fiscally, every NEern state except NH is ranked in the bottom 3rd (fiscal health). Toss in Cali (42nd) and IL (50th) and you have the who's who of bad fiscal policy.

Economically is my #1 priority, but culturally I don't want any part of the new left either: late term abortions on demand, cysgender children, destroying masculinity, everything and everyone is racist, and all the other ass backwards shit. No thanks.
 

Irish YJ

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Economically is my #1 priority, but culturally I don't want any part of the new left either: late term abortions on demand, cysgender children, destroying masculinity, everything and everyone is racist, and all the other ass backwards shit. No thanks.

with you 100.
i'm a moderate on social issues, but the left has gone bat shit crazy. it's simply disturbing.

economics is my #1 though. if we were to split, Cali and NY's GDP would drop like lead balloon, and there would be mass exodus from both of those states. in 20 years, the NE would join Canada, and Cali would be bought by China, or be annexed by MX lol.
 

Ndaccountant

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well we know where business would flee from. and I'd be happy to offload all the cows from Cali.

but i'm with you. let the country divide, and only maintain a shared defense/military.

fiscally, every NEern state except NH is ranked in the bottom 3rd (fiscal health). Toss in Cali (42nd) and IL (50th) and you have the who's who of bad fiscal policy.

If something would ever really happen like that, it would be catastrophic for everyone and I doubt it would be peaceful for long.

Food supplies could/would be greatly impacted, water rights would be confrontational at best and that budget shortfall you claim in California would move right to Washington, as California gets back $0.75 to $0.80 on the dollar for what it sends to the Feds.

Point is, everyone benefits even if we disagree on politics. What we need to do is open our eyes to how much each side really needs each other and focus on enhancing relationships that way.
 

Irish YJ

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If something would ever really happen like that, it would be catastrophic for everyone and I doubt it would be peaceful for long.

Food supplies could/would be greatly impacted, water rights would be confrontational at best and that budget shortfall you claim in California would move right to Washington, as California gets back $0.75 to $0.80 on the dollar for what it sends to the Feds.

Point is, everyone benefits even if we disagree on politics. What we need to do is open our eyes to how much each side really needs each other and focus on enhancing relationships that way.

I agree that people need to wake up, but I don't see that happening. I don't see the right getting further right. I see the Left getting much further left though, and that's the heart of the problem.

The top 4 states that people are leaving (currently).... 1) NY, 2) Cali, 3) IL, 4) NJ. Plenty of NE states included in the top 10. Business are leaving too. 1800+ left Cali in one year. The biggest % heading to TX.

If there were a split, Cali taking less than it gives right now wouldn't matter. It would be a mass exodus of both business and people. Same with NY and the NE in general. All that tax revenue move to the Right, literally.

In terms of Cali in general, their financial situation is simple. They've gone two far left with regs and big gov, they've mismanaged infrastructure and general debt for decades. Even with recent surpluses, they still want to grow gov instead of paying down debt.
 

Ndaccountant

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I agree that people need to wake up, but I don't see that happening. I don't see the right getting further right. I see the Left getting much further left though, and that's the heart of the problem.

The top 4 states that people are leaving (currently).... 1) NY, 2) Cali, 3) IL, 4) NJ. Plenty of NE states included in the top 10. Business are leaving too. 1800+ left Cali in one year. The biggest % heading to TX.

If there were a split, Cali taking less than it gives right now wouldn't matter. It would be a mass exodus of both business and people. Same with NY and the NE in general. All that tax revenue move to the Right, literally.

In terms of Cali in general, their financial situation is simple. They've gone two far left with regs and big gov, they've mismanaged infrastructure and general debt for decades. Even with recent surpluses, they still want to grow gov instead of paying down debt.

Would it? Say for a moment that (made up numbers) Cali tax burden is 15% and Federal tax rate for the more economically enhanced is 30%, with 2% going to military. So if Cali is getting back, say, 75% of the federal dollars contributed, that would mean to keep funding "equal", Cali would need to only tax 21% (28% vs 75%). So, they could use that to fund holes or give it back. Overall tax burden may not even change.
 

NorthDakota

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I mean you want a civil war? Because taking the electoral college and scraping it in favor of LA and NYC deciding every election moving forward is a pretty good way about going about getting one... I’m so tired of the emotionally driven garbage, regardless of which side it comes from (tho it definitively comes from one side more than the other).

There are a few significant things worth fighting for.

1. Electoral College is a big one. The people who want to scrap it are idiots and every time I see a state join that stupid compact I cant help but giffle. What kind of idiots vote to potentially disenfranchise themselves?

