Plane crash at LaGuardia Airport

[irishff1014]

Air Canada plane collided with a fire truck. 2 reported dead at this time.

 

[IrishInOntario]

Federal air traffic controller here. Tons of experience in a busy control tower. Based on initial reporting and audio one of only three things could have happened here.

1). The Ground Controller accidentally cleared an emergency vehicle to cross an active runway with an aircraft short final / or already touched down on the runway with speed breaks / reverse thrusters deployed. It appears the controller frantically tried to stop the vehicle from entering the RPA, to no avail.

2). While responding to another emergency on the aerodrome, the emergency response vehicle either misinterpreted their movement instructions and blew through a hold short of the active runway, or got disoriented / lost on the airfield and accidentally ended up well beyond the hold short line on the active runway.

3). The pilots accidentally landed on the wrong controlled surface, being used for vehicle operations, without a sanitized RPA. This appears the least likely of the scenarios based on the initial comms and reporting.

We're still unsure of whether or not there was a comms issue that developed between the Ground Controller and the emergency response vehicle barring the fire truck from hearing the "stop" and "hold short" commands from being issued.

These are really the only three ways that an aircraft winds up with a disintegrated cockpit by broad siding a firetruck at speed on an active runway. Somebody has royally screwed up.

**Update**

As suspected it was option #1. It appears the Controller accidentally forgot that he had cleared the firetruck across the active runway and subsequently cleared Air Canada to land, or tried to hurry the vehicle across prior to the aircraft landing and mistimed the cross. Leaked audio confirms him saying "I messed up" before breaking off the Delta flight cleared for the approach behind Air Canada. 10 times he attempted to rectify his mistake by telling the firetruck to "stop", however, the firetruck was already inside the RPA and right in the middle of the active runway. The "stop" command likely only made things worse because on an airfield "stop" means "hold position", therefore, even if the driver of the fire truck heard the controller, he would have stopped right where he was, in this case, on the runway... The controller was likely behind on his traffic and reactive, otherwise he would have said "hold short, hold short, hold short", which tells the pilot not to cross the hold short line 200 feet back of the active runway. The fact that he said "stop" ten times indicates the Controller acknowledging that the firetruck had already crossed the hold short line and was inside the RPA (runway protected area). Air Canada had obviously already touched down as well and was not in a position to go around, meaning the pilots likely saw the fire truck on the runway as they barreled towards it and couldn't stop on time. We don't know how much time the PIC (pilot in charge) had to react, but it's very likely that he sacrificed his own life by not trying frantically turn the aircraft at high speed to avoid the firetruck, which would have almost certainly caused the aircraft to cartwheel off the the hard surface, putting the passengers in increased danger. Per the article, another pilot operating on the frequency could be heard consoling the controller.

Air traffic control at a busy airport or in a busy area control center is no joke. It's hard, stressful work and you have to be "perfect" or people die. As a fellow Controller I feel for this guy. He was obviously busily trying to land sequential arrivals on his active runway in congested New York airspace, while making a "hole" for an emergency response vehicle to cross his active runway. Evidently, he misjudged the time he needed to accomplish the crossing or he became task saturated and forgot about either the firetruck or Air Canada. Thankfully he was able to get Delta to "go around" or we'd have a multi plane pileup on an active runway and hundreds of dead people this morning instead of the two we have confirmed now... Likely the end of this Controller's career, and unlikely this mistake ever leaves him. Such is the reality of making a mistake at work as an air traffic controller. It's a ruthless job. This is my nightmare every day.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/livestory/air-canada-crash-la-guardia-airport-9.7138217

 

[FightingIrishLover7]

Had no idea you were ATC. I applaud you for your work. I don't think I can really imagine a more difficult job out there.

Prayers for all the lives lost,their families,the injured and the the atc himself. So much hurting but I trust the Lord will provide

 

[irishff1014]

Federal air traffic controller here. Tons of experience in a busy control tower. Based on initial reporting and audio one of only three things could have happened here.

1). The Ground Controller accidentally cleared an emergency vehicle to cross an active runway with an aircraft short final / or already touched down on the runway with speed breaks / reverse thrusters deployed. It appears the controller frantically tried to stop the vehicle from entering the RPA, to no avail.

2). While responding to another emergency on the aerodrome, the emergency response vehicle either misinterpreted their movement instructions and blew through a hold short of the active runway, or got disoriented / lost on the airfield and accidentally ended up well beyond the hold short line on the active runway.

3). The pilots accidentally landed on the wrong controlled surface, being used for vehicle operations, without a sanitized RPA. This appears the least likely of the scenarios based on the initial comms and reporting.

We're still unsure of whether or not there was a comms issue that developed between the Ground Controller and the emergency response vehicle barring the fire truck from hearing the "stop" and "hold short" commands from being issued.

