Yes. Catholic theology (and Aristotelian philosophy before it) believes strongly in
Consilience; which, in the philosophical realm, is probably best articulated by CS Lewis' concept of
the Tao
It strikes me as odd that most atheists insist on strict consilience in the empirical realm, but are so tolerant of incoherence in their metaphysical and moral outlooks.
C.S. Lewis’ Abolition of Man, “Men Without Chests”: A Critique | The AntiNietzsche
“What Lewis is doing here [Abolition of Man] (as he does in most of his apologetic works) is setting up a false dichotomy, infused with imaginative hyperbole: either educators teach a student to give full credence to the objective truth of his emotional introspections, or they “have cut out of his soul.”[9] Lewis presents no logical, coherent argument to support any of his claims, other than his own subjective opinion that he is clearly right on this matter. It is not self-evidently true how explaining to a young student that our tendencies to attribute traits to inanimate objects is a reflection of our own personal feelings about the object and not an actual attribute of the object, will cause them to develop long-lasting character deficiencies. When I stub my toe on my coffee table, my instinctive reaction is to curse the table for hurting me. I know that the table is not alive; I know that the table didn’t actually set out to hurt me; I know that the table is not malicious; I know that the foul words I’m attributing to the table are a subjectively emotional response, and not an actual reflection of the table itself; I know that the table cannot hear or sympathize with me, but I still can’t help but animate the inanimate object. Why?—Because I’m human, and I can’t control the chemistry in my brain that dictates my responses to the stimuli of my environment. Knowing and recognizing this reality has not hindered, or stunted, my emotional development, nor has it done so for anybody else. And even if it did have negative repercussion to our human psyche, this still would not be an argument against the veracity of our emotional attributes to the surrounding world being an entirely subjective experience. As it stands, Lewis’ entire reasoning for opposing this view rests on the basis that he finds it unpleasant and harmful. To which the only salient response can be, so what? The veracity of a claim does not depend on its supposed bleakness and implication of unpleasantness.
Lewis also tries to give further authority to his position by claiming how, prior to modern times, all men believed that, “objects did not merely receive, but could merit, our approval and disapproval, our reverence or our contempt.”[10] Prior to modern times, men also attributed the occurrence of epilepsy to demonic possession, instead of a treatable neurological disorder; the mistaken beliefs of the past need not hold credence to us in the present, especially as we gather more information and knowledge about the world. Also, the claim that objects can merit approval and disapproval is a baseless assertion. Objects can cause us to respond towards them in one manner or another, but they do not merit our response, since objects are devoid of any kind of intent, and thereby, do not/cannot strive to live up to anyone’s conceived expectations. Not to mention, out responses to objects are entirely dependent on the context of the situation we find ourselves in, and likely to change under different circumstances. Hence, our emotional responses remain a subjective experience every way one wishes to look at it.”
“A frustrating part about Lewis is his apparent inability to differentiate between the objective fact of a matter (such as the fact that I happen to have feelings XYZ about an object), and the subjective response that stems from it (the actual emotions caused by feelings XYZ, the specifics of which, in any particular situation, are unique to me alone). He states, “It can be reasonable or unreasonable only if it conforms or fails to conform to something else,”[15] in an attempt to make his notion of an absolute objective value sound assertive. But being assertive doesn’t make an unfounded claim any more true, because even if one grants the veracity of his statement (namely, that we judge things as reasonable only as they pertain to other things), this admission does not warrant the stipulation of any sort of objective, or absolute, greater value judgment. Our interactions with our surroundings foster the values and emotional responses we attribute to objects/matters; meaning that we are the fundamental arbitrators of our perceptive values. Furthermore, our values and emotional responses change as we gain more information and data about out surroundings. No universally objective point of reference is needed. This does not invalidate the reality of our emotional experiences, but it is nonsensical for Lewis to claim that the mere existence of our emotional experiences must also confirm the existence of some kind of objective source for our emotions.”
