Go Back   Irish Envy | Notre Dame Football Discussion > Outside The Lines > The Leprechaun Lounge
Front Page Forums REGISTER NOW! Members List Calendar Mark Forums Read
Live Chat Game Arcade Varsity Club

Welcome to IrishEnvy.com! Founded in September of 2004, IrishEnvy.com has grown into the premiere web portal on the Internet for mature and intelligent Notre Dame Fighting Irish athletics discussion!

You are currently viewing our boards as a Guest, which gives you limited access to view most discussions, articles and access our other FREE features. By joining our FREE online community, you will have access to post and respond to discussions, communicate privately with other members, and access many other special features.

Registration is fast, simple and absolutely FREE, so join the IrishEnvy.com Community today! If you have any problems with the registration process, please contact support and we will assist you.

If you already have an IrishEnvy.com membership account but forgot the username and/or password, use our password recovery tool to access your account information.

Reply
 
Thread Tools Display Modes
Old 06-11-2019, 04:39 PM   #1562
Whiskeyjack
Mittere Margaritas Ante Porcos
 
Whiskeyjack's Avatar
 
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: Arizona
Posts: 18,102
Cash: 5,000,194,668.39
Bank: 1,229,360,172,034,724,608.00
Total Bankroll: 1,229,360,177,034,919,168.00
Donate
Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!
Notre Dame




Andrew Willard Jones just published an article at his blog Postliberal Thought titled "What if the liberal concept of religion is the real problem?":

Quote:
American conservatism is in the midst of a fierce internal debate concerning Christianity, morality, and liberalism. In a recent dust up, Sohrab Ahmari caused an uproar by pointing out the truism that a nation’s law is both a reflection of and a source for what it holds as right and wrong. Reaction to Ahmari has demonstrated that this debate is severely hampered by conservatives’ nearly exclusive use of the language that late liberalism supplies. Focused on the distinctions between private morality, public governance and the proper overlap between the two, the debate has retained liberalism’s most fundamental concepts and will not, therefore, bring us anything new. This is because, as is the case with all ideological systems, the construction of the language of late liberalism and the pressing of its conclusions are two aspects of the same endeavor. If we use their categories, we will find ourselves trapped within their conclusions. We must break the coherence of this idiom if we intend to resolve our internal fights and articulate a critique of the current regime without unwittingly reinforcing it. A brief attempt at the deconstruction of two basic liberal binaries might be, I hope, useful. They are: religious/secular and moral/political.

The “secular” should not be juxtaposed with the “religious.” To speak in this manner is to have lost a non-liberal meaning of the word “religion” and to have replaced it with a fundamentally liberal category, invented in the past 200 years or so. This liberal “religion” operates within the private realm of personal activities and opinions -- the same realm as romance, hobbies, friendships, and morality. This realm is made up of lifestyle variations to which the State is officially indifferent, and the State is indifferent precisely because these lifestyle variations are embedded within categories that are already publicly legislated. To think that the liberal state allows for “freedom of religion” in some sort of metaphysical sense is quaint. In fact, the State is indifferent to particular religions because they operate within the stability of the juridical, public category of “religion,” and such variations are by definition socially irrelevant. Once a religion leaves the private realm of personal activities and opinions and is re-categorized as “public,”liberal discourse shifts and starts to call it politics or economics.

Within late liberalism, then, one has freedom of religion precisely to the extent that the State has defined religious content, per se, as not mattering to its order; as something private and so indifferent, like one’s favorite color. As soon as this is not the case, as soon as an opinion or action is understood to impinge on the rights of other legal personae or to affect their public options, these opinions or actions cease to be considered properly religious and are therefore eligible for regulation by the State, a phenomenon clearly on display in State action against bakers or florists who decline to participate in same-sex weddings. Less dramatically, we might note the way in which religions are explicitly situated within the tax code, where their potential “religious” behaviors, such as preaching or praying, are itemized and their potential “non-religious” behaviors, such as property ownership, employment, political action, profit seeking, etc, are likewise spelled out. This is a tedious, bureaucratic demonstration of the fact that within the liberal lexicon, “religions” are necessarily made up of content defined as irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s ends.

It is imperative that we recognize the tautological nature of this discourse. The liberal order considers certain ideas or practices to be religious only because they have already been relegated to the realm of the private, where religion functions by definition. “The secular” is really nothing more than a name for societies that use or operate “religion” in this manner -- as a kind of holding pen for these private, personal actions that do not yet affect the State. In late liberalism, to be “secular” is to be uninvolved with these odd, private actions, while simultaneously subordinating them to the realm of the publically indifferent. It is a power move disguised as an essential, metaphysical, transhistorical, and transcultural binary. That this kind of religion is not, in fact, any essential element of the human experience is obvious in the fact that the content of this religion is fluid. Fifty years ago it would have seemed obvious that a business owner’s choice to not pay for employees’ contraception would be protected by his religious freedom. Now, it is increasing obvious that it does not: such things are now political. Nobody is concerned about this businessman’s Sunday worship: such things remain indifferent and so religious. It is worth remembering that to many ancient pagans the Christian conception of the equal dignity of every human being appeared a bizarre aspect of a rather odd cult; but now such equality forms a basic tenant of the ideological structure of the secular State. Things that were once religious are now political and things that were once political are now religious. These categories are relative and relational, functioning within the liberal idiom. It is not that religion is face-to-face with the secular, with equal footing in an essentialist frame. Rather, religion only comes into being as late-liberal religion within the contingent frame of the secular.

Within late liberalism, then, religions are simply voluntary associations relevant to particular aspects of their members’ private lives. As soon as a religion verges into non-religious aspects of members’ private lives, it becomes a cult; if it verges into coercion, it becomes a terrorist organization; if it mobilizes for political action it becomes a political party; and if it starts manufacturing and selling goods, it becomes a business. In a liberal order, these actions are generally understood as perversions because within its categorical schema the content of religion doesn’t belong in certain aspects of the private or in the public realms of politics or economics. So, liberal States tend to effectively outlaw such perversions. Or else, they must redefine the public to include them and the religious to exclude them. For example, the giving of alms and the provisioning of charitable services such as hospitals and schools, actions which were once understood as profoundly religious, as they have been steadily incorporated into the welfare State have been rearticulated as in essence political and public. Both the political and the religious have been redefined to accommodate this new practice. Hospitals matter socially and so they simply cannot be, in essence, religious -- and so they must be eligible for direct state regulation. Such constant redefinition is the ongoing project of liberalism’s discourse on religious liberty which is necessarily as much about defining religion and keeping it in its proper private realm as it is about protecting it from public disturbance. The late liberal notion of religious liberty is ultimately about the maintenance of the irrelevance of the “religion” category itself. Religion is by definition free and can be identified as whatever we are free to do.