These are really the only three ways that an aircraft winds up with a disintegrated cockpit by broad siding a firetruck at speed on an active runway. Somebody has royally screwed up.

It’s a busy business and they are short staffed too. I would imagine someone is gonna get fired.

Thanks for explaining your side. Hope you never have to deal with this.

 

[NDPhilly]

It also was pouring rain during this period last night for what it’s worth. Visibility was minimal

 

[IrishInOntario]

ATC recording is out...

Awful mistake by the Tower Controller. RIP to the pilots.

- Air Canada 646was lined up for approach to Rwy 04 at Luaguardia.

- A fire truck (Truck 01) and an accompanying firetruck was responding to an emergency aircraft that had already landed. Truck 01 and company was holding short of Rwy 04 at Twy Delta, about 1/3 of the way down the runway from the approach end of Rwy 04. They called Tower requesting to cross the Rwy per procedure.

- The Tower Controller cleared Air Canada 646 to land, giving them priority to the runway.

- The Tower Controller subsequently cleared the fire truck to cross Rwy 04 at Twy Delta. The Controller did not issue an "expedite" to the fire truck(s), nor a "cross without delay", which you would always do in that circumstance to ensure the fire truck(s) crossed quickly with an aircraft about to touchdown. The Tower Controller also fails to pass traffic to fire truck so that the firefighters knew they had an aircraft short final for the same Rwy they were crossing.

The Tower Controller probably should have held Truck 01 and company short considering Air Canada had already been cleared to land in low visibility, with reduced braking action. Regardless, however, if the Tower Controller thought he had time to get the firetrucks across the Rwy the instruction should have been the following:

"Truck 01 and company cross Rwy 04 on Delta without delay. Traffic is a CRJ short final, landing Rwy 04".

The situation was made worse by the Tower Controller because he saw the conflict developing and instructed the Fire trucks to "stop, stop, stop, stop, stop" after they had already penetrated the RPA and were on the active runway. What he should have said was the following:

"Truck 01 and Company expedite cross Runway 04, no delay. Expedite. Expedite. Expedite."

That instruction would have hurried the fire trucks across the runway and alerted them to the aircraft that was about to land on the surface they were crossing.

by telling the fire trucks to stop on multiple occasions, the Controller likely compounded the problem, keeping them on the runway. "Stop" in the aviation world means "stop immediately. Hold position."

We practice and execute these scenarios over and over and we make critical decisions based on how far out the aircraft is from landing, how far down the runway the vehicle that wants to cross is and how quickly we anticipate getting the vehicles to cross. Phraseology and intent matter here. If you need those fire trucks across the Rwy quickly, you need to tell them that and WHY.

Part of the problem is that we try to give emergency response vehicles priority on the airfield, but have to balance it with the fact that airborne aircraft simply need priority sometimes due to their inability to stop on a dime. The Controller likely felt internal pressure to not delay the firefighter's response and chose to cross them in a scenario that he would have otherwise held a vehicle with lesser priority.

 

[irishff1014]

ATC recording is out...

Awful mistake by the Tower Controller. RIP to the pilots.

- Air Canada 646was lined up for approach to Rwy 04 at Luaguardia.

- A fire truck (Truck 01) and an accompanying firetruck was responding to an emergency aircraft that had already landed. Truck 01 and company was holding short of Rwy 04 at Twy Delta, about 1/3 of the way down the runway from the approach end of Rwy 04. They called Tower requesting to cross the Rwy per procedure.

- The Tower Controller cleared Air Canada 646 to land, giving them priority to the runway.

- The Tower Controller subsequently cleared the fire truck to cross Rwy 04 at Twy Delta. The Controller did not issue an "expedite" to the fire truck(s), nor a "cross without delay", which you would always do in that circumstance to ensure the fire truck(s) crossed quickly with an aircraft about to touchdown. The Tower Controller also fails to pass traffic to fire truck so that the firefighters knew they had an aircraft short final for the same Rwy they were crossing.

The Tower Controller probably should have held Truck 01 and company short considering Air Canada had already been cleared to land in low visibility, with reduced braking action. Regardless, however, if the Tower Controller thought he had time to get the firetrucks across the Rwy the instruction should have been the following:

"Truck 01 and company cross Rwy 04 on Delta without delay. Traffic is a CRJ short final, landing Rwy 04".

The situation was made worse by the Tower Controller because he saw the conflict developing and instructed the Fire trucks to "stop, stop, stop, stop, stop" after they had already penetrated the RPA and were on the active runway. What he should have said was the following:

"Truck 01 and Company expidite cross Runway 04, no delay. Expedite. Expedite. Expedite."

