Navy knows it won’t snag top recruits. It can’t effectively run a pro-style offense because it doesn’t have the personnel to do so. So Navy shouldn’t thrive offensively.
But the Midshipmen do anyway, because of the triple option.
“It gives us to chance to compete against people who are week in and week out bigger and stronger and faster than we are,” head coach Ken Niumatalolo said. “… It’s who we are and have always been.”
Unlike most offenses in Division I, Navy (2-2, 1-1 American Athletic) avoids throwing the ball. This season, the Midshipmen have rushed on 88 percent of their plays, the highest mark in the NCAA, while averaging 5.4 yards per rush. Conversely, they’ve thrown the second-fewest passes in the nation (37).
Primarily with two halfbacks, a tight end and a run-first quarterback under center, Navy’s “extreme version” of a run-first offense hides its lack of talent, Niumatalolo said. In that formation, a traditional triple option gives the quarterback three choices: hand the ball to the fullback, run it himself or pitch the ball to the halfback. The quarterback decides what to do based on how the defense plays. For example, if the defense crashed the inside and the quarterback, the ball would be pitched to the halfback.
“We basically tell the opposition the exact play we’re going to run every time,” senior Zach Abey said. “And say ‘Here you go. Stop us.’”
Navy runs the ball on 88 percent of its plays this season through the traditional triple option. The formation gives a quarterback three options: hand the ball to a fullback, run it himself or pitch the ball to a halfback.
Niumatalolo learned the triple option as a quarterback at Hawaii in the late 1980s. He assumed when he arrived that he’d play a classic quarterback role and pass the ball. Instead, then 29-year-old offensive coordinator Paul Johnson offered a new system where Niumatalolo ran more than he threw. Niumatalolo bought in.
Fifteen years later, Niumatalolo was reunited with Johnson, Navy’s head coach, as his offensive line coach. The same system Niumatalolo ran in his playing days flourished as the Midshipmen led the FBS in rushing four of his first five seasons.
But Johnson left in 2007 to implement a similar system in the Atlantic Coast Conference at Georgia Tech. Niumatalolo took over Navy, promising to run a similar variation of the triple read. The Midshipmen have compiled nine winning seasons and five bowl victories under Niumatalolo.
While Navy remains in a triple option formation for almost every play, Niumatalolo’s expertise with blocking has created an array of options for his players. The Midshipmen usually run a veer, but mix in other schemes (trap and speed, midline, two way, and zone options) along with counters and the occasional passing play.
Navy’s rushing attack relies on its forward blocking. Unlike most college schemes, where lateral blocking aims to clear gaps for runners, the Midshipmen rely on their linemen to push forward, “going north to south,” Niumatalolo said, to get consistent yards.
“It’s skill,” junior quarterback Malcolm Perry said of Navy’s blocking scheme. “Being geared toward doing the right things to keep drives going.”
Niumatalolo prefers recruits who thrive in high school spread systems. He knows Navy won’t attract top dual-threat players, he said, but he knows he can get an abundance of run-first quarterbacks. Navy doesn’t recruit true wide receivers, though. Players lined up on the edge vary from blocking tight ends to fullbacks to other quarterbacks.
But roles aren’t cemented. Abey started 2017 as Navy’s primary halfback, posting 1,413 yards with 19 touchdowns. Before the annual Army-Navy game, he made a transition to quarterback, where the decision-making was put on his shoulders. But his role changed again this season with the rise of Perry. At 6-foot-2 and 212 pounds, Abey is now the Midshipmen’s goalline back.
“I wasn’t sure if I would be a quarterback,” Abey said, “but I never thought I’d be in this kind of role in an offense, being the heavy-set fullback guy.”
In Navy’s first game this season against Hawaii, Abey ran for 17 yards, far from his 109-yard average last season, but scored four touchdowns.
Navy’s scheme, combined with the versatility of its players, keeps it relevant in games. Since joining the American Athletic Conference, Navy has kept 13 of its 15 loses within 17 points. That means the final quarter of a game usually decides the outcome, Niumatalolo said.
Navy opened its inaugural AAC season in 2015 with an 11-2 record and followed that up the next year with a victory over Notre Dame. But since its 11-win campaign, the Midshipmen’s win total has dropped by two in 2016 and 2017.
“They’re all close losses,” Niumatalolo said. “Last second field goal here, possession there. It’s not like we have to reinvent the wheel. We just have to play better.”
With the losses piling up, Niumatalolo became more open to making in-game adjustments. Against Air Force last season, the Midshipmen went three-and-out on their first possession. For the rest of the game, Navy opted to run out of the shotgun.
“It’s the biggest change we’ve made ever since I’ve been here,” Niumatalolo said.
The triple option started further from the line of scrimmage and resembled a modern spread offense. Navy followed the change by scoring on six of its next seven possessions. With 15 seconds left, Abey faked a handoff and passed for a score to put the Midshipmen up for good, 48-45.
Even with that scoring outburst, Navy isn’t looking to radically change its offense in the future, Niumatalolo said. It just wants to compete with top-level teams. Whether it be taking the Commander-in-Chief’s trophy from Army this season or attempting to slow down No. 6 Notre Dame’s offense at the end of October, Navy will have a chance because of its option.
“We’ve been doing it for so long that we have so much faith in it,” Niumatalolo said. “We’ve established that when we ride the triple option, good things can happen.”