Within this discourse, when populist, right-wing Christians argue for their religion to become the basis of public order, they can only be heard as arguing for a type of theocracy, for their peculiar, socially irrelevant private beliefs to be forced on everyone. This only reinforces the liberal discourse on religion and politics because the whole discussion has been historically constructed against the ever-present threat of “confessional” States. More directly, liberal Christians who accept the privatization of Christianity work with the secular regime in the maintenance of the social irrelevance of religion, normally and often tragically through their defense of religious freedom. Neither side in the current debate is really breaking free.

Religion is just one type within a whole category of similar phenomena, “morality” being perhaps the most fundamental. For example, for many decades now Christians have attempted to mount an effective opposition to what they have called “moral relativism.” What is meant by this concept? Christians can’t really mean that our late liberal opponents don’t believe in right and wrong. We know that isn’t the case. Those on the left believe with great passion that social security must be extended and that it is a matter of simple justice that the minimum wage be raised. They are outraged by racism and sexism and they find our exploitation of the natural world to be an abomination. Those on the libertarian-leaning right will defend to the death the rightness of private property and individual liberty. Any curtailment of business or redistribution of wealth is abhorrent to them. The entire ideological edifice of liberalism rests on the conviction that it is just plain wrong to intervene in the individual’s pursuit of desire fulfillment, and that to do so is a violation of justice, the paradigmatic moral principle. You will find no group of people more certain of the rightness of their convictions and more willing to force others to comply with them than those who congregate on university campuses. There is, obviously, no shortage of right-and-wrong in late liberalism’s woke culture. And yet, many Christians continue to talk about moral relativism. Why?

This behavior becomes intelligible when we understand that similar to religion, in the everyday liberal vernacular, the word “moral” is restricted in application to things that society is more-or-less relativistic about. Sex is a “moral” issue because we don’t think that people’s sexual preferences impinge upon justice. Sex is like sports. We know that people disagree strongly about which team ought to win, but we don’t feel the need to resolve this conflict through some sort of compromise or censure. We are sports team relativists. In fact, the concept of sports includes this relativism intrinsically – the fans of neither team are wrong and there is no contradiction -- that’s how sports work. Similarly, your favorite color is red and mine is blue, and that’s just fine; we are color relativists and there is no incoherence in our being so. Relativism is built into the concept of favorite colors. In the same way, in everyday, liberal usage, the word “morality” carries with it the concept of relativism. It’s not that society has relegated all “lifestyle” choices to the relativistic category of morality. Light up a cigarette in polite company to prove that is not the case. Smoking is not a “moral” issue, it’s a public health issue, like obesity, and so an appropriate object of public disdain and censure. Rather, particular behaviors have become “moral” precisely because they are understood as socially irrelevant. The relativism comes before the morality; relativism is a criterion for the category. But, this isn’t quite enough. For a behavior to be relegated to “morality,” it normally must be something (like sex) that old-fashioned people (mostly Christians) mistake for something that is not relative (like fair wages). The word “morality” comes to mean something like: “things that we all know are relative and socially unimportant but concerning which Christians have historically tried to oppress us and would again if given the chance.” In this way, the late liberal concept of morality includes within it both moral relativism and the story of Christian opposition to moral relativism. And so, when Christians argue against “moral relativism” as if it were a real thing, they reinforce not only the liberal segmenting of human action into moral (i.e. relative) things and amoral (i.e. political) things, but the marginalization of Christianity as an ultimately tyrannical dogma that has been overthrown, but which remains a threat. They are paradoxically profoundly liberal in their illiberality because liberalism requires them for its internal coherence.

Liberalism has no problem, therefore, with religion or with morality or with other “comprehensive philosophical and moral doctrines,” as Rawls would put it. By definition, these things have a proper and protected place within the liberal regime of rights. They are integral to liberalism’s concept of the private, which is the realm of the irrelevant. One can “define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life” as long as one’s determination of that meaning, as D.C. Schindler has put it, amounts to nothing at all-- at least nothing social. Liberalism provides a tidy, closed circle. This is what the so-called pluralism of liberalism ultimately amounts to. It is, in fact, a profound homogenization and enforcement of orthodoxies. Everything is the same in its “diversity.” Everyone has a different favorite color as they move through the relentless sameness of the State and the market.

Christians, then, ought to shift the argument away from the proper role of morality or religion in legislation and to the fundamentally religious/moral character of all law. The liberal tradition in part rests on the notion that reason and morality are distinct. Morality, as we have seen, is defined in public discourse as made up of convictions that are not based on reason. Reason for liberals is, therefore, by definition morally neutral ground and so the only legitimate basis for coercive, legal action. The Christian tradition, however, views things almost exactly opposite. To the Christian, to say that an action is moral and to say that it is rational is to say the same thing. All moral action is rational action and all rational action is moral action. To say that something pertains to morals is simply to say that it pertains to practical rather than speculative rationality. Human law is, therefore, merely reason applied through prudence to the here and now, which is another way to say that all law is the “legislating of morality.” This is not a complicated idea. It is merely to understand that the right thing to do and the reasonable thing to do are the same thing—which we all already know (I hope). This simple idea, however, explodes the liberal conceit because within it to declare something as pertaining to “morals” does not exclude it from the realm of legislation, quite the opposite, in fact. Through the Christian idiom, such simplistic and tautological categorical denunciations are undone and the liberals would be compelled to make a case for the prudence of particular legislation. For example, they would be compelled to argue that banning pornography is a bad idea not because sex is categorically a moral issue but because either porn is itself good or because the disruption such a ban would cause to the good of free political speech is not worth the benefits, or something like that. In this way, within the Christian idiom which equates morality with rationality, the liberals would, perhaps ironically, be compelled to offer rational justifications for their legislative actions or inactions. Stripped of the cover of their constructed categories of “morality” or “religion,” liberals would have to account for the empirical consequences and the rationality of their laws or lack of laws. This works in the other direction as well. Christians could not fall back on their private morality or faith but would rather be burdened with the demonstration of the rationality of their convictions and with determining their prudent application, given a society as de-Christianized as our own.