That instruction would have hurried the fire trucks across the runway and alerted them to the aircraft that was about to land on the surface they were crossing.

by telling the fire trucks to stop on multiple occasions, the Controller likely compounded the problem, keeping them on the runway.

We practice and execute these scenarios over and over and we make critical decisions based on how far out the aircraft is from landing, how far down the runway the vehicle that wants to cross is and quickly we anticipate getting the vehicles to cross. Phaseology and intent matter here. If you need those fire trucks across the Rwy quickly, you need to tell them that and WHY.

Part of the problem is that we try to give emergency response vehicles priority on the airfield, but have to balance it with the fact that airborne aircraft simply need priority sometimes due to their inability to stop on a dime. The Controller likely felt internal pressure to not delay the firefighters response and chose to cross them in a scenario that he would have otherwise held a vehicle with lesser priorities.

Great information. Thank you for your side of how this works.

 

[IrishInOntario]

It’s a busy business and they are short staffed too. I would imagine someone is gonna get fired.

Thanks for explaining your side. Hope you never have to deal with this.

Sadly, I've seen numerous RPA violations. Usually they are the fault of a vehicle operator or pilot that misconstrues an instruction or gets lost on the airfield. Unfortunately, Controller's are human too and they make mistakes.

Ground Control (especially double-hatted like this controller was) is no joke at a busy aerodrome. It's common to have more than a dozen call signs on your frequency simultaneously, as you solve the jigsaw puzzle that is an aerodrome to keep it moving, ensuring that you keep it safe at the same time.

Laguardia is similarly busy to an aerodome I've worked at, with approximately 350,000 movements each year, serving 30+ million passengers. Very, very busy environment.

 

[IrishInOntario]

It's incredibly likely that the pilots did not have time to veer out of the way of the fire truck that they T-boned. Honestly though, it was probably for the best. Because they didn't attempt the high speed maneuvre around the fire truck they simply plowed directly through it and the cockpit disintegrated on impact, while the fuselage wound up angled upwards on top of the wreckage of the fire truck, protecting the passengers.

If the PIC had veered at high speeds on a wet runway, it easily could have been catastrophic, putting the aircraft into a cartwheel and exposing the passengers on board to far greater risk.

The 1979 crash of Western Airlines Flight 2605 in Mexico City is a prime example of a pilot having time to see a runway obstruction and veering away from it, only to lose control of the aircraft at high speed and hitting an adjacent hangar, killing everyone on board the DC-10.

 

[IRISHDODGER]

It's incredibly likely that the pilots did not have time to veer out of the way of the fire truck that they T-boned. Honestly though, it was probably for the best. Because they didn't attempt the high speed maneuvre around the fire truck they simply plowed directly through it and the cockpit disintegrated on impact, while the fuselage wound up angled upwards on top of the wreckage of the fire truck, protecting the passengers.

If the PIC had veered at high speeds on a wet runway, it easily could have been catastrophic, putting the aircraft into a cartwheel and exposing the passengers on board to far greater risk.

The 1979 crash of Western Airlines Flight 2605 in Mexico City is a prime example of a pilot having time to see a runway obstruction and veering away from it, only to lose control of the aircraft at high speed and hitting an adjacent hangar, killing everyone on board the DC-10.

Did the firemen occupying the fire truck survive? I didn’t see it mentioned in the reports.

 

[IrishInOntario]

Did the firemen occupying the fire truck survive? I didn’t see it mentioned in the reports.

Was not reported as far as I saw.

 

[dublinirish]

 

[Irish#1]

So sad. Prayers for everyone. Appreciate all of the detailed info IIO.

 

[IrishInOntario]

Yep. Exactly as I anticipated that it happened. The Controller clearly forgot about Air Canada and that he had cleared him to land. There is no practical reason that Truck 01 and the accompanying vehicles would have ever had time to get fully across the runway and out of the RPA.

Major screw up by the Ground Controller that tried to correct his error at the last minute and simply could not get Truck 01 to stop... It's also obvious that the second vehicle in the convoy either saw Air Canada, listened to Ground Controller frantically telling Truck 01 to stop, or both.

Tragic for everyone involved. Those firefighters were incredibly lucky that the plane hit the back of their truck and that the cab was was spared. Borderline miraculous.

The firefighters were not at fault here, although I will say that their defensive driving and situational awareness was terrible here. Had they looked left and right down the runway, per the rules of driving on the airfield, they would have seen the lights of Air Canada barreling at them and they could have held position. It's evident that they trusted the Controller's clearance across Rwy 04 and didn't look prior to crossing. For the same reason that you are supposed to look left and right at an intersection even if you have the "green light", we do the same on an airfield despite the verbal "green light". Controller's fault, firefighters didn't do their part and help the situation.