“The message Lewis is presenting to the reader here is that one cannot disagree with what he has said, because only those who accept his premises of an absolute, objective, value have any basis upon which to argue about truth. Of course, this is completely dishonest and unfounded to anyone who does not already agree with Lewis’ [subjective] point of view. The authors of the textbook he has been arguing against don’t say that there exists no means by which to perceive truth, nor is there any rational extension by which one can make such a claim (this is another one of Lewis’ retreats to fallacies). Instead, what they rightly say is that one’s personal feelings on a matter are irrelevant when it comes to evaluating reality, because reality is not contingent on the perceptions of any person’s emotional response to it; nor does it ultimately care about your meager opinions. But Lewis cannot accept this, which is why this entire lecture can be summarized as follows: “I don’t like the implication of X, therefore X needs to be wrong.” His entire justification of the objective truth of emotional responses collapses into one giant emotional response; one subjectively giant emotional response.”
Regarding imagining a new color etc… primary colors are specifically light at a specific wavelength. I don’t have to imagine it because all the colors that are capable of being created are limited by our ability to perceive them with our eyes, which in turn have their own limitations. Further the red you see is not what I may see and is most definitely what a bird will see as they have more ocular rods and cones. We can however create many different hues by mixing wavelengths to create other hues or colors. Further I can quite easily imagine what it is like to view the sky of another star. There are quite literally billions of possibilities. This requires no metaphysical inspiration at all. I can simply look through a telescope or read a great piece of fiction.
Bhuddists have no concept of marriage, property rights, and a very strong conceptual objection of body mutilation, and murder of living things. This is quite clearly different from the Abrahamic traditions as well as Roman and Greek intellectual processes. Why did circumcision evolve in one part of the world and yet be anathema to an adjoining group of people.
I am not really moved by CS Lewis’ concept of how right he thinks he is and as the person critiquing your citation says, his points really boil down to a subjective emotional response.
Evolution, Dawkins' "altruism" genes, etc. cannot be the basis for an authoritative morality, because evolution is an arbitrary process. Order does not spontaneously arise out of chaos.
If order did not arise from chaos, we would not exist. Of course it does and nature is very efficient at it. From pairign of chemicals through bond, the formation of tissues from cells, etc.. It happens all the time.
Luckily evolution is not the wholly owned subsidiary of Dawkins and genetic mutation. It is so natural in fact that the concept is applicable to anything in our physical world. We use selection procedures to generate food, grow certain animals, determine what flowers and plants can be sold at Lowes during a certain part of the year, and even create specific tools or instruments like antennae for satellites to optimize gain and broadcast capabilities (
http://www.cs.tufts.edu/comp/150GA/handouts/zitzler04.pdf).
Because evolution appears as an arbitrary process does not mean it is arbitrary. What the process acts on is random to an extent, but in fact, selective pressures are not random and are typically very specific with results that appear over and over again (Convergent evolution). Particularly with humans (
Introduction to Human Evolution | The Smithsonian Institution's Human Origins Program) and civilization (
http://duaneelgin.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/self_guiding_evolution.pdf), common and recurring or converging patterns form from those very non-random selection sources. Naturally evolving biological objects are not directed by a moral authority. A whale did not need morals to evolve a fin from its original fingered land-based hands. Amphibians needed no moral authority to develop lungs and retain gills in order to take advantage of the interface of water/ land, leading to non-competitive resources. This process is a natural one and all living beings are subject to environmental pressures over time that result in changes to form, function and behavior. Its not willed by metaphysical means.
Likewise, humans, who were unaware of the Catholic theology or any theology for that matter, when there were at least 3 or more distinct upright hominids who interacted and even bred with each other. (
The Case of the Missing Human Ancestor). We know now that our DNA has at least two and maybe three parts originating from the Neanderthals and possibly the Denisovans. They operated within a realm that did not include a fully functioning society but and at most did involve burials and ancestor worship (common to eastern societies) so it is not surprising to see that things like this carried through as they served at least a good benefit or a non-harmful behavior.