The current conflicts rocking conservatism needs to be shifted into a more fundamental frame. Christians need to stop moving the liberal pieces around on the board and start bending the rules of the language game themselves. To argue that our morality or our religion ought to be enshrined in law, while retaining the liberal definitions of all these terms, is, I’m afraid, as a matter of definition proto-fascist. To argue that our morality or our religion is a merely private matter, is, I’m afraid, to argue that Christianity doesn’t matter at all. Rather, we need to speak in an idiom which joins religion and morality to rationality in the very definition of law. We need to describe late liberalism in this idiom, deconstructing the categorical tautologies out of which it is constituted. Such a move would, in fact, bring unexpected moderation because it would bring to light the vast swathes of religious and moral ground shared by political opponents. As St. Augustine taught us long ago, what holds us together politically is not some neutral, amoral realm. It is rather our shared loves, our shared morals, and ultimately our shared religion – even if minimal, confused in content, and admixed with error. It would be good, I think, for us to see this.
__________________
Whiskeyjack is offline   Reply With Quote

Sponsored Links
Don't like this ad? Register to make it go away!

Old 06-19-2019, 03:27 PM   #1563
zelezo vlk
Legend
 
zelezo vlk's Avatar
 
Join Date: Jan 2014
Location: Austin, Texas
Posts: 12,425
Cash: 113,765,071,769.07
Bank: 999,750,133,456,676.50
Total Bankroll: 999,863,898,528,445.62
Donate
zelezo vlk should be giving advice to Kelly!zelezo vlk should be giving advice to Kelly!zelezo vlk should be giving advice to Kelly!zelezo vlk should be giving advice to Kelly!zelezo vlk should be giving advice to Kelly!zelezo vlk should be giving advice to Kelly!zelezo vlk should be giving advice to Kelly!zelezo vlk should be giving advice to Kelly!zelezo vlk should be giving advice to Kelly!zelezo vlk should be giving advice to Kelly!zelezo vlk should be giving advice to Kelly!
St Louis Cardinals Chicago Bulls Chicago Bears


Thought-provoking blog post that was linked into a discussion on the upcoming Amazon Synod (or rather the big topic of that Synod).

http://modernmedievalism.blogspot.co...x-priests.html

Quote:
Thought experiment: married "simplex" priests to strengthen the celibate clergy
What did Pope Francis say this time?

I was particularly ruminating on this during the recently past feast of Saint Patrick: a bishop who was born to a clerical family, his father having been a deacon and his grandfather a priest (a fact which is curiously omitted from Patrick's biography in the 1913 Catholic Encyclopedia). The latest papal kerfluffle was over the Pope's answers to some questions in an interview in the German newspaper Die Zeit. To quote a CNS article:
He was also asked about the possibility of allowing married "viri probati" -- men of proven virtue -- to become priests.
"We have to study whether 'viri probati' are a possibility. We then also need to determine which tasks they could take on, such as in remote communities, for example," Pope Francis said.
The remarks caused enough waves that I even overheard the kind old ladies who come to my workplace to knit once a week talk about it! Of course, there was no discussion on what Pope Francis meant by the phrase viri probati. (That would be "proven men", presumably of advanced age and known piety such as older married deacons, who would be ordained as supply priests to help the established clergy.) In most people's imaginations, whether they're for or against it, any talk of opening the priesthood to married men is taken to mean that seminaries will soon be flooded with young newlywed guys. That may well be the fate of the old Latin discipline by the end of my natural lifetime, but in the spirit of my blog's tagline, "Applying old-world solutions to new-world problems", you dear readers will indulge me in the following thought experiment about a model of priesthood which has passed into obscurity but may find renewed usefulness in the not-too-distant future....

First, I tack on my disclaimer that, of course, as "there are those who make themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake", the path of celibacy is a higher calling than that of marriage. Obligatory celibacy for priests has been a part of the Latin tradition for a thousand years. Even the so-called "Anglican" Personal Ordinariate of the Chair of St Peter to which I belong, which uniquely relies on a mostly married presbyterate of former Anglican clerics, still affirms that the model of celibate priests formed in the traditional seminary system is preferred. The Ordinariate places high hopes on its four traditional seminarians (one of whom is a longtime friend of mine), and so do I.

Now with that out of the way....




There are two kinds of arguments against the use of married priests: spiritual and pragmatic. People in the first camp pride themselves on the idea that the priest, as an alter Christus, is "married" to the Church as our Lord and living more closely to the ideal of celibacy as proposed by St Paul. There is simply no room for the idea of married priests in this ecclesiology--indeed, many people in this camp have a visceral reaction against the idea of a married man, especially one who may still be sexually active, in celebrating Mass or administering the holy Eucharist. A few traditionalists might be so repulsed by the idea that they'd rather attend a diocesan Ordinary Form Mass or drive to a traditional Latin Mass in another state, rather than attend a Latin Mass celebrated by a married priest. For these folks, no argument suffices, and I don't bother convincing them otherwise.

The pragmatists are the sort who question the applicability of married priests, not the idea in principle. They ask, "how do we pay for them and their families? Will we need to renovate the rectories to accommodate family life? How can a priest be attentive to his wife, children, and needs of his flock all at once? What about the psychological affects of being raised as a PK [pastor's kid]?" concerns are alleviated easily enough by rediscovering what being ordained as a priest exactly entailed during the medieval centuries of the Church. In short: simplex priests.

A sacerdos simplex is a priest who is ordained for celebrating Mass, and little else (beyond the usual obligation of praying the Divine Office). No confessions, no preaching, no pastorships of parishes. To be "simplex" is to exercise only the core of the presbyteral ministry, which is offering the holy sacrifice of the Mass. The rest, while certainly integral to the priest's mission on earth, is not essential to it. Imagine if, in large parishes that stretch their priests thin, the bishop says to the pastor:

"I want you to approach your deacons and your three most devout, older laymen (no younger than 45) and ask them if they'd be willing to apprentice under you for three years and then be ordained priests. Their sole duties, other than praying the Office, would be celebrating Masses that you can't cover yourself, helping distribute Communion, and bringing Communion to the sick. Other things such as teaching catechism are up to them, but they can't hear confessions except in danger of death, and they won't perform baptisms or weddings unless you specifically delegate them. They can only preach if they were already formed as deacons beforehand. Finally, they do this service only for love of God, with no expectation of income."