2. Guns - 'nough said. Come and take it.

3. Abortion. Still waiting for the KoC to give me a sign to execute order 66.
 

Irish YJ

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Would it? Say for a moment that (made up numbers) Cali tax burden is 15% and Federal tax rate for the more economically enhanced is 30%, with 2% going to military. So if Cali is getting back, say, 75% of the federal dollars contributed, that would mean to keep funding "equal", Cali would need to only tax 21% (28% vs 75%). So, they could use that to fund holes or give it back. Overall tax burden may not even change.

Cali already has the highest state tax rate in the Nation IIRC. They are the highest regulated state in the nation, if not the world. Their debt is the highest. Pensions are blowing up. Infrastructure is crumbling and they are easily in the top 10 worst states if not top 5. And toss in one of the worst cost of living, and THE WORST quality of life.

Cali also has the most federal employees of any state which would be cut in half at minimum. California is also the largest or second largest recipient of government contracts (45+B/year) which would change drastically. Given their unemployment rates are one of the few states still over 4.0, not good. The revenue their ports (they take in 40% of the nations cargo) take in would also drop.

In short, Cali already has the highest exit rate of any state for both people and business. A split would amp that bigly. Cali would crumble given the above and regardless of a small differential in overall tax rate.

NY and NJ are similar. And letting a few states, which are some of the most fiscally irresponsible states, dictate our politics..... no sir.
 

Ndaccountant

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Cali already has the highest state tax rate in the Nation IIRC. They are the highest regulated state in the nation, if not the world. Their debt is the highest. Pensions are blowing up. Infrastructure is crumbling and they are easily in the top 10 worst states if not top 5. And toss in one of the worst cost of living, and THE WORST quality of life.

Cali also has the most federal employees of any state which would be cut in half at minimum. California is also the largest or second largest recipient of government contracts (45+B/year) which would change drastically. Given their unemployment rates are one of the few states still over 4.0, not good. The revenue their ports (they take in 40% of the nations cargo) take in would also drop.

In short, Cali already has the highest exit rate of any state for both people and business. A split would amp that bigly. Cali would crumble given the above and regardless of a small differential in overall tax rate.

NY and NJ are similar. And letting a few states, which are some of the most fiscally irresponsible states, dictate our politics..... no sir.

Cali also has the most federal employees of any state which would be cut in half at minimum.
According to OPM, Cali has ~155K employees, which is most of any state. Based on 2018 population estimates, Cali has 39M people living there. So, 0.4% of the population is working for the Fed Gov't. That same number is 0.7% for Georgia, 0.45% for Texas, 0.75% for Alabama, and 0.57% for the US and District of Columbia. Cali could be hurt, but data would suggest the magnitude of the pain would be less than other states.

California is also the largest or second largest recipient of government contracts (45+B/year) which would change drastically. Given their unemployment rates are one of the few states still over 4.0, not good.

According to Nerdwallet, the top 5 states that get the most in contracts versus how much they pay in taxes is Mississippi, Alabama, Virginia, New Mexico and Maryland. It would stand to reason these states would proportionally be hurt more than California.

artwork-2018-states-most-dependent-on-the-federal-government-v1.png


The revenue their ports (they take in 40% of the nations cargo) take in would also drop.

The number has been moving downward over the last 10 years with wider locks in Panama. But even in your scenario, the infrastructure needed to both receive the additional containers and then distribute efficiently to areas California serves today isn't cost effective, especially with you factor in Asia shipping and the expense of going through Panama.

In short, Cali already has the highest exit rate of any state for both people and business. A split would amp that bigly. Cali would crumble given the above and regardless of a small differential in overall tax rate.

Per capita, that is not the case. Plus, those figures do not cover LEGAL immigrants, which outnumbers the outflow.

And the differential in tax rate would not be small. Again, 25% of the federal dollars Californians send to Washington never come back. That is also not factoring in how much other states would need to increase their taxes as they take in more money from the Feds than what they provide.
 

Legacy

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California has now passed the U.K. for the fifth largest economy in the world. New York has the thirteenth largest economy in the world. Combined they represent one-sixth of our Gross Domestic Product. Some of the world's top countries by economic measures have significant investments in California. With the impact of tariffs China with subsequent decrease in the supply of electronic components for one instance, trade may continue to decrease some for their economy. The costs of the electronics will increase and increase further should California not be part of the U.S.

Imagine Governors pursuing their own trade agreements.
Wary of Trump's Approach, Governors Seek to Forge Own Trade Agreements (Governing)

Certainly any nation would want to trade with the fifth largest economy in the world. If California were separate, they could provide other countries a trading source for their steel without Trump tariffs. California could then supply the revised U.S. with lower cost steel but at a profit for CA. It goes without saying that the largest banking and financial institutions with global implications reside in California and N.Y. California would also be free to set their own immigration policies, free of limitations on visas of high tech foreign workers instead of seeing them pack up and leave the U.S.
 
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