Is it really hard to see how people who respect objective analysis and materialistic answers to our natural world do not require metaphysical answers, since they can neither be measured, counted, generated, or confirmed? Your analogy of the Necessary Being and its inability to have meaning is about as far as one can take the theology in logical analysis.
If an objective cosmic order exists, then they're all reflective of it (to varying degrees). If no such objective cosmic order exists, then they're all empty and utterly devoid of authority. There's no 3rd coherent alternative.
That is an a big IF from which to proceed. The third alternative is that they exist because we create them.
“Our morality is evolved.
Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution, said Dobzhansky, and morality certainly makes no sense except as the product of our evolutionary heritage. Our moral sense is one of a number of systems developed by evolution to do a job: the immune systems counters infection, the visual system gives us information about the world, and our moral feelings are there as a social glue to enable us to cooperate with other humans.
As a product of blind Darwinian evolution, our morals will have developed solely from the pragmatic consideration of what works, what enables us to benefit from cooperation and thus leave more descendants. For interacting with another human, what matters is not what is “objectively” moral (whatever that means), but what that human considers to be moral.
Human intuition that morality is objective is really the only argument (if we are honest) that that is the case. And yet evolution doesn’t operate according to what “is moral”, it operates according to what helps someone to have more descendants. Thus, even if there were an “absolute” morality, there is no reason to suppose that it would have any connection to our own human sense of morality. Anyone arguing for objective morality by starting with human morality and intuition — which of course is how it is always done — is thus basing their case on a non sequitur.
(2) Humans are only one species.
An objective morality must, by definition, be independent of human opinion and thus be independent of humans. There are trillions of galaxies in the known universe, each with trillions of stars and trillions of planets, and for all we know there may be millions of species on many of those planets.
And yet, surprise surprise, the “objective” moral systems that people argue for are all about human welfare and just happen to bear a striking resemblance to the morals of that one species of ape on just one planet around a fairly unremarkable star in a fairly unremarkable galaxy. This is simply projection, human hubris.
Medieval theologians placed humans at the centre of the universe; aren’t we above projecting our own parochial notions of social interactions into some sort of objective property of the universe? Isn’t it obvious that our social interactions (and thus our moral senses) will depend on the details of our species and our ecological niche?
A K-selected species would have very different morality from an r-selected species. Ahaplodiploid or eusocial species would have very different morality from us. So would species where hareems are normal. Morality would be very different in territorial animals than in non-territorial animals. And who knows what variations there are strewn across the trillions of galaxies in the visible universe? And yet people want to consider one species alone from one planet alone and project that onto everything else!
(3) Starting from “well being” is subjective.
Many attempts at establishing an objective morality try to argue from considerations of human well-being. OK, but who decided that human well-being is what is important? We did! This whole enterprise starts with a subjective leap. Yes, human well-being is what morality is all about but human well-being is all about human feelings and preferences, and is thus subjective.
(4) Aggregation schemes are arbitrary.
So you’ve decided that well-being is what matters. Good start. But, if you want to arrive at an objective morality you now need a scheme for aggregating the well-beings of many creatures onto some objective scale, such that you can read off what you “should” do and how you “should” balance the competing interests of different people.
The beauty of accepting that morality is ultimately subjective is that you reject the whole concept of objective aggregation onto an absolute scale, and thus an otherwise insoluble problem disappears.
Of course many people have proposed their own schemes for aggregating, based on their own preferences, but no-one has derived one from objective reasoning. You might consider it “obvious” that everyone counts equally. But then your “objective” morality would require you to treat your own family identically to an unrelated stranger in a distant country. That’s flat out contrary to human nature (and illustrates why we wouldn’t actually want any of these “objective” schemes).