In a stroke, these simplex priests, some of whom are perhaps married, will have already resolved all the pragmatists' objections:

They're mature in both age and faith, and if they're married, their children are older or out of the house
They serve at no expense to the faithful; no salary, no housing, no retirement pension or other benefits needed because, like deacons, they're expected to maintain their own income and (if necessary) secular employment
They have a shorter course of study under their pastor, as most priests did before the arrival of the seminary system after Trent--again, at no cost to the faithful

In exchange, we could reap the following benefits:
Many more priests to celebrate Mass in "non-priority areas", especially in remote rural parishes or near-abandoned urban parishes, or in chaplaincies for the neglected like prisons and hospitals
More priests to offer Sunday Mass at the parishes (especially early and late Masses) so that pastors only have to celebrate the principal Sunday Mass; thus keeping to the traditional rule whereby priests are only supposed to celebrate Mass once per day (there used to be an indult required for "binating" or "trinating", meaning offering Mass twice or three times a day)
More priests around to distribute holy Communion, thereby reducing the need for lay extraordinary ministers
More priests to deliver holy Communion to the sick, in place of lay ministers
More priests to lead hours of the Divine Office
More priests to offer personal instruction to catechumens, as was common prior to Vatican II
On an as-needed basis, pastors can delegate baptisms and weddings to simplex priests to free time for themselves

With simplex priests helping out much the same way auxiliary bishops assist the diocesan bishop, the celibate, beneficed ("full time") pastors and curates would then have a lot more free time to hear confessions, make visits to parishioners' homes, get to know more of their flock one-on-one, and perhaps most importantly, devote themselves more fully to the Divine Office and regular prayer. Everyone wins.

If you think me crazy for saying for proposing such a wacky ecclesiology, just consider that even today, every priest is "simplex" at least on the first day of his ordination. Unlike bishops who are all inherently "the Bishop of So-and-so place", no priest is guaranteed a parish assignment; in the old days, most priests never even made it to "pastor". Priests still require faculties for confession--they can't just hear someone's confession at will, and if they hop over to the neighboring diocese, they still need that local bishop's permission in writing before hearing someone's confession there (as well as to celebrate Mass). Priests need permission from the pastor or rector of any church before officiating a baptism or wedding there. There's really little that a priest is allowed to do on his own except hear the confession of someone in grave danger of death (in that case alone, even an excommunicated priest is given faculties). Until the 1983 Code of Canon Law, priests even needed faculties to preach.

We also have a fairly recent example of a (religious, not married) simplex priest on the path to canonization: the Venerable Solanus Casey, OFM Cap (1870-1957). The Archbishop of Milwaukee ordained Casey as a simplex priest because of he found Latin and other academic disciplines of the seminary system too challenging.


The Ven. Solanus Casey above.
As vocations in the mainstream Church continue to hemorrhage, the existing body of diocesan priests will be stretched further and further. Some priests are already pastors of three or four parishes, all which formerly had three or four assisting curates each. In such conditions, they have little time to really see to the needs of the faithful in their care, or even, critically, their own souls through prayer and private reflection. The whole Church then suffers from poor ministry.

And before someone points to the large number of men applying to places like the FSSP's Our Lady of Guadalupe Seminary (a fine institution which two friends of mine attend).... while it's certainly true that vocations to certain traditional seminaries such as those of the FSSP or Institute of Christ the King are faring much better, these are still single institutions that must serve the needs of entire continents. The fruits of their labor remain out of reach in most places, even in most major metropolitan centers. There are still many communities that haven't yielded a single priest despite celebrating the old rites exclusively for five or ten years at a time. By contrast, your average pre-conciliar parish yielded one or two seminarians per year. Considering that some saints have written that God calls as many a third of the general Catholic population to clerical or religious life, I'd say even "traddies" have a shortage of vocations.

To close, I'm certainly not suggesting that my suggestion for ordaining simplex priests be rolled out during this tumultuous pontificate (not that anyone from the Vatican is reading my blog, anyway). I believe we'll have to wait for the vocational winter to truly hit us over the course of the next 15 or 20 years as the last remnants of the big vocation boom of the 1950's and early '60s retire and die out. Once the diocesan structures enter a total freefall and the existing diocesan clergy begin to burn out in record numbers, I'll dust off this old blog entry and see if anyone bites. That said, if my dismal forecast of the future state of vocations is completely off-base and there's a renaissance with four or five unmarried, full-time priests staffing each parish once again, I'll very gladly accept being wrong.

(For the record, I would not seek to become a simplex priest, even if asked. That's definitely not my calling.)
zelezo vlk is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 06-27-2019, 03:26 PM   #1564
Whiskeyjack
Mittere Margaritas Ante Porcos
 
Whiskeyjack's Avatar
 
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: Arizona
Posts: 18,102
Cash: 5,000,194,668.39
Bank: 1,229,360,172,034,724,608.00
Total Bankroll: 1,229,360,177,034,919,168.00
Donate
Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!
Notre Dame




Joe Carter recently published an article in Providence titled "What You Should Know About Integralism":

Quote:
Several weeks ago, First Things published a piece by contributor Sohrab Ahmari on “Against David French-ism,” a condemnation of a perspective represented by National Review writer David French. This broadside launched a debate within the conservative movement that has since resulted in a hundred articles and thousands of postings on social media.

While there are many nuances and side issues in the debate, the crux of the disagreement appears to be a general clash between two opposing political philosophies adopted by religious believers: Catholic integralism and classical liberalism.

In a future article, I’ll present and explain the roots and core tenets of classical liberalism. For now, here is what you should know about integralism:

1. Catholic Integralism (hereafter, integralism) holds that there are two powers that rule humanity: a temporal power (represented by the state) and a spiritual power (represented by the Catholic Church). Integralists believe that since man’s temporal end is subordinated to his eternal end, the temporal power (the state) must be subordinated to the spiritual power (the Church). The world in all its aspects is to take shape only under the direct or indirect action of the Church.

2. As R.R. Reno notes, the term “integralism” came into use during the modernist crisis in early-twentieth-century Catholicism. “It denoted the party opposed to liberalizing trends in European Catholicism,” says Reno. “The word suggests nostalgia for an earlier period, one in which the moral, cultural, and political life of Europe was organized around—integrated with—the authoritative teachings of the Church.”

3. Within the American political context, integralism is often associated with (if not a subset of) the religious dissent wing of post-liberalism. As Ross Douthat explains:

Quote:
These are Western Christians, especially, who regard both liberal and neoconservative styles of Christian politics as failed experiments, doomed because they sought reconciliation with a liberal project whose professed tolerance stacks the deck in favor of materialism and unbelief. Some of these religious dissenters are seeking a tactical retreat from liberal modernity, a subcultural resilience in the style of Orthodox Jews or Mennonites or Mormons. But others are interested in going on offense. In my own church, part of the younger generation seems disillusioned with post-Vatican II Catholic politics, and is drawn instead either to a revived Catholic integralism or a “tradinista” Catholic socialism—both of which affirm the “social kingship” of Jesus Christ, a phrase that attacks the modern liberal order at the root.
Not all post-liberals who affirm Catholicism are integralist themselves. Some Catholic post-liberals who are sympathetic to many of the aims of integralism, yet who reject the label of integralist or distance themselves from the movement, include Notre Dame professor Patrick Deneen, First Things editor R.R. Reno, and Sohrab Ahmari of the New York Post.