Good for the PIC flying the plane to not deviate off the runway centerline in any frantic way. Very wet conditions at relatively high speed could have led to the aircraft cartwheeling. Had they deviated to the left they would have also collided with all of the vehicles lined up on Twy D and there would be a lot more dead people. Instead, they did what they're trained to do in that instance, which is steer straight and use the cockpit to absorb the impact, protecting the wings and the belly of the aircraft from absorbing contact and igniting the fuel in them. Wouldn't be surprised if the pilot flying was former military. That was a painfully disciplined decision to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their passengers and the safety of the other people operating on the airfield.

 

[burmafrd1944]

The pilots were the only ones, it appears to me, that did everything correctly.
even to the point of sacrificing their lives. Just makes it worse that they paid the ultimate price for mistakes by others.
RIP to them
I feel very sorry for the Controller. This will haunt him for the rest of his life
Like someone that hits a kid darting out between cars. You were going under the speed limit and did everything right but the child dies
and it eats you up for the rest of your life
I read of one accident like that. Six months later the driver hung himself; leaving a note that said he could not continue to live while the child died

 

[IrishInOntario]

The pilots were the only ones, it appears to me, that did everything correctly.
even to the point of sacrificing their lives. Just makes it worse that they paid the ultimate price for mistakes by others.
RIP to them
I feel very sorry for the Controller. This will haunt him for the rest of his life
Like someone that hits a kid darting out between cars. You were going under the speed limit and did everything right but the child dies
and it eats you up for the rest of your life
I read of one accident like that. Six months later the driver hung himself; leaving a note that said he could not continue to live while the child died

Yep. The pilots did exactly as they are trained to do in this scenario and it worked out "great". They were the only two people killed, which is among the best outcomes in this scenario.

The Controller made a terrible judgement and one can only believe that he forgot about Air Canada, because nobody qualified to control both VFR and Ground at Laguardia (let alone trusted to control both positions simultaneously) would ever think they would have had time to get a convoy of vehicles across their runway prior to Air Canada touching down.

The firefighters in Truck 01 did not commit an infraction, but they clearly did not help the situation by not looking to right, down the active runway they were crossing, to ensure it was clear of traffic.

Lastly, I'll say this... While there is no need to over react to a single mistake causing a crash (the first fatal crash at Laguardia since 1992), one has to wonder why min staffing at an airport that has 350,000 movements per year allows for a single Controller to control both Ground and Tower simultaneously, without somebody else in the Tower cab. Toronto Pearson sees virtually the same number of traffic movements as Laguardia annually (approximately 350,000) and minimum staffing at Toronto Tower is 2 personnel (one Tower Controller and one Ground). If there are two qualified Controllers in the Tower, this almost assuredly doesn't happen, because one controller is focused on what's happening in the air, while the other is focused on Ground movements, as they coordinate with each other.

 

[burmafrd1944]

Yep. The pilots did exactly as they are trained to do in this scenario and it worked out "great". They were the only two people killed, which is among the best outcomes in this scenario.

The Controller made a terrible judgement and one can only believe that he forgot about Air Canada, because nobody qualified to control both VFR and Ground at Laguardia (let alone trusted to control both positions simultaneously) would ever think they would have had time to get a convoy of vehicles across their runway prior to Air Canada touching down.

The firefighters in Truck 01 did not commit an infraction, but they clearly did not help the situation by not looking to right, down the active runway they were crossing, to ensure it was clear of traffic.

Lastly, I'll say this... While there is no need to over react to a single mistake causing a crash (the first fatal crash at Laguardia since 1992), one has to wonder why min staffing at an airport that has 350,000 movements per year allows for a single Controller to control both Ground and Tower simultaneously, without somebody else in the Tower cab. Toronto Pearson sees virtually the same number of traffic movements as Laguardia annually (approximately 350,000) and minimum staffing at Toronto Tower is 2 personnel (one Tower Controller and one Ground). If there are two qualified Controllers in the Tower, this almost assuredly doesn't happen, because one controller is focused on what's happening in the air, while the other is focused on Ground movements, as they coordinate with each other.

Or maybe better procedures to double check things so that this does not happen again.
Clearly a terrible mistake was made. Now we need to know the complete circumstances of that mistake.
A second person to keep an eye on things might be the answer.

 

[IrishInOntario]

Or maybe better procedures to double check things so that this does not happen again.
Clearly a terrible mistake was made. Now we need to know the complete circumstances of that mistake.
A second person to keep an eye on things might be the answer.

We have a scanning procedure to double check that our RPA is sanitized, but like anyone else, this controller was human and task saturation leads to procedures being ignored / missed. A second set of eyes is almost always the answer because it's much harder for both parties to make the same mistake simultaneously... But even that is not guaranteed. Hence flights crews making catastrophic errors while piloting aircraft.