And of course you also have to aggregate across species (I’m presuming the “objective” morality is not medieval-theological enough to think that humans are the centre of the universe and the only thing that counts). Could there really be an objective weighting scheme for aggregating the interests of different species? How is this going to work concerning predators and prey?
Accepting that morality is subjective avoids all this by simply accepting that our morality is indeed subjectively about us, programmed into us to regulate interactions with our own species, and thus that our morality is only about us. Other social species would then have their own sense of morality for interactions within their species (which of course they do).
(5) Rooting morality in “God” is still arbitrary.
A favourite argument of the religious is that you can’t have objective morality without a god. And they are right. What they don’t realise, though, is that you also can’t have an objective morality with a god. After all, plumping for “God’s opinion” instead of human opinion is equally subjective. Who says that God’s opinion about morality is better than Satan’s opinion? The answer that God says that God’s opinion is better is simply circular. The answer “might makes right” is a non sequitur, as is the unsubstantiated claim that being the creator conveys rights to dictate morality.
The traditional response would be to argue that God’s nature is good, which is an appeal to some supra-God objective standard of goodness against which to measure God’s nature. Of course this begs the whole question as to what this objective standard is and where it came from, and so doesn’t begin to actually establish objective morality. And if there were this supra-God objective standard then we wouldn’t need God. Theologians have got nowhere is addressing these problems in the thousands of years since Plato pointed them out.
(6) No-one has any idea what “objective” morality even means.
Lastly, and actually the strongest argument of all, no-one has ever proposed any coherent account of what “objective morality” would even mean! Yes, humans have an intuition about it, but that intuition was programmed for purely subjective and pragmatic reasons (see 1), and thus is a hopeless base for establishing absolute morality.
When asked, the advocate of absolute morality explains that it is concerned with what one “should do”, regardless of human opinion or desire. When asked what “should do” means they’ll replace it with a near synonym, explaining that it is what one “ought to do”. But if you press further they’ll simply retreat into circularity, explaining that what you “ought” to do is what you “should” do, and thus beg the whole question. They can’t do any better than that, though they’ll likely appeal to human intuition, which won’t do for the reasons above.
The subjectivist has a clear answer here. The “oughts” and “shoulds” are rooted in human opinion, they are what people would like to happen. Thus morality is of the form “George is of the opinion that you should …” or “human consensus is that you should …” or “people have an emotional revulsion to …”. But, without the subject doing the feeling and opining, morality would not make sense. Morality is all about what other humans think about someone’s actions — that is why evolution programmed moral senses into us. Remove that subjective human opinion and the result is — literally — nonsensical.
Six reasons why objective morality is nonsense | coelsblog
"Objective morality does not exist. Only our collective will." That is text book Nietzsche. I understand that you probably aren't comfortable with the label of "nihilist", but you haven't really distinguished your views from his.
See above. Nietchze is not the only alternative. In fact nihilism is not really even a real possibility, so please stop conflating subjective moralism with nihilism. In fact there are many alternatives, and they are of our own creation. Further, nihlism indicates there are no morals and no purpose for them I do not contend that. I believe they exist and that we create them.
If the source of what you're calling "morality" isn't metaphysical, then it's devoid of authority. And as I mentioned above, the differences in morality between various cultures does not disprove Natural Law one bit.
Again see above. You are interjecting an authority and holding it as a precept for all human cultures. There need not be one except that which we create and allow. Moral authority is an Aristotlean concept. Many cultures existed and were operating at very high levels independent of Greek logic and therefore have no basis in Western Culture.
Maybe not, but it's the only coherent alternative to nihilism. Despite all his hand-waving about genetics, Dawkins is still just painting a smiley face on Nietzsche.
No. Dawkins is small potatoes in the context of evolution. I don’t think I even brought him up. I understand since he is the poster boy for evolution and atheism why you would select him, but there are far more scientists who research evolution that are not atheistic and are also subjective moralists. Again I believe that morals exist, have purpose, and are even necessary for our cultures.
I put alot of time into this and I hope it meets you well.