4. As with most social theories, there is a wide range of views on what constitutes integralism. But a core idea of all forms of integralism is that Catholicism provides the only satisfactory basis for the ordering of society. Because ethical values determine social conduct and the Catholic Church sets the standard for morality, integralists believe the state has a duty to defend the interests of the Church. This makes integralism a movement that views the political sphere as a subset of the religious sphere.

5. A primary belief of integralism is that public life is an extension of interior life (i.e., a life dedicated to finding God in all things); the public life is everything that is not the interior life. As L. Brent Bozell, Jr. said, “This means that Christian politics is free to regard family and school, play and work, art and communication, the order of social relationships and the civil order, as integral parts of a whole: as integral and therefore mutually dependent aspects of civilization.”

6. Integralism is not the promotion of theocracy since it does not advocate that the church rule the state. Providence contributing editor Daniel Strand explains:

Quote:
The state has its own integrity and is governed by natural law. Catholics think in terms of natural and supernatural goods. With the advent of Christianity, the state, as was the case prior, is no longer the guardian and enforcer of religious doctrine because the ends of religion are now supernatural and placed under the jurisdiction of the church. Divine law revealed through the ministry of Jesus Christ addresses humanity’s supernatural end. It is the church—and in Roman mind, the Roman Catholic Church alone—that is entrusted with the authority over this new supernatural order.
7. Rather than attempting to advance a theocracy, integralists want a Catholic confessional state. Thomas Pink, professor of philosophy at King’s College London says that “while the state remains the sovereign potestas[power] over civil questions, the Church is now the sole potestas[power] over religion, with a sovereign jurisdiction based on baptism to legislate for religion and to enforce that law through punishments.” Pink adds:

Quote:
The state should publicly recognise the truth of the Catholic religion. But since religion is now a supernatural good, it entirely transcends the authority of the state, as natural goods such as transport and education do not. So when the state legislates and punishes for purely religious ends, such as to privilege a religion just on grounds of its truth or to further people’s salvation, it can only properly do so as agent for the authority of the Church—as the Church’s secular arm. And that the state, when publicly Christian and so directed by the Church, is bound to do—as canon 2198 of the 1917 Code reflects. Since the supernatural good of religion is higher than any natural good, the state should submit its authority to that of the Church in matters specific to religion, as (Leo XIII’s parallel) the body submits in intellectual matters to the soul.
8. For many integralists, the nation that comes closest to fulfilling their vision in the modern age is Poland. As Jozef Andrew Kosc says:

Quote:
In Poland in 2018, an unabashedly Catholic society is fully integrated into a modern European polity and economy. This society represents an integral and democratic Catholicism, one that has resisted the anti-culture of postmodernism and neoliberal cosmopolitanism. Americans might describe it as a national Benedict Option—though the Poles would reject Rod Dreher’s term, since most have little conception of the aggressive secular liberalism that exists across the rest of the West. For them, cultural Catholicism is a normal way of life.
9. Integralists recognize the difficulty in implementing their political vision in America. “There is no country on earth today where an integralist program is likely to have any immediate success,” admits integralist Edmund Waldstein, O.Cist. One approach to moving toward integralism is ralliement, an idea derived from Leo XIII’s 1892 encyclical Au Milieu des Sollicitudes, which urged French Catholics to rally to the Third French Republic in order to transform it from within. A prominent advocate of ralliement is Adrian Vermeule, a professor of constitutional law at Harvard Law School. Vermeule’s strategic approach is for Catholics to “work within a liberal order towards the long-term goal, not of reaching a stable accommodation with liberalism, even in a baptized form, but rather with a view to eventually superseding it altogether.” His recommended tactical approach is to model the biblical figures of Joseph, Mordecai, Esther, and Daniel in co-opting the administrative state and promoting “integration from within”:

Quote:
Insofar as these figures, like Joseph, Mordecai, and Daniel, hold posts as elite administrators—or if, like Esther, they gain the affection and respect of those who formally wield power, and thereby exert influence—they may even come to occupy the commanding heights of the administrative state. Again, this is not to be imagined as disloyal, or as anything but worthy service to the regime. But in the setting of the administrative state, these agents may have a great deal of discretion to further human dignity and the common good, defined entirely in substantive rather than procedural-technical terms.

Joseph, Mordecai, Esther, and Daniel, however, mainly attempt to ensure the survival of their faith communities in an interim age of exile and dispossession. They do not evangelize or preach with a view to bringing about the birth of an entirely new regime, from within the old. They mitigate the long defeat for those who become targets of the regime in liberalism’s twilight era, and this will surely have to be the main aim for some time to come. In the much longer run, it is permissible to dream, however fitfully, that other models may one day become relevant, in a postliberal future of uncertain shape.
Vermeule says that his version of ralliement focuses on executive-type bureaucracies rather than on parliamentary-democratic institutions.

10. In the article that launched the debate Ahmari claimed, “[President Trump’s] instinct has been to shift the cultural and political mix, ever so slightly, away from autonomy-above-all toward order, continuity, and social cohesion. He believes that the political community—and not just the church, family, and individual—has its own legitimate scope for action. He believes it can help protect the citizen from transnational forces beyond his control.” While most Christians would be surprised by that claim, for some integralists Trump is the champion they’ve been waiting for. As P.J. Smith says:

Quote:
It seems to us self evident that Donald Trump, whether or not he could articulate his position in these terms, believes that it is possible to use state power to pursue a vision of the good. He is, as others have noted, inconsistent in this. However, it seems as though Trump has a few fixed ideas about what the common good of the United States requires and he is willing to exercise state power to achieve those ends. One can disagree with Trump’s concept of the good or his handful of fixed ideas or his implementations of state power in service of those ideas. But it seems to us beyond dispute that Trump is, in a way most presidents before him since Jimmy Carter have not been, willing to use state power to achieve these goals. To our mind, then, Trump represents, among many things, the beginning of a return to a vision of state power in American life that was last clearly represented by Richard Nixon.
__________________
Whiskeyjack is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 07-30-2019, 03:23 PM   #1565
Whiskeyjack
Mittere Margaritas Ante Porcos
 
Whiskeyjack's Avatar
 
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: Arizona
Posts: 18,102
Cash: 5,000,194,668.39
Bank: 1,229,360,172,034,724,608.00
Total Bankroll: 1,229,360,177,034,919,168.00
Donate
Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!
Notre Dame




Vermeule just published an article at Postliberal Thought titled "Liberalism as a Felix Culpa":

Quote:
At the end of his “Biglietto Speech,” the freshly-minted Cardinal Newman famously expressed confidence that despite the seemingly irresistible spread of theological and political liberalism in his lifetime — which might “be the ruin of many souls” — Providence would ensure that the Church as a whole would ultimately prevail against the “great apostasia.” The only question was how:

Quote:
[W]hat is uncertain, and in these great contests commonly is uncertain, and what is commonly a great surprise, when it is witnessed, is the particular mode by which, in the event, Providence rescues and saves His elect inheritance. Sometimes our enemy is turned into a friend; sometimes he is despoiled of that special virulence of evil which was so threatening; sometimes he falls to pieces of himself; sometimes he does just so much as is beneficial, and then is removed. Commonly the Church has nothing more to do than to go on in her own proper duties, in confidence and peace; to stand still and to see the salvation of God.[1]
We may distinguish here two theses about the relationship between liberalism and Catholicism, one of which has been explored in recent writings, one of which has not been discussed recently, as far as I am aware. To find intimations of the second thesis, we have to return not only to Newman, but also to de Maistre and other 19th-century Catholic critics of liberalism.

The first thesis is that liberalism is self-undermining — that by internal causal processes it generates forces that destabilize its own supremacy and, in the extreme, depose and even destroy it. This corresponds to Newman’s “our enemy falls to pieces of himself.” The second, conceptually distinct thesis is that liberalism, although indisputably error in itself, is actually the very means by which Providence benefits the Church and helps it to fulfill its mission in history. I will call this “liberalism as a felix culpa,” locating it in the tradition of providentialist theory that sees either the Fall itself, or particular heresies and crimes in history, as means by which grace more abounds, such that Providence actually turns error into blessings that could not have come about absent the error. In this way, Providence fulfills de Maistre’s profound definition as “that for which even obstacles are means.”[2] To this idea corresponds Newman’s other surprising possibilities, in which “our enemy is turned into a friend” or that “he does just so much as is beneficial, and is then removed.” As we will see, Newman distinctly held a felix culpa view of liberalism, according to which theological liberalism, although a grave error, is itself an indispensable part of the developing process by which Providence both constrains the reason for the sake of reason’s own well-being, and also advances the infallible truths of dogma proclaimed by the Church.

Section 1 offers some general remarks on the felix culpa, both as a global claim about salvation history and in illustrative local applications. Section 2 lays out the two distinct critiques of liberalism and locates Newman’s felix culpa theory against the backdrop of Catholic critiques of liberalism after 1789. Section 3 focuses on Newman’s own major example, arguably the master motif of his thought: the conflict between Infallibility and Reason, between Authority and Private Judgment.

1. The Felix Culpa Tradition

The global version of the felix culpa should be distinguished from local applications and variants. In its largest sense, the felix culpa is a counterfactual theological claim about the whole of salvation history, according to which man's Fall through disobedience to God was not merely a fault but a "happy fault." God in his providence, by means of the Incarnation and the Resurrection, brought forth out of the wreckage of the Fall a redeemed creation, one that — crucially — is greater still than the old. Absent the Fall, the summit of felicity might never have been attained.

This is not obviously good theology. One might argue, without logical error, that the counterfactual is incompletely specified. Unfallen man, that is, might have enjoyed felicities unimaginable to us, and greater still even than those enjoyed by redeemed man. The tradition is otherwise, however, and holds with Augustine that "God judged it better to bring good out of evil than not to permit any evil to exist.”[3] As Aquinas puts it:

Quote:
For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good therefrom; hence it is written (Romans 5:20): "Where sin abounded, grace did more abound." Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal candle, we say: "O happy fault, that merited such and so great a Redeemer!"[4]
By contrast, local variants of the felix culpa are arguments to the effect that particular historical developments in particular places, rather than the whole of salvation history. The scriptural examples are familiar;[5] let me offer instead some less familiar examples from early modern theorists:

• In response to the failure of the Spanish Armada in 1588, Pedro de Ribadeneira argued that God allowed heresy to flourish so that His glory might all the more abound. “[God’s] power was glorified in the {eventual, long-run} victory over it; his wisdom was manifested in that he raised up teachers to refute the heretics; his goodness was revealed in that he inspired men to die for the faith; [and] the presence of heresy was a test of faith.”[6]

• Bishop Bossuet argued that the Roman Empire served as an indispensable means for the propagation of the Gospel, in two ways — both as creator of the Pax Romana, and also as persecutor of Christians:

Quote:
The commerce of many different nations, formerly strangers to one another, and afterwards united under the Roman dominion, was one of the most powerful means that providence made use of for the propagation of the Gospel. If the same Roman empire persecuted for the space of three hundred years that new people, which was growing on all hands within its compass, that persecution confirmed the Christian church, and made her glory shine forth conspicuous together with her faith and patience.[7]
Of these two points, only the second is a felix culpa argument. The second point is hardly original to Bossuet, of course; as Aquinas put it, “there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution.”[8]

• The liberal and Protestant historian Herbert Butterfield actually argued that the (putative) horrors of the Wars of Religion were a felix culpa by which Providence prepared mens’ minds for liberalism:

Quote:
Once the medieval Church had been split by the Reformation, the wars of Protestants and Catholics, precisely because they were so horrible, led to a different set of conditions, and brought about a new order which the modern world, from a certain point of view, would regard as superior, in that it was based on toleration. Initially neither party wanted toleration nor even conceived it as an ideal; but reflecting on that tragedy and making a virtue of necessity, men in the after-period established toleration, and came to rejoice in it — came, not merely to recognize it as the best thing Providence could arrange in a world of religious differences, but even to be glad that a religious schism had taken place to make such a benefit possible (emphasis added).[9]
We should be clear that although the global and local variants have a common conceptual structure, turning on counterfactual claims, they hardly entail one another. Even if one believes that salvation history overall has a felix culpa structure, it would be a rank instance of the fallacy of division to think that any particular historical episode itself conduces to the overall felix culpa path of that history. The latter may or may not be true, but would be true, it at all, for separate reasons.

2. Liberalism and its Critics

Let me now situate the felix culpa in the broader context of critiques of liberalism, with special attention to Catholic critiques. Many, both Catholic and otherwise, have argued that liberalism in some way undermines itself. I need not rehearse the whole history of this class of argument; a few landmarks will have to suffice. As to theological liberalism, Newman begins from the premise that “false liberty of thought” —- that is, reason applied to the subject matter of Revelation, the great category mistake of the fallen reason in Newman’s thought — is not only error, but suicidal error, in which reason falls into an all-pervading skepticism, including skepticism about its own powers, and thereby immolates itself. As to economic liberalism, there is Schumpeter’s idea that capitalism undermines itself by generating an intellectual class that is relentlessly hostile to capitalism;[10] Carl Schmitt’s thesis that “[a] society built exclusively on progressive technology would thus be nothing but revolutionary; but it would soon destroy itself and its technology”;[11] and the inquiry, pursued most famously by Kenneth Arrow and Albert Hirschman, whether markets undermine themselves by depleting the pre-liberal social and moral capital on which the efficient functioning of markets depend. As to political liberalism, there is a large literature adumbrating, in one form or another, famous words “spoken to Napoleon by the poet François Andrieux: ‘On ne s’appuie que sur ce qui résiste’ (You can lean only on what offers resistance).”[12] Political liberalism, on this account, relentlessly undermines the nonliberal institutions in civil society - family, community, church — that are necessary to buttress the liberal regime itself.

So much for the self-undermining thesis. An entirely distinct thesis is that liberalism, although an error or indeed a heresy taken in itself, works providentially over the long run to benefit the Church and the divine order of society that it promotes. These two theses are obviously compatible — one may hold both as a logical matter — but it is important that the first does not entail the second. It is perfectly possible to hold that liberalism eventually undermines itself while counting its rise and spread, while it lasts, as a pure cost — a pure deviation from Catholic truth that, as Newman notes, might result in the loss of many souls while the error runs its course, even if that error cannot ultimately prevail against the Church.

(Obviously enough, a third position is that liberalism and Catholicism are fully compatible as a matter of principle in the first place. I am trying to think my way through the Catholic critiques of liberalism on their own terms, accepting their fundamental assumptions, so I will bracket and ignore this possibility here. Even if one does hold such a view, it is of course of direct interest to see whether Catholic critics of liberalism can account for its rise, spread and persistence within the framework of salvation history).

Great critics of liberalism have held the first thesis without holding the second, or at least without emphasizing it. Louis Veuillot often argues that (theological, economic or political) liberalism defeats itself, but he seems to assume that, counterfactually, the world would have been strictly better off, from the standpoint of Catholic truth, if liberalism had never come into existence — precisely what the felix culpa thesis denies. As to Protestantism, which for Veuillot is theological liberalism and thus the direct ancestor and cause of other strands of liberalism, he writes

Quote:
If Catholic unity had been maintained in the sixteenth century, there would be no more infidels, no more idolaters, no more slaves: the human race would be Christian today, and by the number and diversity of nations united in a common faith, it would have kept clear of the global despotism that is such a threat hanging over it now.[13]
On this view, the implicit counterfactual is simply that Catholicism would have been far better off without liberalism. There is no suggestion that absent liberalism, Catholicism could not have obtained some desirable benefit, to which the existence of liberalism was in fact indispensable.

In contrast to Veuillot, there is a robust tradition of Catholic felix culpa theorizing about liberalism (needless to say, from the opposite perspective to Butterfield’s). After 1789, and with increasing urgency through the 19th century, a major question for Catholic critics of both theological and political liberalism was how to account for the rise and terrifying spread of ideas and forms of social life that they took to be antithetical to holy Catholic truth, or even demonically inspired. Felix culpa accounts suggested that liberalism, although culpably sinful in itself, was the indispensable means by which Providence prepared Catholicism for an even greater future. Let me illustrate briefly by invoking the unholy trinity of de Maistre, Donoso Cortes and Carl Schmitt, before turning to Newman’s version, the most developed among the Catholic critics of liberalism.

• De Maistre’s Considerations on France, addressed specifically to 1789 and its aftermath, argued at length that the Revolution, although in itself profoundly criminal, was an irresistible force supported by Providence to sweep away obstacles to the even greater glory of a Catholic and royalist France. As to the monarchy, “[a]ll the monsters of the Revolution have, apparently, labored only for the monarchy.... [T]hanks to them, the king will reascend his throne with all his pomp and power, perhaps with an increase of power.” As to the Church, “the priesthood in France needed to be regenerated;” the constitutional oath of support for the Civil Constitution of the Clergy “sifted the clergy” such that “all those who swore it saw themselves led by degrees into an abyss of crime and disgrace.”[14]

• Donoso Cortes, writing to Montalembert in the aftermath of the revolutions of 1848, argued that “[c]onsidered in a certain way, revolutions, like heresies, are good because they clarify and confirm the faith. I had never understood the enormous rebellion of Lucifer, until I saw with my own eyes the senseless pride of Proudhon.”[15]

• Finally, and most grandly of all the three, Schmitt’s 1923 work Roman Catholicism and Political Form outlined a vision of the providential destiny of the Church, brought to its apotheosis through and by means of the spread across the globe of “economic rationality,” which for Schmitt included both the economic liberalism of the West and the economic planning of the Bolsheviks. Economic rationality attempts to depoliticize the public sphere and to reduce all public questions to managerial, cost-benefit calculations. It is the great opponent of the entirely different rationality of the Church, which is both juridical and authentically political. The spread of economic rationality is itself, however, the crucial precondition for the Church’s triumph at the end of history, because it drives out feeble compromises and forces all mankind to a final decision, in which an authentic form of life cannot be found extra ecclesiam:

Quote:
Should economic thinking succeed in realizing its utopian goal and in bringing about an absolutely unpolitical condition of human society, the Church would remain the only agency of political thinking and political form. Then the Church would have a stupendous monopoly: its hierarchy would be nearer the political domination of the world than in the Middle Ages.[16]
3. Authority and Private Judgment

Let me now turn to Newman’s own felix culpa argument, which is less romantic, and generally more English, than those of the other great Catholic critics of liberalism I have mentioned. As I mentioned, the crucial problem for Newman is the self-destructive tendency of natural rationality, which inevitably tends to fall into theological liberalism — “false liberty of thought” — by subjecting Revelation to a rebellious, acidic scrutiny. In so doing, reason descends into a helpless, self-consuming skepticism. (Incidentally it is not even close to being true, as one sometimes hears, that Newman cares only or mainly about theological as opposed to political liberalism. He comments acidly on the latter throughout his corpus. What is true is that he thinks political liberalism is, conceptually and historically, an offshoot of theological liberalism, and that the latter is the root of the evil).

As against this, divine mercy provides mankind with the Church, an institution possessed of infallible authority, to shape and constrain the natural reason, preventing its suicide. “[The Church’s] object is, and its effect also, not to enfeeble the freedom or vigour of human thought in religious speculation, but to resist and control its extravagance.” From the fear-stricken standpoint of the liberal individual, this submission to an epistemological authority that is simply given by Revelation, not itself chosen as an authority by the individual’s reason, itself portends the very death of the natural reason. For Newman, however, it is the very existence of the constraint that paradoxically allows the reason to express and fulfill its real nature:

Quote:
It will at first sight be said that the restless intellect of our common humanity is utterly weighed down [by infallible Authority], to the repression of all independent effort and action whatever, so that, if this is to be the mode of bringing it into order, it is brought into order only to be destroyed. But this is far from the result, far from what I conceive to be the intention of that high Providence who has provided a great remedy for a great evil,—far from borne out by the history of the conflict between Infallibility and Reason in the past, and the prospect of it in the future. The energy of the human intellect "does from opposition grow;" it thrives and is joyous, with a tough elastic strength, under the terrible blows of the divinely-fashioned weapon, and is never so much itself as when it has lately been overthrown (emphasis added).[17]
So far, this is a paradox but not yet a felix culpa argument. Newman has merely said that from the standpoint of the objective well-being of the reason, the existence of infallible constraint is both a necessary and a beneficial limitation, however much the reason might chafe at it. Rather, Newman’s great felix culpa claim occurs when he proceeds to argue that the error of theological liberalism is itself an indispensable element of the larger providential operation of the Church’s magisterium.

To understand the full picture, a few definitions are necessary. For Newman, “private judgement” is the exercise of individual reason. It is not that private judgment is intrinsically erroneous; there are, of course, vast stretches of human life that infallible Authority does not purport to reach, nor are regulated even by fallible social authorities for that matter. Newman is clear that “[l]iberty of thought is in itself a good; but it gives an opening to false liberty.” The problem of private judgment then, is that it inevitably produces theological liberalism unless checked.

The felix culpa twist here is that this dynamic process — in which private judgment produces false liberty of thought, which is in turn checked by infallible authority, whose judgments must then be interpreted, and so on — is for Newman a positively desirable process, not merely a costly form of damage control. The errors and excesses of reason contribute to, are a causal force within, the success of the process itself. In this sense, it is a mistake to think that “false liberty of thought” is bad, simpliciter; it is a mistake for Catholics to simply read the wild epistemological rebellion of Protestantism in reverse. Of course theological liberalism is not only bad, but is a wicked and indeed literally damnable error, taken by itself. But it is also providentially transformed into the very means by which the infallible dogmatic teaching of the Church is developed and refined over time:

Quote:
It is the custom with Protestant writers to consider that, whereas there are two great principles in action in the history of religion, Authority and Private Judgment, they have all the Private Judgment to themselves, and we have the full inheritance and the superincumbent oppression of Authority. But this is not so; it is the vast Catholic body itself, and it only, which affords an arena for both combatants in that awful, never-dying duel. It is necessary for the very life of religion, viewed in its large operations and its history, that the warfare should be incessantly carried on. Every exercise of Infallibility is brought out into act by an intense and varied operation of the Reason, from within and without, and provokes again, when it has done its work, a re-action of Reason against it; and, as in a civil polity the State exists and endures by means of the rivalry and collision, the encroachments and defeats of its constituent parts, so in like manner Catholic Christendom is no simple exhibition of religious absolutism, but [it] presents a continuous picture of Authority and Private Judgment alternately advancing and retreating as the ebb and flow of the tide.[18]
Indeed, the same process operates not only within the ordinary life of the Church, but at the level of the Church’s extraordinary councils as well, seen as a process of successive correction over time. As Newman wrote, rather presciently, after the First Vatican Council: “It would seem as if the Church moved on to the perfect truth by various successive declarations, alternately in contrary directions, and thus perfecting, completing, supplying each other. Let us have a little faith in her, I say. Pius is not the last of the Popes—the fourth Council modified the third, the fifth the fourth.”[19]

Epistemologically, on this view, the Church must be understood a vast complexio oppositorum, in which the challenge of individual reason to the Church’s infallibility is itself subsumed as an indispensable part of the providential design. In this way (to end where we began) Newman believes that “our enemy is turned into a friend ... he does just so much as is beneficial, and is then removed.” This is perhaps the most elegant exemplar of the species of argument I have tried to uncover here, the vision of liberalism as a felix culpa.
__________________
Whiskeyjack is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-14-2019, 01:55 PM   #1566
Whiskeyjack
Mittere Margaritas Ante Porcos
 
Whiskeyjack's Avatar
 
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: Arizona
Posts: 18,102
Cash: 5,000,194,668.39
Bank: 1,229,360,172,034,724,608.00
Total Bankroll: 1,229,360,177,034,919,168.00
Donate
Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!
Notre Dame




Behold the "Spirit of Vatican II":





__________________
Whiskeyjack is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-14-2019, 02:06 PM   #1567
wizards8507
Varsity Club Member
 
wizards8507's Avatar
 
Join Date: Jan 2013
Location: Bristol, CT
Posts: 19,859
Cash: 1,100,171,497.26
Bank: 63.99
Total Bankroll: 1,100,171,561.25
Donate
wizards8507 should be giving advice to Kelly!wizards8507 should be giving advice to Kelly!wizards8507 should be giving advice to Kelly!wizards8507 should be giving advice to Kelly!wizards8507 should be giving advice to Kelly!wizards8507 should be giving advice to Kelly!wizards8507 should be giving advice to Kelly!wizards8507 should be giving advice to Kelly!wizards8507 should be giving advice to Kelly!wizards8507 should be giving advice to Kelly!wizards8507 should be giving advice to Kelly!
Boston Red Sox Boston Celtics New England Patriots Boston Bruins Notre Dame


Gross.
wizards8507 is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-15-2019, 02:00 PM   #1568
Whiskeyjack
Mittere Margaritas Ante Porcos
 
Whiskeyjack's Avatar
 
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: Arizona
Posts: 18,102
Cash: 5,000,194,668.39
Bank: 1,229,360,172,034,724,608.00
Total Bankroll: 1,229,360,177,034,919,168.00
Donate
Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!Whiskeyjack should be giving advice to Kelly!
Notre Dame




Today, the Feast of the Assumption of Mary, is holy day of obligation. Go to mass!

__________________
Whiskeyjack is offline   Reply With Quote
Reply


Currently Active Users Viewing This Thread: 1 (0 members and 1 guests)
 
Thread Tools
Display Modes

Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

BB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is On
HTML code is On
Forum Jump




Copyright © 2004 - 2013 IrishEnvy.com. All Rights Reserved. All material on this Notre Dame Fighting Irish discussion forum is strictly for entertainment purposes only. This site and any pages within are in no way affiliated with the University of Notre Dame, the Big East Conference or the National Collegiate Athletic Association. Any images, copyrights, or trademarks used on this site are used under the "Fair Use Provision" of the Copyright Act for purposes of comment, criticism, and news reporting. SEO by vBSEO 3.7.4